Artificial Tensions and the Test Ban

...In this connection, it should be observed that the proposed test-ban treaty, though it does not in itself appreciably dimmish the arms race and does not get us very far in the direction of a reduction of armaments, does perform a significant function in dramatizing the fact that what we have with the Soviet Union today is a limited-adversary relationship...

...Shulman's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee...

...While the present period does not afford much encouragement for an early settlement of major issues with the Soviet Union, or for substantial advances toward disarmament, it appears possible that the Soviet leadership can be brought to perceive a mutual self-interest in some limited safeguards in the arms race...

...d.) To create an atmosphere which would inhibit the Western reliance upon nuclear weapons beyond the terms of the Treaty...

...The main factor in the Soviet change of position appeared to be a desire to damp down international tensions in the wake of the Cuban episode in order, first, to insure against the development of a Western momentum to exploit its advantages after Cuba...

...This is illustrated by the recent Soviet protests against U.S...

...We, too, have an interest in this exploration, for the time may come when the Soviet political leadership reaches the realization that its own selfinterest requires moving from the slogan of "general and complete disarmament"—which now serves to block progress in this field—to more modest and attainable measures of introducing some stability and moderation in the military side of our confrontation without requiring millenial changes in the Soviet system...

...This process of adaptation, though defended by the Soviet leadership as a more prudent and more effective course leading to Soviet ascendancy, should be recognized as a favorable development from the point of view of United States interests...

...An increasing number of Soviet specialists who demonstrate a competence in the arms control literature have also appeared...

...The so-called "hot line" proposal, which received Soviet acceptance in early June, was signed on June 20...

...The Soviet capacity to manipulate the international climate without any substantive changes of policy is enhanced by our tendency to indulge in wild swings of mood from extreme hope to the depths of despair...

...This is true for several reasons...

...It is not the case today that our optimum security position can be achieved by the quest for maximum strategic military superiority over the Soviet Union...

...The question remains, however, whether these adaptations will in fact lead to Soviet ascendancy, as the Soviet leaders claim, or whether they will lead to a longterm modification of Soviet policies and the Soviet system in a benign direction...

...e.) Optimally, in the atmosphere of détente, to seek such political gains as an explicit acceptance by the United States of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, or a reorientation of West German policy toward a less firm commitment to the West...

...The point here is that, confronted with a Soviet effort to reduce the atmosphere of tension, without much change in the causes of tension, our response does not need to be the artificial regeneration of tension, but rather requires of us the harder course of educating public opinion, both here and in Europe, to exert the necessary effort without requiring the adrenalin of a crisis atmosphere...

...and the sheer complexity and uncertainty of the many elements involved in these matters...

...We have an interest in the stability and steadiness of the opposing forces in the world, our adversaries' as well as our own...

...and to the extent that the tone and level of our legislative discussion truly reflects the broad outlook and purposes of the United States, we can strengthen the confidence of our allies that their interests are close to our own...

...One of the lessons to be gained from a study of Soviet policy since the War is that there has been a substantial amount of inter-reaction between Soviet policy and our own...

...It should be possible for us to recognize, without in the slightest minimizing the seriousness of our conflict with the Soviet Union, or diminishing the vigor of our prosecution of this conflict, that this does not preclude the search for some safeguards, though perhaps at this stage only marginal ones, which can be mutually advantageous...

...What the Chinese Communists are now attacking as "revisionism" is in fact an effort by the Soviet leadership, perhaps not wholly consciously, to adapt its ideas and its policies to this reality...

...The revolutions that are transforming the international environment are not coming from the proletariat, but from nationalism, which is fragmenting the polarization of power...

...Khrushchev made it clear, however, that the Soviet Union remained opposed to on-site inspections in principle and thought them unnecessary, but was willing to make this concession to American domestic politics, which he believed responsible for the United States' position...

...THINKING ALOUD Artificial Tensions and the Test Ban By Marshall D. Shulman The steps by which the Soviet leadership shifted its position on a nuclear test-ban treaty may be charted from December 1962 to the second week in June 1963...

...In the forefront of Soviet policy, therefore, is the effort to achieve political footholds in these areas, footholds not pointed toward social revolution but toward changes in political orientation and in the flow of industrial trade...

...did not appear disposed to take advantage of the post-Cuba situation or the Sino-Soviet dispute, there followed a brief lull in the Soviet situation...

...and this agreement, too, was announced on June 19...

...There has been a considerable evolution in the attitude of the Soviets toward the effects of general nuclear war since 1954...

...This chronology suggests that the Soviet leadership decided, around the second week in June, to proceed with a partial test-ban treaty, if possible in conjunction with an East-West non-aggression pact...

