The British Backlash

...NIXON S FOREIGN POLICY The British Backlash BY JOHN MANDER London The expected European backlash to America's planned withdrawal from Southeast Asia, as outlined in President Nixon's foreign policy message to Congress last month, has come rather sooner than we bargained for Indeed, the heart of the document, the Nixon Doctrine enunciated at Guam—seemingly a warning directed only to the small, weak and Oriental—is beginning to assume the proportions of a Truman-Doctnne-m-reverse The most obvious symptoms of European discontent at the moment are to be seen in the British press and Parliament—particularly in the weighty pronouncements of men like Lord Mountbatten and Denis Healey And, come to think of it, it is only logical that the first signs of vexation should appear in Britain Whatever may be said at White House receptions about France being America's oldest and truest ally, few here are taken in France continues to flout American policy in the Middle East and elsewhere, and it is in France that suspicion of America runs deepest In the long run, however, Germany may prove to be the true inheritors of Gaulhsm (as I suggested m "Germany Moves East," NL, January 19) Britain, of course, has long harbored a crypto-Gaulhst faction of its own, but it has coexisted, peacefully up to now, with the traditionally cordial Anglo-American relationship Was the backlash inevitable'' Some might argue that anti-Ameri-camsm has been endemic to Europe since the end of the War, and that what is now being said, even on the far Left, is much more restrained in tone than what was being said in the early '50s One need only look up issues of Kingsley Martin's New Statesman from the summer of 1950 to appreciate the difference Others might argue that the US involvement m Vietnam has let loose a fresh wave of anti-Amencamsm more virulent than the diatribes of 1950 There is no doubt something in both arguments, though I am of the opinion that the present denunciations of America are at least as much a reaction against the reported behavior of its youth (pot, campus violence, hippie killings) as to any brutalities committed in the name of authority Let's face it, the United States has acquired a bad image But is there any relation between this bad image and the "Gaulhsm" (for want of a better word) that one can sense developing in Europe'' I think not I doubt if the British, or most Europeans, care very much about Vietnam one way or the other (that was not true, obviously, of Biafra) This may sound callous, John Mander's most recent book is The Unrevolutionary Society but I think it is true—and significant, for it suggests that whereas Africa remains withm the European sphere of interest (as does the Middle East), the Far East and Latin America have been written off as "America's babies " Washington could hardly have believed that Europe would not see the ultimate implications of the Nixon Doctrine, particularly since Henry Kissinger's views have long been public property It is all very well for the President to reassure Europe of its continuing primary importance to America But the writing is on the wall Clearly, there will be troop reductions during the '70s, and there must now be growing doubt about the credibility of American willingness to sacrifice, say, Chicago for Hamburg This falling credibdity hits Britain hardest, although it is probably less directly threatened than the continental countries For it was the British who based their defense policy (the Sandys White Paper of 1957) on American assumptions of the John Foster Dulles era They put all their eggs in the nuclear basket and, alone in Europe, abolished the draft, thus leaving themselves with no viable nonnuclear option Since Labor's Denis Healey took over the Defense portfolio in 1964, Britain (with Germany, under British influence) has moved even closer to American thinking Complex "guidelines" have been worked out as to the when and where of any nuclear response to an attack on Western Europe (Russia has been excluded from targeting at American insistence—another eyebrow-raiser for the Gaulhst-mmded) But the fact remains, as Healey was compelled to admit recently in Parliament, that it would be only a matter of "days or hours" before the nuclear option would come into play Lord Mountbatten, who was for 10 years Chief of Defense Staff, has denounced this policy with characteristic naval brevity as "suicide or surrendei " Yet, as we shall no doubt be hearing soon from disaffected U S Senators, if not from the Administration, Europe has the men and industrial resources to put up a credible conventional defense for much longer than a few days What stands in the way is the unwillingness of European governments to spend more on defense, partly in the belief that a Russian attack is not imminent, and partly because they prefer to cling to the heart-warming certainties of the Truman-Dulles era Healey declares in his latest White Paper that Britain has the most effective over-all military capacity of any country in Europe It was the cocky assurance of his remark that created the recent storm For a capacity to beat the French, or even the Germans, is not especially relevant when there is only one enemy in sight whose crushing superiority in conventional weapons (Czechoslovakia is not quite forgotten) is the threat that Britain—minus the draft—is least equipped to meet The argument goes on Sparked off m Britain, it will soon become a major concern of West German policy There are those who look forward to the success of some land of disarmament conference in Europe But I do not see that optimism about disarmament is in order The Soviet troops in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary serve a dual purpose to impose the Kremlin's political will, and to guard against an attack from the capitalist West Nuclear weapons would not have been of much use against Dubcek, whde conventional methods have proved very successful in putting his revolution into reverse Thus the Soviets cannot afford any major reduction in their conventional forces A similar risk exists on this side in the West More European troops means basically more German troops—with the restraimng force of an American presence removed What, then, is the answer7 A lot, clearly, depends on Britain Yet how could any British government dare to reintroduce the draft7 The dilemma is not one that most Britons care to face One can foresee that American policy is likely to produce conflicts and uncertainties of a similar kind all over the world This is not an argument for an American Empire But there now exists the serious risk that America may wake up some time during the Nixon era to find it has focused on its internal disorders at the expense of the nations that formerly looked to it for support I am sure this is not the legacy President Nixon wishes to leave behind him, and so far it is only a faint cloud on the horizon It could happen, though, and it summons up some marrow-chilling possibilities...