Alternatives in the Congo

...whatever his shortcomings, is the only legal Prime Minister of the Congo, it should not be taken without several grains of salt...

...This is the reason why Tshombe will always have a place on the Congolese political scene—whether in office or in the opposition...

...3. The organization of the forthcoming general election under the supervision of an impartial agency of control, be it the OAU or the United Nations...

...at the same time, the holding of a general election was postponed until 1965...

...It is significant, in this respect, that President de Gaulle has been extremely wary of any open entanglement in the current Congo situation...

...His true significance is that of a powerful baron (one of many), the political boss of an important section of the Congo Republic...

...These considerations merely serve to emphasize that the humanitarian aspects of the Congo rescue operation cannot be separated from its political aspects...

...For one thing, the members of the OAU may find it difficult to agree on any common policy line toward the Congo and to shoulder the cost of a police operation...

...and its legitimacy seems to be still flimsier...

...Serious obstacles will admittedly have to be surmounted before such measures can be put into effect...

...Thus, the renewal of Kasavubu's Presidential mandate was conveniently postponed, but the incumbent Premier was made to resign...

...Ex post facto disputes regarding the scope and tactics of the operation have for the most part been lacking in relevance...

...Get themselves a nigger (tuer du noir...

...But in the past two weeks, the Soviet Union has shown an increasing proclivity to involve itself in the Congo on a scale unequalled since the summer of 1960...

...Either of these two possibilities opens disturbing perspectives on the conception and conduct of our African policy...

...Meaning what...

...Three types of military assistance have been either considered or actually used...

...Another possibility is the extension of military assistance by Western nations—specifically by the United States and Belgium...

...Apart from its technical and functional qualities (which are real), the new Constitution is characterized by the political gimmickry of some of its transitional provisions...

...The restoration (or rather the achievement) of national unity, proclaimed as Tshombe's foremost objective, has been given only lipservice by the Congolese Premier, while his actual policies—indeed, his very presence at the helm of government—have introduced fresh divisive factors in the body politic...

...Finally, there is the solution of an African peacekeeping force...

...he holds no popular mandate, enjoys no support from a freely elected Parliament, and clings to power by exclusive virtue of Kasavubu's discretion...

...Ambassador Attwood and rebel representative Thomas Kanza were broken off within hours of their opening, it has been suggested by some observers that they were conducted with a less than wholehearted commitment...

...Analogies between the Congo and Vietnam, which are common currency these days, occasionally point to a similarity between the Tshombe and Diem regimes, but even this apparent parallelism is deceptive: When the late Ngo-Dinh Diem came to power, he was able to derive a certain amount of popular support from his uncompromising attitude during the terminal period of French colonial rule...

...But, more important, it should be clearly understood that, if the OAU agrees to step into the Congo morass, it will quite naturally insist on conducting an African policy and show considerable sensitivity to any hint of dictation from non-African quarters...

...Thus, the decision to aggravate the jeopardy of those who could not be reached must have been taken with a full realization of possible consequences...

...where bound and gagged Congolese were tossed into the river and used as floating targets by government troops, is only one example among many...

...No one who knows the Congo can have entertained seriously the notion that simultaneous commando actions could rescue all the whites scattered throughout the rebel-held areas...

...This would be, in a number of ways, the most desirable solution—or, at any rate, the least divisive—and the United States has hinted that it would be happy to entertain any constructive suggestion from the OAU to this effect...

...Paul Carlson and countless others is so greatly overshadowed by the much less commendable actions of other white men...

...Under the present circumstances, however, this appears to be little more than wishful thinking...

...in fact, become seriously eroded by the end of 1963) collapsed almost overnight...

...Since, despite the importance of the stakes involved, negotiations between U.S...

...This solution, in turn, raises some major problems...

...There has been considerable disagreement, though, as to the source and functions of this external aid...

...Proof of this may be found in the fact that while denouncing Western intervention, no African or Asian nation even attempted to express regret for the massacre...

...Up to a certain point, indeed, the confusion of humanitarian and political motives was useful to the Leopoldville authorities...

...Even in the cases of Stanleyville and Paulis, policymakers could not be unaware that, no matter how rapid the intervention, the rebels would have time to massacre many of their hostages or to march them off into the bush—which indeed they did...

...That's it...

...The breakdown of communications with the rebels, however, has deeper roots: It can be traced, in part, to the lack of real cooperation (both in Washington and in Leopoldville) with the conciliation commission appointed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—a situation repeatedly deplored by the commission's chairman, Jomo Kenyatta...

...But the alternative to their adoption— for the Congo, for Africa or for the world—is infinitely less attractive...

...The decision to resort to these mercenary units is, in many ways, a carry-over from the practice of the former Katanga "state...

...De Gaulle's well known skill for gauging African sensitivities (even when he chooses to ignore them) holds a valuable political lesson for our policymakers in Washington...

...At the same time, it has helped to reinforce in the public's mind several of the emotional stereotypes too often circulated in the press in lieu of accurate editorial comment...

