Russia's New Asian Offensive

...Though they are already seeking to improve their relations with the Russians, Moscow is hesitant to embrace a regime that has so recently repressed the Indonesian Communist party...

...The second danger is that by trying to arbitrate so intractable a dispute, Moscow is attempting the impossible and could end up alienating both parties...

...A deeply-rooted, assertive Hindu nationalism is becoming increasingly respectable in India and Shastri had gained considerable popularity by catering to it...

...In this sense, Peking is correct in saying that by collaborating with the U.S...

...At the same time, the Russians probably used their increasing influence in Hanoi to urge a negotiated settlement of the war-as they have urged in the past...

...As the recent Tashkent meeting of the Indian, Pakistani and Soviet heads of state and the dispatch to Hanoi of Aleksandr Shelepin indicate, there has been a revival of Soviet interest and diplomatic activity in South and Southeast Asia...

...The immediate future will therefore depend on Ayub's decisions...

...By moving closer to Pakistan, Moscow evidently believes it can strike a double blow at China and the United States...

...According to Chinese charges which the Russians have not denied, Soviet Premier Kosygin put before Hanoi and Peking last February a proposal to convene a new international conference on Indochina without prior conditions...

...But once Nasution allows a more domesticated and pro-Soviet Communist party to take the place of the old one, which appears likely, Soviet-Indonesian relations can be expected to warm up rapidly...

...In Indonesia the abortive coup against the Army by the pro-Chinese Communists, staged shortly after a visit to Peking by party leader D.N...

...The Russians, however, must be careful to avoid confirming Chinese charges of appeasement...

...Now, however, in exchange for increased Soviet pressure on India, he can offer to cut some of his ties to both Peking and Washington...

...For Pakistan, the Soviet intervention represents a new diplomatic alternative for achieving its goals in relation to India generally...

...Moreover, such an orientation would not be in India's best interest so long as it can obtain military and economic aid from both Moscow and Washington...

...Even if, as is almost certain, Ayub cannot ultimately obtain substantial concessions on Kashmir, he now can, if he chooses, at least salvage something at home from the failure of his recent military adventure: He can claim that he has succeeded in neutralizing Russia -the only major power to support India on Kashmir-and that this is a vital step on the road to an eventual settlement...

...Though Moscow's primary concern is to contain Chinese influence in the international Communist movement, it also shares the American interest of preventing the expansion of Chinese power in all the new states, not because of a belief in the "domino theory" but because of apprehension over China's campaign to sabotage Soviet diplomacy and discredit the Soviet Union as an Asian power...

...The consequent likelihood of a SovietU.S...

...Since his successor too will undoubtedly need the support of the Hindu Right to consolidate his domestic position, unpopular concessions to Pakistan are inconceivable for the forseeable future...

...In Pakistan today there is much frustration, increasing anti-Americanism, and a growing belief that China can be the only true ally against India...

...At the same time, Moscow, as part of its new campaign to neutralize its Middle Eastern neighbors still allied to the United States, is trying to remove Pakistan from what little remains of CENTO and SEATO and to eliminate the American strategic base at Peshawar...

...The meeting at Tashkent, planned as the first of a series, is the latest Soviet attempt to demonstrate its impartiality by undertaking arbitration of the conflict...

...Those in the United States and elsewhere who dream of formal, longrange Soviet-American cooperation in Asia against China are pipedreaming...

...Further, in the light of Shastri's sudden death, Ayub can now argue that any precipitate move against Kashmir should be avoided until Pakistan can size up the new Indian leader...

...On the other, he can give in to strong domestic pressures to "talk tough" to India and eventually move closer to China...

...So long as Moscow and Peking remain apart, the U.S...

...To induce the North Vietnamese to join in such a conference, which would have obvious anti-Chinese implications, Shelepin probably offered them additional military aid and new assurances of support against any stepped-up U.S...

...The Russians evidently calculate, therefore, that they can reap the advantages of an improved relationship with Pakistan without substantially weakening their position in India...

...Unwilling to pay the price and take the risks of an offensive posture, Moscow is employing its power mainly to counter what it regards as the offensive thrusts of its two major competitors, the United States and China, and to build up its prestige in the region...

...Subsequently, but before President Johnson's Baltimore speech, Moscow urged negotiations on the minimal condition that the United States stop its bombing of North Vietnam...

...Meanwhile, India was drifting Westward as a result of the border conflict with China and there were even indications that the Soviets contemplated disengagement from Laos and Vietnam...

...Ayub, similarly, has already been criticized at home for ending the war too soon...

...The second parallel U.S.-Soviet interest is preventing the outbreak and spread of armed violence that could force the two super-powers to an unwanted confrontation in support of their respective proxies...

...But the Russians have in the past also exercised a moderating influence on Indonesia by warning Sukarno against military adventures against Malaysia and on Hanoi, by urging restraint in the Vietnam war...

