Harold Wilson's Formula

...Certainly its world pre-dominance in the 19th century does not seem to have been seriously inhibited by this reputed body-blow By 1917, of course, the story was different But whereas, m 1914, Britain could declare war without consulting Canada, Australia or South Africa, who can imagine the United States still being m a similar condition of dependency...

...Harold Wilson's Formula By John Mander LONDON "Punch...

...runs the old joke, "P"is not what it was—but then it never was " The chestnut is worth bearing in mind these days amid all the talk that Britain has forfeited her role, is decadent, played out, and generally debilitated Britain is not what it was—but then it never was Indeed Enoch Powell, the maverick among England's Conservatives, has argued persuasively that Britain never was an imperial society m the sense that ancient Rome and China, or for that matter modern Russia or France, were imperial societies To Americans brought up m the tradition of the War of Independence, this may come as a surprise Yet it is a perceptive point What harm, after all, did the loss of the 13 colonies do Britain in the long run...

...John Mander author of Berlin Hostage for the West (Penguin), is a contributing editor of Encounter HAROLD WILSON The truth is, the loss of the American colonies, of Britain's "First Empire," is hardly more than a peripheral episode in history books here The development of British trade and British democracy, of science, literature and technology were basically not affected Jane Austen wrote her novels, and James Har-greaves invented his spinning-jenny, the Industrial Revolution was followed by the great Reform Bills If we were to look for the precipitate of political events in the Enghsh literature of the age—in, say, the writings of the Romantics?we would find little evidence of Clive's conquests m India, the beginnings of Britain's "Second Empire," or the American Revolution Instead, the brave dawn and dispiriting outcome of the French Revolution would loom large Though historical analogies are treacherous, they are sometimes suggestive If the spectacular loss of the First Empire, and the no less spectacular acquisition of the Second, left hardly a mark—perhaps the effects of Britain's loss of empire since 1945 have been less traumatic than is generally assumed...

...It would seem fair to say that, while they were happy enough to have Wilson talking in this vein they were not anxious to face the unpleasant consequences of what might be involved in such policies'' And some of Wilson's popularity, would appear to lay in the fact that the public actually recognized him for a talker and not a doer What I am suggestmg is that people get the leaders they deserve, and in a profound sense Britain deserved a Harold Wilson in «he 1960s Most Englishmen, and particularly the English intellectuals, were aware by the middle '60s that there was much profoundly wrong with British society, but they were unprepared, in general, to do anything fundamental about it Wilson's bustling, rather histrionic style suited the national mood The right noises were being made, and nothing drastic was being undertaken The true explanation of Wilson's ascendancy is that the nation felt safe with him, as it had once felt safe with Stanley Baldwin, that other family-doctor type with the reassuring bedside manner Inevitably, a nation turns against such figures once they have served their purpose—the more ferociously, the greater the preceding self-delusion But the fault then lies as much with the national spurt as the national leader The loss of Empire I believe, has not m itself been traumatic What has damaged the British spurt is the complacency generated precisely by the ease and relative lack of violence of the process The violence of war produced a reahsm m Europe that neither the British public nor the British government ever achieved Something of this should change now under the impact of the present crisis But the underlying mood of complacency, the enduring British phlegm, will hardly change as quickly It would seem Britain is a society uniquely impervious to the processes of "Great Events," to the rise and fall of its own and other people's empires, to their alarums and revolutions Whether this is an admirable or unfortunate trait depends on your angle ot vision—and on the context British phlegm helps to make Britain a comfortable country to inhabit, as most foreigners agree But it is an increasingly expensive luxury...