...The recent tragedy is of the sort which defies rational discussion...

...Edouard J. Bustin, formerly on the faculty of the University of the Congo, is now associate professor of government at Boston University...

...it is also the point where Tshombe's policies differ most radically from those of Adoula...

...Specifically, it is unlikely that the African nations will defer to any Western exhortation to play a more active role in the Congo crisis until they are given assurances that the Leopoldville regime will give way to a more palatable political constellation...

...Until a precise account of those negotiations is available, it is futile to attempt to pass judgement on their chances of success...

...At the same time, the resilience of the rebels, who are now entrenching themselves in the bush and even rcoccupying towns previously captured by the Army, tends to confirm that no purely military solution is possible in the Congo...

...Given the realities of the situation, the preconditions required to set the Congo on the road to political recovery would seem to call for the following steps: 1. The replacement of the Tshombe Cabinet by a caretaker coalition government incorporating all major political factions (including the leaders of the rebellion and Tshombe himself...

...in order) to win to his side an even greater commitment of official Belgian and United States support...

...I am referring to such comments as those found in Time magazine, to the effect that Dr...

...It may of course be argued that the risk of being misunderstood was inevitable, and that it cannot have weighed very heavily against the lives of the hostages...

...At the heart of the discussion lies the widely held consensus that recent events demonstrate that Tshombe cannot restore order and normalcy to the Congo without external military assistance...

...Adoula pleaded in vain for the right to submit amendments to the constitutional draft when it was made public in April...

...Carlson's death "did more than prove that Black African civilization...

...The assumption that the Tshombe government cannot survive without the aid of an outside military force has actually been the basic ingredient of the Congolese Premier's policy since he came to power in July...

...Diplomatic moves which tend to have the OAU step in are almost certain to fail as long as they can be interpreted by the Africans as mere Western maneuvers to bolster the Tshombe regime...

...And there is reason to believe that the Administration's qualms about further military commitment is guided in part by a similar appraisal of the mood of the African states...

...The Congo may therefore be rapidly relapsing into the cold war syndrome from which it had been partially and laboriously extricated by the former Premier Cyrille Adoula...

...One of the few advantages derived from the use of mercenary troops, from a purely Western viewpoint, is that it minimized the need for actual combat involvement by United States or Belgian military personnel...

...A more direct form of Western military intervention might actually be more harmful for United States positions in Africa than the continued presence of white mercenaries and Cuban pilots...

...But the immediate tactical advantages of this solution (evidenced, notably, in the fact that virtually all the military success scored against the insurgents have been the work of these white commandos) are outweighed by its obvious psychological and international drawbacks...

...And the attempts that were made to keep newsmen away from recaptured cities are a significant reminder that the current conflict, whether it is labeled civil war, guerrilla, or colonial war, is an ugly and merciless one...

...The rescue operation in Stanleyville and Paulis, no matter how unadulterated its motives may have been, cannot be evaluated without reference to this conflict...

...That is probably inevitable...

...Tshombe's accession to power has led to a dramatic polarization of political oppositions in the Congo...

...Too many of the mercenaries fit the candid thumbnail description given by one of them, a few days ago, to a correspondent of the Belgian state radio and television: "Q...

...To this day...

...This makes about as much sense as the recurrent Communist judgement that racial violence in the South "proves," American civilization and democracy are mere shams I also submit that we cannot be blind to the fact that the lives of dozens of Congolese citizens conveniently dubbed "rebels" have been exacted by government troops in retaliation for the life of every murdered white...

...The commission began its task just as the Congolese government forces, spearheaded by white mercenaries, had regained the military initiative and it is conceivable that conciliation was then seen as somewhat superfluous...

...Yet, one of the unfortunate by-products of the Stanleyville episode has been to render any sober examination of Congolese affairs virtually impossible...

...The task of preparing the long-awaited Constitution was then bestowed upon an ad hoc commission of 125 members handpicked by President Kasavubu...

...It also hopelessly compromises any attempt to achieve national reconciliation...

...Even nations which Washington normally considers as being "pro-Western" or at least "moderate" inclined to view the rescue operation as being part and parcel of the current BelgoAmerican military action on the side of the Tshombe regime...

...There is serious and understandable reluctance on both sides of the Atlantic to becoming involved in an African version of Laos or Vietnam, and the prospect that direct intervention would invite a corresponding move on the part of Communist powers is not taken lightly either in Washington or in Brussels...

...As a Christian Science Monitor editorial noted, Tshombe "was not above using the hostages for political ends...

...It may be that those who committed the crimes were fanatically sincere, or terrified, or both, but sincerity and fear have no intrinsic value: A sincere murderer or a frightened one are still murderers, and nothing can alter that fact...

...They come for the money and they work very efficiently . . . The danger is to find them some day on the other side of the fence . . . They come here to do what they would like to do at home...

...In addition, it is also a permanent invitation to overt—and psychologically justifiable — intervention by other nations on the side of the insurgents...

