The 'Other War' in Vietnam

...Official United States statistics show that in the northern part of the country near the demilitarized zone--that part most open to the massive sweeps that have created refugees--75 per cent of the refugees were not receiving their daily food or piasters payments in the spring and summer of this year And last month, when refugee authorities were saying that there was no food problem m this area, it was learned that thousands of refugees were literally starving to death In I Corps up until August of this year, there were half a million additional refugees that no one in a position of responsibility knew about, and as a result no one cared about No provisions were made for them and they had little food Yet everyone knew about the military actions that had created them...

...Yet our failures m the medical program are equalled or even exceeded in our care of refugees And in this area one finds what is perhaps the most serious problem in Vietnam today??the almost total disruption, and in many cases destruction, of the fabric of life and society in that nation I do not mean to belittle the work of the many brave and compassionate individuals who have gone to Vietnam to help the refugees Our Civic Action teams m the military, our aid personnel, the doctors who volunteer their services, and the dedicated staffs of voluntary agencies like the International Rescue Committee deserve the respect and admiration of us all It is unfortunate but true that they labor under the most difficult of circumstances--in part because they are working m war, but also because they are trying to do a job without the full support of those to whom we have entrusted the effective direction of the military effort and the winning of the South Vietnamese people...

...As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, I have attempted for the past two years to influence the priorities that our government accords these people I am not prepared to say that the success of the subcommittee has been notable, but I am prepared to say, as chairman, that we will not rest until there is a greater realization that this problem, the most forgotten problem, is perhaps the most important one in our struggle in Southeast Asia We shall continue to offer recommendations and programs, though they may only be stop-gap measures, until our government realizes it is in the best interest of our nation, and of the American fighting men, that Vietnam be saved from Communism by first saving the people After intensive hearings and study, I am prepared now to make the following recommendations to the Administration...

...Edward M Kennedy...

...Those were the days when we talked of "the other war ', and we talked of military might as something that was necessary to provide a shield behind which civilian programs could be carried out But military activity was not the point of our sword--to defeat the insurgents we knew we must first defeat years of corruption the abuse of the absent landowner, and a tradition of central government that was both self-serving and unresponsive to human needs This cool appraisal of the challenge we faced in Southeast Asia reflected our lack of experience in such matters Our subsequent frustration and impatience with progress in South Vietnam, especially in the most difficult year of 1965, caused us to retreat to the common solutions and the techniques of warfare that were familiar to us...

...If it could be said that these massive actions produce military advantages, however measured, of such an extent that the despair and the destruction of a people and a culture is justified, then we could accept the rationale that this is war and war is difficult Or if it could be said that the places to which these people are sent were m any way comparable to where they came from, then it could be argued that, in our effort to wipe out the Vietcong and the soldiers from the North, we had bettered the people of the South and hence won their support for our actions I do not believe that these justifications can be made, and I cite the following facts...

...In my mind, the waging of the "other war" in real, not imagined, terms is the demand we face today We have to date totally neglected this aspect of Vietnam For example, for some years it has been apparent that the South Vietnamese people are suffering heavy civilian casualties--on the order of 150,000 a year--yet it was not until 10 months ago that our government made any attempt to survey the number of these casualties or to show any actual interest in their care and treatment We have continued to allow scandalous conditions to exist in the few hospitals equipped to deal with the civilians injured in the war, and we have paid little or no attention to ways m which the number of casualties and civilian deaths could be lessened...

...To justify these expenditures and these losses, it seems to me, will eventually require the clear conclusion that what we went to Vietnam to do is being done, that the people whom we went to defend have welcomed our defense, and that the result will be the opportunity for them to choose a form of government and a way of life consistent with the ideals of the free world That conclusion cannot be reached now, and I firmly believe that our current course in Vietnam is not leading in that direction To the extent that we lose the people, to the extent that we are identified only with destruction, to the extent that our massive forms of warfare cannot be differentiated from the more discriminating terror of the Vietcong--we ate losing Vietnam It is time, I believe, to redefine our position m Vietnam--to question whether the people of the South can be won and the land secured by guns alone I think we must reappraise our total approach and ask ourselves bluntly whether the losses we have suffered and the resources expended have brought any real gains in affecting the political inclinations of the South Vietnamese people...

...7. To help supply needed personnel in the "other war," there must be a greater effort to create and encourage short-term programs for the training of South Vietnamese specialists in social welfare, public health, agricultural development, and para-medical occupations Some of the needed nurses, lab technicians, corpsmen and other specialists could well come from the refugee population and could be trained to assist in the health and social welfare programs m the refugee camps and shantytowns 8. Every effort must be made to strengthen and facilitate the role of voluntary agencies and other private organizations in assisting the dispossessed in South Vietnam Because specialists m refugee and social welfare work are urgently needed, our government should subsidize the travel and salary costs of agencies willing to recruit additional personnel Every consideration should also be given to providing capital resources for hospitals, clinics, schools, resettlement villages and similar facilities, which individual voluntary agencies could operate and support Such contracting programs effectively operate elsewhere, notably m Hong Kong A similar pattern should be encouraged in those areas of South Vietnam where security conditions and need make it both possible and desirable...

...chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, delivered the main address at the 1967 International Rescue Committee Freedom A-nard Dinner, from which this article is adapted...

...6. We must root out the corruption and lethargy that have resulted m the near collapse of the South Vietnamese refugee efforts We must help provide the support and logistical control so that those devoted and able South Vietnamese refugee workers who do exist, and I am sure there are many, can do the job facing them...

...THINKING ALOUD The'Other War'in Vietnam By Edward M. Kennedy When the decision was made so long ago to become involved m Vietnam, our nation acted with the full realization that the Vietnamese conflict, unlike conflicts of the past, would demand a different response It was basically a political struggle that could best be met by a political, not a military, offensive At that time we chose to have the American presence felt in moderation, with limited objectives and limited means To give support to a government and a people threatened by insurgency called for winning the hearts and minds of that people as a basic step m winning the war...

...4. Immediate steps must be taken to substantially expand the refugee staff and personnel in Vietnam We should take immediate steps to have refugee personnel assigned to each province, and to each refugee camp if need be This is not an area where we should be skimping m our efforts Current expenditures for our entire refugee program amount to less per year than we expend in halt a day to wage the total war We must elevate the sense of urgency and importance attached to the refugee program 5. We must face up to the problems of the uprooted millions who have swelled the coastal urban areas and begin to develop programs for housing, slum clearance, sanitation and public health We must make a real effort to provide schooling for children and technical training for the idle or unemployed The 2-3 million unregistered refugees represented in these urban areas can well hold the key to success or failure in our efforts to win the support and allegiance of the people Thus far we have closed our eyes to the deplorable and dangerous conditions m the shantytowns, we have flirted with near epidemics of cholera, typhoid, typhus, polio and other communicable diseases because of our lack of public health programs, we have allowed the social disintegration of the cities to set m It is essential that we begin to face up to these problems, and strive to develop programs of simple social justice that will allow the people m the cities to live in decency and with self-respect...

...For until we show the people of the South by deed, not by strength, that we represent the forces of freedom and all that means for individual welfare and dignity, we will have done little Until we reorder our priorities and make it clear at least that the preservation of the people of Vietnam, their society and their culture, is just as important to us as the destruction of the enemy, we may be condemned to continue an effort that is inappropriate to the challenge...

...During this past year our aid field organization requested 86 refugee personnel, 45 were authorized, but only 32 were in Vietnam Of the 32, most were stationed in Saigon and a majority were assigned to duties not related to refugee work...

...In early 1965 there were 200,000 refugees counted in South Vietnam, mainly refugees from Vietcong terror Today there are 2 million refugees m South Vietnam, refugees m large part from U S and South Vietnamese military efforts But even these figures are suspect How can we tell how many refugees there are when, for example, last month in Binh Dinh Province 200,000 refugees were listed one day and none the next, simply because the 200,000 had been on the books for three months and after three months refugees are considered resettled...

...This information is a litany of our failure and constitutes a measuring rod in the progress of the real war in South Vietnam For we are in Vietnam, we are fighting there and we are dying there, to give the people of that country a free choice in the selection of their governments in the future The real indication of our success will come only when they make these free choices after we have removed ourselves from their land It because of our actions today, or because of our lack of concern, they exercise their new choice in a manner adverse to the ideology of the free world, then we will have fought and died in vam If they cannot differentiate the American effort from any other military force that they have faced in the past, then we will have fought and died in vain If we are ever to affect the future of Vietnam as a free country, we must affect it now We cannot wait until the land and the people are torn beyond recognition, for then it will be too late...

...Refugee assistance must increasingly emphasize long-term rehabilitation and resettlement There is an urgent need for meaningful programs, which will restore hope in the refugees--mdeed, in all the people of South Vietnam--as well as keep them alive Activity is needed to educate the children, to care for the orphans, and to raise standards of health Activity is needed to establish cottage industries, cooperative self-help projects, local agricultural development programs, vocational training and general education centers, resettlement villages, and other channels to train idle bands, to encourage industriousness, to stimulate productive life, and achieve active allegiance to the government Such programs will contribute to nation building in South Vietnam and the long-term betterment of its citizens We have hardly scratched the surface in this area...

...2. In those cases where military demands necessitate or cause refugee movement, we must be prepared to insure the safety of the refugees, and we must provide a regular source of food and supplies, adequate housing and medical care We must place far greater importance on efforts to allow refugees to return to their homes We must coordinate military activities at the highest policy level with refugee programs, so that we are not caught unprepared and unaware again, as we were m I Corps during the spring and summer of this year...

...In a time of war, of course, the best is most difficult to achieve, and efforts to care for people cannot be measured against the usual standards I cite the conditions in Vietnam, however, to point up the fact that in both policy and operations the U S and Saigon governments have not really faced up to the refugee problem We have viewed it more as a burden of conflict than an opportunity to help win the "other war " We have failed to give it the priority it so urgently demands and so rightfully deserves...

