Neutrality and South Vietnam
ETZIONI, AMITAI
ANALYZING THE PROSPECTS Neutrality and Vietnam By Amitai Etzioni Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's latest swing through South Vietnam could, at least temporarily, help boost...
...The answer lies, in part, in Peking's fear of American tactical nuclear weapons...
...It seems bent on devoting the next 10 years to building up both its economic and military power, and is hardly likely to opt for a risky, expensive military adventure...
...China's agriculture is in a mess, its industrialization plan is behind schedule, and the country is experiencing a general decline in morale...
...Under these circumstances, a neutral South Vietnam (or Laos) would be no more "exposed" to outside aggression than neutral Cambodia, Nepal, Burma, or Afghanistan...
...But what about indirect aggression...
...Compared with alternative plans now being discussed in Washington, neutralization is fraught with the least danger of provoking a nuclear war, has the least chance of pushing Peking back into Moscow's arms, and seems least likely to force the United States into any direct confrontation...
...The bulk of the Viet Cong's arsenal consists of American weapons captured from the South Vietnamese, home-made equipment, and weapons taken over from the French during the Indochinese War...
...To be sure, there is one "catch" to neutralization...
...A Viet Cong victory would inevitably be viewed as a validation of the Chinese claim that "wars of national liberation" can indeed be fought without courting the danger of nuclear war...
...Current suggestions to blockade or bomb North Vietnam, even if supplemented by South Vietnamese raids, will not necessarily lead to a military victory...
...And certainly it involves some risks, but at this late hour it seems the best way out of a difficult situation...
...Nevertheless, China's bellicose talk covers up a far from daring foreign policy...
...Secondly, by helping to implement genuine neutrality, the Soviets could proclaim that they prevented a dangerous confrontation with U.S...
...Still, it is fair to ask why the Chinese should now abide by a plan similar to the unsuccessful one drawn up in Geneva in 1954...
...Wouldn't the Chinese and North Vietnamese continue to ship military supplies to the Viet Cong and thereby enable it to accomplish a take-over from within...
...With the prospect of increased American pressure looming large, China too might accept neutrality in South Vietnam...
...And, in my view, the only condition under which neutralization can be achieved—i.e., that it be in the interest of all the major powers concerned—now seems to exist...
...Thus China has improved its relations with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan Ceylon, Burma, and Cambodia...
...A Moscow-supported neutralization in South Vietnam could thus provide an impressive ideological victory over Peking...
...Similarly, it has not tried to occupy the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu...
...But if China attempted to annex a negotiated neutralized zone, at once violating a plan the Soviet Union favors and becoming embroiled in a fight with the U.S., it would almost surely be on its own...
...Not that this Force could actually prevent arms shipments across borders...
...As for covert arms shipments of any magnitude, they are almost invariably detected—as they were in Palestine in 1947, in Guatemala in 1954, and in Venezuela in 1963...
...This is one of the principal reasons the Chinese have followed a cautious policy while bitterly complaining of the Soviets' refusal to give them nuclear backing...
...Once it goes into effect, it is virtually certain that revolutionary governments will be established in both South Vietnam and Laos—particularly if all foreign powers truly refrain from intervention...
...Seen through the Chinese Communists' paranoic eyes, however, such things look a good deal different...
...But if these two countries are not annexed to China, as Burma is not, or as Yugoslavia is not annexed to the Soviet bloc, or as Afghanistan is not annexed to either, then it might well be possible for them to develop more economically and politically stable governments...
...power, a confrontation which, if Peking's counsel had been followed, would have been ineluctable...
...retreat and Communist take-over, appear attractive...
...But it has not eliminated the factors in the conflict there which make genuine neutrality, a neutrality that is not merely a thin cover for U.S...
...But the North Vietnamese are extremely unlikely to consider even discussing General de Gaulle's proposal for neutralizing the whole area...
...In addition, Peking has yet to test a single atomic weapon, and most experts now estimate it will not be capable of delivering nuclear bombs—the sine qua non for big-power status —within the next decade...
...It should be remembered, too, that one factor which protects the neutrality of these countries is the prospect of U.S...
...Soviet influence in the international Communist movement could not then help but decline...
...Americans tend not to pay much attention to occasional testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, or to an article in a military magazine which explores the use of such weapons in a confrontation with China...
...but it could serve to inform world opinion of which side has violated the neutrality plan...
...Peking has refrained from invading Taiwan, attempting to annex Hong Kong, or driving into India after collapsing India's defenses...
...It also helps explain why Peking has not openly come to the aid of the Viet Cong, despite massive American help to the South Vietnamese government...
...For psychological effect, I favor maintaining a "remote deterrence" force ready for deployment, at least during the transition period...
...Granted, even with neutralization the situation will still be a far cry from what we would like...
...There are two important reasons for the Soviet Union to be interested in establishing neutrality...
...Moreover, neutralization of North Vietnam would mean a loss of influence and face for China, and no genuine neutralization can be achieved without Mao Tse-tung's blessings...
...Genuine neutralization, on the other hand, offers the twin virtues of making it possible to gain time and avert disaster...
...Amitai Etzioni, Research Associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University, is author of the forthcoming book, Winning Without War...
...This would also make it easier for President Johnson to sell the plan in the United States, and would provide a better precedent for neutralizing other areas of East-West conflict...
...Arms shipments from the North are even now quite small...
...Instead, Chinese policy seems aimed at establishing weak, friendly or neutralist governments on its borders, with the object of safeguarding its flanks and also leaving the door open for a more expansionist policy at a later day...
...To further increase the visibility of such shipments, however, I would propose positioning a UN Observer Force, composed of units from nations in the region, on the borders between North and South Vietnam and on the borders which separate Laos from North Vietnam and China...
...ANALYZING THE PROSPECTS Neutrality and Vietnam By Amitai Etzioni Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's latest swing through South Vietnam could, at least temporarily, help boost the stock of General Nguyen Khanh's regime...
...forces being deployed against an aggressor...
...First, if the present Communist drive in South Vietnam succeeds, the proPeking factions in the Communist parties of the underdeveloped world —and particularly those in Asia— will see it as a decisive triumph of the Chinese over the Soviet position...
...They are too confident of winning the war in South Vietnam, of Peking's support and, in the event of Washington's initiating warlike actions against them, of Moscow's backing...
...At best, such actions might serve to increase the other side's interest in neutralizing the area...
...Of course, the most equitable plan would include North Vietnam in any proposed neutral zone...
...and why it has been so slow and circumspect in encouraging pro-Communist forces in Laos, though the field has been left wide open to them...
...It seems safe to say that a neutral Laos and a neutral South Vietnam will show no more taste for being swallowed up by the Communists than has Belgrade, Rangoon or Kabul...
...at worst, it could involve the U.S.—perhaps before November—in another Korea...
...Such a deterrent should be introduced into South Vietnam as well: We should make it clear that if neutrality is agreed to in South Vietnam or Laos and then breached, we shall come to their assistance with all the means we deem fit...
...It has also raised its standing with many Western countries, including Britain, France and Canada, as well as its industrialized neighbors, Japan and Australia...
...The Chinese appear confident that if they were attacked Moscow would have to support them or else lose the confidence of the other Communist countries as well as its global power status...
...This seems a remote possibility...
Vol. 47 • March 1964 • No. 6
