A Strategy of Diffusion

...Edward Teller, have seriously questioned the assumption that the common interests we share with the Russians outweigh the potential advantages of continued weapons development...

...The treaty will also make it possible for both nuclear superpowers to pursue their own interests with a minimum risk of the arms race escaping their control...

...Faced with the threat of nuclear diffusion, the Kennedy Administration has often attempted to prevent it rather than to control it...

...as an equal...

...Since the United States' common interest with France is, in the long run, more profound than its common interest with the Soviet Union, sooner or later the Administration must recognize the legitimacy of de Gaulle's view of French self-interest as well as Khrushchev's view of Russian self-interest...

...But the principle of self-interest can cut two ways: Just as it can be the basis for agreement between rivals, it can be the basis for disagreement between allies...

...This pessimistic conclusion, I think, can be avoided by rejecting part of President Kennedy's "strategy of peace.' In his speech, the President spoke of nuclear diffusion as "one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963," and indeed much of American foreign policy is based on the idea that avoiding nuclear catastrophe requires "centralized command and control" over the thermonuclear capabilities of the Western alliance...

...The conclusion of the limited test-ban treaty and the establishment of a "hot-line" between Moscow and Washington, however, belie this view...

...While Schelling and Halperin did not think their approach would be "inconsistent with an approach that emphasizes the political environment more and the military environment less," there is room for doubt...

...With Peking challenging Moscow's leadership and Paris challenging Washington's leadership, in moments of crisis the U.S...

...and "a Europe united and strong capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner...

...what is desired, after all, is not an invulnerable force which can singlehandedly deter a superpower, but rather a force sufficiently large so that France (or China) can threaten to trigger an all-out nuclear war should the U.S...

...He went on to remind his domestic critics and Nikita Khrushchev alike that "even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest...

...For example, had the Administration been willing, before Nassau, to support de Gaulle's nuclear ambitions in return for French willingness to admit England into the Common Market, the long-term consequence could well have been a broader political union in Western Europe, a union relatively secure from the threat of dominance by any one nation...

...and the Soviet Union...

...Another alternative might be to try to control the diffusion of nuclear weapons in the West by encouraging the development of an economically and politically stable Western European community armed with an independent nuclear force and closely allied with the U.S...

...defenses...

...While this has led to the recently concluded agreement with the Soviets, the analysis of such direct "communications procedures" fails to include consideration of the increasing allied suspicion of American intentions...

...This is clear from the case of France...

...In assessing the recent U.S...

...Unfortunately, little comfort can be found in this view for two reasons: First, in all probability the Chinese will have an operational nuclear force within 15 years (if not sooner...

...as an equal is a political goal which is contradicted and undermined by strategic concern about the dangers of nuclear diffusion...

...These two recent agreements are largely the direct result of American policy as formulated by the Kennedy Administration...

...True, to some extent they are rational responses to the threat of an unintended all-out nuclear war, but they also indicate that the nuclear superpowers recognize the responsibility conferred on them by their dominant military position...

...What other long-range policy offers equal security for a future in which the West will confront two Communist nuclear powers...

...Several years ago, in stressing the desirability of "reciprocal activity" which could help prevent accidental war, Thomas Schelling suggested the advantage of arranging "in advance, even if crudely and informally, communication procedures, exchange of information, and inspection facilities, for use in the event of an accident, alarm, or misunderstanding that created a crisis...

...Those who have opposed ratification, like Dr...

...The real question, then, may not be how to prevent nuclear diffusion, but rather to determine who will develop nuclear weapons and with what objectives...

...We all cherish our children's future...

...Most discussion in the Senate has focused on the strategic issue of whether continued testing is actually necessary to maintain U.S...

...and USSR now appear willing to enter into direct, bilateral negotiations—even at the cost of alienating allies...

...agreements with the USSR one must also consider the long-term effects of the Administration policy that brought them about, a policy that emphasizes interests shared between the two nations...

...One possibility for U.S...