...There have already been ample warnings against "euphoria," and this does not need further repetition...

...Perhaps one of the major responses required by the present phase of Soviet policy is careful attention to the political priorities of our own foreign policy...

...This situation arises not only because of a difference of evaluations in Moscow and Washington, but because some overlapping of mutual interests does exist, centering around an interest in avoiding a general nuclear war...

...This factor is particularly difficult to judge, however, since research and development expenditures, which are increasingly costly and which involve critical skills and materials, are not explicitly described as such in the Soviet budget...

...It should also be said that, while it is difficult to determine how strongly Soviet policymakers are influenced by domestic economic strains, it is evident that a reduction in Western military expenditures would make it possible for the Soviet leadership to ease some of its own critical shortages of resources and manpower...

...From the Chinese Communist point of view, this trend represents a departure from orthodoxy...

...But it is intended to suggest that there may be a point beyond sufficiency at which purely military preoccupation may diminish rather than increase our security in the full sense of the word...

...and to encourage the installation of governments in Western Europe which would be more favorably disposed toward trade and political relations with Moscow, particularly if the U.S...

...The effect of the treaty may depend not only upon what it contains, but how it has been negotiated and how it is ratified...

...Although these changes result largely from forces over which we have little control, they are also at least in part a Soviet reaction to Western strength and determination, and to that extent represent the fruits of our policies, taken as a whole, since the War...

...It seemed to be most directly related to a change of policy in defining the Yugoslav position as a member of the Socialist group of nations in the series of slogans published on the occasion of May Day...

...That is to say, we are engaged in an extremely serious conflict, but it is neither total nor absolute...

...This article is adapted from Mr...

...Hence, we would be unduly complacent if we neglected the integrity of our coalition on the basis of its evident remoteness from a Communist transformation...

...Since June 19 there has been no jamming, perhaps to indicate a tangible effort at the improvement of relations with the West...

...Only by so doing can we encourage the Soviet Union to move toward more substantive measures for the reduction of causes of tension than they have so far been willing to contemplate...

...One of the consequences of technological and other changes in our environment is that they oblige us to look freshly at the means we use to assure our security...

...b.) To encourage the flowering of divisive issues in the West—particularly the conflicts between the United States and France on the one hand and the United States and West Germany on the other, since this process of fragmentation has always been encouraged by the absence of an external threat...

...When it turned out that the United States was not prepared to accept the three on-site inspections, that the two sides were far apart on the conditions of inspection even if the number could be compromised, and that, moreover, the U.S...

...Indeed, the most striking characteristic of recent Soviet foreign policy has been the way in which policies undertaken for short-term, expediential purposes have tended to elongate in time and become imbedded in doctrine and political strategy...

...There are several reasons why the actual effects may be broader than, or different from, the immediate conscious purposes of the Soviet leadership: the limitations and rigidities of their analysis...

...underground testing and the transfer of nuclear warheads to Canadian territory as "contrary to the spirit of the Treaty...

...appeared to be moving toward bilateral settlements with the Soviet Union...

...It may be that the Soviets anticipate that the broad atmospheric effects of the proposed treaty would inhibit this development...

...2. In the heightening conflict with the Chinese, the Soviet leadership not only could claim a success for its policies but, more important, was making maximum use of the "peace" issue to strengthen its position at home and within the Communist bloc, and to further isolate the Chinese...

...Second, the President's speech on June 10 appeared to indicate a readiness on the part of the United States for an improvement of relations...

...This can occur if the integrity of our alliance system is allowed to weaken, if confidence in our resolution and dependability is called into question, if the effectiveness of our political and economic policies is insufficient, or if we do not have the kind of force required to meet local conflict situations...

...In May, Soviet jamming of the BBC and the Voice of America also began to slacken off, and was dropped altogether on the occasion of the President's June 10 speech at American University...

...This impression was explicitly confirmed by Khrushchev in his speech in East Berlin on July 2, in which the proposal was ambiguously tied to a non-aggression pact proposal...

...c.) To remove the stimulus for further Western military appropriations, and to bring about a reduction in the level of Western military mobilization...

...The shift to an emphasis on "peaceful coexistence,' originally a tactical alternation, has been evolving and deepening into a policy directed to power-bloc politics rather than toward social revolution...

...The principal specific purposes for this shift appear to be the following: 1. To achieve a relaxation in the atmosphere of international tension at minimum cost...

...The second point grows out of the fact that we are in the position of having to distinguish between an atmosphere of dètente and an actual reduction in the causes of tension...

