The Search for Security

...In fact, at the moment America's Strategic Air Command, whose capacity for crushing retaliation after absorbing the first blow is the West's main deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack, is outside the NATO framework altogether-and this although its deterrent shield covers the European allies no less than the United States itself...

...To this extent it would give both sides every reason to maintain the balance at a lower and less expensive level...

...And even if it did not lead to a mutual reduction of forces, it would solve the major strategic problem with which NATO has been wrestling in vain for the last 14 years: to obtain sufficient advance warning of a major Soviet attack to deploy effective resistance in the forward areas in time...

...A system of ground control posts properly distributed and equipped could thus reduce the risk of major war in Europe to negligible proportions...

...The current military situation in Central Europe amounts to an absolute veto on German reunification...

...Under existing circumstances, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany would lead to the forcible overthrow of the Pankow regime, and this would then present an irresistible provocation for the return of the Red Army...

...In the United States and Britain, the military-industrial complex, against which President Eisenhower gave his valedictory warning, fears any decline in the demand for arms and soldiers...

...But for the overwhelming majority of Europeans and Americans the test-ban treaty marks the first real breakthrough toward that global order on which mankind's survival now depends...

...It is difficult to predict today how and when the Russians might be brought to negotiate German reunification on terms acceptable to the West Germans...

...Arms control can lead to genuine disengagement only on two conditions: first, that all concerned, both inside and outside the area, are satisfied that disengagement offers at least as much military security as a continuing confrontation of the opposing armies...

...In any case, the process of arms control which I have outlined would enormously increase the security of both sides at a steadily declining cost...

...On the other hand, they argue that ground control posts are worthless, since such stations offer no protection against surprise attack by nuclear rockets from deep in the heart of Soviet Russia...

...But anything which reduces the risk of ground warfare in Europe reduces the importance and urgency of these problems, even though it does not make them easier to solve...

...The second argument against negotiating for ground control posts in Europe is a complete red herring...

...Talks are proceeding both in the Geneva disarmament conference and through diplomatic channels...

...Others, perhaps more dangerous, look forward without fear to an American withdrawal because they hope they may then be able to negotiate on their own with Russia...

...Of course, in itself the establishment of such posts would not effect the possibility of a surprise attack by nuclear rockets one way or the other...

...In France and Germany, some politicians fear that any change in the status quo might lead to a collapse in America's European commitment...

...For this reason it must be made clear to the Soviet Union that though there are good reasons for removing nuclear weapons altogether from the Central Area, the Western need to use long-range nuclear weapons in case of a major violation of the agreement might well be greater than it is today...

...Personally, I hope it will...

...for many years Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, like those of NATO, have been deployed in defensive not offensive positions...

...Disengagement proper, involving the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from Central Europe, could follow a process of thinningout only if each side had complete confidence in the other's military intentions...

...If it is not taken now, it may disappear for good, with political consequences both in Russia and the West which leave the situation far worse than it was before...

...It would, however, rob both sides of any incentive to upset by clandestine reinforcement the rough balance of conventional and atomic power which now obtains...

...Denis Healey is the British Labor party's Spokesman for Defense...

...For the same reason, European support for a thinning-out process is bound to depend in part on strengthening confidence in the ultimate availability of the American deterrent...

...This, in turn, would depend on solving the problem of German reunification...

...Meanwhile, throughout the Atlantic alliance all those forces which for various reasons fear any further relaxation of tension are mobilizing in a great pincer movement against the Soviet offer...

...But I believe that the experience of cooperation between East and West on security in Europe would in itself produce changes not only in the attitude of the Soviet leaders to this problem, but also in the character of the East German regime...

...Indeed, one cannot help feeling that much of the opposition to the search for cooperation between Russia and the West is based on fear not of its failure but of its success...

...And if it seemed to be moving too far or too fast, it would always remain open to either side to halt the process at any stage...

...There are obvious problems both for the Western alliance and for East-West relations in maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent...

...True, any comprehensive form of arms control in Central Europe could ultimately lead to the mutual withdrawal of foreign forces from the area...

...Of course, Russia gains in exactly the same way or it would not have made the offer...

...Yet neither does the immense panoply of atomic and conventional forces which NATO maintains at present in West Germany...

...Though there is a close relationship between the two, the problem of preventing a ground attack on Western Europe is essentially distinct from that of preventing an all-out strategic nuclear attack on the West as a whole...

...Certainly there is more chance of Russia agreeing to German unity in the context of a functioning European system of arms control than in the context of an unlimited European arms race...

...Besides a poverty of imagination which cannot conceive of any end to the cold war except total victory or defeat, there are powerful vested interests concerned with maintaining tension...

...On the one hand, they argue that the Russian proposal represents the thin end of a wedge which will ultimately lead to America's total withdrawal from Western Europe (the dreaded word "disengagement" is freely used...

...At least in London and Washington, majority opinion sees Khrushchev's offer of control posts against surprise attack as well worth serious consideration...

...But in itself what is now proposed has nothing to do with genuine disengagement-i.e., the physical separation of Soviet and American forces...

...What is more, successful cooperation between Russia and the West in one field of security increases the incentive for cooperation in other fields as well...

...RELAXING TENSIONS IN EUROPE The Search for Security By Denis Healey London It is now clear that the only field in which the great powers are likely to make early progress in following up the test-ban agreement is that of security in Europe...

...second, that the problem of German reunification is finally settled...

...The opportunity for taking a second step in that direction is at hand...

...and still others believe that Russia is now on the run and that Chinese pressure may before long compel it to surrender all its European interests for nothing...

...I myself hope and believe that it would progressively lead to reductions in forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain, though naturally there are obvious limits to this process so long as it is confined to the European continent where Russia's capacity for reinforcement is greater than America's...

...The exchange of ground control posts against surprise attack does not in itself imply any change in the number or deployment of existing arms and forces...

...In fact, the "forward strategy" to which NATO has been verbally committed for so long depends on an improvement in existing intelligence which can be achieved only with Soviet agreement...

...Moreover, throughout this phase of the security process the physical presence of American forces-in whatever strength-on the dividing line between East and West would be the only sure guarantee of automatic sanctions against violation...