...it was the glory of the British that they could both rise to the challenge of Hitler's domination of Europe and remain remarkably calm about their own, at the tune, unfavorable prospects After the War, Bntish phlegm was a more doubtful blessing In many Continental countnes, the War had acted as a revolutionary stimulus Germany, for example, experienced a more thoroughgoing restructuring o?its society (even if under Right-wing auspices) than anything attempted by the postwar Labor governments in London The mood in Britain was reminiscent rather of America's return to "normalcy" after World War I It is generally admitted now that this failure to turn the disasters of the '40s to good account—the failure, for instance, to see the significance of the emerging Common Market—is still damaging Britain m the '60s And it is possible to see m Harold Wilson's victories m 1964 and 1966, and m Edward Heath's election as Conservative leader in 1965, the belated realization of the British people that they had, thus tune, earned their traditional phlegm too far What was wanted was "dynamism" and "abrasive-ness"—in short a sense of crisis These things Harold Wilson promised to provide Few politicians can ever have lost credibility as fast as Wilson over the past few months Elected on a program of dynamism and expansion, especially m the economic field, Wilson's government has proved less capable of dealing with the country's economic ills than the Tory governments of the '50s The growth-rate has fallen, and unemployment has gone up In foreign affairs the situation is worse Britain's inability to influence the course of events m Vietnam, the Middle East, or even in Europe itself has become painfully obvious The most enduring result of Wilson's foreign policy may thus prove to be the withdrawal from "East of Suez"—something to which he and his leading ministers were vehemently opposed during their first three years in office No wonder, then, that Wilson has lost credibility both as a world statesman and as the economic wizard who would attack Britain's domestic problems at the root None of this, however, need mean that we have seen the last of Wilson Under the British system it is extremely difficult to get rid of a Prune Minister so long as he controls a large and loyal majority m the House ot Commons A party revolt might do it, but that is unlikely at present Nor does Wilson have to call a General Election before 1971 He therefore has ample time to recoup, and it is quite m the cards that he will do so and lead his party to victory in three years EDWARD HEATH Commentators who blame the Prime Minister for all Britain's ills—and few do not?seem to have overlooked the reasons for his phenomenal grip on the popular imagination during the five years since he succeeded Hugh Gaitskell as head of the Labor Party How much did the British people really want "dynamism" and "abrasiveness" in the middle ^Os...

...Britain was never really an imperial society m either an organizational or a subjective sense True, the "public schools" turned a proportion of the sons of the manufacturing class into efficient imperialists But the number of ruling-class Englishmen actually involved m running the Empire was always very small—in India seldom more than 20-30,000 There was no equivalent to the presence francaise The British were neither anxious to diffuse their own culture nor receptive to the culture of the subject races The Empire was expected, as far as possible, to run itself If it made a profit, well and good, if it lost money, there would be awkward questions in Parliament The Marxist theory of imperialism does not hold water in Britain's case In his End of Empire, John Strachey showed that much of the most profitable British investment during the Victorian Age was m countries outside the empire—in Argentina, for example, and the United States No doubt Englishmen were marginally richer from their- empire Yet the real strength of the nation lay m its industrial su-premacy—a supremacy that had passed to Germany and the United States by the end of the century By and large, contrary to what both imperialists and anti-impenalists thought, empire did not pay The "Little Englanders" among 19th-century politicians always said this They protested vigorously as province after province was added to Victona's holdings—at vast expense, they contended, to the British taxpayer Their arguments have a familiar ring today For the essence of their complaint was that Britain had set itself up as a World Policeman, and that such a role (America, please note) was as thankless as it was unprofitable The Little Eng-landers did not have their way, but neither did self-appointed imperialists, politicians like Chamberlain or poet-propagandists like Kipling When Britain came to fight in 1914 (and m 1939), it fought as a nation—an island nation of some 40 million inhabitants, precariously perched on the rim of the Atlantic shelf One has only to listen to the songs of World War I to appreciate the insular, intensely English (or sometimes Scottish or even Irish) quality of British patriotism When the chips were down, it was Little England, "dear old Blighty," that mattered—not the Empire of the Kiplings and Chamberlains This past, I suggest, is relevant to Britain's present crisis It is tempting for foreign (and British) commentators to attribute this country's economic and psychological ills to its physical over-extension and failure to adapt "Britain," declared Dean Acheson, "has lost an empire and not yet found a role " Economically, to be sure, Britain has borne an undue burden Since 1945, it has spent a higher proportion of its budget on defense than any nation in the West—except America It maintained a "Great Power posture" around the Indian Ocean long after the chief motive for this posture—the political control of the Indian subcontinent?ceased to be relevant It fought guerrilla wars in Cyprus, Kenya and Malaysia, and expensively "confronted" Indonesia, while paying for considerable forces in Germany and for its own nuclear deterrent By doing so, Bntain relieved America of its world police duties over a large area of the globe, and it performed this "role," by any cost/efficiency standards, with re-markable competence Americans have every reason to regret the British are no longer able and willing to shoulder these burdens They will inevitably fall into Washington's lap But the fact is, Britain can no longer afford such extravagances Richard Crossman has declared that the devaluation of the pound and the retreat from "East of Suez" are part of an essentially Socialist program for Great Bntain This may be "essential Socialism," but that is not how Harold Wilson put it when has government took power m 1964 Wilson, on the contrary, was adamant that Bntain should re-mam a power with "world capability," and the pound was long a sacred cow to Socialists If London has now been forced to take certain decisions, it is not because these form part of "essential Socialism," it is because the country can no longer pay its way What is the psychological impact of all this on the British people likely to be...

...It is not easy to say The British thrive on cnses They are also exceptionally phlegmatic In the 1930s it was not sensible of them to be phlegmatic about Herr Hitler It almost proved their undoing Yet in 1940...