...To be sure, both the test ban and the hot-line are laudibly realistic responses to the dangers of an unwanted thermonuclear war...

...But a realistic appraisal of cold war politics in the mid-'60s shows that such a goal is untenable...

...and the USSR share "common" or "converging" interests on this matter: "We all breathe the same air...

...Given the safeguards emphasized by the Administration and the advantages of a limited test ban, the President's reliance on mutual self-interest in dealing with the Soviet Union would seem to be justified...

...Despite the ideological overtones of the Sino-Soviet dispute, nuclear strategy is clearly no less important in the Communist world than in the West...

...Moreover, since the agreement has been signed by a number of nations having the potential for developing their own nuclear weapons, it will doubtless slow down the rate of nuclear diffusion...

...While the execution of such a policy would by no means be easy, it would at least offer promise of maintaining the Western alliance and at the same time provide a sense of security for all the nations of Western Europe...

...And their implicit acceptance of the responsibility for avoiding a major war necessarily reduces the importance of consulting allies...

...And it is hard to deny that the two nuclear superpowers do have common interests in avoiding accidental war, checking the diffusion of nuclear weapons to irresponsible powers, and limiting radioactive fallout when testing is not essential to their own security...

...And we are all mortal...

...If so, it would seem that, however nations act, stable control of nuclear weapons is impossible...

...The presumably dangerous effects of nuclear diffusion have been pointed up by a number of strategists, but the very reference to this question as the "Nth Country Problem" shows how far the military strategists are from considering the political effects of which countries gain a nuclear capability...

...Yet this tendency toward big-two negotiation of crises raises the very questions that underly the splits within the Communist and Western alliances: Can a major nation in either bloc trust its dominant ally, the nuclear superpower...

...The hot-line and testban treaty are proof of this...

...There are many potent political reasons in favor of the test ban...

...Ironically, the President's own foreign policy approach may be invoked to justify de Gaulle's seeming intransigeance...

...President Kennedy's efforts to reduce cold war tensions, then, seem to be having the undesired additional effect of reducing common interests shared within NATO...

...The strategic equation, of course, is never easy to calculate...

...Both were originally American proposals, both were initially rejected by Premier Khrushchev, and in both cases a strong argument can be made that agreement came about as the consequence of Russia's response to President Kennedy's "strategy of peace...

...second, if Europe is to retain any significant power in world politics, its leaders will ultimately seek to control their own nuclear weapons...

...or the Soviet Union will risk destruction to defend the interests of its allies...

...And since nuclear diffusion is inevitable, surely it would be to the United States' advantage if the next nuclear power were to be a united Europe—secure, able to defend itself, and thus capable of true cooperation with the U.S...

...By coming to a test-ban agreement with Khrushchev, therefore, Kennedy reinforced French opposition to American policies...

...The U.S.-USSR attempt to control nuclear capabilities in order to minimize the chance of mutual destruction merely results in greater determination on the part of their allies to demonstrate independence...

...Finally, deferring to the desires and fears of non-aligned nations is not without value for the U.S...

...While not freezing weapons development, the treaty will probably reduce the pace of technological innovation (especially with respect to the development of anti-missile missiles, which are the most direct threat to the nuclear stalemate...

...The weighing of political factors in strategic writing today is all too frequently either very weak or altogether absent...

...This approach is, in many ways, due to the President's inclination to subordinate political elements to technical and military ones...

...insists on maintaining a monopoly over the decision to use nuclear weapons...

...Does the current political and military environment mean that American attempts to moderate the cold war by agreements with the Russians will only produce splits in the Western and Eastern alliances as France and China seek to become nuclear powers...

...President Kennedy's image of a Europe united and allied with the U.S...

...policy might be to permit the French to pursue their military goals, and, while not aiding in this development, to attempt to maintain the maximum possible integration of NATO on the basis of close Anglo-French-American cooperation...

...Since the treaty makes independent development of a nuclear capability difficult, it necessarily isolates the sole NATO power which now has both the desire and capacity to test...

