Rooting for Mao

...Similarly, one can try to determine the alignments of the factions in China today on one particular issue, such as Peking's future international and strategic policies...

...It is barely 10 years since Peking stood on the right wing of international Communism, propagating the 'Spirit of Bandung' and supporting Poland's Wladislaw Go-mulka, and the Russians were the leftist hard-liners...

...that the Soviets have shown an occasional and disturbing tendency to succumb to temptations, and it is here that the most dangerous situations have arisen...

...It should be remembered that the term "revisionist" is broad and elastic, covering many sins: It can refer either to a man who is less than militant on international issues or to one who advocates friendship with Moscow, and the two need not necessarily coincide...

...His successors seem to be more cautious, but may not be immune to such infections...

...Otherwise, a rapprochement with Moscow might look suspiciously like an act of Chinese surrender, and no faction in Peking could afford to create such an impression...

...Khrushchev, having embarked on the path of seeking a rapprochement with the U.S., was apparently prepared to endanger both that project and peace itself when confronted by sudden temptation in Cuba...

...Moreover, Chinese forces would have to rely upon the Soviet nuclear deterrent to keep the battle on reasonably equal and non-catastrophic terms...

...While the professionals admitted that the Soviet political leadership •My analysis of this material, presented to the recent China Conference of Chicago's Center for Policy Studies, will be published shortly by the University of Chicago Press...

...Some Western reporters, for instance, have joyfully speculated how pleasant it might be if the Soviets found ways, during the present upheaval, of permanently neutralizing or disposing of the nuclear installations in China's far west...

...both repeatedly paid lip-service to the thought that war could, under certain circumstances, be prevented, but the Chinese claimed that the Soviet path was most calculated to encourage the other side to precipitate a showdown...

...The prospect of redeeming China with the help of Mao's opponents belongs precisely to this realm...

...But situations like this have their own momentum...

...Among Mao's more important opponents, Liu Shao-ch'i, at any rate, has given many indications throughout his life of being anything but a moderate...

...But of far greater significance is the fact that, as the 1965-66 debate shows, even if one were to equate pragmatism with plans for modernization, Mao's opponents always linked such proposals to calls for a limited reconciliation with Moscow...

...These considerations and, indeed, the whole Peking debate on foreign policy and strategy, are highly relevant for any analysis of the present and future global effects of China's internal strife...

...once it was known exactly where an electron was located, its precise velocity could not be established, and vice versa...

...To be sure, the Russians have no intention of getting bogged down in any invasion of China, but if China were reduced to anarchy and civil war, a careful, limited Soviet action to assist a local Chinese force which asked for help somewhere in the border regions should by no means be considered unthinkable...

...Nevertheless, some meaningful material is available pointing to the probable trend of Peking's foreign and military policies if one or another of the current contestants wins...

...Surely, it would be preferable for Mao's victory to rule out such concepts altogether and to shield the Russians from such temptations...

...In the top Party bureaucracy, only one personality appeared to oppose the Liu-Teng-Lo line—the number two man in the Secretariat and head of the ccp's Peking apparatus, P'eng Chen...

...Within the Army, two groups of officers fought out a bitter and protracted battle...

...That is an extraordinarily static view of history...

...Until recently, some observers have assumed that the prominent victims of China's upheaval necessarily belonged to the same faction, simply because the term "revisionist" was indiscriminately hurled at all of them...

...As they have shown at the meetings in Warsaw (and as both Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi have repeatedly indicated), Mao's men have no objections whatever to sitting down alone with the U.S.—they simply don't want the Russians to do so...

...would be relegated to a much lower place on China's agenda—a matter to be taken up at some unknown distant date when "victory" had been won over the Soviets...

...There are some indications that at one stage of the Peking debate on strategy, P'eng Chen joined forces with Lin Piao's guerrilla faction...

...Ranged against Lo and his professionals was another military group, consisting of "political" or "guerrilla" officers and headed by Defense Minister Lin Piao...

...He remained violently opposed to Moscow and was actually singled out personally in the Russian press as the man in China who had been most consistently anti-Soviet ever since the 1940s...

