New Guidelines for the West

...Indeed, to justify historically their own role in contemporary revolutionary processes, the Chinese assert that the geographical vortex of the revolution-after shifting during the last 100 years from France to Germany, and then from Germany to Russia-has finally moved to China...

...The American-Soviet confrontation after 1954 temporarily created an illusion of new international stability...

...The Chinese, operating in more primitive conditions, are at a more retarded stage of the revolutionary experience and in a more Utopian mood...

...This willingness is particularly appropriate now, since China has been stymied on a number of international fronts and has suffered major reversals...

...This is particularly true of the spheres of influence notion...

...Moreover, the traditional spheres of influence concept is not an adequate analytical tool for evaluating the threat to global peace posed by rapid changes and probably intensifying conflicts in the Third World...

...They are undergoing a unique convergence of three immensely roiling and destructive historical processes: a nationalist revolution, which creates the basis for mass commitment and national political self-awakening...

...policy...

...In other words, the "enclave" suggestion means yielding what is really at stake in the region, namely its internal political and ideological future...

...during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, was taught to the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962...

...But this can be done only in a framework of wider goals and broader horizons...

...No less significantly, the positive value of the SinoSoviet dispute to the West derives from the fact that it hinders the forcible expansion of the Communist world...

...The neutralization solution is also unsatisfactory because, while it proposes a withdrawal of American power from Southeast Asia "in return for a similar withdrawal on China's part," it is not clear what Chinese withdrawal would be involved...

...And assurances that China is not likely to intervene may persuade Peking that our own actions are based on that expectation (and hope), rather than on a clear-cut assessment of our own interests...

...and last but not least, a Communist revolution, still in its intensely ideological and revolutionary stage...

...The Soviet Union, in spite of abortive efforts, in the final analysis did not intervene in Greece, Korea, Berlin, or in Vietnam...

...Unless all three objectives are pursued and eventually attained, it is likely that the world will rapidly succumb to international chaos, made all the more ominous by the spread of nuclear weapons...

...3. To establish international conditions which channel the revolutionary changes taking place in many societies toward constructive ventures, and prevent the process of modernization and development from being forcibly taken over by Communist elites supported by militant Communist states employing the strategy of "national liberation wars...

...In this setting, it cannot be the purpose of American foreign policy to stamp out the revolutionary wave or to create a sort of American-Soviet condominium...

...In fact the rift developed in large measure because the Soviets, feeling the time had come to moderate their previous militancy, warned the Chinese that direct pressure would not only fail in achieving the expansion of Communism but could bring about a dangerous military confrontation with the West...

...But, politically and morally, it is doubtful that this argument alone would sustain a case on behalf of American intervention...

...Thus a consideration of some of the larger issues facing the United States may cast some light on the American-Chinese relationship, as well as on the troubling question also raised by the Senator, of criteria for American military intervention in the revolutionary processes of the Third World...

...An alternative suggestion endorsed by Fulbright, that in the event of a Chinese refusal to neutralize the area the United States could restrict itself to "easily defensible fortified bases somewhat like Guantanamo or Gibraltar," suffers from weaknesses analogous to those of the neutralization proposal...

...In that light, the question of our own policy takes on a different meaning...

...Current Soviet policy is increasingly based on the assumption that Western fragmentation, still regarded as both desirable and inevitable, will evolve without direct military pressure, the essential ingredient of the policy pursued from 1958 until the Cuban confrontation...

...As the range of unpunished international violence is reduced, the range of international cooperation will increase...

...The fact is that the United States exercises absolutely no political influence on Cuban affairs from Guantanamo, nor do the British on Spain from Gibraltar...

...In defining our own interests, it is important to avoid concepts which are no longer relevant to the revolutionary and dynamic conditions of our age...

...Conditions of stress have tended to drive further apart Chinese and Soviet national interests and ideological assessments...

...and as they come to realize that the mounting chaos in the Third World, exploited by radical revolutionaries, may either force Russia into an unwanted direct conflict with the U.S...

