The View from Pnompenh

...Most likely, in the opinion of knowledgeable officials and observers But not without much hardship, many tragedies, and what may be a tenuous, tottering existence for years to come One veteran Asian hand may have hit the mark when asked if he thought the war in Cambodia would be a long one "No, he replied, "but the first 10 years will be the hardest" Arnold Abrams regularly reports in these pages from Southeast Asia...

...CAMBODIA SETTLES IN The View from Pnompenh BY ARNOLD ABRAMS Pnompenh The irony of Richard Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia is that it turned out to be an excellent tactical move, even though it was probably made for the wrong reasons We will never know precisely what factors went into the decision, but there is reason to believe that extraneous considerations--proving Presidential manhood and impressing Soviet leaders--weighed heavily It is questionable whether Lyndon Johnson, unafflicted by Nixon's need for self-assertion, would have acted similarly Without the strike into Cambodia, however, the Vietnamization program would be considerably less advanced than it is today Aside from seizing substantial caches and forcing Hanoi to develop new supply routes--temporary setbacks at best--the incursions eliminated all Communist sanctuaries outside North Vietnam and ended enemy pressure on South Vietnam's crucial southern sector Those were significant and enduring allied gains They have undeniably contributed to the recent lull in the fighting and allowed the United States troop withdrawals to proceed according to plan Arguing that Nixon engulfed Cambodia in war is no more valid than contending that he prevented its being completely overrun Nobody on this side really knows what Hanoi's intentions were at that critical juncture last spring Lacking full facts, perhaps we should accept the judgment of most informed Cambodians, who believe they were saved Certainly events since then would appear to confirm this view For all its weaknesses--a ragtag army, devastated economy and narrow popular support--Premier Lon Nol's government now appears more firmly in control, and the nation seems more likely to survive, than at any time since Prince Norodom Sihanouk was deposed Government troops, who went off to war last March on Pepsi-Cola trucks, actually have taken the offensive And government leaders, who were not even consulted before U S and South Vietnamese forces plunged across their borders, now are asserting themselves, accepting responsibility and proudly proclaiming that they will go it alone if necessary "It's a matter of heart," explains one Western diplomat, a long-time Pnompenh resident "The Cambodians have it They are committed to their country, willing to fight and die for it And when the people are like that, a nation can survive anything--even war with the Vietcong and North Vietnamese " American and South Vietnamese military backing has not hurt, of course, but the point is well-taken Despite that support, the country could not have held if the gentle, easygoing Khmer people lacked the will to fight It is not clear, however, how far heart alone can carry them, or how long There are many imponderables, the foremost being Hanoi, whose full capabilities remain unknown An estimated 50,000 Communist troops--North Vietnamese, Vietcong and local Khmer Rouge--control more than half of Cambodia, including the entire northeast and most of the north They roam almost at will over the rest of it, popping up to interdict a road or overrun a village, then pulling back before being hurt Still, the government retains control of Cambodia's population centers, embracing approximately two-thirds of the nation's 7 million people Intelligence information indicates that perhaps as few as 5,000 enemy troops actually are involved in combat activities here, the rest reportedly build and man base camps or supply routes for efforts in Vietnam The surprising lack of strong enemy pressure has raised doubts among military and civilian authorities about the Communists' real combat potential here "The time to take this country was last spring, or maybe even early summer," notes one knowledgeable American "But they obviously didn't It seems that they either were incapable of mounting such an effort, or were unwilling to pay the cost " Whichever, officials here believe Hanoi's target remains South Vietnam One major reason for the enemy's low posture may well be the Cambodians' hatred for all Vietnamese, from North or South This ancient ethnic enmity keeps popular support for Communist (mostly Vietnamese) forces minimal In Vietnam a passive, intimidated populace furnishes enemy soldiers with food and shelter, in Cambodia a hostile populace treats them as unwanted outsiders The countryside is politically neutral, but fiercely nationalistic "We are coming across cases where people aren't clear about who Lon Nol is, says an American official, "but they've seen outsiders in their area and they know these guys are fighting against government troops So when the villagers get the chance, they inform on the enemy This never happened--it still doesn't--in Vietnam" The absence of a massive American presence m Cambodia has also helped The official U S community in Pnompenh has grown from an 11-man consulate to an embassy with a stafl of 60, half of whom are military attaches But unlike their colleagues in neighboring Laos, these attaches apparently restrict then activities to gathering intelligence and distributing the 30 tons of military supplies that arrive daily Reports have circulated recently about cia personnel directing the training of approximately 1,500 Cambodian troops in Laos, and even negotiating arrangements for some elements of the overmanned, underequipped Cambodian Army to fight m Laos m exchange for supplies from the overequipped, undermanned Royal Laotian Army Bizarre but believable So far as is known, though, American officials in Pnompenh are not involved m these dealings The man m charge of all U S activities here is Ambassador Emory Swank, 48, easygoing and accessible to newsmen No stranger to spook operations, he served as deputy chief of