The Danger of a German Veto

...Bonn had been unwilling to recognize the fact that a major element in the continued Soviet presence in Eastern Europe is the fear of many East Europeans that the removal of Russian influence would inevitably be followed by a return of German predominance in the region...

...And this would probably have a very negative effect on inter-European relations, contribute to new European tensions, and polarize European views...

...Their policies, however, are still strongly opposed in Germany...

...Since Europe will remain the central issue in American-Soviet relations for many years to come, this is close to saying that Bonn should enjoy a veto over American policy toward Russia...

...would harden the German position on the subject of American negotiations with Russia...

...Furthermore, Schroeder himself has given every indication that West German policy toward Eastern Europe no longer ignores the changes which have taken place in recent years in the relationship between the East European states and the Soviet Union...

...This has been the case in Eastern Europe, too...

...policy benefits, quite paradoxically, the more pro-Paris-oriented German politicians, and in the long-run would harm the American-German alliance...

...Secondly, it would have a harmful impact on West European politics and Western Europe's relations with us...

...A great many Germans, especially those associated with the pro-de Gaulle, Strauss and von Guttenberg position, have argued that the KennedySchroeder approach involves a weakening of German interests, and their position is likely to be strengthened by the arguments advanced by Dean Acheson...

...With the appointment of Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroetter and particularly since the assumption of the Chancellorship by Ludwig Erhard, the West German government has given indications of a growing willingness to engage itself peacefully in East European affairs, and to strive —at least by indirect means—to establish itself as the authentic voice of democratic Germany in the East European capitals...

...BY unintentionally encouraging a hardening of the German posture, Washington is also likely to complicate further its relations with Western Europe...

...In some of the above cases the Soviets have made political capital out of supporting the Arab, the Indonesian and even the Somali irredentists...

...In still broader terms, the United States should make it clear that it aims at a peaceful unification of all Europe, and that its contacts with Moscow have as their ultimate purpose promoting the process of change in the Communist world...

...To be sure, the greatest change in Russia's foreign policies was brought about by the Cuban confrontation, which forced the Soviet leaders to realize that a showdown with the United States, either in Cuba or in Berlin, could lead to the destruction of the Soviet Union...

...He went on to urge that we not "continue the British-American-Soviet talks about Germany" because they create "uneasiness and suspicion" in Germany...

...Since it is highly unlikely that a rigidly static American and German posture would prevent closer economic contacts with the East (especially since the business circles in the West are likely to insist upon them in any case), the adoption of an American policy of "Germany first"' would permit the Soviets to have their cake and eat it too...

...It is a conception which they are not willing to articulate clearly for obvious political reasons, but one which involves initially the re-establishment of German sovereignty over East Germany, to be followed subsequently by a resolution of the frontier issue in Germany's favor...

...Accordingly, a recognition, formal or only de facto, of the Ulbricht regime is out of the question...

...It is in the interest of neither the United States nor Western Europe as a whole to precipitate a new armed conflict, and the sooner any ambiguity on this issue is removed the better it will be for the future of Europe, including Germany...

...Greater freedom for Eastern Europe, including the reunification of Germany, can only come as the result of an over-all change in the relationship between the East Europeans and the Russians on the one hand, and the Americans and the West Europeans on the other...

...To an extent this was done by Chancellor Adenauer, who had repeatedly promised that Germany would not use force to redress any wrongs which it feels have been imposed on it as a consequence of the World War II, particularly with respect to the frontier issue...

...Certainly, West German views have to be considered, but the task is to see them in a wider perspective than the understandable, though necessarily parochial, German interest in reunification and in regaining territories possessed in 1937...

...Precisely because the United States is a global power, and precisely because it must maintain a global perspective in shaping the American-Soviet relationship—and its implications for American-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations—it is imperative that the United States exercise over-all leadership...

...But it is neither in the American interest nor is it essential that the U.S...

...Since the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, the United States has systematically pursued a course of establishing gradually but persistently closer contacts with the East Europeans, while at the same time improving its relations with the Soviet Union...

...Indeed, one may further suspect that under present conditions the Soviet Union would welcome a GermanAmerican return to a rigid posture vis-à-vis the East...

...This can only be done by asserting the essential autonomy of American initiative...

...Giving West Germany a veto over United States policy toward the East means, in effect, that the proponents of the more rigid position can argue that there is no need for Germany to take initiatives on its own...

...France, England, Italy, and all of Western Europe have an interest in European stability, and their views are equally important...

...The Erhard-Schroeder leadership seems to recognize that there is increasing room in Eastern Europe for Western economic and political maneuver, and that Germany should be prepared to participate in such common undertakings...

...While Bonn has not yet undertaken direct diplomatic relations, this initiative constitutes an important departure from the past...

...This policy has been based on the sound assumption that real peace in Europe first requires a gradual change in the relationship between the West and the East, and that the direct reunification of Germany or the "liberation" of individual East European states is no longer feasible...

...THINKING ALOUD The Danger of a German Veto By Zbigniew Brzezinski IN a speech delivered at the University of Connecticut (and published in the New York Times Magazine of December 15) Dean Acheson argued that, "in making political and military judgments affecting Europe a major—often the major—consideration should be their effect on the German people and the German government...

...At the same time...

...This is likely to come, however, at its end rather than at its beginning, since it will first require a qualitative change in Russia's relationship with Eastern Europe as well as with the West...

...It is not likely to involve any change in the territorial status quo, for that could only take place with the use of major force...

...But of late, in part because of a domestic re-evaluation and in large measure because of the influence of the Kennedy Administration, the West German government has begun to shift its views...

...Until quite recently, Bonn's prevailing position was that reunification will be achieved at some future point when the Soviet Union realizes that it can no longer expand into Western Europe and Western "strength" forces it to withdraw...