...Marshall D. Shulman, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Research Associate of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, is author of the recently published book, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised...

...3. The effort to reduce the atmosphere of tension with the West appears to be motivated by the desire: a.) To insure against Western pressures in this period...

...To this, one further factor needs to be added, although it is difficult to evaluate its effect in terms of Soviet calculations: an apparently genuine anxiety concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and, in the first instance, the accession by the Federal Republic of Germany of nuclear capabilities either through the multilateral force proposal or through its new treaty with the French...

...It is therefore possible to have some measures which the Soviet leaders feel may serve their interests, and which we, for reasons of our own, regard as in our interests as well...

...and from the continued industrial transformation of the advanced industrial states, which has, if anything, increased their power and their prosperity...

...At the time, it will be recalled, there were signs that the dispute was heading toward a climactic confrontation...

...IN addition to the conscious Soviet purposes which, according to our best judgment, may have motivated the Soviet interest in this partial test ban at the present time, it is necessary to take account of the unintended effects of this action...

...In certain aspects of our confrontation with Russia, the security of each side is interlocked with the security of the other...

...In most areas of the Communist world, the weakest part of the Chinese case is the "war-peace" issue, and the Soviets were here making the most of their advantage...

...Meanwhile, two external developments accelerated the pace of events: First, the intransigeant Chinese note of June 14 made it clear that the proposed July 5 meeting between the Chinese and the Russians would not be likely to produce a reconciliation...

...The Soviet leaders have made it clear that they regard the advanced industrial areas of the world— Western Europe, North America and Japan—as decisive ones in the present period...

...On the same date as the President's speech, but perhaps before its content could be known in Moscow, Khrushchev flatly indicated to Harold Wilson, the British Labor party leader, that he was no longer willing to accept three on-site inspections...

...And the condition which has most favored the evolution of Soviet policy in the direction of moderation has been a firm resistance to Soviet probes combined with demonstrated political and economic vitality on the part of the non-Communist nations...

...At the 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses, and in the new Communist Party Program, this policy has acquired doctrinal underpinnings related to the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism and the non-inevitability of war...

...To the extent that our conduct of the negotiations makes it clear that we are functioning, not independently, but in conjunction with our allies...

...Khrushchev's indication in December that the Soviet Union would be willing to return to its previous position of accepting three on-site inspections for an underground test ban was apparently based upon a mistaken impression that the United States was prepared to accept this number...

...Within the past year and a half, there has been a substantial increase in discussion in Soviet journals of what is in this country called "arms control," and what the Russians call "partial measures of disarmament...

...from technology, which is increasing the destructiveness of war...

...the long-term effects of measures undertaken for short-term purposes...

...Even small gains in weakening the Western orientation of the industrial areas of Europe or of Japan in the next few years would be regarded as a decisive increase in the relative power of the Soviet bloc...

...It is quite possible for us to have an overbearing superiority in strategic weapons, for example, and yet to be faced with the successive erosion of our power and influence in the world...

...At this point, Soviet acceptance of any compromise figure on on-site inspections for an underground test ban, or possibly even the acceptance of three inspections, might have made Khrushchev more vulnerable to a Chinese charge of "capitulation to the imperialists...

...But this seemed to Wilson to intimate that the Soviet Premier was prepared to consider a partial test ban in the three environments—above ground, in the air and at sea—that did not require on-the-ground inspection...

...This is relevant to the proposed test-ban treaty in two respects...

...Measures that we may take in the unilateral pursuit of security which call into question our intentions may have the effect of diminishing our security, if they serve to intensify our adversaries' actions or preparations, especially in research and development, and lead to destabilizing technological advances...

...From our point of view, this development can best be understood as a process of adaptation to the fact that the terrain of international politics has been changing radically, and that the Marxist-Leninist analysis, as well as traditional patterns of foreign policy, are inadequate to cope with the new reality...

...Our security is also dependent upon the interreacting situation between the powers...

...None of this is intended to suggest that a sufficient level and composition of military strength is anything less than vital in order to insure against any temptation by our adversaries to consider militarily aggressive policies or the political use of their military capabilities...

...In addition to relative military capability, security has many dimensions...

...The answer will depend upon the effectiveness of our own process of adaptation to this environment...

...In the same period, the Soviet representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency shifted his position to accept the principle of supervision of reactors provided through the Agency...

...The incapacitating illness of Frol Kozlov in April-May 1963 is thought by some analysts of the Soviet Union to have been a factor in re-introducing some flexibility in the Soviet position...

...and second, to diminish the Western temptation to exploit the disarray within the Communist bloc resulting from the Sino-Soviet dispute...