Participatory Foreign Policy

...Congress has the power of the purse and the power to regulate foreign commerce with the United States Its relationship with the President is embraced in the words "advice and consent," a phrase recognized as vague ever since President Washington stormed out of the Senate chamber "in a violent fret," according to reports at the time, because he wanted consent more than advice History shows, as Edward S Corwin, a distinguished scholar of the Presidential office concluded, that by its wording the Constitution offers to both the President and Congress nothing less than "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy " And experience has revealed that m this struggle the Presidency has immense advantages, which John Jay long ago pointed out in The Federalist its unity, its superior access to information, and its capacity for secrecy and dispatch A consequence has been to make Congress less active than reactive in the making of policy, and more eager to denounce it than to devise it The names attached to the great dicta of American foreign policy, therefore, have been provided by the Executive Branch Monroe, Polk, Hay, Theodore J WILLIAM FULBRISHT Roosevelt, Marshall, Truman, and Eisenhower Congress has supplied the naysayers from Thomas B Reed to John W Bncker, from Henry Cabot Lodge to Robert A Tatt and now J W Fulbright Still, the opposition to Presidential policy-making which SR 85 represents is a response to a deep-seated fear of Executive power that is a by-product of activist Presidencies The United States has participated in approximately 100 foreign military operations since 1789 —almost all of them a result of Presidential initiatives These initiatives have become more frequent in this century, and since World War I especially they have sometimes been on a large scale Some critics of the Resolution argue that the handling of the Cuban missile crisis, the Pueblo incident, and the more recent case of the "spy" plane bagged over North Korea required such secrecy and quick decision that public consultation with Congress would have been precluded even if there had been a Commitments Resolution Proponents know—or at least so they say—that m a crisis the President must act fast because he is the Commander-in-chief Their concern is that in the major debacles of the past few years the Bay of Pigs, the Tonkin Gulf, and the Dominican Republic—the President erred, and they note that m none of these cases was the urgency to act so acute that Congress could not have been consulted beforehand The unease about the power of the President to make war began to grow at the start of the 20th century The so-called Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 was a bloody struggle that cost 4,000 American lives Carl Schurz, the veteran politician and ardent anti-imperialist, denounced the fighting as a "President's War " "I ask any fair-minded man," he thundered, "whether the President, before beginning that war, or while carrying it on, has ever taken any proper steps to get from Congress, the representatives of the people, any proper authority for making that war " Woodrow Wilson's actions m sending troops into various parts of Latin America, and most notably into Mexico agamst Pancho Villa, were accepted by the public without question These were not foreign wars, it could be said, these were order-keepmg expeditions appropriate for a people whose country had recently become a "first-rate power," and who would be forgiven if they occasionally confused technological superiority with moral superiority The military interventions contmued to take place during the 1920s, remaining confined to this hemisphere At the same time, World War I had turned millions of Americans into isolationists with respect to involvement in Europe and they found a style in being anti-President The President—which meant any President—was an evil genius not to be trusted in international affairs Most isolationists had a greater faith m Congress to keep the country out of war But some sought an even better alternative One effort, now generally forgotten, was the so-called Ludlow Resolution of the 1930s The work of Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana, it was based, as is the National Commitments Resolution, on the conviction that the conduct of foreign relations requires no expertness or special training Ludlow proposed a Constitutional Amendment providing that, except m case of an attack on the United States or its possessions or upon any country in this hemisphere by a non-American country, "the people shall have the sole power by a national referendum to declare war or to engage in warfare overseas Ludlow's argument was that war could be declared by a total of 267 persons in Congress, "while 127 million other people have nothing to say about it Thus we find the war power vested in a very little group in Washington that is singularly influenced and dominated by one other individual, the other individual being whoever happens at any given time to occupy the office of President of the United States " Roosevelt condemned the suggested Amendment in a letter to the Speaker of the House, saying it "would cripple any President m his conduct of our foreign relations...