mission m Vientiane and Moscow before coming here His right-hand man is Jonathan F Ladd, 49, a tough but straight-talking former Special Forces commander who runs the military assistance program He recognizes the fundamental inadequacies of American policy in Vietnam, where he commanded the Green Berets in 1967-68, and seems determined not to repeat past mistakes "Cambodia is another story, it is not Vietnam," he cautions "It will require a different approach" The low-key approach of Swank and Ladd reflects the cautious and discreet policy that has evolved since U S forces were withdrawn from Cambodia American officials here are anxious to keep U S troops out, to be prudent with aid, and, above all, to have Cambodians assume most problem-solving responsibilities The relatively modest scale of U S aid has caused some discontent in Pnompenh While appreciative, Cambodians say they have been receiving less than they can effect vely use American officials on the scene agree, and their recommendations explain President Nixon's recent request to Congress for a supplemental appropriation of $155 million in aid to the Lon Nol regime Until now, Washington's economic support has been limited to $9 million in emergency funds last spring and a $40 million program approved last summer About half of that money has gone for small arms and ammunition In addition, the U S has supplied about 50,000 old rifles and 10,000 captured ak-47s, as well as radio equipment, vehicles and small artillery Pnompenh has no complaints about air support Officials merely grin at Washington's insistence that U S air action over Cambodia is only designed to "interdict" enemy movement This is semantic nonsense Cambodians regularly request and receive direct American--and South Vietnamese--air support for ground operations Although minute compared to air activity over South Vietnam or Laos, this support has enabled Cambodian forces to take the initiative The government's biggest offensive was launched last September, when an estimated 10,000 troops were committed to reinforcing the encircled provincial capital of Kompong Thorn, 85 miles north of Pnompenh, and retaking the strategically located town of Taing Kauk, located midway between the two and in enemy hands since spring Besides boosting morale and hurting the enemy, the government hoped to reestablish contact with the rural populace, thus proving that it would act to protect them Final results of the month-long effort appear to have been mixed Enemy elements tied down the attacking troops for several weeks, subjecting them to costly harassment and the embarrassment of having vital bridges blown up in their midst Between 50-100 government soldiers were killed in the drive, another 300 were wounded No more than 400 enemy troops were needed to stall the offensive and inflict those casualties Nevertheless, Pnompenh's forces eventually retook Taing Kauk and reinforced Kompong Thorn with troops, artillery, food, and tons of supplies Until then, the besieged provincial capital had been supplied only by South Vietnamese helicopter lifts and air drops The rural populace semed greatly relieved at being freed from the control of the enemy Overall, the Cambodian Army has come a long way since it first entered combat last spring Its ranks have swelled from 30,000 untrained troops to about 150,000 ill-trained ones--which is progress of sorts It has more of such basics as rifles and ammunition, now uses radios in place of public telephones, and even rides requisitioned buses into battle instead of soda trucks Still, it remains a ragtag body with a bewildering array of outfits, officers, weapons, and women among its ranks It marches with great esprit, but out of step, it sings lusty songs and adopts flamboyant dress, but does not know enough to dig foxholes in night bivouacs, or to avoid walking in single file when out on patrol Ultimately, though, the nation's precarious financial situation may prove more troublesome than its military problems The economy has been paralyzed With rice and rubber exports nil, tourism nonexistent, transportation disrupted, and tax collection hampered, government earnings have fallen by more than 50 per cent Meanwhile, the national budget--balanced early in the year at $170 million--has soared to twice that figure since last March Cambodian officials have reduced imports, allowing the economy to coast on export earnings banked m the first half of the year and on approximately $60 million in foreign exchange reserves Economic experts predict that Pnompenh will need $230 million in foreign aid for 1971, and possibly twice that amount will be needed the following year Since Washington is reluctant to foot the entire bill, Lon Nol's government has approached Australia, Taiwan and several other Asian countries for aid Its greatest hopes, however, rest with Japan Tokyo officials have indicated a willingness to furnish a $20-million grant and $40-milhon loan, but they apparently will not do so until the U S provides more aid Washington, meanwhile, has been waiting for another nation to enter the act "A typical diplomatic minuet," remarks one diplomat "But eventually it all will be worked out It's inconceivable that everyone would let Cambodia slowly rot away" Although some officials fear shortages here in the coming months, to date there have been few signs of them Prices are relatively stable, supplies of food and other staples arc plentiful, and the citizenry seems content A refugee flow from the countryside has almost doubled the capital's population, now at 1 5 million, but Pnompenh continues placid, almost paradisical, compared to Saigon In marked contrast to Saigon, too, the government here is unified, with no evidence of political factionalism openly splitting leadership ranks Lon Nol and Deputy Premier Sink Matak are staunchly supported by the national assembly, the military, middle class, civil service, students and intellectuals, and Buddhist leaders Despite the Premier's limited personal following in the countryside, where most people live, officials in the capital seem confident of the general population's continued loyalty Will Cambodia survive...