...Heisenberg postulated that accurate measurements could not be made in more than one dimension of the microcosm...

...Even in the unlikely event this did occur, it would be sufficient to mobilize China's masses gradually, while withdrawing into the interior...

...A Western "atmosphere" which could be interpreted as encouragement by those elements in Moscow who harbor such thoughts and desires is highly undesirable...

...Lin's faction strongly resented the insinuations of Chief of Staff Lo that the Defense Ministry had taken inadequate steps to prepare the Armed Forces for all eventualities...

...And as the 1965-66 debate shows, some people in Peking did advocate a favorable response to Moscow...

...that was the only way to clear the decks for a later struggle against imperialism...

...The most "practical" leader in China is probably Premier Chou En-lai, who appears to be with Mao and not against him...

...The guerrilla group went on to stress that at this particular stage it was the "modern revisionists" in Moscow who were the immediate enemy, not the West...

...Roughly speaking, the views expressed suggest the existence of four factions...

...It is equally erroneous, though, to assume that such platforms can give us no clue whatever to the attitudes governing the political thinking of those who advocate them...

...While China's acceptance would undoubtedly have increased the measure of Soviet control over Peking's military and political actions, it is clear that it would have escalated the dangers run by Moscow as well...

...Those who have watched the Soviet scene carefully since the cpsu plenum in mid-December (which reached certain unreported conclusions on the Chinese situation) have seen some disturbing indications of itching fingers in Moscow...

...In any case, late in the fall of 1965 the guerrillas and their allies were able to decapitate the Army's professional group by purging Chief of Staff Lo...

...But on foreign policy matters, at any rate, Peking's Mayor P'eng Chen and Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing belonged to diametrically opposed groups...

...the imperialists, on the other hand, can be ignored because they have little effect on the local scene...

...This is just one indication of the kind of risk the Soviet leaders felt was commensurate with the prize of reestablishing their influence and control over China...

...The guerrillas ruled out any reconciliation with the Soviet Union, on the grounds that "unity of action" would give the Russians dangerous control over China's military and political moves...

...What was really at stake, of course, was China's resentment at the thought of the other two great powers discussing the fate of the rest of the world between them, alone and in secrecy...

...Consequently, these questions come to assume considerable tactical importance, and one can now gather significant evidence about prevailing attitudes from statements and declarations made during that period by certain leaders...

...Khrushchev's successors" must be fought "to the end...

...It is, of course, perfectly true that policy platforms which are tactically useful in rallying various groups when power is being contested need not necessarily be implemented by the victorious faction once the struggle is over...

...Thus it was necessary to create a modern, sophisticated, relatively small and highly mobile army, equipped and trained with Soviet assistance...

...But there is no evidence that this has really been a serious matter for argument in the Sino-Soviet dispute (on the contrary, it was precisely militant Peking which, correctly, tongue-lashed Khrushchev for irresponsibility and adventurism in unleashing the Cuban confrontation...

...If that is the case, it is important to note that in 1965-66 the Mao-Lin faction consistently advocated an international and strategic approach that was far more cautious and restrained toward the West than the policy favored by the Liu-Teng-Lo alignment...

...And this is far more likely to develop if Mao's men win...

...If his opponents gain the upper hand, even temporarily and locally, the Russians will be sorely tried by two temptations: to intervene, or to join in a militant Sino-Soviet "unity of action" agreement with an anti-Mao government, or both...

...P'eng favored an ultra-cautious line toward the West, while Lo advocated militant "unity of action" with Moscow and military preparation for an early confrontation with the West...

...The ccp had excellent reasons, covering some 40 years of bitter experience in its relations with the cpsu (under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev), for knowing that Moscow could always think of urgent motives for subordinating the interests of the Chinese "comrades" to other considerations...

...Temptation has strange effects on politicians...

...And if the Lin strategy were followed in Asia, Africa or Latin America, the U.S...

...Peking's attitude of active hostility toward Moscow is an exception to this rule, largely because of Mao's justifiable feeling that the "modern revisionists" are attempting to influence China's domestic affairs...

