De Gaulle's Grand Design-A Debate:
GORDON, BERNARD K. & HAHN, JOHN R. THOMAS, WALTER F.
DE GAULLE'S GRAND DESIGN - A DEBATE General de Gaulle's recent actions have stirred sharp controversy over what United States policy should be toward France in particular and Europe in general....
...As the British experience in the "Blue Streak" and "Blue Steel" era of the mid-'50s has demonstrated, allowing an ally to learn from one's own expensive mistakes often results in a strengthened alliance...
...responses to the French position and the new situation it creates, rather than the stand itself, could work to the Soviet's advantage...
...When he was in the Senate, John F. Kennedy pleaded that France resolve its Algerian problem...
...difficulties in Europe...
...Thus it seems clear that the important thing now is to come to grips with the meaning of the term that has epitomized U.S...
...We cannot equate the expense of the American nuclear arsenal, with its wide array of weapons and nuclear warhead development, with that planned by the French...
...Like any other boom, the current European economic spiral must inevitably level off, prompting commensurate changes in European attitudes...
...De Gaulle gets widespread applause when he thumbs his nose at Washington, and even when he does the same to London there is scattered applause...
...But in the process he forgets a salient lesson of history: Nationalism always begets its own counterforce...
...Can he reunify Germany...
...In keeping with his hauteur, the General has been perfectly candid in tracing his "grand design...
...The argument whether Mirage IV aircraft would or would not penetrate Soviet air defenses is an academic one: De Gaulle does not really believe that his force de frappe will ever have to be invoked...
...Second, is a "strong Western Europe" compatible with de Gaulle's design...
...he wants to merge Europe with France...
...And by recognizing France's new economic strength and stabilizing its politics, de Gaulle has made it objectively possible, for the first time since 1914, to integrate Germany effectively into Europe without the aid of outside forces...
...This might—repeat, might—be so, but the formal German renunciation of nuclear weapons in 1954 is not affected by the recent closer ties with France...
...Then, as now, the defeat of the European Defense Community at the hands of the French National Assembly seemed to signal the arrival of NATO at a critical crossroads...
...It would be tragic if the United States, which since 1946 has nurtured European stability, did not see that many of its desires have already been met...
...The two articles below, we believe, accurately reflect the debate currently being waged in official and semi-official circles...
...To begin with, France has the advantage of being able to benefit from the vast amount of scientific information already available in this area, and it also can concentrate its resources on a very small number of devices...
...Gordon and Thomas ask what de Gaulle wants, and answer: "Stripped of words like 'mystique' and 'grandeur,' with which his name and policy have been surrounded, de Gaulle wants a strong Western Europe in which Germany and France are the leading forces...
...How are we to deal with Charles de Gaulle...
...are very real and very durable, but hidden behind them is at least a countervailing respect for genuinely solid power...
...The U.S...
...Even if "Bonapartism" does not describe the General's personality or bearing, it fits his design of a new Continental system, down to his Utopian projection of that system from "Gibraltar to the Urals...
...officials, which simply endorsed Britain's becoming part of the Community without detailing the growing difficulties the move was encountering, serve to enlighten Americans...
...cannot expect to alter the will of France by threats or by forcing the other European nations to choose between France and America...
...but for the French, who have fewer alternatives, it might very well be acceptable...
...True, a Germany internally controlled and integrated with Europe is no less likely to become a nuclear force than a Germany held in check by distant American control...
...De Gaulle is a worthy partner, and his willingness to bear a greater share of the Western defense burden need not be a cause for U.S...
...should not react spitefully and precipitately to de Gaulle's peremptory actions...
...How de Gaulle himself hopes to keep West Germany tied to his objectives after Adenauer's departure is, of course, a large question...
...The U.S...
...The inescapable fact is that only the United States is in a position to secure Germany's interests...
...it is the essence of statesmanship, in any situation, to proceed with prudence and tact...
...Stripped of words like "mystique" and "grandeur," with which his name and policy have been surrounded, de Gaulle wants a strong Western Europe in which France and Germany are the leading forces...
...The USSR may miscalculate the benefits that would follow a Western "split," however, and that could lead to actions dangerous to the West and the Soviet Union alike...
