Awaiting a Dubious Legacy

...European powers, etc" In 1966 Tory Defense Minister Peter Thor-neycroft explained "It [European] political institutions grow, it may be possible to have some [nuclear] sharing even closer than we have been attempting But to abandon the deterrent now, before the discussion has started, before these institutions have even begun the fiist flicker of growth, would be an extraordinary 1 enunciation It would not be an abdication of our defense, but of our role m the world " Such language could just as easily have come fiom Paris How else to explain de Gaulle's antipathy toward British entry into Europe, economic or political, it it does not derive from the Geneial's fundamental distrust ot an Albion who has too often chosen her daughter America over la vieilte Europe Grosser feels the French President would still prefer the Directorate of France, Britain and the United States that he once proposed to President Eisenhower in 1958 Short of this, he will continue to assert his claim to the leading role in Europe, whether or not the other continental nations are ready to accept secondary parts Ironically, it has been rumoied that de Gaulle, in his desire to keep Britain out of Europe, might resurrect the ghost of an idea he once excoriated—a European Defense Community (though undoubtedly without integration) For if Great Britain persists in its application to join the Common Market, de Gaulle will insist that London drop all pretense of a "special relationship" with Washington When the British Prime Minister finally comes to Canossa on bended knees, he will offer up his nuclear establishment to Europe or be left waiting in the snow It is worth noting that when de Gaulle discussed the problems ot British entry in May, he used the phrase "notably in matters of defense" m referring to the differences between his European policy and London s He took care to point out that the two policies could not merge "unless the British again assume complete command of themselves " Here again, there axe echoes of the Fourth Republic When Premier Pierre Mendes-France buried the original European Defense Community in 1954 he pointed out that had Britain been willing to join, France would have been less hesitant to merge her national forces with Germany's Meanwhile, back at the Elysee, de Gaulle continues to spin out the illusion that style is action, even when this results in inaction But as Grosser observes, in the absence of means "one can pass off for a force what is simply a word, a presence ' He suggests that the reader pretend he is General de Gaulle (just try to remember what it was like in the schoolyard playing King of the Mountain and you'll find it comes fairly easily) Anyway, put yourself in de Gaulle's place "The United States repeats endlessly that the influence you can achieve through your power is insignificant, and yet, when you have your Minister of Information read the final sentence of a communique dealing with Vietnam the President of the United States issues a statement, and the world press flashes five-column headlines Would you really be convinced that your deeds and gestures were of no importance9" Certainly, Washington acts in a self-defeating manner when it chooses to reply to de Gaulle on his own terms, in a time and place of his own choosing Grosser brands the United States as being "at least as anachronistic as France is In constantlv reproaching General de Gaulle for his refusal to submit to a majority vote American opinion has displayed an altogethei drsarm-mglv clear conscience in view of the American inability even to conceive of the tact that true Atlantic equality would require Amencan submission to majority decisions Incomprehension here is total, for American leaders and the Amencan public find it inconceivable that the United States should lose its full sovereignty m matters of decision making The "good American —a species rather like the "good European"?might well reply OK, but the disproportion of power between the United States and a "little Europe" is too great to allow true joint decisions It only Europe would find some way ot uniting if only Great Britain were a part ot this larger Europe which could then truly speak as an equal to us we would gladly work out some machinery ot consultation some directorate that would insure a unified and more powerful Western voice in the council ot nations Surely this is a consummation devoutly to be wished—and indeed, a viable policy as long as America understands fully that a powerful Europe would demand no less than what America demands for itself Such a policy cannot be put on ice until de Gaulle disappears from the scene The foreign policy of the Fifth Republic is, as Alfred Grosser warns, ' to some extent irreversible " The successors of de Gaulle as well as the successors of Lyndon Johnson will undoubtedly d'scover this tor themselves...