...or the USSR was to be treated as the main enemy in the immediate future...

...It was the Mao-Lin group, too, that rejected out of hand all proposals for additional Chinese commitments in Vietnam—whether under the guise of "unity of action" or otherwise—and replaced concrete plans for action with vague guerrilla concepts committing China to no particular measures at all...

...To some extent, this might be a more negative development than was the victory of Mao's forces in 1949...

...but this tends to blur rather than sharpen the neat image of the line-up in Peking which observers can extrapolate from other (ideological or personal) disagreements between the Chinese leaders...

...Neither possible result of victory by Mao's foes can be viewed with equanimity by the West...

...The Liu-Teng group repeatedly used terms implying a larger degree of military and political commitment in Vietnam than other Chinese factions were prepared to risk...

...This being the case, it can be asserted with some assurance that the domestic fanaticism of Mao's associates has little or no bearing on their foreign policy— which, to say the least, is extremely cautious and isolationist rather than interventionist...

...in the long run, they contend, the fanaticism of Mao's followers presages ill for the world, while the pragmatism of his opponents is said to hold out hopes for more rational behavior...

...No doubt the very natural revulsion against the outrages committed by the Red Guards has a great deal to do with this tendency...

...The main leaders of the entrenched ccp bureaucracy, especially Liu Shao-ch'i (Mao's heir presumptive before Lin Piao's elevation to the position of Mao's "closest comrade"), and ccp General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, urged a limited and conditional rapprochement with the Soviet Union primarily for economic and political, rather than military, reasons...

...To start with, some extrapolations may be made from the recent past to the immediate future, but there are really no reliable data on which to base predictions for the decades to come...

...In either case, the end result was likely to be the same...

...Technological advances have made an open collision course between East and West a nightmare no leader will risk...

...On one occasion in 1965, Teng made it clear that the early modernization of China's economy was intimately linked with the problem of aid from the more advanced Communist countries...

...Once this was achieved P'eng became dispensable...

...The same cold and rational balance of power concepts which require that China should not unduly extend its control and influence beyond its present frontiers, demand also that China should under no circumstances be dismembered— nor should a power hostile to the West be encouraged to intervene in China's internal affairs and to bring a dissident faction to power...

...Anticipating the arguments advanced later in Lin Piao's name, he advised China to let other peoples fight guerrilla campaigns against the West without becoming involved itself...

...Therefore, at least a conditional and limited reconciliation between Peking and Moscow was required...

...But if Mao's opponents are the same men who advocated a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and if such a rapprochement would both involve China in serious commitments against the West and entice the Soviet leaders onto risky paths they might not otherwise tread, why should that be welcomed by the West...

...During the first half of 1965, P'eng seemed to be advocating a limited, tacit arrangement between China and the United States...

...indeed, it is not unreasonable to assume that its 1965-66 platform does constitute a fairly reliable guide to its attitudes and policies...

...P'eng bitterly denounced the very concept of "unity of action" with Moscow and warned that, since the Soviets were totally unreliable and the West was enormously strong, China should do its utmost to avoid any military confrontation with the West...

...It was Mao's opponents who asked for more militant action in Vietnam under the guise of limited reconciliation with Moscow, or for conditional reconciliation with Moscow under the guise of militant action in Vietnam...

...It is utterly pointless to try and envisage the situation many years after Mao has passed from the stage...

...The current international postures of China and the USSR are the products of many tactical, personal, propagandistic and other considerations pertaining to present conditions...

...Eventually, the invader would be submerged by China's millions employing their traditional guerrilla methods...

...After all, Soviet planes and personnel would have become directly involved in Vietnam...

...THE VIRTUES OF 'ANTI-REVISIONISM' Rooting for Mao By Uri Raanan Any attempt tO foCUS On a specific aspect of Communist China's upheaval runs the risk of violating Werner Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty...

...It is sometimes objected that the victory of Mao's opponents, a consequent rapprochement with Moscow, and even Sino-Soviet "unity of action" in Vietnam would simply mean increased Soviet ability to moderate China's actions...