...True, de Gaulle now has recourse to the coercive instrument of the Common Market...
...In his eyes, the disparagement of Britain is justified by a special AngloAmerican relationship which the British enjoy...
...In the light of the fears consistently articulated by Europeans in the past, this would constitute an astonishing upsurge of confidence...
...Not much else need be lost to the West, however, if the U.S...
...is reduced to this level of selfdefeating threat, then relations between Germany and the other nations of the West will already have deteriorated so far that it will not make much difference who is attempting to inhibit German actions...
...What, after all, does de Gaulle want...
...But if the U.S...
...And, to paraphrase Stalin's cynical query about the power of the Pope, how many nuclear warheads does the General have...
...Thus in the minds of Soviet leaders today, current U.S.-French differences have a dual significance: They confirm Lenin's thesis, and they also present opportunities for Communist exploitation...
...This does not mean, however, that the U.S...
...He would favor it not because of any "softness on Communism," but because of his often reiterated conviction that the Soviets, enmeshed in their own bloc and domestic problems, have no intention of aggrandizing themselves at the expense of Western Europe...
...Without speculating about the probable person and policy of Adenauer's successor, it is sufficient to suggest that in several key respects the interests of the two countries are not naturally aligned...
...policy in Europe...
...As for the first tendency, it is significant that on the whole Americans have been given only one side of the story...
...A "strong Western Europe," I gather, means a cohesive Europe...
...and 3) appreciate that faulty U.S...
...De Gaulle believes that the move toward "Atlantic Community" has been over-propagandized and sentimentalized...
...The current rumblings against de Gaulle's peremptory blackballing of Britain are perhaps better signposts of the future...
...Gordon and Thomas also contend that to de Gaulle the "disparagement of Britain seems justified by the special Anglo-American relationship...
...It is often objected that de Gaulle's force de frappe notions will be too expensive for France...
...An overly negative American reaction to de Gaulle could lead the Soviets to believe that Western differences afford them a free hand to threaten and blackmail France and Germany...
...If, as it seems, this statement refers to the recent Franco-German accord, then the proposition is an extremely questionable one...
...Perhaps by constantly (and rightly) emphasizing that the defense of the West is indivisible, the U.S...
...A deterrent force aimed entirely at a few cities—especially Leningrad, Kiev and Moscow—would loom as a highly effective deterrent to the Russians...
...will realize that its own security is inextricably tied to the security of Western Europe...
...And if there is any doubt on this score, then on these narrow grounds alone de Gaulle's policies deserve closer attention than they appear to have been given...
...Furthermore, if the Dutch, the Belgians and the Italians have in the past harbored resentments toward the Anglo-American "alliance within an alliance," they are likely to be equally, if not more, perturbed under a Franco-German combine within the much more narrow confines of a Continental constellation...
...If the vilification of de Gaulle is sharper than that accorded Pierre Mendès-France almost a decade ago, this reflects an awareness that the U.S...
...Thus far there has been a shared NATOSoviet interest in keeping nuclear arms out of German hands, and this should be maintained in order to forestall a needlessly fearful Soviet response...
...Tactically speaking, perhaps the most likely and dangerous area for immediate Soviet miscalculation as a result of de Gaulle's actions relates to Germany...
...and European security...
...But these (understandably) responsive chords are far from signifying a European willingness to embrace French leadership...
...to follow the "logic" of military technology back to "Fortress America," with or without the facesaving device of mutual disengagement...
...can avoid such dangers...
...Is it so certain that he is not correct...
...It would be an abdication of policy for Washington to pin its hopes on his early demise, or to expect that his views will somehow be "reduced to a footnote of history...
...But if, as some people maintain, the United States can more effectively control Germany than France, then it must be asked: by what leverage...
...By threatening to reevaluate our commitment to Berlin...
...French Mirage IV aircraft, moving at a speed and altitude which give only a few seconds notice, are capable of penetrating Soviet defenses...
...A Boon in Disguise By Bernard K. Gordon and John R. Thomas Reaction in this country to Charles de Gaulle's rejection of Britain's entry into the Common Market has been marked by three possibly harmful tendencies: failure to 1) recognize the circumstances that led to the rejection...
...In the same vein, de Gaulle should clearly not be tarred with a "soft on Communism" brush simply because he is willing to envisage a European "third force...