...an industrial revolution, which ruptures the fabric of established traditional society and creates a condition of alienation and loneliness-the basis for more total political organization...

...conditions in which either or both states can pursue their goals without danger or damage to each other's interests, tend to bring out the latent Communist stake in preventing a total split...

...Nor should a detente be purchased at the cost of yielding in the East to pressures which in the West have been successfully resisted...

...But it does not follow that since neutrality has worked in Burma it would work everywhere in Southeast Asia: given the present setting of mutual American-Chinese suspicions, the absence of a firm external balance of power in the region, and the lack of internal political stability in the contested states...

...The Berlin and Cuban confrontations demonstrated that nuclear pressure is inadmissible where the vital interests of other powers are involved...

...Nor would it be constructive or stabilizing to strive for an American-Soviet condominium...

...In this revolutionary age, neutralization as a method of resolving cold war tensions works only in a context of mutual restraint, stable external balance of power, and firm internal political stability...

...Since today China is relatively weak-and this is a major difference from the U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the late '40's-it would be wrong for the United States to rely on force alone in determining the character of the American-Chinese relationship...

...The successful consummation of the policy of peaceful engagement toward some Communist states does not preclude taking a forcible stand against violence by others...

...It propounds a sterile military stance as a solution to a profound political issue...

...Politically, it is wrong for the Administration spokesmen to convey the impression that China is not likely to intervene...

...This policy of peaceful engagement may require a departure from established modes of thought that took root and matured during the period of acute European cold war, and of West Europe's intense consciousness of its dependence on America...

...The United States abstained from intervening in East Germany and Hungary when the populations of these countries rose against Communist tyranny...

...Still, the questions raised by Senator Fulbright, although they focus on American-Chinese relations in Southeast Asia, pertain to U.S...

...By and large, the younger generation appears to be composed of relatively unsophisticated and inward-looking Party bureaucrats, not unlike the generation that came to power in the Soviet Union during the '30s...

...The willingness of the Soviet leaders to associate with the West in such a community will grow as they come to realize that Western unity neither provides opportunities for Communist expansion nor threatens existing Communist states...

...2. A more difficult problem is posed by qualitative political changes on the cold war line that are effected peacefully...

...Today, more than 20 years after the end of World War II, with West Europe no longer insecure and the Cold War no longer so acute, it is important to infuse the Atlantic Alliance with a new sense of purpose...

...The most that can be hoped for is a stalemate which may slowly ripen into a bilateral exploration of views, interests and avenues of accommodation...

...The two blocs are gradually breaking down, while the nuclear stalemate is yielding to nuclear proliferation, with weapons of mass destruction soon to be possessed by volatile and often irresponsible elites...

...and helps to erode the revolutionary mystique among the Soviet rulers, making them more inclined to see an advantage to themselves in a stable world...

...policy in the present age as a whole...

...If it attempted to opt out of the revolutionary age or balk revolutions in general, the United States would be repudiating the traditional meaning of the American Revolution for the rest of the world, and bequeathing the future to the Communist states...

...On balance, however, it would be contrary to our interests, in view of the likely political consequences elsewhere, and to our own principles, given the kind of world we wish to promote, for the United States to intervene actively...

...The concept of ending peacefully the existing European partition by fostering multilateral links with the European Communist states would also encourage the United Kingdom and Scandinavia to see a greater role for themselves in closer ties with the Continent, furthering the kind of cooperation and integration that has been sought in Europe since 1945...

...While the West has wisely accepted this principle, opportunities for international mischief-making are not one-sided...

...reduces the Communist capacity for mischief...

...Turning to the present conflict in Southeast Asia, it is unwise to focus public speculation-as has been the case in the Senate hearings and with some recent Administration statements-on the question of whether China will or will not intervene...