...As events have demonstrated, Kennedy's policy only makes de Gaulle more insistent on pursuing his force de frappe, and Khrushchev is obviously unable to prevent the Chinese from achieving their nuclear objectives...

...For if, as the President has said, friendly nations, like hostile ones, undertake "only those obligations which are in their own interest," this principle leg'timizes de Gaulle's refusal to cooperate with Kennedy's "grand design...

...THINKING ALOUD A Strategy of Diffusion By Roger D. Masters A standard complaint about American foreign policy in the cold war has been that the United States reacts to Soviet ventures rather than taking the initiative on its own...

...Yet as long as French opposition to U.S...

...A strategic approach consistent with the fact of Europe's emergence as an equal ally, however, is possible...

...policy is treated as a personal idiosyncracy of de Gaulle, pursuit of Kennedy's "strategy of peace" will continue to weaken NATO because of the gap between American military and political goals...

...American observers, I think, often overstate the weakness of the strategic capability that a new nuclear power is likely to acquire...

...The most frequent response to this line of reasoning is that the Chinese will not have nuclear weapons for a decade and that the French may well abandon their nuclear program when they discover, as did the British, the enormous costs of developing a reliable missile system...

...While few have doubted the utility of the hot-line, the extent to which the test ban is in fact in the self-interest of the United States has generated wide debate...

...Whether one likes it or not, some degree of nuclear diffusion is, in the long run, inevitable...

...On June 10 of this year he repeated the offer, placing particular emphasis on the desirability of a nuclear test ban...

...Ultimately, though, whether or not a test ban is in the self-interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union depends on political as well as strategic factors...

...Is this situation an inescapable concomitant of the cold war...

...We could not convince the Europeans of the permanence of America's commitment even if President Kennedy did not speak of "surprising changes in the relations of nations and neighbors...

...This option is consistent with President Kennedy's political goal of an alliance between the U.S...

...Schelling and Morton Halperin, in their book Strategy and Arms Control, admitted this and went on to add: "We incline to the view that the political and psychological benefits that may stem from arms control will be more genuine, the more genuine is the direct contribution to international security...

...And, if not, will the superpowers assist their allies in the development of an independent nuclear striking force...

...It is no accident that Jean Monnet foresees that such a community would need to have its own nuclear weapons capability...

...But the last opportunity to follow this course was probably destroyed by the President's replacement of General Norstad as NATO commander, and there is a danger in setting the precedent of permitting a third NATO power to develop an independent nuclear potential—a precedent that the West Germans would be tempted to follow...

...Secretary McNamara's defense of the treaty indicated that the benefits to be derived from further testing are at least open to doubt...

...In his Inaugural Address, President Kennedy suggested that he was willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union in order to stabilize the precarious balance of terror...

...In the context of the "strategy of peace" address, the explicit pronouncement of this statement implies that the United States can and will trust the Russians to "accept and keep" treaties when it is clearly in the interest of the Soviet Union to do so...

...Roger D. Masters, a new contributor whose articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review and the Yale Review, teaches at Yale University...

...neither suffers from a reputation for defending "the genetic integrity of the human race...

...But it is not enough to know that President Kennedy's "strategy of peace" is capable of moderating the cold war...

...Is it credible that either the U.S...

...or Russia) refuse its backing on a key issue...

...But as long as Americans view nuclear diffusion as an unmitigated evil and attempt to persuade their allies that they should cooperate in a multilateral NATO nuclear force, Europeans will continue to assume that the U.S...

...They fail to see that French and Chinese fears can be stilled by a secondary nuclear capability...

...The hot-line between Moscow and Washington is also a perfect example of the relative absence of political considerations in the works of strategic analysts...

...In other words, a prime factor in stabilizing world politics, according to these authors, is the management of "international security" in terms of the necessities of military strategy...

...Fear that their respective dominant allies will not protect their vital interests is the source of France and China's common determination to develop nuclear weapons independently...

...The President stressed that such an agreement would be both possible and reliable since the U.S...