Peace, Morality and Vietnam

...that it is not a problem to be judged merely in terms of the popularity or even the stability of the local regime, but in relation to the entire pattern of international relations at the present time...

...Lastly, it is not even certain that the North Vietnamese themselves would wish to get involved in a land war, thereby acknowledging failure of their revolutionary strategy...

...The fundamental point is that we are now engaged in a slow and tortuous process of creating international stability...

...Reacting by assisting the North Vietnamese would mean getting involved in a theater of action in which the Soviets have no effective military establishment and would therefore be dependent on Chinese goodwill for their logistical and strategic support...

...The United States had acted on this principle during the Hungarian crisis when, in spite of its proclaimed policy of liberation, it exercised self-restraint in refusing help to the Hungarian rebels...

...All of this was ably pointed out by S. L. A. Marshall in these pages ("The Military Mess," NL, March I...

...Many who launched these accusations did so earnestly, and subsequently they had cause to regret their words...

...The increasingly vacillating American posture in Vietnam suggested that, fundamentally, the Chinese might have been right...

...It is therefore likely that the North Vietnamese too will continue to exercise self-restraint and might eventually come to recognize the advantage of international stability...

...Thus the Soviet Union would end up merely pulling Chinese chestnuts out of the fire...

...By reassuring the Soviet Union that it was right in its original analysis, the United States is contributing to the maintenance of the Soviet-American detente, and preventing the Soviet regime from emulating the Chinese posture Indeed, it is only after the more revolutionary Communist movement itself understands that attempts to change the status quo through force of arms are doomed to failure that international stability may be possible in Asia...

...Eventually, perhaps, the Chinese will moderate...

...air power...

...American disengagement would interrupt this process...

...It would also mean sacrificing any chances of improved trade with the Westsomething of far more immediate interest to the Soviets...

...is ready to extend in the event the North Vietnamese desist from their present aggression...

...Since both powers have much to lose from a direct showdown, their mutual presence could set the stage for eventual stability...

...Furthermore, it is not certain that the North Vietnamese would wish the Chinese to become involved, for they certainly have no intention of becoming a Chinese satellite...

...Soviet means of reaction are moreover, limited...

...That is sound, although it is still important not to undermine the credibility of such military action by overstressing the economic benefits the U.S...

...The Chinese Army was flushed with victory in the civil war, and it was operating in an area close to its own major lines of communication...

...Only then will the basis for real negotiation exist...

...The strategic picture, therefore, would not be favorable...

...Recently, however, the new Soviet leaders had reason to doubt the accuracy of this earlier analysis...

...The Soviet Union acted similarly, if more painfully, in Cuba, and it is to the credit of its leadership that it accepted this principle and thereby avoided a nuclear showdown...

...This point is of immense importance, for it reminds us that the Vietnamese problem has to be seen in the light of American-Soviet, Soviet-Chinese, and AmericanChinese relations...

...And the Korean experience certainly does not offer an appealing precedent to the North Vietnamese...

...Eventually, perhaps, an international settlement will resolve the Vietnamese conflict...

...And they were willing to pay that price, because they perceived the dangers of excessive zeal...

...North Korea was devastated, bombed, and overrun...

...These offensive moves provide a more balanced basis for negotiation than mere pleas for a settlement accompanied by predictions of inevitable American defeat...

...Such an involvement would mean transforming a civil war, with all of its international appeal, into a war of the Korean type...

...In Vietnam, it would be tackling a vastly more powerful United States, with the prospect of probable Soviet neutrality, and it would be increasingly forced to jeopardize its own more advanced weapons in an area exposed to effective U.S...

...Self-appointed troubadors of morality are castigating the Administration, labeling those who support its Vietnam policy as warmongers, and rejecting out of hand the considerable evidence of North Vietnamese involvement...

...It can even be argued that the present American moves, including offensive military action against North Vietnam, constitute a form of preliminary negotiation...

...It marked a turning point in AmericanSoviet relations, establishing mutual acceptance of the principle that all major powers must exercise selfrestraint in the nuclear age and, as a corollary, that no major power can risk altering existing political relaZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, a frequent tions by use of force...

...At that time, the United States was relatively disarmed, and the Chinese could count on Soviet support...

...It was in this context that the Soviet leadership began to show renewed interest in North Vietnam...

...The Cuban CrISIS, moreover, marked the beginning of the American-Soviet detente-a detente based on the acceptance by the Soviets of a fundamental shift in the relationship of violence to historical change...

...Eventually, an arrangement might be contrived involving the stationing of Soviet troops in North Vietnam, thereby giving the Soviet Union some influence in an area now under Chinese control, while American troops remain in South Vietnam...

...The chinese,if they become militarily involved, would do so under conditions far less favorable than those in the Korean conflict...

...The Soviets thus paid a great historical price for the Cuban lesson...

...One of the paradoxical advantages of more direct Soviet military involvement would be the establishment of a direct American-Soviet bargaining relationship in this area...

...But the bombing of North Vietnam had the effect of proving the earlier Soviet assumptions right...

...It is yet to be achieved in Asia, where conditions are far less stable to begin with, and where revolutionary interference is thus even more destructive...

...There is little reason to believe, judging by past Soviet experience, that such magnanimity and philanthropy will characterize Soviet foreign policy...

...PERSPECTIVES Peace, Morality and Vietnam By Zbigniew Brzezinski Although nearly three years have passed since the Cuban missile crisis, it is still painful to recall how at the time President Kennedy was abused as a liar, a warmonger, a manufacturer of false evidence...

...At the very least, I think, the 1962 experience demonstrated why caution should govern such judgments...

...The most effective Soviet response could be made only in Berlin, but that would mean a direct and total American-Soviet confrontation...

...What is more important, the Cuban confrontation offered a basic lesson in international politics...

...This was followed, in turn, by a further aggravation of SinoSoviet relations, and by a gradual decline of the Soviet position in the international Communist movement...

...Finally, even if limited support to the North Vietnamese were successful, the ultimate political beneficiaries would be the Chinese...

...Yet today much the same pattern is being repeated...

...This process has succeeded in Europe...

...Asia would be destabilized, and Communist China would be able to proclaim victory for its own strategy...

...The national liberation struggle was not escalating, hence the United States was indeed acting like a paper tiger...

...It is heartening to note in this connection that even the New York Times, which a few weeks ago was advocating "a Titoist solution," i.e., a Communist takeover of all of Vietnam, now recommends that American air strikes be balanced by a peace program...

...It reassured the Soviets that the United States will react if pushed too hard -that there was legitimate merit in maintaining international stability...