...9. Programs for economic and social development should be coupled with efforts to encourage the growth of viable democratic political action within the refugee centers Elected councils within those centers, closely tied to the existing political structure, could reflect and serve the interests of the dispossessed at the provincial and national levels of the South Vietnamese government The meaning and experience of creative and democratic political activity cannot be minimized in a country where the concepts of nationhood, and of a national government responding to individual needs and legitimate demands for social change, are novel and without tradition...

...In 1966, 28,000 individual families were officially added to the lists of refugees living m camps, but only 4,000 new family units were built during the same year--one small living unit for each additional seven families In a nation where half the population is under the age of 16 and approximately 13 per cent of the population are refugees, only 15 per cent of the refugee children are receiving any schooling at all, as opposed to 60-70 per cent of the general population...

...1. We must develop policies which give greater emphasis and higher priority to the goal of maintaining traditional village and hamlet life as well as the social fabric of South Vietnam In short, we must stop creating refugees whenever possible We have heard in recent months the theory that the countryside should be cleared and the peasants moved to areas of better government control In this way, it is argued, the Vietcong will lose its source of recruits and logistical support Yet, such a policy is shortsighted and totally destructive of the Vietnamese rural population In a country where the peasant has long drawn his strength from the stability and tradition of village life, where great attachment exists with the land, where the graves of ancestors play an important part in each peasant's life we must strive to give the peasant every possible chance to remain in his village or hamlet To do otherwise is to rum the society and, in the long run, to lose the allegiance of the people of the countryside...

...It is a brutal and alarming fact that because of the war nearly one-third of the population of South Vietnam is displaced The tragic and disruptive consequences of this tremendous movement in the life of the individual refugee and the society of which he is a part staggers the imagination, and almost defies comprehension The war has created a rootless people, it has destroyed the familiar rituals and traditions of village life, it has fostered apathy, disorientation, and even distrust and hate for our efforts within a significant cross-section of the South Vietnamese people...

...3 We should re-examine the decision which placed the refugee program under the overall Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development structure ( cords ), and consider the possibility of returning the refugee program to civil control It is clear that placing the refugee program under cords last April resulted in a lowering of the priorities given the programs and a substantial shifting of refugee personnel to other pacification programs If refugee programs suffer in this way under military control, then the entire program, along with other essentially civilian programs, should be removed from cords and placed directly under the responsibility and control of the U S Ambassador in Saigon If the programs are to remain within cords, it is high time that a full and clear statement of the priorities for this and other civilian programs vis-a-vis our military effort be made public and adhered to...

...We lost sight of the special nature of this war and began to undertake operations and procedures directed to annihilation of the Vietcong and the troops of the North, rather than to winning the hearts and minds of the people of the South What became important was the number of Vietcong killed, the "other war" was reduced in meaning to press releases and plans on paper that never seemed to be realized So today we are embroiled in a full-scale conflict We have committed over halt a million young Americans to the war, we are spending $25 billion a year on it And no matter how great our firepower, the enemy levels we face in the field appear to remain the same But beyond these expenditures of men and machines, we have also invested the lives of 15,000 young men--an investment by any standard that must be justified to the American people...

...The efforts I am recommending, however, will only help to hold our shaky ground We cannot expect more until the "other war" and the preservation and welfare of the people of South Vietnam is given first consideration and priority I cannot say the program I have outlined here, and a medical program that I proposed recently at the Harvard Medical School, will alone be a turning point in the war Vietnam is far too difficult for that But we are a compassionate and generous people The whole history of our nation is one of concern for the individual The real source of our strength is our understanding of human needs and concern...

...We have flown over entire complexes of villages and hamlets, showering them with leaflets describing the tate that will befall them it they do not evacuate We have driven into these areas with trucks and personnel carriers and herded entire populations away from their homes We have completely demolished villages and razed the countryside while these people were shifted to places called camps--places totally unprepared for their coming, with no buildings, no sanitation, no roads, no work, no form of sustenance available What were their homes and their farms are now free-strike zones--areas that may be hit at will by intense fire power, areas where any moving form is consideied to be a moving enemy form...

...Perhaps it is tune to recall and reinstate our original outlook that whatever we do in Vietnam, nothing of lasting value can be accomplished without the support of the Vietnamese people It was said that the war was their war--now it is our war It may be too late to return to earlier positions, but I do not feel it is too late to use our men and resources m a different kind of struggle--to shift from the reliance on military action to actions that will be more meaningful, merciful, and of lasting benefit to the people themselves...

...No great nation can long claim to have won freedom and democracy for another people if, in the process, the destruction of their land and way of life was the hallmark of the effort And so I am calling for a shift in our efforts in Vietnam--a return to the struggle to win a people by responding first to human needs and values, and by lessening our reliance on sheer power For this is the first reflection of the America we know It has been the only possible path to success...