...Grosser has added an epilogue for the American edition emphasizing how much LTnited States policies and attitudes 'over the past twenty-five years" have contributed to what Americans consider most "shocking" about Gaulhsm The stress on these postwar years was intentional, for without an understanding of the objectives of French foreign policy—independence both from the United States and from the threat of the USSR—there is scant hope of planning an intelligent American policy toward Europe France's longing for independence from the US, however, was opposed to prosperity and to 'Europe But prosperity for what end7 As Grosser points out, the Fourth Republic replied quite simply 'So that the people might be more prosperous " De Gaulle answered otherwise "So that prosperity should forge foreign policy " The inherent conflict between domestic demands and foreign policy requirements has never been solved The chief divergence m this respect between the Fourth and Fifth Republics is that de Gaulle has unhesitatingly sacrificed domestic needs to foreign goals—though it should be remembered, never so gravely that his rule has been seriously threatened Despite variations in style, despite crises at home and abroad, the majoi decisions of the Fourth Republic have been ratified by the Gaullists Whether it be the construction of a nuclear establishment, begun under Edgar Faure and Pierre Mendes-France, or the adhesion to the Common Market, de Gaulle has made these policies his own (In the case of decolonization, he moved far more swiftly than the Fourth Republic dared, but along a path that Fourth Republic leaders by and large would have approved ) At the same time, the European policy of both Republics—and the mam thrust of French foreign policy —has been tangled m ambiguity Briefly, it has been "to establish Europe as a power in itself, and not to dilute it m advance by immersing it in a wide conglomeration where it would immediately lose its personality ' Europe, in other words, has been seen as independently valuable and as an instrument for establishing French independence, especially in regard to the United States There is no reason to believe de Gaulle s successors will be any less eager to play the same game For who is to say the leading players will necessarily be more agreeable to Washington or London7 One might well ask White Hall or Foggy Bottom if they would prefer a Michel Debre to a Charles de Gaulle If this seems too ridiculous (or frightening) a prospect, then surely a Gaston Defferre would play the game according to the rules of the Atlantic Alliance Yet Defferre, the Socialist mayor of Marseilles and bitter opponent of de Gaulle in the last Presidential campaign, stated "In foreign pohcy Gaulhst objectives are often well chosen Maurice Faure, president of the centrist Radical party, has complained at some length in he Monde of how difficult it would be to form an integrated Europe if England were admitted to the Common Market Opposition to de Gaulle—and this was never more evident than in the elections last spring—is almost wholly couched in domestic terms It is no more likely for the successors of de Gaulle to abandon the nuclear force de frappe than it was for the British Laborites to throw their atomic weapons into the sea—for all the cost in terms of domestic needs, for all the military absurdity inherent in these mim-bombs Yet French toieign policy, except in matters of style, has largely been a failure, it has achieved neither independence nor power The reason becomes clearer under de Gaulle than under the leaders of the Fourth Republic Bogged down in colonial wars, threatened by the menacing gestures of the USSR, the ancien regime premiers had little choice but to follow the dictates ot Washington Once treed from the colonial millstone, and breathing the more congenial atmosphere of the Kosygm-Brezhnev era the Fifth Republic has been able to turn all its attention to Europe And here the inherent ambiguity of Paris policy has become more apparent than ever Without England, there is no hope tor a Europe large enough to challenge the United States, with England, French independence and French leadership would be threatened De Gaulle sees Britain as America's "Trojan Horse"—when in tact Germany turns out to be the real Trojan Horse As Grosser wisely pomts out ' The United States and Germany are the only two countries tor which there is no problem posed by the issue of an Atlantic Community above and beyond the Atlantic Alliance alone No matter how warm the relations between Bonn and Paris, France simply cannot deliver on the most crucial issue in West German foreign policy—reunification Only Washington and Moscow can finally "settle" the German problem, as Germans from Kurt Kiesinger to Willy Brandt know In fact, the real foundation tor a viable European policy would be a Europe built on the cornerstone of Anglo-French cooperation Both countries desire closer relations with Eastern Europe, both nations are critical of America's Asian commitments, and both states resist supranational forms of integration No less significantly, in their military policy both employ virtually the same terminology Grosser quotes a 1963 statement by Patrick Gordon Walker, then Foreign Secretary in the Labor Shadow Cabinet "We believe that the best solution for the Atlantic Alliance lies m an idea originally proposed by France There should be a Directory to deal with broad policy covering nuclear weapons...

...Awaiting a Dubious Legacy FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DE GAULLE By Alfred Giosser Little, Brown 175 pp $5 00 Reviewed by JAMES CHACE Managing Editoi, "Intelplay" Like greedy relatives waiting for the death of a detested but powerful grandfather, the statesmen of the Atlantic nations await the death of Charles de Gaulle Only then, they feel, will it be possible to set things right Thus, after de Gaulle's press conference last May, when he repeated his severe conditions for British entry into the Common Market, the conclusion drawn by the London Economist ran to form No British entry except over de Gaulle's dead body There is some question, though, that even then the British will find the doors swung open Death, as Henry Luce used to put it, must come to all men—including Charles de Gaulle But his successor may be more difficult than the great man himself The legacy of de Gaulle, like the legacy of Bonaparte, could prove so troublesome that people come to yearn for a leturn to the original Indeed, continuity in French policy has been a staple of postwar France And it is one of the many virtues of Alfred Grosser s succinct often brilliant book that he points this out in wholly convincing fashion \ director of the National Foundation of Political Science in Pans and no Gaulhst himself...