...Before de Gaulle's veto, the press and other communications media simplistically portrayed a Britain anxiously awaiting to be embraced by the Common Market...
...The agreement is a symbolic act reflecting the passionate goal of Konrad Adenauer, a man who, with painful reluctance, is about to step down from power, and who wants to erect this last monument to his life-long conviction...
...will not desert them...
...For years he has frustrated the efforts of men like Walter Hallstein, who hold that political unification requires planned institutional growth parallel to that required by economic integration...
...cannot hope to adopt some of his policy's "positive" points while rejecting the negative ones...
...On the other hand, Americans should not blink at the fact that de Gaulle spells bad news—for Europe as well as for the U.S...
...A nuclear-armed Germany would be seen by them as at least as great a threat as the Cuban missile bases were felt to be by the U.S...
...Next, would a French-led confederation of Continental nations be a cohesive one...
...has also come to believe its undivided control of the alliance is the only way to preserve security...
...This is the crux of the contradiction posed by de Gaulle...
...This sentence is loaded with assumptions which deserve close examination...
...Surely, though, the case is arguable...
...It is doubtful even whether, in unveiling his grand design, he speaks for a great majority of Frenchmen—certainly not for Jean Monnet and the other architects of postwar Europe...
...Conceivably, at the present time Europeans might go along with de Gaulle's "third force" notions...
...It might be further objected that de Gaulle's FrancoGerman axis may help place a German finger on the atomic trigger...
...Ignored almost completely were the special conditions London was insisting upon—particularly for Australian and New Zealand fanners...
...Both the Labor party and Conservative right came out against entry, while many other politicians and intellectuals remained indecisive...
...It does not seem unfair to say, therefore, that the losses brought about by de Gaulle's action have been exaggerated...
...sits by passively—let alone, if it should endorse de Gaulle's "third force" project—it is not implausible to envision a gradual shift in the climate of American opinion and policy which would make it infinitely easier for the U.S...
...must instead emphasize that it continues to stand as the major deterrent to overt Soviet aggression, whatever the future course of Franco-American relations...
...After all, the argument runs, does not a strong independent Europe constitute a major goal of America's postwar endeavors...
...Bad News for the West By Walter F. Hahn THE current debate in the United States over President de Gaulle's rejection of Britain's entry into the Common Market evokes sharp and unhappy memories of 1954...
...American officials should stress in public statements those elements of de Gaulle's program which have merit, and, at the very minimum, soft-pedal its seemingly disintegrating features...
...Conversely, determination to win a leading world role for France and Germany is based on the fact that politically and economically these two countries are already Europe's most dynamic elements...
...In any event, considering the line of thinking represented by Franz-Josef Strauss when he was West Germany's Defense Minister, there can be no guarantee that under U.S...
...What de Gaulle fears, pure and simple, is the entry of Britain on any terms— with or without a "special relationship," with or without economic ballast—as a rival or counterbalance to France's pre-eminence in Europe...
...This effort can help give the U.S...
...It means that Americans have to accept the fact that the U.S...
...objectives: "free nations associating freely...
...However differently from the U.S...
...The first question is: Can anyone who has read de Gaulle's memoirs, listened to his speeches, and witnessed his policy moves strip away such words...
...Gordon and Thomas suggest that de Gaulle and Europe "understand" that, when the chips are down, the U.S...
...He does not want to merge France with Europe...
...In fact, beyond the economic ties of the Common Market (on which, by the way, Germany is less dependent than the other countries), de Gaulle's scheme could hardly integrate Germany into Europe "without the aid of outside forces...
...It is an accord between two men, binding upon their countries only so long as they are in a position to decree it and the interests of the two countries are aligned...
...maintains that de Gaulle's force de frappe is inconsistent with the technology and strategic environment of the late '60s and '70s...
...For him it would be primarily a political instrument designed to accredit France's pre-eminence in Western Europe...
...In the same way, the U.S...
...Nor should the eventual shape of those relations be allowed to deteriorate...
...But it seems illusory to assume that this is principally responsible for de Gaulle's opposition to British entry into Europe, that de Gaulle is beset by fears of an American Trojan horse in the councils of Europe...
