The Conservative Battle Plan

...Governor Reagan, not only because ot his glamour but also because he said so well the things their hearts wanted so much to hear Those who oppose Reagan would make a tremendous error if they attributed his success to style alone In a way Goldwater never could, Reagan articulates and defends a beguiling set of conservative nostrums for our troubled times Again, moderate and liberal Republicans have been at a disadvantage m ideological combat Their pragmatic philosophy has often meant no philosophy at all To generate emotion they have often rehed on a handsome face or ready smile They find that rank-and-file moderates are more easily stimulated to oppose the exotic rhetoric ot a Goldwater than to support any positive doctrine The best response they can make to Reagan is to label him "inexperienced " It is difficult to build an emotion ally appealing program out of a re spect for complexity, or open mind-edness, or sound judgment or restraint That, however, is what the moderate Republicans will have to do if they hope to head off the California idol The attraction of simplistic Reaganism will be effectively countered only with a program that people feel is worth "believing in " The so-called moderates must somehow inspire men and women to be more than moderate in their commitment The materials for such a philosophy can come from a variety of sources, ranging from the romantic humanism of the New Left to the libertarian inventiveness of the New Right But Republicans must first be tuned into this range of new impulses, they must be willing (and able) to think hard about new ideas They must repair the gulf separating the gop from many academic and professional communities, they must reverse the flight of the intellectuals which began in 1912 and was completed by McCarthy Many of the leporters who covered the Omaha conclave proceeded directly west during the last week in June to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, and the meeting ot the Republican Governors Association Theie they observed the deliberations ot the strongest progressive force in the gop, one which, more than any other, symbolizes the Republican comeback of 1966 The gathering ot the governors—coming just one week after Omaha—dramatized sharply the difference between the progressive resurgence of 1966 and the conservative resurgence of 1964, 1967 and—possibly—of 1968 For some time now the Republican governors have been discussing how they might translate their splendid state successes into victory on the national level They have never agreed upon an answer, m part, perhaps, because they look to inappropriate models for guidance The victories of 1966 provide an example The party's success last November was really only the sum ot a wide variety of state and local successes No national cause or hero led the way In fact, when gop leaders have wanted to identify some one person with the sweeping national conquest they could only turn to Ray Bliss, the closest thing the party has had to a universally accepted leader since 1960 Thus—much to his own surprise, I suspect—Bliss has been told again and again this year that he was the man really responsible for Reagan's victory and Rockefeller's, for Mark Hatfield's triumph in Oregon and Claude Kirk's in Florida Nor is the applause entirely inappropriate For the heart of the understandable Bhss philosophy is that national party leadership must be non-factional and non-ideological "I will fight as hard tor Strom Thurmond as for Jack Javits," says the National Chairman And he means it From a moderate point of view, this coalition philosophy worked veiy nicely m 1966 Each state organization was allowed to go its own way, each man ran his own race Whether it will serve moderates as well in 1968 is another matter It is a vital matter, too, since at their national conference this summer the Republican governors indicated that they would like to play the game of cooperative coalition politics again next year The only constant theme at Jackson Hole was that the governors had no common theme Their most significant resolution requested delegations to the 1968 convention to remain uncommitted The most common prediction was that the '68 convention would reflect the mood of the national party under Bliss calm, orderly, professional The convention would nominate the candidate most likely to win, it was said, or otherwise "broker" its way to a happy compromise The politics of coalition might turn the trick for the Republicans once more m 1968 But the lesson of 1964, re-enforced by its sequel in Omaha in 1967, is that conservative Republicans are no longer playing by those happy and generous rules The most important tact about the repudiation of Bliss at Omaha is that it symbolized the conservatives' disdain for coalition politics even as it demonstrated their power to make one faction supreme These conservative leaders know what they want and they know how to go about getting it Their twin tools are a highly disciplined organization and an effective and appealing ideology And the moderates, though toying now with the shadow of both, have yet to acquire the substance ot either...