...The first is to isolate China...

...How should the United States view this new Soviet role in Asia...

...for another, association with the Soviet Union does not expose him to the charge of being an imperialist stooge...

...Nasution will never again trust China, and he will probably lean more toward Moscow than Washington...

...At the urging of Moscow and Washington, who share an interest in excluding China from Pakistan, he decided to call off hostilities and make a final effort to achieve his objectives through diplomacy...

...the Chinese can plausibly impute appeasement to the Russians alone, but it would be more difficult for them to level such an accusation against the majority of the international Communist movement...

...It seeks to replace Peking's influence in Rawalpindi with its own, and, more generally, seeks to demonstrate to the Afro-Asian neutrals that Russia, unlike China, promotes peace, does not intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, and has an important stabilizing role to play in Asia-contrary to Chinese charges that Russia is an imperialist, European, white power with no business in the poor and colored regions of the world...

...Still strongly influenced by an ideological belief that Asian progress towards "Socialism" entails elimination of "imperialist" influence, Moscow is not yet willing to encourage an American presence to help contain China...

...This is precisely why Moscow would like to convene an international Communist conference on the subject of Vietnam...

...Moving into a political vacuum created during the last year by Chinese blunders and American preoccupation with Vietnam, the Russians have recovered some of their influence in the Asian Communist parties and in such countries as Pakistan, India and Indonesia...

...For one thing, Moscow, the chief supplier of the Indonesian Army, supports Nasution's goal of eliminating both Chinese and Western influence from the area...

...Moscow knows very well that even temporary cooperation with Washington in Asia helps legitimize the American presence there...

...Fortunately, General Ayub recognized the Chinese game for what it was...

...unless he can show some progress on Kashmir through negotiations, he is open to the charge that his entire venture has flopped...

...And it is this fear that inclines Moscow to use the UN to arrange a cease-fire when local wars begin...

...There remains a crucial point of conflict: Washington's commitment to remain in Asia and the Soviet desire to squeeze it out...

...Aidit-apparently with the cooperation of President Sukarno-has propelled General Abdul Haris Nasution and strongly antiChinese elements into the ascendancy...

...will be emboldened to intensify the war, and it is the Chinese, not the Russians, who will be seen as the prime obstacles to united Communist action in Vietnam...

...In the past, Moscow's exclusive commitment to India meant that Ayub could pursue his objectives only by reliance on Washington, which had proven fruitless, or by edging closer to Peking, which was dangerous...

...The main question remaining is whether the Johnson administration has the political vision, the courage and the patience to resist advice to expand the bombing of North Vietnam-which would only play into China's hands...

...and so long as China foments revolutionary violence and maintains its primary goal of expelling American and Soviet influence from the continent, this degree of Soviet-American parallelism will continue...

...Shastri, before his sudden death, refused to budge from the Indian position that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and Ayub would not be put off with a non-aggression pact so long as India continued to be intransigent...

...This stabilizing role can be seen most clearly in the Soviet effort to reconcile India and Pakistan...

...The Russians have also made special efforts in the past two years to improve their relations with Turkey and Iran...

...It is this vision of the future, a nightmare to Peking, that prompts the Chinese drives to keep the Vietnamese war going at all costs and to involve Moscow and Washington in a head-on clash...

...Thus Peking issued an ultimatum to India at a crucial point in last September's Indo-Pakistani conflict in the hope of encouraging the faltering Pakistanis to continue fighting rather than bring in the Russians or the Americans as peacemakers...

...This danger has motivated longtime Soviet efforts to have the United Nations adopt a resolution calling for the peaceful settlement of border disputes...

...With the two leaders reflecting hardened national attitudes resulting from the Kashmir war, neither could make substantial concessions...

...By refusing to cooperate with Moscow against the United States in Vietnam, Peking has probably convinced many North Vietnamese that it is more concerned with scoring debating points against Moscow than with helping Hanoi...

...On the one hand, he can hold out hope for diplomatic progress on Kashmir and claim a victory as a result of the change in Soviet policy...

...In line with this goal, the proSoviet Indian Communist party continues to combine its calls for a tough line against China with demands for the expulsion of American and Western "imperialist" influence...

...At the moment, Russia and the United States do have more in common with each other in Asia than either has in common with China...

...Soviet behavior in the Kashmir crisis is a case in point...

...But if the United States expands the bombing of North Vietnam after the present pause, the Soviet Union will not be able to withstand bloc pressure to become more substantially involved in the conflict...

...Last year, for example, they refrained from taking sides in either the border dispute over the Rann of Cutch or the Kashmir war...

...Of course, Soviet and American interests in Asia are not identical, and their parallel interests do not yet provide the basis for deep, longrange collaboration against China...

...The recent Chinese taunt that Moscow should send supplies to North Vietnam by sea rather than through China reflects Peking's desire to see an American interdiction of Russian ships...