...But whatever the internal evolution of Chinese society or the external character of Chinese foreign policy, it is not right to argue that opposition to China's ambitions necessarily reduces the Sino-Soviet rift...

...Since our purpose is to create a stable world in which the present social and technological revolution finds a constructive outlet, it follows that Western policy should not become an anti-Communist crusade any more than an anti-revolutionary one...

...On the contrary, the Sino-Soviet rift usually widens as a consequence of international crises...

...Rather, American global engagement should have three fundamental and interrelated purposes: 1. To maintain the common sense of unity between America and the West European states, promote European institutional interdependence, and thus prevent the Continent from reverting to the unstable conditions that led to two world wars and Europe's political suicide...

...What is needed is some general standard for action which obviates counterproductive and hasty intervention, while avoiding the self-paralysis inherent in a purely moralist doctrine of non-intervention...

...The bipolar condition, however, is fast disappearing...

...In responding to this situation, the United States should, first of all, be very clear in its own mind before acting that what is involved is in fact a Communist coup...

...It would be an error, however, to assume that this evolution will automatically follow the Soviet precedent, namely, that it will move by evolution from a rigid Stalinist-type totalitarianism to a more moderate system...

...If the answer is "yes," it should be stated unambiguously, so that Peking will have no doubts as to our own involvement...

...This approach ignores the fundamental problems of domestic instability and internal revolutionary conflict in much the same way that they have been ignored by those who propose merely stepped up military pressure as a solution to the present problems...

...The larger issues encompass our entire relationship with the Communist world...

...Perhaps the following distinctions may be useful: 1. In the event of an effort to achieve by violence or military threat a qualitative political change on the cold war line, intervention by the United States is justified...

...It should not be forgotten that it was this success that laid the basis for the detente, in spite of the apocalyptic predictions of prominent "realist neo-isolationist" critics, who during each Berlin crisis had urged a policy of concessions...

...Only if all the above criteria are met would American intervention be justified in case of a coup or revolution not directly involved in the cold war confrontation...

...On the other hand, it would be simple-minded and harmful for the United States to adopt the principle that it should intervene whenever and wherever a Communist takeover threatens or has actually occurred...

...Analytically, this is the wrong question to pose...

...The QuemoyMatsu crisis of 1958, the U-2 crisis of 1960, the Cuban confrontation of 1962 and the American bombing of North Vietnam in 1965 all were followed by intensified polemics, mutual accusations, and, it may be presumed, by heightened suspicions concerning each other's motives and good faith...

...Indeed, in Europe the forging of stable, enduring and growing bonds among the Western nations can be reinforced by a simultaneous endeavor to include the Soviet Union and East Europe in a broader community of the developed states...

...Similarly, the American-Soviet detente is not to be welcomed when it implies a subordination of the interests of our Western allies-for then it could have a divisive effect, eventually likely to be exploited by Moscow, thereby altogether negating the detente itself...

...If the Chinese are also to learn the principle, it is essential that the West, and particularly the United States, be unambiguous in the definition and prosecution of its interests...

...The West, for example, could instigate violent unrest in East Europe, acts of sabotage against the Berlin Wall, new guerrilla activities in Cuba, or a national liberation struggle in Tibet...

...Finally, just because the United States is now engaged in limited conflict with some Communist states in Asia, it is especially important to pursue an active policy of peaceful engagement toward the European Communist states...

...Establishing a reactionary regime through American arms, while a local defeat for the Communists, would provide them with a regional political success...

...The immediate issues relate to the practicality of neutralization in Southeast Asia...

...For the success of the Communist radicals could infect the Soviets-restoring Communist unity not because of our resistance but because of its absence...

...In other words, are our interests sufficiently important to justify a war with China, should China decide to intervene...

...Even if China were to succeed in asserting its revolutionary leadership and in stimulating a violent, radical, anti-Western and anti-white revolutionary wave-cutting across societies and even continents-it does not follow that China would become, in the traditionally accepted terms, the dominant power within its own sphere of influence...

