India and Israel
KOREY, WILLIAM
India Israel By William Korey One unhappy by-product of the unsuccessful United Nations attempt to cope with the Mideast crisis was the unmasking of India's posture of Olympian morality and...
...India Israel By William Korey One unhappy by-product of the unsuccessful United Nations attempt to cope with the Mideast crisis was the unmasking of India's posture of Olympian morality and neutrality—so carefully cultivated among liberals throughout the world —as sheer pretense From the start of the crisis on May 18, the Indian government has parroted the Cairo-Moscow arguments, however contradictory and whatever the alternations required by swittly changing circumstances At the very first meeting ot the Security Council on May 24, when almost everyone was still stunned by the hasty withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force from Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh as well as Nasser's Gulf of Aqaba blockade, Indian delegate Gopalaswami Parthasarathi was already offering vigorous support to the UAR "We must state, with the utmost confidence, that the United Arab Republic has been and is a firm believer in cooperation with the United Nations " He avoided saying anything similar about Israel He also rejected proposals that the Security Council tiy to mitigate Egyptian belligerence, William Korey is a political scientist and fanner member of the faculty at Columbia and Cit\ College warning that such action would be "precipitate The next day India's Minister lor External Affairs, M C Chagla, fully bared New Delhi's un-neutral stance in a speech to Parliament India, he declared, understood why Cairo felt "impelled" to request unef's removal The step, he said, was necessitated by Isiael's "aggressive designs ' Chagla did not acknowledge what was widely known at UN headquarters, that India had played a leading role in forcing U Thant to pull out the peace-keeping troops Far more disturbing was the support given the UAR's tenuous apologetics for the Aqaba blockade Chagla announced that since 1967 India had considered the Gulf an "inland sea within the territorial waters of the United Aiab Republic and Saudi Arabia The External Affairs Minister apparently tailed to see any significance in the fact that for 10 yeais the maritime countries had recognized the international character of the waterway On May 27, the Times of India editorially chastised Chagla tor endorsing Nasser's every move, and for weakening the country's capacity to play a peacemaking role by assuming a strongly partisan tone But New Delhi refused to budge from its pro-UAR position That this reduced the effectiveness of the UN, in which the Indians have a vital interest, seems to have been forgotten Yet, as a lead article by Shev Shas-tn in the May 24 Indian Express observed, the removal of unef brought to a close an epoch of hope in the capacity ot member states to uphold the principles ot the Charter Once hostilities broke out and news of the decisive early Israeli victories began filtering back to UN headquarters, New Delhi reversed its stand on the proper role ot the Security Council Where it had urged inaction when an effort might at least have been made to prevent a war, now, together with the Russians, the Indian delegation suddenly called tor Council action Without a word of explanation for the extraordinary somersault, on June 6 Parthasarathi demanded a return to the conditions responsible for the fighting in the first place His speech was laced with anti-Israel vituperations larely heard at the UN, except tiom Arab spokesmen Referring to the accidental bombing of an Indian unef convoy —later apologized for by Israeli Foreign Mimstei Abba Eban—he spoke of "treacherous and dastardly" attacks by Israel, of its "wanton" and "cowardly" sti ike causing the loss ot Indian lives The Security Council did not act on India's foimal lesolution asking Israeli v\ ithdi aw al, instead it adopted a simple cease-fire resolution As Israel's mihtaiy victories grew, though India s diplomats became more shrill moie \mdictive Parthasarathi proclaimed on June 9 that Tel \\ i\ alone bore "responsibility for the grave situation presently prevailing in the Middle East,' and he lepeated the demand for a retreat to prewar lines The fighting was over Sundaj June 11, yet the Indian Ambassadoi could still advocate nothing moie productive than a return to the status quo ante By then Prime Mimstei Indira Gandhi had put her own piejudices and predilections on lecord backing up her UN representatives In a speech June 10 at Ambikapur 500 miles southeast ot New Delhi, she declared that ' the seeds ot the current conflict were sown at the time of the birth of Israel Thus Israel was born with original sin " and the implication was clear To underscore the Indian commitment, the Prime Minister lauded Nasser as "a force for progress and pledged support for the United Arab Republic Indira Gandhi s reference to Israel's birth was not without historical consistency Shortly after the proclamation of the State ot Israel, India's Moslem Ambassador to Egypt, Dr Syed Hussam, had declared that "the Indian Government and people are wholeheartedly for the Arabs" While this statement was sharply criticized m the Indian press, the Nehru government avoided comment and it voted against the admission of Israel m the General Assembly roll-call of May 11, 1949 Nevertheless Jawaharlal Nehru soon modified India's early obduracy On September 16, 1950, he addressed the following cable to Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel "In conveying to Your Excellency the decision of the Government of India to accord recognition to the Government of Isiael, as from the 18th of Septembei, this year, I send the greetings of the Government and people of India to the Government and people of Isi ael ' On June 25, 1953, Nehru had the courage and torthrightness to tell a press conference in Cairo that Israel was an established fact and India would not withdiaw recognition The anticipated full diplomatic relations, however, never materialized An Israeli Consul was admitted in June 1953, with headquarters not in the Indian capital but ' in the diplomatic Siberia of Bombay," as one observer put it And when Nehru in later years reiterated the de jure