The Strategies of Detente
KLINGHOFFER, ARTHUR JAY
The Strategies of Detente STRATEGIC POWER AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY By Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush Chicago. 225 pp. $5.95. KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARMS RACE By Lincoln...
...Wary of risking the highest stakes, atomic holocaust, the Soviet Union and United States have confronted each other in a fast-paced game of psychological enervation...
...And all such statements, including a good number by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, are accepted without their motivation or veracity being questioned...
...The authors concentrate on the "missile gap" of the late 1950s, its exposure as being false, and the subsequent Soviet foray into Cuba...
...This study is a useful and comprehensive compendium of facts related to arms control...
...After the Cuban fiasco, the Soviet Union showed a greater willingness to reach accords with the United States...
...They point out that the USSR increased defense spending in 1961 at the same time that economic growth declined...
...The Soviet leaders constantly sought to strengthen the belief in the supposed "missile gap" in order to create an image of strategic superiority...
...After the "missile gap" fallacy was exploded in 1961, the Soviets embarked upon the 1962 Cuban adventure in a new effort to seize the strategic initiative...
...had a greater delivery capability...
...Uncertain about the true extent of Soviet missile capabilities, the U.S...
...Although sometimes significant, the authors believe that economic considerations are not a major factor in armament policies...
...KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARMS RACE By Lincoln Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens Jr...
...Agreement on a partial nuclear test ban, prohibition of bombs in orbit, reduced production of fissionable material, and the hot line soon followed...
...Confidence in United States military superiority and anticipation of a continuing East-West détente are common elements of the two studies...
...Despite its overall impressiveness, however, the work is not without flaws...
...Once this image was generally accepted, the Kremlin was able to use it to both back up a sometimes aggressive foreign policy and neutralize the United States...
...Soviet strategic power is used as a fulcrum for military and political offensives...
...For example, the authors base their entire presentation upon the a priori premise that the "missile gap" was exclusively a gigantic Soviet bluff...
...As Khrushchev upset the balance by leaning more toward the West, the Sino-Soviet dispute became more virulent...
...Generally excellent in both style and analysis, the book's only weakness is an occasional seige of excessive technicality...
...338 pp...
...They also fail to discuss the impact of the major work on military strategy produced by Marshal Sokolovsky and his associates...
...They see the "missile gap" as fanciful, depict the Soviet leaders as losing military confidence after its exposure, and cite the Cuban missile affair as a Soviet gamble to gain strategic ascendancy...
...Reviewed by ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER Assistant Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University Although power enhances a nation's prestige and foreign policy capabilities, in this period of precarious East-West détente, psychological considerations have become even more significant than military ones...
...Soviet foreign policy is expertly presented and the motives behind the 1955 changes in Soviet strategy are cogently evaluated...
...and Franklyn Griffiths M.I.T...
...Both volumes are sober, and carefully researched, and since they cover different facets of Soviet strategic thought during the Khrushchev era they complement each other...
...In this world of overkill, the question remains, beyond the assurances of these two books: Will we human lemmings want only conclude our march to the sea...
...The authors further appreciate the decline of bipolarity and pay ample attention to the impact of Soviet strategy upon Communist China, West Germany and the Afro-Asian states...
...The United States is represented as a vigilant but more defensive force, resisting Communist advances and using its strategic power as a deterrent...
...While this is probably true, the little concrete evidence belatedly cited to support the contention consists largely of statements by United States government officials...
...The reader sees Nikita Khrushchev as the man on a tightrope, seeking limited cooperation with the West yet at the same time fearing the effects of his actions upon the more militant Chinese Communists...
...Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush have graphically depicted the tense strategic interplay of the Khrushchev period...
...Moreover, because they present the Soviet leadership of the Khrushchev years as a monolith, Horelick and Rush do not delve into any internal policy differences or interest-group pressures in the Kremlin...
...Where their subject matter coincides with that of Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, their interpretation is somewhat similar...
...But they state that in late 1959 and early 1960, the USSR may have had more ICBM'S on launchers than did the U.S., although the U.S...
...Bloomfield, Clemens and Griffiths offer a many-faceted study of Soviet armament policies...
...The cold war of mutual psychological probing, it is suggested, will continue...
...What we still do not know are the portents of nuclear proliferation or the course that will be taken by a nucleararmed Communist China...
...was kept off-guard...
...The Soviet Union wanted to minimize the strategic advantage held by the United States but, as the authors perceptively affirm, these agreements were also aimed at restraining Communist China...
...The authors' analysis of Soviet options during the Cuban crisis is brilliant, and the final section on implications for future Soviet strategy is most illuminating...
...While clearly cognizant of objective military capabilities, they stress the reciprocal images of the two countries and assert that particularly in a state of general nuclear parity, "the political use of strategic power does not directly depend on the objective capabilities of the two sides.' The Soviet Union is portrayed as the active force, seeking an extension of its influence within the non-Communist world and increasing or reducing tension to accord with changing circumstances...
...Khrushchev and the Arms Race traces Soviet arms control policy throughout the Khrushchev years, with four factors consistently serving as the basis for analysis: strategic policy, foreign policy, domestic politics, and economics...
Vol. 49 • July 1966 • No. 15