...Neutral" Yugoslavia is often cited as a European precedent germane to Southeast Asia...

...or give rise to new political movements that will use American-Soviet hostility for their own ends...

...The importance and the desirability of the detente is to be measured in direct proportion to what it contributes to international stability, i.e., to the acceptance of the principle that in the age of rapid social change and immensely destructive weapons no major power can attempt to impose by force qualitative political changes at the expense of another major power's interests...

...Two global blocs, locked in nuclear stalemate, provided a seeming balance of power and reduced the risks of a conflagration...

...In the long run, much will depend on the internal evolution of Chinese society...

...Such chaos will certainly not be averted if the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world adopts a posture of gradual disengagement, refraining from the use of its military might in areas where local power is insufficient to meet the challenge of Communist force, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, often specifically designed to negate the positive advantages of Western economic aid...

...The Vietnamese war shows that "national liberation" struggles can escalate into local wars, and (for the first time in the history of established Communism) that the sponsor Communist state cannot enjoy with impunity a privileged sanctuary...

...Finally, any act of intervention should be accompanied by a considered program of social-economic reform in order to provide an additional ex post facto justification for the use of force...

...These conditions could not be achieved after World War II in Central Europe, where the West and the Soviet Union had irreconcilable objectives, and they do not exist today in Asia...

...and Chinese power were both engaged in its Asian surroundings...

...4. Another eventuality is posed by the coming to power of a Communist government through peaceful parliamentary elections...

...Precisely because our policy has been more or less successful, some adjustment in it may be warranted, lest it become a policy for all seasons...

...At this stage, though, it would be wishful thinking to expect a major improvement in American-Chinese relations in the foreseeable future...

...It is essential that the principle that violence cannot be used to expand one side at the cost of the other be mutually accepted...

...This new attitude creates the precondition for some limited adjustments, and perhaps eventual reconciliation with the West, since our own policy towards the East now eschews forceful "liberation" and presumes an evolving fragmentation of the Communist bloc (though we postulate that a basic change in the character of the Communist system will result...

...One possible justification for such intervention would be the argument that once a Communist system is entrenched, it refuses to yield power even if the populace regrets its choice...

...the effort would inevitably create fissures in the Western alliance that could be exploited by the Soviets...

...In our age, given the internationalization of ideological and political conflicts, there can be no absolute doctrine of non-intervention...

...International stability can only be achieved if societies that consciously reject a closed society and a Communist pattern of development do in fact advance, and are assured international and domestic security in pursuing their development, even in the face of a deliberate and sustained Communist effort to disrupt them...

...3. Another possibility is forcible change by coup or revolution which threatens to establish a Communist government in areas not on the cold war line...

...The Korean war showed that direct invasion does not pay...

...Indeed the Chinese may face a major domestic upheaval or, out of frustration and embitterment, may embark on a more adventurous path, especially once they have gained a significant nuclear capacity...

...Persisting ambiguity on this score clouds the case made on behalf of the intervention in the Dominican Republic...

...And the internal difficulties of the Chinese economy may prevent the kind of socialeconomic change that served as a prerequisite for the limited evolution and liberalization that the Soviet Union experienced in the late '50s and early '60s...

...Postwar American-Soviet relations have involved a search for a common standard of behavior to mitigate the dangers of the nuclear age...

...The possibility should not be excluded that after Mao Tse-tung goes, his successors will be even more rigid and parochial in their perspectives...

...It should never be forgotten that any success of the extreme revolutionary Communist factions is bound to have a feedback on Soviet attitudes, and that a revival of Soviet revolutionary expectations would automatically reduce the chances for ending the cold war among the essentially Western and developed nations...

...Its logic would point to the conclusion that the United States should invade Cuba but should not oppose the expulsion of the West from Berlin...

...Neutralism usually cannot serve as a short cut in the difficult and probably lengthy process of creating international stability, but if greater international stability is achieved, neutralization can become one of the various ways of resolving outstanding issues...