recognition of Israel, he added that no deepening of relations was to be expected In addition, the Indian Government erected a host of obstacles to trade and cultural contacts, and periodically Indian businessmen have been warned that impoit and export licenses will not be issued for commerce with Israel Passports for travel to Israel must be specifically validated by the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi and are often difficult to obtain In January 1964, for instance, the Indian Trade Union Congress was advised that the Ministry ot Laboi would not permit Indians to tra\el to Israel lor a special training program Embarrassing situations have also nsen on highei levels In late No-vembei 1962, Mis Yehudit Sim-lioni, head of the Political Department of Histadrut, Israel s laboi tedeiation, was refused a visa to paiticipate in the 10th Anmversaiy celebiations at the International Confederation ot Free Trade Unions college in Calcutta—even though she had been invited as a icftu board membei Only through the intervention of icftu Secretary-General Omar Becu was she able to get a visa Moie politically revealing was the episode in 1964 involving a reception to mark Israel's Independence Day The Israeli Consul in Bombay came to New Delhi in April to organize the affair Not until all the arrangements had been made and the invitations were sent out did the chief of protocol of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs summon the Consul and inform him he was accredited only to Bombay The Ashoka Hotel where the reception was to have taken place, further harassed the Israelis by cancelling the reservation for its mam lounge This general anti-Israel approach has been translated into a pronouncedly pro-Arab policy on key Near Eastern issues Addressing her Arab hosts in Amman in 1963, the then Indian Minister for External Affairs, Mis Lakshma Menon explained her basis toi the policy, We do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel because we are in sympathy with the Arab people and we do not want to lose their Inendship " In a joint communique signed in April 1964, with visiting Iraqi President Abdul Ant Nehru himself publicly endorsed the Arab position on the Palestine refugees and control of the Jordan River But despite his pro-Arab course, Nehru managed to avoid open bias and maintain a certain |udiciousness in his approach He joined Burma's U Nu, for example m favoring Israeli participation at the 1955 Bandung Conference When Arab intransigence compelled him to give in, he refused to accept a resolution condemning Israel and fully endorsing Arab demands The Aiab-Israeh dispute lequired early settlement, he emphasized, implying that direct negotiations were essential to achieve this objective Through his moderating influence, the resolution that emerged from the Conference supported "the rights of the Arab people of Palestine" and also called tor "the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question " Nehru's successor, Lai Bahadur Shastn, departed sharply from this effort to keep a semblance of balance in relations with the Mideast countries Visiting Cairo shortly after his inauguration in June 1964, he too supported "the just claims ot the Arab countries to the waters of the Jordan River and the rights of the Palestine Arab refugees" Then in November of that year, he extended an official welcome to a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the newly-formed militant group headed by Ahmed Shukairy (already notorious for his openly anti-Semitic statements at the UN) Actively supporting the plo line at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo, Shastn voted for an extremist proposal calling for "the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland " Ironically, representatives of other Southeast Asian countries expressed reservations about the resolution, but not Shastn In Februaiy 1965, he told a symposium on "The Arab World and India," held in New Delhi, that 'India has the fullest sympathy tor the urges and aspirations of the Arab peoples in regard to the Palestine refugees and the Jordan water question " Further catering to Arab aspiration India on July 12 1965, officially recognized the Arab League and accorded formal status to its diplomatic mission m New Delhi?the first to do so of all the non-Arab states where the League had offices Since the Arab League openly advocates Israel's liquidation, it was somewhat unseemly for a champion ot peace to rush to recognize it Indira Gandhi has carried Shas-tn's anti-Israel prejudice to the extreme Her recent policy statements were foreshadowed by an incident in March 1966 that evoked widespread criticism in the Indian press and Parliament The President of Israel, Zalman Shazar, had arranged a 24-hour stop in Calcutta while on his way to visit King Ma-hendra of Nepal, skipping New Delhi to avoid causing any embarrassment The Indians had assured the Israelis that the President would receive all honor and respect due his high office Instead, both the Central government and the government of West Bengal (where Calcutta is located) completely ignored Shazar and his party Two cars were made available to drive the Israeli delegation to and from the hotel, but a bill of 400 rupees was later submitted tor this service The only demonstration permitted was a hostile gathering of noisy Egyptians As one deputy in Parliament observed, the government's conduct was a "moronic display of discourtesy " Such gestures can hardly be interpreted as a response to Israel's behavior For Israel has not merely been determinedly and pointedly correct in its relations with India, it has sought in various ways to be helpful Between 1958-64, over 200 Indians participated in Israeli courses for trainees from developing countries A number of Israeli technical advisers have also served in India, under un auspices and independently In 1964, Israel offered assistance in the project to reclaim the desert area of Rajastan, but India rejected the offer Again in 196b, in response to a plea from the UN Food and Agricultural Organization to help India solve its food problem, Israel offered large quantities of citrus fruit, orange juice and fertilizers This was declined because of "political considerations,' to quote Food and Agriculture