...influence from Europe...
...continues to imply such doubts, it plays into Soviet hands...
...Thousands of others similarly hoped for an end to the instability which plagued the Fourth Republic and necessarily resulted in a weakened Europe...
...not cooperate with him by admitting some of the "positive" points in his policy...
...And herein lies the reason for his ironclad opposition to any meaningful measure of European political integration and his conception of a "Europe of Fatherlands...
...To sum up: I agree that the U.S...
...This would be costly, and unattractive for the United States, where other deterrents are more feasible...
...fears...
...Surface-to-air defensive missiles have a limited range, and unless Russia is liberally covered with such missiles at least some French planes will get through...
...On the other, the Soviets appear concerned that, in the absence of American leadership, the Franco-German alliance might eventually deteriorate into German "revanchist" domination...
...Yet it is quite a leap from recognizing this to the self-solacing notion that what is happening in Europe today might actually be a boon to both the U.S...
...A public row within NATO at this time obviously would benefit no one except the Soviets...
...Yet these conditions drew the opposition not merely of de Gaulle but of the Five as well...
...This same conviction underlies his evaluation of an independent deterrent force...
...Probably the most immediate loss is the boost that Britain's stagnating industry might have received from wider participation in European markets— though it is by no means certain that it would have succeeded in competing with French and German industry, either in Europe or in Britain itself...
...Taking nothing away from de Gaulle's many attributes, these are feeble guarantees for the future and doubtful substitutes for "distant" (whatever that means) American control...
...That the Soviets could respond out of desperation is a possibility not to be underestimated...
...a better negotiating position with de Gaulle himself...
...And if strains appear in the Continental system, or if a disillusioned and uncontrolled Germany decides to solve its own problems in its own way, the danger of a Soviet miscalculation might become more real than any Khrushchevian misstep induced by current friction within the alliance...
...is disagreeing not merely with a politician over the tactics of Western unity, but with an extremely self-confident, uncompromising man over the future design of the Western alliance—if, indeed, "alliance" in the strict meaning of the term is part of his design...
...If the debate today is more acrimonious and "agonizing," this is because it is recognized that the crossroads are more starkly drawn and fraught with more sinister implications...
...If the day should come when the U.S...
...European resentments of the U.S...
...security interests...
...The point here is that de Gaulle's design does not mean binding integration, let alone control, of Germany...
...For even if the British had gone into Europe, it would eventually have had to be realized that European political unity, envisaged as an outgrowth of the Common Market, was not acceptable to Britain...
...In other words, he wants a strong Europe in which France is the undisputed leading force, not one in which "Germany and France are the leading forces...
...At the least, de Gaulle would not stand in the way of such a withdrawal, which would remove the last major crowbar of U.S...
...There has been considerable breast-beating about how the U.S...
...Europeans cannot be expected to muster the same respect for France, a second-rung nation which by the doubtful trappings of a force de frappe is pretending to European hegemony...
...Certainly it would be difficult to demonstrate that such a policy would result in a net loss to Western and U.S...
...At best, though, this is an unproven objection...
...This can be done if it is recognized that the consequences of the General's behavior are not cataclysmic but catalytic...
...If it is not, the fissures which will ultimately develop within the alliance under the impact of Gaullist "leadership" may well dwarf any of the current frictions caused by American opposition to de Gaulle's designs...
...It should also be remembered that de Gaulle has achieved great victories for the West...
...has mismanged its alliance diplomacy and must now brace itself to reap the whirlwind...
...In any event, many Americans would not share such optimism...
...must fall into the trap of imposing upon its European allies a categorical choice between American and Gaullist leadership...
...But even if the French effort proves burdensome beyond current expectations, it could prove beneficial to the West...
...the U.S...
...To the extent that de Gaulle represents such a Europe, ought the U.S...
...Such threats would in any event be empty, since de Gaulle and many other Europeans know that, ultimately, the U.S...
...Let us look at a few of these alleged "positive" points...
...Not only is there no basis for this charge, as his treatment of Soviet threats on Berlin amply demonstrates, but the vicious attacks to which Moscow has subjected him should dispel any lingering doubts about his firmness...
...Nor did the public statements of U.S...
...must work with de Gaulle...
