After the Test-Ban Treaty

...From a military point of view, the West has everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking the offer seriously...

...But great political rewards await the first German leader to show his people that he has a practical program for moving toward reunification, a program that will replace the mystical slogans which make reunification impossible...

...In fact, though France has juridical rights as a member of NATO which it could use to obstruct certain possible agreements, de Gaulle's most important weapon is his influence on West Germany...

...So even if the Kennedy Administration now argues the opposite, a good deal of hard work will be required in Germany itself to bring public opinion around to a sober acceptance of the facts...

...Moreover, his views on the implications of the test-ban treaty have substantial support in Bonn...

...In reality, neither side is likely to want a change in the political status quo in Germany so long as any political change automatically changes the military status quo...

...So a solution for NATO's nuclear dilemma will be as necessary in the context of arms control as under the existing arms race...

...The General's last press conference showed that he intends to pursue his opposition to the Soviet-American rapprochement as a member of the Western alliance, and that he will proclaim his friendship for the United States even as he tries to undermine Washington's current policies...

...But regardless of disturbing evidence that the Chinese leaders might begin new adventures against India or South Korea, it is difficult to believe that they would risk a large-scale Western intervention against their regime at a time when the Soviet reaction is at best unpredictable...

...Implicit in the treaty is a mutual undertaking to seek agreement in other fields where military security can better be achieved by cooperation than by competition, even though the search may impose dangerous strains on the existing alliances...

...It is not surprising, therefore, that the French and Chinese governments, each already dissatisfied with its place in its respective alliance, should have taken up battle stations against the prospect of a Washington-Moscow axis whose aim is to freeze the present balance of power in world affairs...

...Even if forces were maintained at the existing level, inspection could greatly reduce the possibility of a surprise attack, which is the only fear of either side...

...As the most important European contributor to NATO, Germany's loyalty to the alliance can decide whether Khrushchev has an incentive to negotiate at all—for it is only the solidarity of Western Europe with the United States which can lead him to seek a change in the status quo...

...This is the reason General Norstadt put forth proposals for protection against surprise attack while he was NATO Supreme Commander in Europe...

...And since for practical purposes China is now outside the Soviet bloc, it can exercise no direct bargaining power on Russia...

...Without a more thorough inspection of Eastern Europe than the West can now achieve by espionage and longrange reconnaissance, it is doubtful whether NATO forces would have time to take up their battle positions in the forward areas...

...It is only by first stabilizing the military balance in Central Europe, by means which guarantee the security of both sides, that German reunification can be brought within the field of diplomatic bargaining...

...Agreement with the Soviet Union offers no easy way out here...

...In particular Germany, still the most exposed member of the alliance, must feel certain that the nuclear deterrent will be used to save it from becoming a battlefield...

...Actually, the opposite is the case...

...It is doubtful whether today Peking can exercise much influence upon any of the other Communist governments whose consent may be required for further steps toward East-West rapprochement...

...It is doubtful whether any German politicians really believe this...

...Meanwhile, Germany's allies have their own responsibility...

...Yet in itself the limited agreement to ban atomic tests scarcely justifies so fundamental a reversal of the accustomed priorities...

...together to prevent China from producing its own nuclear weapons, and in the long-term consequences this will have on the military and diplomatic policies of other Asian states...

...For Bonn now holds the key to further progress in many fields...

...At the same time, Germany is the only member of the alliance which seeks a major and legitimate change in the status quo for itself— the reunification of its people as a single nation...

...POSSIBILITIES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS After the Test Ban Treaty By Denis Healey London Any remaining doubts about the importance of the testban agreement should have been laid to rest by Peking's rage and the arguments it has used to justify its attitude...

...De Gaulle's position, though much weaker in the long run, may well prove more difficult to deal with in the immediate future...

...Yet Bonn still shies away from any such arrangement for fear that it will make reunification more difficult...

...Any agreement between the West and Russia on arms control in Europe, though it offers the best prospect of real security for all concerned, will be politically viable and militarily sound only if the peoples of Western Europe can have complete and justified confidence in America's will and ability to join in protecting them against any violation of the agreement...

...Thus the real threat posed by Peking to the new East-West consensus lies in the evident inability of Russia and the U.S...

...More recently, Dean Acheson has created much the same impression...

...Khrushchev has always made it clear that he is not prepared even to discuss the possibility of German reunification while Central Europe remains a focal point of the international arms race...

...For this reason, any further agreement between Russia and the West which concerns Europe is unlikely to win the necessary consent from Germany unless it can be shown to bring reunification nearer, or at least not to reduce such chances of reunification as exist at present...

...The last few years have shown that neither side will risk the use of force to change the status quo...

...Although Secretary of State Rusk has persuaded West Germany to accept the test ban, it is likely to be more difficult to achieve vital German acceptance of any further agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev which affects the military or political situation in Europe, or which seeks to limit the spread of atomic weapons...

...Some such agreement has at last been put within the scope of serious negotiation by the Soviet Premier's offer of control posts and inspection inside the Soviet Union itself...

...It will not be easy for China to pursue both these courses simultaneously, as it clearly intends to do...

...But despite the striking similarity between the postures of de Gaulle and Mao Tse-tung, the two pose very different problems for the new Soviet-American consensus...

...For the first time since the cold war began, Moscow and Washington have each decided it is better to try to halt the arms race than to try to win it...

...Assuming strategic necessities are observed, West Germany would in fact gain more than any other NATO power through achieving security by means which reduce the danger of its own territory becoming a battlefield...

...There is thus the clearest common interest for both sides to maintain the military balance in Central Europe at the lowest level compatible with their security under mutual inspection and control...

...The only rational grounds on which the Germans could oppose such an arms agreement would be the expectation that without it the West could somehow or other ultimately achieve so great a military superiority over the Soviet Union that Russia would be forced to surrender East Germany without receiving any concessions at all...

...There are also signs that Peking may not have given up hope of provoking a revolution against Khrushchev inside Russia itself by starting wars in Asia from which the Soviet Union could not afford to remain aloof...

...Unfortunately, Dulles and Adenauer sold NATO to the German people by talking as if they themselves believed it...

...The rupture between Russia and China had become final before the test-ban agreement...

...So Peking's only hope is to construct a new block of its own, cither by helping sympathetic Communist parties into power in Asia, or by mobilizing anti-colonial "havenot" governments of all types into a common front against what it presents as the new nuclear alliance of white imperialist "haves...

...indeed, it made the latter possible...

...More important still, they have accepted the daunting corollary to this position: that the arms race can be halted only if each puts cooperation with its opponent before cooperation with its allies...

...The real issue here is the desirability of military cooperation between the two alliances to reduce the risk of war in Central Europe...