...This would suggest only two possible conclusions: that the United States diplomatic personnel in Africa were guilty of amazingly poor liaison in failing to warn against the possibility of adverse reactions, or else that the likelihood of such reactions was anticipated and deliberately disregarded...

...Consequently, the legality of the Tshombe government is, at best, a highly formalistic one...

...The Constitution was then adopted by an expeditious and rather questionable referendum...

...France offered only perfunctory approval of the rescue operation and politely, but firmly, declined Tshombe's request for a more active support of his government...

...currently, in Mississippi...

...While his usefulness as a credible symbol of national reconciliation has been largely discredited, his more limited but nevertheless substantial role in the realm of Congolese politics cannot be ignored...

...among whom neither Parliament nor the Cabinet was represented...

...A good deal of the anti-white attitudes dramatically highlighted by the Stanleyville massacre finds its roots in the presence of such men...

...But while there is an almost unanimous recognition of the need for some sort of national reconciliation, no real agreement exists as to the means of achieving this goal...

...This is, as a matter of fact, the most uncontroversial statement that can be made about the Congo today, and it would in all probability be subscribed to by both supporters and adversaries of the Congolese Premier...

...Whatever its repercussions on the diplomatic scene, the rescue operation did not substantially alter the military situation...

...Essentially, it means either that a.) Tshombe must secure some sort of external military assistance, or b.) his inability to pacify the Congo without outside help disqualifies him for the task of achieving national reconciliation...

...The circumstances of the operation themselves were sufficiently ambiguous to invite misapprehension: The air drop coincided with the closing in of mercenary-led columns around Stanleyville...

...This concurs with the other alternative inference derived from the initial proposition: i.e., that political stability and national unity cannot be achieved under the present Congolese regime...

...That the administration should have been "surprised" by the bitterness of the Afro-Asian reaction seems implausible...

...As for the frequently advanced argument that Tshombe...

...yet, in both cases, political factors have been standing in the way of intervention...

...Indeed, one of the tragedies of the Congo is that the work of men like Dr...

...In fact, indiscriminate reprisals against the civilian population have been common since the rebellion broke out almost exactly a year ago...

...There is no doubt that the presence of mercenaries is the chief, if not the only obstacle to some kind of acceptance of Tshombe by other African governments...

...It seems improbable that the Administration could delude itself into believing that the righteousness of its motives would not be questioned by the African nations...

...Since the first national Parliament elected in 1960 had already been dissolved by Presidential decree, this meant the new Premier selected to replace Adoula would be relieved of seeking Parliamentary support and confidence for a period of six months or more...

...These are the conditions under which Tshombe has gained and retained the Premiership...

...What do you think of the mercenaries...

...The shortcomings of this policy are best seen in the light of the Katanga precedent: Widespread use of mercenary units was incapable of establishing any stable control by the secessionist regime...

...This was bound to inspire sinister interpretations of the whole operation...

...Momentous as these decisions were, because the stakes were set in terms of human lives, the element of gamble they involved was probably inescapable once the premise of intervention had been accepted as being the only possible recourse...

...2. The dispatch of an African police force created by the OAU and designed not only to enforce a truce between Congolese factions and supervise the withdrawal of mercenaries, but also to insure the political neutrality of the armed forces, particularly in the capital...

...But was it...

...One cannot overcome the disquieting suspicion that every alternative to military intervention may not have been adequately explored...

...First and foremost, there are the white troops recruited from South Africa, Rhodesia, Belgium, Portugal, and elsewhere...

...The recent case of Kindu...

...Indications are that the same conclusion has been reached by the Department of State...

...In other words, it was known—from a humanitarian viewpoint—that the rescue mission was bound to be at least partly unsuccessful, that only a certain number of hostages could be reached in time...

...On the other hand, Tshombe holds a political asset which the mandarin nepotist of Saigon never had: his own popular home base in Southern Katanga...

...Rival factions are now further apart than at any time since 1960...

...At that time, though, threats were already being made by the rebels against the lives of United States and Belgian citizens...

...While the reverse decision was reached in the Congo, it is hardly conceivable that the operation was planned and executed without some previous appraisal of its possible political sideeffects...

...Humanitarian motives alone could have justified action in Hungary or...

...Yet, if moral indignation is to have any meaning, it cannot afford to be one-sided or tainted with a racial bias...

...is largely a pretense...

...The precarious edifice of national reconciliation which had been laboriously built by Adoula (and which had...

...AFTER STANLEYVILLE Alternatives in the Congo By Edouard J. Bustin A month after the completion of the Congo rescue operation, the need for a dispassionate assessment of the problems faced by that unhappy country is perhaps greater than ever...

...Despite the terminological escalation evidenced in the press (which spoke, in succession, of the rebels as being "Communist-encouraged," "Communist-inspired" and "Communist-led"), little proof of any extensive Communist influence was found among the mass of documents captured in the former rebel capital...

...Late in 1963, the national Parliament (or what remained of it after repeated purges of its Lumumbist elements) was despoiled by Presidential fiat of its constituent powers...

...Tshombe lacks even this initial capital...