The Dayan Compromise

...Sadat's statements have become increasingly belligerent, upping the price for a continuation of the cease-fire Dayan has repeatedly stated that, while he is anxious to avoid a hot war, he is not afraid of the Egyptians Yet it is too early to tell whether Egypt's new ruler is able to, or wants to, understand the difference Eliahu Salpeter a past contributor to these pages, is a member of the editorial board of Ha'aretz, one of Israel's leading newspapers...

...Secondly, less-than-total withdrawal, in exchange for less-than-total peace, may be more acceptable to the Egyptians at this juncture than a complete withdrawal that would oblige them to sign a formal peace treaty with Israel, thereby officially recognizing the Jewish State This does not mean that Dayan is about to recommend a major pullback or acceptance of the minor border rectifications called for in the Rogers Plan On the contrary, Israel's stance on the border question will be determined by the seeming reliability and permanence of the peace that would result from withdrawal--a matter that has been complicated by the massive Soviet buildup of Egyptian forces during the last six months Thus, at the moment Jerusalem is primarily concerned with preserving the cease-fire and retaining some of its strategic military positions, rather than upgrading the status of any agreement reached with Cairo Under Dayan's plan, the Israelis would reduce, or thin out, their forces along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal if the Egyptians accepted an unlimited extension of the cease-fire and guaranteed not to send forces across the Canal Negotiations for a more permanent solution could then continue in an improved atmosphere Eventually, the interim arrangement might be succeeded by an armistice along a line deeper inside the Sinai Peninsula--leaving such issues as firm borders and formal peace terms for a much later stage Unfortunately, two crucial questions about the Dayan plan remain unanswered First, is it safe to assume the Egyptians are as interested as Israel m avoiding a return to war9 A number of recent developments suggest a positive answer, and Washington is optimistic But reports persist of pressure from junior officers to resume the fighting President Sadat could also conclude that "defusing the war" would only ease international pressure on Israel to withdraw completely from the Sinai Second, will strong Israeli assertions of a desire to prevent more bloodshed be misinterpreted in Cairo and Moscow as a sign of weakness...

...ISRAELS NEW FLEXIBILITY The Dayan Compromise by Eliahu Salpeter Tel Aviv DEFENSE MINISTER Moshe Dayan's apparent shift from superhawk to dove's advocate is perhaps the most spectacular expression of a new mood emerging in Israel On a more mundane level, one is struck by it in everyday conversations or at cocktail parties Preoccupation with Suez and the Egyptians is giving way to talk about the theater, traffic accidents and rising prices Midway through the second 90-day cease-fire, the feeling seems to be growing here that resumption of warfare is unlikely and that flexibility on Israel's part can make it even more so The significance of this will probably be exaggerated by foreign observers, some of whom are already misreading Dayan's revised stance, and there is danger of the Arabs and Russians being led into tragic miscalculations Indeed, the saber rattling of Egypt's new ruler, Anwar el-Sadat, during the visit two weeks ago of a delegation headed by Communist party national secretary Boris N Ponomarev, and the Soviet leader's assurances that Moscow "will support the people and leaders of the United Arab Republic under all circumstances," are not happy harbingers But the change in Israel's attitude remains unmistakable True, twice before this year Jerusalem has retreated from positions held firmly since June 1967 By agreeing to negotiate a settlement through UN mediator Gunnar V Jarring, Jerusalem relented on its original demand that any talks with the Arabs take the form of direct, face-to-face discussions Then, in responding to U S Secretary of State William P Rogers' peace initiative, Israel used the word "withdrawal" regarding areas occupied during the Six Day War--a gesture, it will be recalled, that broke a three-year taboo and incited the nationalist Gahal party to withdraw from the government coalition Neither of those steps, though, ranks with the one currently being considered For the first time, top Cabinet members are publicly acknowledging the possibility of a settlement short of a formal peace And this strikes at the heart of the question about Israel's relations with its hostile neighbors Whatever their implications, the first two points were formal technicalities rather than substantive issues Few foreigners, for instance, shared fully Israel's view that Arab refusal to enter into face-to-face talks proved, a priori, their refusal to grant the Jewish State's right to exist Thus, by agreeing to indirect talks, Jerusalem was merely conceding that the "how" of negotiations did not necessarily predetermine the outcome of the "what," the issues to be resolved As for Israel's unwillingness to specifically mention "withdrawal, it was clearly a tactical ploy Since the Arabs were not prepared to talk peace there was no sense m arguing--either at home or abroad--about the extent of a pullback, an exercise that would have involved hammering out the location of future "secure and recognized boundaries " When, under pressure of a favorable reaction to the Rogers Plan, the term was finally accepted, it was carefully employed in a way that still left the whole issue of boundaries to be decided at the bar-gaming table But Israel's new flexibility about the legal status of an initial settlement with the Arabs is quite another matter It suggests a very substantive revision of what has been considered ironclad policy Until now, it has been cogently argued that if the Arabs would not sign a formal peace treaty with Israel--just as other nations sign such treaties if they have been at war with each other--this could only be interpreted to mean that they have not yet reconciled themselves to living with the Jewish State in their midst In other words, their rejection of a full peace is proof that the Arab states are merely waiting for the opportunity to launch another attempt to destroy Israel The argument, of course, is no less valid today than it was yesterday What has occurred in recent weeks to bring about Jerusalem's seeming willingness to soften its demands on this fundamental issue...