...Not only does one have no firm way of estimating how the Chinese assess the situation (even though one can make some assessment of China's capability), but a Chinese intervention in the wake of Administration assurances to the contrary would produce an acute crisis of confidence...

...It is doubtful whether the Western critics who vigorously object to Western responses to pressure in Berlin or Vietnam, pressure designed to change the political status quo, would with equal vigor urge Moscow to yield for the sake of American-Soviet detente...

...As a result, Peking may be tempted actually to intervene...

...Moreover, the concept of a joint American-Chinese neutralization of Southeast Asia carries with it the implication that the basic problems of the region are external in origin...

...The argument often is made that offers of political-diplomatic accommodation may encourage Chinese expansionism by reaffirming China's feeling that it is riding the crest of history...

...In certain places and at certain times, however, the quest for world order may require the use of force...

...Similarly, a neutral Burma endured because U.S...

...Such a policy could arrest present trends toward renewed balkanization in both sections of the Continent and lend new relevance to America's now declining relationship to Europe...

...At the same time a portion of the Communist world, making the best of its economic and military adversities, has become actively dedicated to the encouragement of revolution and guerrilla warfare within the less-developed parts of the world-hoping in addition to intensify Soviet-American hostility and to revive the gradually waning Soviet revolutionary morale, badly shaken by the Cuban missile crisis of late 1962...

...But such offers, coming at a time when China is isolated, very conscious of its recent setbacks, and-according to China experts-perhaps even reconsidering its militant foreign policy, may have a more desirable effect...

...Neither in Russia nor in East Europe were these three revolutionary processes experienced together...

...Yet a neutral Yugoslavia could be maintained precisely because a stable environment for its neutrality was created by the presence of Soviet power in Central Europe and of Western power in Greece and Italy...

...Our posture, as has been suggested, should be one of firm response to the use of force by the other side, but of willingness to develop relations in all other respects...

...Since China's presence is geographically determined and since its actual involvement tends to be primarily political and ideological, American withdrawal could not be matched by a similar Chinese withdrawal...

...Because this concept would become a self-fulfilling prophecy if applied to Asia, the Indians, the Thais and China's other Asian neighbors are today closely watching the West's response to China's challenge...

...The Sino-Soviet conflict was exacerbated precisely because this principle, tacitly accepted by the U.S...

...For example, the Communist coup in Zanzibar probably did not...

...Obviously, it would be disastrous for the West if a country like Iran should peacefully determine that it wishes to adopt the Communist system...

...Secondly, Washington should be reasonably certain that a Communist government established in a particular country actually poses a political or a military threat to the United States...

...Otherwise, our own policy toward the Communist world may seem to be one of unmitigated hostility...

...In those circumstances, the United States would have no choice but to accept such change-which, quite apparently, is U.S...

...In any case, regardless of China's reaction, overtures toward Peking would improve America's international posture...

...It would make no sense, therefore, to grant to the ideologically more radical Communist states, merely to keep the Sino-Soviet dispute alive, what in the past we have denied the Soviets...

...The really meaningful question is what American interests are involved in Southeast Asia and what scale of risks they warrant...

...2. To encourage the eventual emergence of a looser community of the more developed nations, including not only Japan but also most of the European Communist states, and thereby gradually transform current conflicts into the beginnings of cooperation, particularly in regard to the Third World...

...Thirdly, intervention must be preceded by some evidence that an effective local alternative to Communism is available, and that this will not take the form merely of a reactionary anti-Communist regime...

...THINKING ALOUD New Guidelines for the West By Zbigniew Brzezinski Senator J. William Fulbright's recent proposals for an agreement between the United States and China to neutralize Southeast Asia raise both immediate regional and long-term global issues for American foreign policy...

...This goal should be pursued even if tensions mount in Asia or elsewhere, for it is essential that some of the Communist states see clear-cut advantages to themselves in a peaceful relationship with the West...