...It denies the proponents of the more activist policies of engagement the argument that their initiatives also reflect the common interest of the West and are in keeping with the position pursued by Washington...

...identify itself with the West Germans as far as the future of East Central Europe is concerned, and this is particularly trae with respect to American-Soviet relations...

...Indeed, it is unlikely that they will heal until the generation which experienced the horrors of Nazi occupation has passed from the scene...

...In addition, Acheson's proposed policy would tend to work against the present trends in Eastern Europe...

...This posture justified continued German unwillingness to establish diplomatic relations with East European nations, fortified formally by the principles of the Hallstein Doctrine...

...There are three good reasons why this counsel is wrong and dangerous...

...President Kennedy was very conscious of this, and that is why he was able to establish himself as a global leader...

...In part, one may suspect that the crisis itself was brought on by the Soviets in order to consolidate their control over Central Europe...

...While Germany is one of our principal allies, it is not our only ally...

...The immediate consequence of the Sino-Soviet dispute has been a weakening of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and, thus far, only a partial yet still significant change in the Soviet ideological attitude toward such issues as war and peace and relations with the West...

...Zbigniew Brzezinski is Projessor of Government and Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University...

...There is a strong impression among many observers that the Germans have a two-stage conception of their reunification...

...It might also have brought about a freezing of the Israeli-Arab, the Malaysian-Indonesian, the IndianChinese and the Soviet-Chinese borders, thus reducing in all cases the Kremlin's capacity for mischief-making and further inciting the Chinese against the Soviets...

...Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union involve immediate and long-range American interests independently of Germany...

...on the other, it is likely to encourage the rest of our European allies, particularly the Germans and the French, to intensify their arguments on behalf of an essentially rigid and passively "hard" posture...

...Since the critics of the Erhard-Schroeder line are proGaullist, making the anticipated German reaction "the major" consideration in the formulation of U.S...

...Trade missions have been opened in Warsaw, Budapest and Bucharest...

...In fact, it seems to me that we were far too precipitous in dismissing Khrushchev's recent proposal for a border freeze...

...IT is important for American policy toward the Soviet Union to differentiate between what is essential and what is not...

...Given the domestic political situation in Germany, it is extraordinarily difficult for a German politician to appear more yielding and more accommodating with respect to the East than Washington or Paris...

...With increased stability and mutual security, Eastern Europe will gradually evolve its own freedom, and the puppet regime in East Germany will become untenable for the Soviets...

...His most recent book is Africa and The Communist World published by Stanford...

...policy...

...Part of the process will inevitably involve the reunification of Germany...

...Under these circumstances, it is absolutely incumbent upon Germany to do all that it can to reassure the East Europeans of its peaceful intentions...

...German policy toward the East was rigid for many years...

...The United States has persisted in this attitude in spite of the Berlin crisis precipitated by the Soviet Union in 1958...

...One can hardly expect the new Labor government to welcome overt acknowledgment by the United States that West Germany is now its primary European ally, especially since the result of such an acknowledgment is reasonably certain to be the external hardening of the German position and an internal shift in favor of Germany's pro-Gaullist elements...

...It cannot be accomplished by coming close to conceding to an important yet still only regional ally an effective veto on U.S...

...It did contain certain loopholes, to be sure, but giving the proposal serious consideration could have enabled us to improve our posture on the Oder-Neisse issue without offending our West German ally...

...Nevertheless, in the spectrum between war and peace there are a great many possible variations in attitude and posture, and recent years have seen a certain evolution in Soviet foreign and domestic policies...

...On one extreme, it is likely to push some of our allies in the direction of neutralism, with England and possibly Italy taking the lead...

...It would also aid Soviet efforts to reconsolidate their control without in any way contributing to the creation of the preconditions necessary for the eventual return of Eastern Europe, and particularly of East Germany, to the European fold...

...It is essential that the United States not recognize the division of Germany as permanent, nor do anything which would implicitly contribute to the perpetuation of this division...

...and could have the effect of upping the French ante and encouraging de Gaulle to advocate, with greater assurance than ever, that the United States should under no circumstances negotiate with the Soviet Union on the subject of Berlin and the future of Central Europe—thereby putting a premium on rigidity in European affairs...

...That is why American-Soviet talks about Germany are both justified and desirable as a way of avoiding either drifting back to the old "they will yield if we stand pat" line, or precipitating new Soviet pressures...

...Similarly, a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which includes East Germany, cannot be considered under any circumstances...

...Moreover, the obvious emphasis on Germany as America's number one ally in Europe, inherent in the Acheson view, can only further antagonize the English, not to mention the possibility of stimulating English neutralism after Harold Wilson's predicted electoral victory...

...Nonetheless, a great deal of ambiguity remains...

...First of all, its application would have a negative effect on internal German politics and on external German policy...

...Thirdly, it could halt, or even reverse, some of the recent trends in the Soviet world toward more diversity and autonomy for the Communist-ruled East European nations...

...The frontiers of the eventually reunited and reunified Germany have never been spelled out clearly by Bonn, and the formal insistence of the German government on the legality of the 1937 German frontiers has an ominous ring not only for the Poles but also for the other East European nations, such as Czechoslovakia, who would not like to find themselves surrounded by the Germans should the 1937 frontiers be restored...

...Giving Bonn this veto would inevitably intensify the competition for Germany's favor...

...The memories of World War II are still fresh, and not all the wounds have healed...

...This rejection involves a legitimate and vital German interest, and that is why George Kennan, in my view, went too far in suggesting fin his January Foreign Affairs article) that West German leaders "accept the existence of a Communist Germany...

...That would merely be a concession to the division of Europe and would permit Khrushchev to suck the United States into co-sponsoring the line on the Elbe...