...Time and crisis will provide both the interpretations and the answers A nice point raised by Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming, the outstanding critic of the Resolution, is whether the Senate is not engaging in some special-pleadmg He speaks of the Senate demeaning itself in seeking a role m the shaping of foreign policy even as it demeans the high office of President "Imagine," he says, "the impact on the prestige of any pro football team whose only excuse is that the other side has stolen the ball" The Senators' resolution, McGee declares, is deeply tinged with neo-isolationism—a withdrawal from world responsibility at the very time that the world is shrinking in size On McGee's side is the startling fact that many of the arguments m favor of the Resolution might have been taken from Senator Taft's well-remembered speech of 1951 on the subject of Presidential power in foreign affairs, a speech that was widely denounced as isolationist The Resolution has broad support, too, among many thoughtful students of foreign policy outside of government As they have become more "doveish" they are looking for comfort to the branch of government that is also "doveish When they were "hawks" not so long ago, they defended the prerogatives of the Presidency, which happened to be "hawkish " Ruhl J Bart-lett, Professor Ementus of Diplomatic History at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, gave extensive favorable testimony at the hearings the Senate Foreign "Relations Committee held m 1967 Bartlett concluded that passage of a Commitments Resolution "could be the first great constructive act in returning the ship of state to a safer course " Henry Steele Commager of Amherst College, who twice in articles in the New York Times Magazine (1941 and 1951} came down hard in favor of the argument that the conduct of foreign relations rests exclusively with the President, has changed his mind He avers today that the power of Congress in international affairs has been grievously eroded Commager's turnabout is not unique In 1961, in a lecture subsequently published in the Cornell Law Quarterly, Senator Fulbnght advocated a strengthening of the role of the President "As the leader of a beleaguered community of free nations," he said, "the United States is under the most pressing compulsion to form wise and far-sighted policies The essence of this compulsion is the conferral of greatly increased authority on the President " (Fulbnght was unabashed by McGee's use of this material in the debate on the Resolution ) Shortly after the Korean War ended Walter Lipp-mann, in his brilliant book The Public Philosophy, deplored the degradation of democratic leadership in foreign affairs, choosing as a descriptive the phrase "the enfeebled Executive " Later his unceasing criticism of the role of the President in the making of the Vietnam war became a significant element m the collapse of the Johnson government Finally, it should be noted that m June 1968 the editors of the Harvard Law Review, never notably opposed to a vigorous Executive Branch, examined the respective powers of the President and Congress to commit forces to combat abroad and judged the Resolution (they had an earlier version of it) "a commendable attempt to restore the proper constitutional balance " But if a new mood has descended on the country in which the intellectual leaders share, President Nixon need only be attentive, as his foreign-policy message suggests he has been, he need not be intimidated Presidential power to act decisively in a crisis—including the use of troops—is not yet seriously eclipsed Each Chief Executive as he begins his term reminds himself that history deals roughly with weak Presidents He speedily makes up his mind, therefore, not to be a Buchanan In his determination he can take advantage of his high, daily visibility and his easy access to the channels of public communication Familiarity breeds confidence as well as contempt, and normally the President alone is in a position to mold public opinion on a national scale Consequently, if the President and Congress should be at loggerheads, the battle may be uneven, especially if the President has personal magnetism, regardless of "the sense of the Senate " The Resolution and the Senate debate on it convey the notion that Presidents require the additional wisdom that congressmen can supply Among the assumptions, no doubt, is the idea that several hundred heads are better than only one, despite the fact that the world of cliche also knows the truth that too many cooks spoil the broth Almost nothing in the American political process forces the voter to examine candidates for Congress as possible makers of foreign policy Nor could anyone argue successfully with the view that, on the whole, the electorate has chosen better Presidents than congressmen, and is going to continue to do so Then, too, the forces that play upon a congressman are likely to make him keep both ears close to the ground—familiar congressional acrobatics that, despite its usefulness, greatly reduces the angle of vision Another unspoken assumption underlying SR 85 is that congressmen are less belhcose than Presidents and, therefore, capable of exercising needed restraint The record will always show, though, that the War of 1812 was a product of congressmen who forced their will upon a weak President The sobriquet "war hawks," once leserved by historians for those militants of 1812, has been notably resuscitated in our own day to describe the supporters of a "Piesident's War" The Spanish-American War was also thrust upon an unwilling President by a "hawkish" Congress In fact, President McKmley responded to the loud beat of the FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT drums just in time to prevent the men on the Hill from declaring war without a message from him As the pendulum swings toward Congress again, it is worth reminding ourselves that legislatures tend to be inert on most large questions, galvanizing themselves into action only at the last possible moment The examples abound Congress, archaic m its organization and functioning, is the branch of government least able to anticipate troubles abroad, alter the national policies at the choicest time, or break a lance in a bold and stirring cause Furthermore, a singular problem in the formulation of foreign policy in a democracy is the need to fix responsibility before the public The Congress collectively cannot be the responsible agent and, therefore, cannot be co-equal with the President m fact In the missile crisis in 1962 when President Kennedy announced to the congressional leadership his intention to establish a blockade of Cuba, Senator Richard Russell of the Armed Services Committee spoke up for bolder action Kennedy replied that it was possible to respond as Russell had only if one did not have the responsibility for the consequences—m this case of killing Russians as well as Cubans Six years later, Russell—who, incidentally, is credited by Fulbright with having played an important initiatory role in the framing of SR 85—was not alone among Senators who spoke quickly for harsh action against North Korea m the Pueblo crisis The question for the American people is not whether to choose between the President and the Congress as the keeper of the gate, or to seek some greater security in following them conjoined Americans, to judge from many kinds of evidence, yearn for a policy in the world that will protect them as well as inspirit them—what the actions of the strong Presidents and their Secretaries of State seemed to produce until Vietnam For all manner of reasons such actions are not likely to yield the desired results again in the foreseeable future The racial turmoil at home, for one, carries a message to every part of the world, and particularly to those places where Presidents have been inclined to act without consulting Congress The message says that the power of the United States is enormous but strangely unaccompanied by conviction The ringing phrases that were once part of the American arsenal...