...No one can take issue with the warning, sounded above by Bernard K. Gordon and John R. Thomas, against a precipitate U.S...
...He is attempting to secure for France a new and resplendent national identity at the expense of muting the identities of the other members of the confederation...
...influence German nuclearization will be more effectively prevented...
...At that point, some of Herman Kahn's hypothetical scenarios about a Soviet or satellite push westward in Europe under the protective auspices of nuclear "parity" could become very realistic indeed...
...In the long run, however, they are likely to chafe even more violently under the General's peremptory leadership than they do now under the American variety...
...Insofar as the U.S...
...de Gaulle may view the framework within which Western interests should be upheld, his behavior hardly indicates interest in making a deal with Russia at the expense of vital Western concerns...
...Nevertheless, this tendency, tinged with partisan overtones, is also evident in some of the statements now appearing in the press...
...In fact, although many in Europe and the United States looked to eventual political unification as the EEC'S ultimate goal, this goal was least shared by Britain and France...
...and the entire free world...
...In framing its response to de Gaulle's policies, Washington must keep these contradictions in mind...
...What must be explored, therefore, is the potential for gaining positive results from de Gaulle's action...
...At the same time, though, the U.S...
...This brings us to what is probably the most dangerous implication of Gaullist policy...
...True, this "special relationship" has been one of the main sources of U.S...
...It must be understood, moreover, that the man and his design are indivisible...
...Then, as now, vilification was poured upon the man who was deemed responsible for upsetting the movement toward meaningful Western integration...
...Lenin taught that the capitalist world is torn by antagonistic contradictions...
...The stark and potentially fatal contradiction in de Gaulle's approach is that he is trying to have his cake of nationalism and eat it too...
...It seems highly doubtful that economic ties alone—in the absence of the equally meaningful political integration which de Gaulle steadfastly opposes—will ultimately be able to withstand all of these centrifugal forces...
...Moreover, since it was apparent that some Commonwealth interests would inevitably suffer, no firm consensus in favor of joining the EEC was formed by the British public or its political leadership...
...Washington may well have to shelve its cherished objective of Atlantic Community in favor of a U.S.-Western Europe partnership, which would be more compatible with the new European spirit of selfconfidence and independence that de Gaulle is now capitalizing upon...
...Can de Gaulle safeguard Berlin...
...Clearly, de Gaulle does not speak for Europe...
...The authors are all members of the International Studies Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Washington-based research organization...
...This alternative ought to be pressed with all the considerable means at America's disposal...
...On the one hand, the Franco-German rapprochement is welcomed by the Soviets, since it tends to lessen Europe's ties with the United States...
...The counter-argument that any aircraft deterrent must be highly vulnerable is also debatable...
...2) consider the possibility that the General's action need not necessarily result in a weakening of U.S...
...But can he expect to use the Market indefinitely as a leash upon the other five members of the EEC...
...These things de Gaulle has done...
...IN regard t? Germany, Gordon and Thomas assert that de Gaulle, by stabilizing France, has made it "objectively possible, for the first time since 1914, to integrate Germany effectively into Europe without the aid of outside forces...
...Nor is German nuclearization and, by extention, German Irredentism, likely to be prevented more effectively by having the Federal Republic "internally controlled and integrated with Europe, rather than under distant American control...
...is willing to understand de Gaulle and base its policies on the realities of the situation...
...riposte to the General's recent actions...
...can openly give its support to the European movement represented by such men as Hallstein and Ludwig Erhard, proponents of a politically unified Europe...
...In keeping with his mystique, perhaps he expects to master this task, along with other objectives, through the sheer power of his personality, the thrust of his will, and what he believes to be the infallibility of his vision...
...De Gaulle wants a strong France, and he wants a strong Europe to the extent that it is a catapult for France's resuscitated "greatness...
...Given the present context of American attitudes and commitments, there may be no immediate danger of a drastic reversal of U.S...
...It would not be impossible to put air bases in the Pyrenees or Alpes Maritimes and "harden" them by storing planes under several feet of concrete (as the Swedes have done...
...The reaction seems to be not so much against de Gaulle's Anglophobia, which many Continentals share, as it is against France's high-handed action...
...Similarly, the U.S...
Vol. 46 • March 1963 • No. 6