...Still, the Russians must have considered the chance, however slender, that the Chinese might accept their suggestion...

...For the Soviet leader who wins that particular prize can expect to achieve a prominent niche in Soviet history and, more important, a secure place at the helm of the Soviet ship of state...

...They apparently favored a positive Chinese response to Moscow's request for airfields in southern China that could be used to provide Soviet air cover for Hanoi...

...With this prospect in mind, Soviet leaders are likely to take many a risk...

...True, the Russians expected a Chinese rejection that would enable them to give Hanoi proof of Peking's unreliability...

...The matters at issue between Peking and Moscow were tactical...

...With regard to the effects of the "unity of action" proposals, it should be noted that they entailed not merely increased Chinese commitments and risks, but also implied a certain escalation of involvements and risks on the part of the USSR...

...Indeed, divisions over different issues seem to have cut across existing groups...

...These appear to have coalesced into two major groups that divided over such vital issues as China's future military posture and the build-up of its Armed Forces, the options available in Vietnam and, above all, whether the U.S...

...The most scientific approach would be to regard the Chinese debate as an interesting indication of the attitudes of individual Chinese leaders toward international issues...

...The foes of Mao and Lin have, of course, been largely silenced in recent months, but the solicitude displayed by the Soviets about their fate indicates that Moscow does not believe their policies would change if they were to be victorious...

...would certainly not use nuclear weapons to cope with essentially domestic struggles in other parts of the world, so the existence of a Soviet nuclear deterrent would hardly be relevant...

...It was Mao's "main-line faction" which demanded that the fight against the West be relegated to a much lower place on the agenda, and that China should first carry the struggle against the Soviets "to the end...

...The Liu-Teng group appears to have realized, however, that its policy package could be sold in Peking only if it were wrapped up as a plan for militant action by both China and the USSR to rescue a "fraternal" country (Vietnam...

...Space does not permit a detailed presentation of the massive evidence showing how these groups lined up on the most urgent questions of foreign policy and strategy.* Suffice it to say that on a large number of occasions during 1965-66, two or more Chinese leaders delivered statements on the same day, from the same platform, dealing with identical issues, but remarkably divergent in their proposals for action...

...It is exactly in this region (Cuba, the Third World, etc...

...It is quite true that, in the purely bilateral field of U.S.-USSR relations (test ban, space, perhaps even arms limitations), there are excellent technological reasons for a continued Soviet-American dialogue, above all since the thermonuclear giants must constantly define and redefine the "rules of the game" to avoid fatal errors...

...In fact, this meant the fight against the U.S...

...Even Lo Jui-ch'ing never suggested that China should take the initiative in precipitating a showdown...

...Liu and Teng also backed reunification of North and South Vietnam, an issue on which other Chinese leaders remained strikingly ambivalent...

...And there is no reason to assume that precisely the same policy motivations would be ignored now if Mao's opponents were able to defeat him...

...A rapprochement with the USSR also was consistently advocated by Mao's foes as part of militant "unity of action" in Vietnam, which would have involved both Peking and Moscow in considerable risks of confrontation with the United States...

...It is hard to imagine a more dangerous or counterproductive suggestion...

...He may even have been instrumental in drawing up the guerrillas' joint policy platform, which subsequently became famous in the form of Lin Piao's article, "Long Live the Victory of Peoples War...

...In addition, unlike the "imperialists," the "modern revisionists" were attempting to interfere in China's domestic problems and had ways of influencing the local scene...

...The "pragmatism" of Mao's opponents, moreover, is a very questionable proposition altogether...

...was highly probable...

...They also insisted that it was unnecessary because early war with the West was highly improbable...

...had not always treated China well, they insisted that in the event of conflict with the enemy, "reliable" people in Moscow, headed by the Red Army, would certainly overrule the "Khrushchev revisionists...

...The Soviet Union was a hostile and treacherous neighbor, who would inevitably stab China in the back if it were to become involved in a battle with the West...