...all men are created equal," "liberty and justice for all"—seem empty, almost as if they were old heraldic mottoes The American performance at home is not measuring up to the American promise to the world, and no amount of force—whether applied by the Executive or by the Congress, with or without the approval of the other—is likely to be persuasive The nation is shifting its sights and its feet, looking for a more effective stance The effort to alter the present relationship between the President and the Legislature is only one stage in the correction taking place It is not of itself a new move toward isolation —although it may foreshadow such a move It has been undertaken in the hope of discovering a fresh way of defining such unavoidable concepts as "national interest" and "international responsibilities " The method chosen—the passage of SR 85—is obviously pregnant with possibilities good and bad, but probably not as significant as its sponsors believe and hope The policies that achieve success hereafter will require approval far beyond the White House and the Capitol, separately or yoked...

...The answers affect significantly the arrangements to defend Thailand Moreover, does the Resolution mean that joint Legislative-Executive steps are necessary in order to carry out a commitment as well as simply to enter into it...

...a more responsible participation by our friends in their own defense and progress"—may also reflect the fact that he is less free to make fresh "national commitments" than any of his predecessors in the White House Although Senate Resolution 85-chiefly the work of Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J W Ful-bright-has received relatively little attention since its adoption by an overwhelming majority last June 25, many foreign policy watchers think it may have trimmed, if not clipped, the Chief Executive's wings Known informally as the National Commitments Resolution, it states simply " it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the Executive and Legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment" (A commitment is defined as an undertaking to use the Armed Forces on foreign soil or a promise to send military or financial assistance to a foreign power "either immediately or upon the happening of certain events ") In a word, the Senate has said, "No more Vietnams without the approval of Capitol Hill" What lies behind this remarkable assertion that Congress must be recognized as an equal partner of the President in the shaping ot foreign policy'' Coming as it does a generation after Franklin Roosevelt issued his "shoot on sight" order without consulting Congress, 11 years after Eisenhower sent Marines into Lebanon without consulting Congress, and almost five years after Johnson decided to "go North" without consulting Congress, an obvious answer is that the Executive Branch is being punished for the failure m Vietnam The inability to "nail the coonskin to the wall" has exacted a cost from the Presidency, of which this resolution may only be an installment In the bargain, Congress, feeling collectively embarrassed over its guileless support of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964, is balming its wounded pride generously Vietnam is, however, far from the whole explanation for passage of SR 85 Unquestionably the persistence of international problems without end or solution, passed on from one Administration to another like family heirlooms, has underlmed the limitations of the President's fiats m the world, not to speak of the military measures often required to support them There is a keen feeling in Congress, too, that the task of being the world's policeman—grimly and boldly undertaken in the days of Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo?has not only soured as a national policy but has become an unbearable military burden In telling the President that he cannot be Chief of Police plus District Attorney, Judge and Jury in foreign affairs, Congress was demanding an end to a dispensation that had come to seem natural as well as anathema to millions at home and abroad It was inevitable, also, that in a time when almost every institution in society is responding to calls for fuller participation by the public in the making of decisions, the formulation of foreign policy would not remain an exception An inclination in this directon has long been evident Since the beginmng of the century Americans have increasingly sat like a nation of Madame Defarges in constant cntical judgment on their country's international agreements Up to now, though, their judgments have come chiefly as after-the-fact reflections on irrevocable decisions Another ingredient of SR 85 is that Congress is beginning to recover at last from its chagrin at having been so terribly wrong-headed m 1919 about the possibilities for peace through collective security, and in the 1930s about the dangers to America from the Fascist dictatorships Fulbnght stated the matter baldly m 1967 "Since at least 1945 when the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter with virtually no debate, Congress has been doing a kind of penance for its prewar isolationism, and that penance has sometimes taken the form of overly hasty acquiescence in proposals for the acceptance of one form or another of international responsibility In its deference to the Executive m foreign affairs, Congress has conceded him, and the experts around him, a kind of infallibility which the wisest among them would readily admit they do not have Versailles, like Munich, has conveyed more lessons than were m it, its only lesson, as far as the workings of the American government are concerned, is the need not of congressional diffidence but of congressional responsibility " In addition to these special factors playing at the moment on the relationship between the President and Congress, the Resolution may reflect a new swing of the pendulum in the ancient struggle for supremacy between those two branches of government The Constitution is by no means clear as to where the dividing line is between the Legislature and the Executive m the responsibility for making foreign policy and war The Framers expected reasonable men to be m charge of the Republic and did not write rigid guidelines The President's duties and powers are dealt with m only 320 words With regard to international affairs the Constitution states that the President is to be sworn and bidden to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution He is to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, with the advice and consent of the Senate he may make treaties, with the consent of the Senate he is to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, and from time to time he may give to Congress information on the state of the Union and make recommendations for its consideration that he deems necessary and expedient That is all the Constitution says about the President's power to make foreign policy Beyond this he is guided by his conscience, his respect for tradition, his imaginativeness-including his sense of history-and his ability to persuade the people to follow him Congress, on the other hand, has the stated power to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States It can declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, make the rules governing land and naval forces, call out the militia, and take charge of whatever part of the militia it presses into Federal service In addition...