Mimster Sub-ramama Asked whether Indians should be allowed to starve because of government policies, he replied "We had to take into account other reactions " Trying to explain India's conduct, observers have sometimes pointed to the country's 50 million Moslems and to its deliberate policy of sending chiefly Moslem ambassadors to Arab states—a device, incidentally resulting in a disproportionately large number ot high-ranking Moslems in the foreign service But the most frequent explanation concerns the Kashmir issue One correspondent was told by an official of the External Affairs Ministry "While Israel has one vote in the United Nations, the Arabs have 13 votes, and these votes are badly needed by India in its dispute with Pakistan " To manv Indian intellectuals, the government stance appears ngid and churlish Friendship with the Arabs, they contend does not require open hostility to Israel India's closest neighbors—Nepal, Ceylon and Burma—maintain cordial relations with both, and their image m the Arab world has not suffered The Hindustan Tunes of Octobei 5 complained that 'Cairo has imposed on us a sort of Hallstern doctrine in our relations with Israel, threatening a diplomatic rupture the way the West Geimans used to wain they would automatically break relations with any power that recognized the East Geiman regime To capitulate the Times commented, is "patently unprincipled behavior on oui pait and the likelier consequence ot it is not respect from Cairo but to be taken tor granted " A public outcry followed the cancellation of the Israeli Consul's Independence celebration in 1964 and prompted over 100 distinguished citizens—including the noted editor of the Indian Express Frank Mor-aes, and such wel-known writers as Nirad Chaudhun and R Prawei Jhabvala—to form the Indian Friends of Israel Society The Society has aroused indignation among Arab diplomats in New Delhi, who this past fall insulted one ot its prominent women members present at a reception, then walked out en masse Nor has the Society been favorably looked upon by the authorities Both the Indian International Center and the Indian Council of World Aflairs refuse to allow Society meetings in their buildings During the past year public debate has erupted over India's policy toward Israel This was tngered by the action the Arab heads of state took on Kashmir at their Casablanca meeting Despite New Delhi's pronounced pro-Arab and anti-Israel position, most ot the Arab leaders came out in favor ot Pakistan—with Jordan, Syria Saudi Arabia and Morocco openly antagonistic to India's viewpoint Nasser alone actively defended Indian interests, and he succeeded only in getting his colleagues to adopt a somewhat innocuous resolution backing self-determination and adherence to past UN resolutions The Indian Ex pi ess has called for a "new look" at Indian foreign policy, complaining that our support to the Arab countries' has been given "so generously and unilaterally that we are now taken tor granted and what we regard as our vital interest hardly figures in the calculations of the Arab countries " A major article m the Hindustan Times demanded a ' second look at our foreign policy" with the query " is it not time for us to rescue that initiative we have mortgaged to Cairo7" Disappointment has been registered even in official quarters At Beirut airport last September Mohammed Ah Curnm Chazla commented 'After all, we have been friendly with the Arabs all these years We have supported the Arabs in the question of the Jordan waters and Israel, and we thought they would take a more sympathetic attitude toward India in this conflict " In contrast an Arab League representative was quoted by the Indian Expiess on November 28 to the effect that the Arab countries could not be expected to support India on Kashmir as a quid pio quo for support on Israel The question of economic assistance from Israel has also entered the public discussion, with many people urging the Indian government to accept technical advice on agriculture Israeli cooperative farming techniques, it has been argued, might be usefully duplicated Realists in India have begun quoting the late Lord Salisbury's dictum that a country has no permanent friends or permanent enemies, it has only permanent interests One commentator in the Hindustan Times, clearly speaking foi a stratum of enlightened opinion, stated "Our policy in the Middle East must shed its hard and outworn crust of rigidity " In February ot this \ear, the New Delhi Diplomatic Obsei \ ei reported that a sizeable section ot the political and parhamentan community ta-vored establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel One prominent book, Inteinational Studies, a summary of a discussion among various Indian intellectuals and civil servants recently published by Sapru House, indicates that there is not only widespread interest in fostering bettei relations with Israel, but a desire to encouiage a rappioche-ment between the Arabs and the Jews, in keeping with India's professed peacemaking function Friends of both India and Israel in the West have frequently noted the seeming compatibility of interests between the two countries Both have strong democratic roots, a rarity in Asian politics, both have rich cultural traditions, and in addition are the birthplaces of four of the world's great religions—Hinduism and Buddhism in India, Judaism and Christianity m Israel, both are striving to establish modern economies, organized on a welfare and semi-Socialist basis, both are struggling to create an administrative apparatus responsive to the people and their needs, and both take pride in their successful struggle for independence against a colonial system Neither has designs of any type upon the other, and they are not m direct economic or political competition Furthermore India and Israel would derive mutual benefit from a closer relationship—through trade, through sharing skills and technical "know-how through cultural progress But India s conduct at the United Nations dmmg the past two months has been a "moment of truth" tor those who would see these two nations allied m the vanguard of the Third World Measured in either moral or realistic terms In dia's conduct has been a bitter dis appointment...
Vol. 50 • July 1967 • No. 15