...he merely thought that the West was likely to do so and that, in order to prepare for such an eventuality, Peking should lean on Moscow and agree to "unity of action" in Vietnam...

...Some months later (probably for personal and domestic reasons), Mao had P'eng Chen purged...

...Such considerations would be magnified several times over if Mao's opponents were victorious, thus opening before Moscow the broad and enticing vista of bringing a "reasonable" Chinese leadership back into the Socialist camp...

...It is as unhistorical and unscientific to consider the Chinese necessarily militant in international relations and the Russians determinedly reasonable as it would have been for 17th century observers to assume that the Swedes are always warlike invaders and the Germans always innocent victims of their neighbors' aggressions...

...Mao himself apparently decided to back this alliance between the Army guerrillas and P'eng Chen, whose arguments closely resembled the Party chief's own strategic concepts and reflected his personal bitterness against the Soviet leaders...

...There is some danger, slight but real, that the rooting for the victory of Mao's opponents in the Western press could be misread by Moscow as a green light for various forms of Soviet interference in China's affairs...

...This reasoning begs many questions...

...This possibility was already implicit in the dangerous Soviet suggestion, made in the spring of 1965, that China lease airfields in the south to Soviet planes and personnel to provide air cover for Hanoi...

...What is the point of discussing these hypotheses anyway when the West cannot influence the situation in China...

...A Chinese government owing its existence to Soviet manipulations or outright Soviet intervention would constitute a major upset in the existing power system...

...As for the immediate future, it is significant that the current actions and statements of the Mao-Lin faction are entirely consistent with the views it advocated during the 1965-66 debate...

...A world where the West has the option of pursuing two separate and bilateral relationships, one with Moscow and one with Peking, and where Moscow and Peking are mutually antagonistic and, objectively, vying to outflank each other in maneuvering with the West, may prove to be reasonably balanced and safe from temptations...

...In the light of all this, it is difficult to understand why a substantial segment of the Western media has jumped to the conclusion that one should hope for the victory of the anti-Mao forces in China...

...This led the Liu-Teng group to support Chief of Staff Lo and his professionals in advocating a favorable response to Soviet proposals for "unity of action" in Vietnam...

...The "professional" faction, led by Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing, argued that an early military confrontation with the main forces of the U.S...

...Apparently a temporary balance of power within China's elite prevented any single group from imposing its views upon its rivals in 1965-66, and instead something resembling a debate on international issues broke into print...

...These arguments between the rival military factions were reflected in similar conflicts among the top civilian cadres...

...What we know from both the statements and the actions of the Mao group promises limited but real advantages for the West, while, on the basis of their earlier platform, Mao's opponents appear to be favoring policies which are anything but reassuring...

...There is no reason whatever to believe that in an entirely changed relationship, such as would prevail during a Sino-Soviet rapprochement after the victory of Mao's opponents, the international postures of both these countries would remain frozen and immobile...

...If Peking only encouraged other peoples to wage guerrilla struggles against the West, and if China itself refrained from all forms of direct involvement, there would be no reason for a confrontation with the U.S...

...Some observers, though not denying the validity of these concerns, feel they are applicable only in the short run...

...Specifically in relation to Vietnam, the professionals maintained that guerrilla tactics were not the final answer to all problems, and that "unity of action" between Moscow and Peking would enable both countries to give more meaningful aid to North Vietnam's main-line forces...

...It has been established, for Uri Ra'anan teaches international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and at MIT, example, that differences over international and strategic questions provided various factions with convenient slogans and rallying cries during the period immediately preceding the present climax of strife in China...

...History has shown, however, that the gravest dangers to peace arise not in the area of direct relations between the two superpowers, but in the field of multilateral relations, where third parties are involved...

...So it would seem that it was the pragmatists and not the fanatics who were the larger menace to peace and to the West...

...Actually it can, at least in a negative sense...

...as I have already indicated, an opportunity of this kind could probably be exploited only within a militant framework such as "unity of action" in Vietnam, which might prove acceptable both to the Peking and Moscow elites...