...Thinking Aloud PARTICIPATORY FOREIGN POLICY BY HENRY F GRAFF At a press briefing several days before he delivered his February 18 state-of-the-world report to Congress, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's A New Strategy for Peace," President Nixon declared that it "reflects my best view at this time of where we are and where we ought to go " But the recurrent theme of the 40,000-word message...

...and it would encourage other nations to believe that they could violate American rights with impunity" Early in 1939 the Ludlow proposal was defeated when the House failed to pass the discharge motion required A comparable and better-known effort to bind the power of the Chief Executive, grounded in much the same reasoning as Ludlow's, was begun in 1952 by Senator John Bncker of Ohio It armed to control the President through a Constitutional Amendment giving Congress regulatory power over "all Executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization" Once agam it seemed right to many Americans that the nation try to protect itself not only from the actions of irresponsible or misbehaving Presidents but also from the actions of unwary Senators who might be pressured by the Chief Executive Under much heat from the White House, the Bncker idea failed in the Senate A version was defeated in 1954 by only a single vote The Presidency, therefore, was spared being punished for the Korean War Still, the fact that Dwight Eisenhower, a victorious general and a Republican to boot, sat in the Oval Office had not protected him from the attack that the Republican isolationists mounted The National Commitments Resolution is an intellectual descendant of the Ludlow and Bncker proposals While the Presidency has not been handcuffed, it has been put under surveillance, and the President himself is on notice But the most important aspect of SR 85 is the support for it This has come from "internationalists" as well as "isolationists" on both sides of the aisle Besides Fulbright, the backers include Karl Mundt and Claiborne Pell, Jacob Javits and Herman Talmadge, James Eastland and George Mc-Govern, Walter Mondale and Harry Byrd Many of the staunchest advocates have long records of pleadmg for national efforts against aggression and international Communism, for foreign-aid programs, for technical assistance to emerging nations, and for mtercultural relations, Fulbnght's own name, mdeed, adorns the most generous international fellowship program ever created The movement of these men to their present stand has been as painful and as self-conscious as the lonely journey a generation ago that took Senator Arthur Vandenberg from the leadership of the isolationists to a proud place as one of the fathers of the United Nations The implications are portentous These men are, in effect, criticizing the idea that a President must be as strong as he can make himself—a conception that has guided the reforming Presidents of this country from T R to L B J They are also declaring that through the default ot Congress the President's power has been allowed to burgeon and bulge, and that they are determined to realign the scales of power The response of the Administration to the Resolution, at least outwardly, has been of a traditional type so far Yield not an inch President Nixon admits that when he was in Congress he favored a limitation on the power of the President to act militarily But now, he says, he thinks differently He fears that "tor a President of the Umted States to have his hands tied in a crisis in the fast-moving world in which we live would not be in the best mterest of the United States Nevertheless, in decrying SR 85 the Administration has not been forceful even though its opposition is unqualified It relies on the fact that there is no simple formula for arranging the relationship between the Executive and the Legislature And since the Resolution is only an expression of the "sense of the Senate," it is not legally binding upon the President The Administration, of course, is aware that the language of the Resolution is, or appears to be, ambiguous on an important point Can the Executive make a commitment on his own hook if there is already supportive legislation or a pertinent treaty on the books, or does the requirement of Legislative as well as Executive action point to the need of specific joint intention to create a "commitment...