...To begin with, lour months of cease-fire--four months without the parade of young faces above the obituaries accompanying the daily front-page battle reports from Suez--have had their effect People no longer hold their breath as they turn on the radio in search of news, fearful that the latest casualty list will include a familiar name, and they realize there may be a price to pay for the amenities of peace Several events prior to the ceasefire contributed to the change in mood, too One was the "Goldman Affair," the widespread criticism of the government's refusal to sanction a trip to Cairo by Nahum Goldman, president of the World Jewish Congress and former president of the World Zionist Organization, who had been tentatively invited to meet with the late Gamal Abdel Nasser Another was the "Letter of the High School Graduates," addressed to Prime Minister Golda Meir and signed by students from one of Jerusalem's elite schools who were about to begin their military service, asking whether the government was really doing all it could in the search for peace Even The Queen of the Bathtub, a rather tasteless satire of Israel as conqueror, appears to have had a role--not so much for its content as for the fierce public debate the play provoked Overshadowing all these domestic influences, however, is the far more crucial realpolitik that has developed in the Middle East The entire framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been altered in the past six months The Soviet Union's massive buildup of missiles and aircraft on the Egyptian side, and the consequent shipment of U S arms to the Israeli side, have heightened the risk of a superpower confrontation while raising the stakes for the local combatants At the same time, the benefits to be derived from renewed fighting appear to have shrunk proportionally General Dayan offered a succinct analysis of the situation shortly before his trip to the United States two weeks ago Israeli troops could still capture Cairo or Amman, he said, but this would be of no real strategic value, and he therefore could see no sense in making war Should the Egyptians attack, Dayan warned, his forces would smash them harder than ever before, but Israel would prefer to maintain the cease-fire until some formula was devised for a peaceful settlement A peace treaty would be preferable to an interim arrangement, Dayan noted, but an interim arrangement would be preferable to war This recognition that temporary compromise may be the best way to achieve their ultimate goal of normal relations with the Arabs has coincided with an upsurge in Israeli self-confidence President Nixon's latest assurances to Mrs Meir that the U S will not allow Jerusalem to be put at a diplomatic or military disadvantage helped reduce fears here of having to negotiate from a position of weakness Encouragement has been drawn as well from the disarray among Arab leaders following Nasser's sudden death, and from the debilitating bickering inside the terrorist movement In addition, American operations in Cambodia and Nixon's apparent readiness to intervene in the Jordanian crisis have given rise to the feeling that Moscow must now consider Washington less predictable and so will be more cautious about provoking the U S in the Middle East Dayan seems to view the present situation as a stand-off The Israelis having nothing of importance to gain from administering yet another defeat to the Egyptians, the cost in casualties could run high because of the Russians' sam-2 and sam-3 missile batteries, and .the danger of deeper Soviet involvement hangs overhead The Egyptians, meanwhile, know their chances of defeating Israel without large-scale Russian intervention are negligible, and Moscow cannot fail to recognize that such a step could precipitate a military confrontation with the US On the other hand, Dayan is aware that a freeze of the present situation--no shooting, but no Israeli withdrawal--could soon become intolerable to Cairo For this reason, the so-called "thinning-out" plan he has gradually been formulating involves two basic assumptions First, to justify keeping its guns silent, Cairo must have some sign of progress to show its people...