...White realized—as did the Kennedys from 1957-60—amazing things can be accomplished by very small numbers if they aie properly trained and disciplined and inspired White had no trouble assembling such a vanguard—or marshalling the shock troops it so effectively deployed The Young Republicans, many of them in their 30s, provided a matchless and easily mobilized source of political talent and information The yr organization has long been one of the best intelligence and action networks m the party, with nerve ends in every locality For the better part of the last 20 years, the yrs have been controlled by a skilled group of "old friends" that has come to be known as "The Syndicate " White has been among these leaders from the beginning, and it was the Syndicate—battle tested over the years in delegate fights and convention brawls—that provided the crack cadre for the Goldwater takeover Its work continues White's executive assistant in the Draft Gold-water days became chairman of the Young Republican National Federation m 1965 and presided over the Omaha convention this summer It is generally acknowledged that White still calls the Syndicate's shots When the guns at Omaha fired on cue tor Reagan, many remembered the proposition White had set out m Suite 3505 The Young Republicans, he says, "have consistently exerted powerful influence upon Republican policies and principles" What happens at "the biennial convention held the year before the Republican national convention has become a tell-tale barometer foi gop Presidential nominations " The primary lesson ol Omaha, then, is that Reagan is tor real This much the press has told us, and it has left the matter there But there is moie to be said about the Omaha capei, for it demonstrates in practice the elements of conservative success detailed by White in his book They revolve around two key factors a highly disciplined national organization and an inspiring ideology As at San Francisco in 1964, the organizational muscle of the conservative forces never had to be called into full play at Omaha Votes were there in ample supply whenever the splendid walkie-talkie network buzzed its orders The right officers were elected, the right resolutions were passed The major test of the Syndicate's power, and an impressive tribute to its will and confidence, came on two confrontations with senior party leaders The first was the Syndicate's refusal to seat the New Jersey delegation Why'' Because New Jersey had recently reconstituted its yr organization—dissolving old clubs to rid the party of an anti-Semitic, anti-Negro, anti-Catholic coterie This was the faction that sang offensive songs, lauded Governor Wallace, called their chapters "Klaverns" and named themselves "the Rat Finks " Their leader had even been elected to the national yr board Increasing publicity in 1965-66 only persuaded the Syndicate to make the case a test of wills For a year and a halt it refused to condemn the Rat Finks or dismiss their leader Irom his national office When the Republican National Committee itself finally condemned the faction for "espousing bigotry and racial prejudice ' the Syndicate retorted by attacking Chairman Ray Bliss and the Committee for their 'interference At Omaha, after Rat Fink leaders weie flown in to make a special plea, the Syndicate refused to seat the clean" New Jersey delegation, despite its wide backing from yr and senior patty officials at home At the same time a pro-Syndicate Rhode Island delegation was seated in defiance ot the state's senioi party, which had revoked its charter for failing to assist the regular organization The second major demonstration ot power was the repudiation ot National Chairman Ray Bliss, who appeared at the podium personally to ask that the delegates approve a series of mild organizational levi-sions These changes had been unanimously requested by the National Committee in 1964, and later worked into a compromise package by Bliss and Syndicate leaders Though Bliss supplies the yrs with over $90,000 a year from party funds, the compromise package was turned down flat Supporting the rejection was Senatot Goldwater, who followed Bliss's plea foi minimal cooperation with a stern warning, "Don't let it happen " 4{ ^%'Jn't let it happen" bc-came the motto ot the convention It summarized well the intransigent mood ot powerful politicians who saw no need to concede anything to anyone "Hell, no'" shouted one chairman as the roll was called on the Bliss resolutions Inti ansigence was mirrored m other yr actions as well Last winter's decision to replace the elephant with a star as the group's official symbol is one example Another is the platform ot the new yr chairman which calls for an independent fund raising effort so that the group can make a clean break from the national organization if circumstances demand it To say that the Young Republicans are a "party within a party" is now a commonplace The critical point is that the discipline, realism, and the allocation of energies which that phrase implies have not been matched on the national level by Republican moderates This is part ot the reason why they could not nominate a Piesidential candidate in 1964, despite the fact that polls of rank-and-file Republicans gave Scianton a 2-1 edge ovei Goldwater lust before the convention This is also part ot the reason why the Goldwater group can so effectively "veto' a Rockefeller candidacy today that even the New York governor accepts that verdict Meanwhile Republical liberals do little to discourage Reagan, though he runs about even with Rockefeller in the polls Conservatives have demonstrated that a few motivated and well directed operatives can do remarkable things with a national party Until now most moderates have been too busy, too tired, or just plain too moderate to duplicate that performance That brings us to the second key principle of the White memoir, the overwhelming importance of ideology in the conservative success White dwells at some length on the religious nature of his conservatism, he testifies to the importance of simplistic doctrines in welding his scattered armies into an effective fighting force He talks of young mothers across the nation who were convinced that the most important thing they could do for their children was put Barry Goldwater in the White House Barry would set light a world gone out of kilter?and if they missed a meal or a bedtime while addressing envelopes or running a telephone drill, that was all right because it was for the kids that they were writing and phoning They were good and decent people who believed m what they did And they cried when the vote came in The ideological note sounded clearly at Omaha this summer, too Right-wing literature from Fred Schwartz and William F Buckley was sold alongside the Reagan autobiography The repeated test of ideas and candidates was simply "Are they really conseivatne9 ' The convention shouted approval tor resolutions attacking "bridge building" with the nations ot Eastern Europe and the Consular Treaty (supported by 25 Republican Senators) It called tor more force in Vietnam and less in suppoit of civil rights It also cheered its new hero...

...The Conservative Battle Plan It was nothing but a huge | Reagan for President rally," said one young Republican miss as she returned from the yr national convention at Omaha in late June And so it was California's new governor dominated the proceedings His picture waved above the platform, state banners carried his name, his autobiography was hawked by delegates in the lobby, his well directed operatives blanketed the city Of all the Presidential contenders, Ronald Reagan was the only one to establish a hospitality suite for delegates or to address the gathering At a convention news conference, Barry Goldwater said he would reconsider his support for Richard Nixon if Reagan continued to rise One delegate poll showed Reagan leading Nixon 46 per cent to 30 per cent, with Nelson Rockefeller, Charles Percy and George Romney sharing the remaining quarter of the vote In another sampling—both were sponsored by conservative groups—Reagan polled three times as many votes as either Texas Senator John Tower or Nixon, his nearLee W Huebner, a teaching fellow in history at Harvard, is president of the Ripon Society, a Republican research and policy group By Lee W Haebner est rivals (In that same poll a Democrat, George Wallace, finished ahead of both Rockefeller and Percy ) All of this is important, of course only so far as the Young Republicans are important—and they are enormously important The not-so-young Republicans intend to nominate a Presidential candidate in 1968 Their 1967 convention may well have been a dress rehearsal tor the drama we will watch next summer The best recent documentation of the role of the gop's youth auxiliary is F Clifton White's new book, Suite 3505 (Arlington House, 450 pp, $6 95), a memoir and manual by the man who engineered the Draft Goldwater movement from 1961-64 White operated during these years on the understanding that national parties in America, particularly minority parties, are so unstructured as to be virtually nonexistent except during Presidential campaigns In this amorphous situation...