...All of this could lead to a radicalization of Pakistani politics...

...Moscow faces two dangers in moving closer to Pakistan...

...During the same period the Kremlin quietly diluted its formerly uncompromising support for the Indian position on Kashmir and moved towards a position of neutrality between India and Pakistan...

...For example, a new generation of Chinese leaders could very well bring China closer to the Soviet Union by a decision to join with Moscow in expelling the United States from Asia through more subtle means than those presently employed by Mao...

...Even the Tashkent accord came as a surprise and may be a result of Soviet promises, particularly to Ayub, which could prove embarrassing in the future...

...Well before that turn of events, the Russians had patiently set the stage for a diplomatic comeback in Pakistan...

...confrontation that neither wants is one of the most cogent reasons for the United States to avoid expanding the bombing of North Vietnam even if the present pause does not lead to negotiations...

...Alarmed at the increase of Chinese influence there, and sensing an opportunity to exploit growing Pakistani-American tensions, Moscow signed an oil deal with Rawalpindi as early as 1961, concluded an air agreement in 1963 immediately after Peking, and last year rushed in with new aid offers despite a drastic cut in overall Soviet aid commitments...

...But while the obstacles to a Soviet-sponsored reconciliation of Pakistan and India remain enormous, the Russians still have some cards left and are not likely to give up the effort...

...But immediately thereafter, the Russians embarked on their unilateral course to reconcile India and Pakistan and increase Soviet influence in both countries at the expense of China and the United States...

...Were it not for Vietnam, it would be safe to predict that Moscow would continue to play a moderating role in Asia...

...military activities...

...Consequently, Moscow is in the unenviable position of trying to reconcile a new Indian leader who cannot afford to make concessions on Kashmir with a Pakistani leader who cannot afford not to obtain such concessions...

...CHALLENGE TO THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION Russia's New Asian Offensive By Donald S. Zagoria Two years ago the Soviet Union was on the defensive all over Asia: It was losing ground to Peking in most of the Asian Communist parties, and in the nonCommunist states of Indonesia and Pakistan...

...in the United Nations, Moscow is playing the "imperialist" game...

...Indeed, the main purpose of the Shelepin mission to Hanoi seems to have been to obtain Hanoi's backing for an international Communist conference - probably to be held during the meeting of the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1966-that would endorse a unified program of action on Vietnam...

...The Russians have been using the slogan of united action with good effect...

...To woo Turkey, they shifted from complete support of Greece against Turkey on the Cyprus issue to a position of neutrality much as they have done in the case of India and Pakistan...

...Premier Kosygin has already opened the way for further meetings and, given its proximity to China, India does not want to affront the Russians...

...Since a Sino-Soviet rapprochement seems unlikely at the present, however, the crucial question for the future is how Soviet policy in Asia will evolve as a result of the Vietnamese war...

...If a way out of the Vietnamese impasse can be found in the near future-before Russia and the United States confront each other there-events of the past year suggest that the two super-powers would work along parallel lines for stability in Asia and against Chinese expansion...

...Peking's principal goal in the Asian subcontinent has been to keep India and Pakistan at each others' throats over Kashmir, and thereby both weaken India and make Pakistan more dependent on China for military and diplomatic support...

...nor does it want to appear uncooperative to the United States, which is tacitly supporting the reconciliation attempt, at a time when it faces its most acute famine since independence...

...The record indicates, therefore, that Moscow and Washington have important parallel interests in Asia...

...In Pakistan, too, the Chinese overplayed their hand and again Moscow-more than Washingtonhas been the beneficiary...

...In Hanoi, too, the Chinese have overplayed their hand to the advantage of the Russians...

...That situation has now changed radically...

...Therefore, any cooperation between Moscow and Washington in that part of the world will be of short duration, occasioned by crisis situations...

...To judge from the troop withdrawal negotiated under Soviet auspices at Tashkent, this danger has been evaded so far...

...But if this Chinese policy were to change, so would the triangular relationship...

...Donald S. Zagoria, author of The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61, is an assistant professor in the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University...

...More recently, and particularly since Hanoi adopted its four-point peace proposal, Moscow has been following the North Vietnamese lead in order to avoid exposing itself to Peking's appeasement charges...

...They probably told the North Vietnamese leaders that although Hanoi can count on Soviet support if the war is enlarged, it should first explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement which could lead to a political victory without the risk of massive destruction in North Vietnam...

...The first, possible damage to Soviet relations with India, is offset by the fact that India cannot afford to weaken its ties to Russia as long as the China threat persists, and by a delicate domestic balance of forces in India that might be upset by an exclusive American orientation...

...There is considerable evidence, however, to suggest that Moscow continues to counsel restraint...

...The Soviets did cooperate with the United States in the United Nations to bring about a ceasefire...