Freezing the Balance of Terror
JACOBS, NORMAN
PERSPECTIVES Freezing the Balance of Terror By Norman Jacobs IN coming weeks, public opinion and Congress will be busy assessing the pros and cons of the atomic test-ban treaty recently drawn...
...If, however, Sweden possessed even a small number of deliverable atomic bombs, its retaliatory capacity would take a quantum jump...
...The prospects are for its indefinite continuation, but with a new Soviet emphasis on peaceful coexistence—which should be welcome to the U.S...
...Rejection of the test-ban treaty clearly would constitute the most stunning repudiation of a President since the Senate ignored the pleas of Woodrow Wilson and vetoed U.S...
...PERSPECTIVES Freezing the Balance of Terror By Norman Jacobs IN coming weeks, public opinion and Congress will be busy assessing the pros and cons of the atomic test-ban treaty recently drawn up in Moscow by the Big Three...
...And more generally, in terms of strict military and diplomatic calculus, for the U.S...
...Can any measures be taken to achieve these ends...
...it must expand...
...But it is a moot question whether de Gaulle has not in effect already destroyed NATO...
...De Gaulle himself would have to acknowledge that the gains from a quid pro quo of this kind would serve both the national interests of the U.S...
...A number of alternatives are possible: 1. The U.S...
...Where Communist China is concerned the situation is even more dangerous...
...Certainly the United States would find it intolerable if, for example, Fidel Castro got his hands on a few atom bombs...
...The other nation exercises its option under the terms of the treaty to withdraw and feverishly resumes testing above ground to overcome the abrogatori lead...
...Whatever happens, it is clear that if Washington and Moscow are serious about the test ban, they must henceforth cooperate closely to prevent other nations from acquiring atomic arms...
...and the USSR, as well as the cause of world peace...
...Advances in nuclear weapon technology made by underground tests or by utilizing existing knowledge do not upset the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance of terror...
...Such a justification acquires still greater force when we keep in mind that to head off China from acquiring bombs it may be necessary to prevent France from further testing...
...It is because he understands this calculus so well that General de Gaulle is adamant about creating his force de frappe...
...3. Both the U.S...
...This does not mean that the cold war is over...
...Realistically, though, we must assume that de Gaulle and Mao will ignore the UN unless it adopts forceful sanctions...
...Moscow may indeed find it advantageous to contain "wars of liberation" or "revolutionary struggles" well below the critical point that threatens to endanger the mutual U.S.-Soviet interest in maintaining the nuclear stalemate...
...From his viewpoint, the General is right...
...What is not obvious—and indeed could be unprecedented in the evolution of events—is a fourth possibility: 4. In enforcing the test-ban treaty, the U.S...
...More specifically, take Sweden as a case in point...
...Given its size and population, and the ideological fanaticism of its leaders, the prospect of a China armed with even a few A-bombs is enough to provoke shudders...
...such a denouement is constitutionally out of the question, but Kennedy would in effect become a lame duck President, utterly discredited and impotent to conduct foreign policy in the future...
...and the USSR have a vital interest in making every possible effort to limit the nuclear club to its present membership...
...It has been further intensified by the test-ban treaty...
...When President Kennedy declares that "a full scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere...
...But the prospects inherent in such a situation—apart from the dangers of fallout from testing or the accidental or irresponsible use of nuclear weapons in the hands of a number of nations—must be intolerable to the Soviet Union...
...The results of that assessment will determine the Senate's decision to give or withhold its consent to the agreement...
...Suppose, for example, the U.S...
...2. One of the two superpowers cheats and is detected...
...As things stand today, though, it is more likely that France and China will go on testing above ground, and this could bring about the ultimate breakdown of the treaty...
...It may well be that any meaningful measures for enforcing the test ban against France and China will seem too drastic to be seriously considered...
...How ironical it would be if the bond forged by the two superpowers in maintaining their joint control over the balance of terror ultimately led to a lightening of the balance and a reduction of the terror...
...All the other nations in the world adhere to the test-ban treaty...
...In an all-out conflict today, Moscow could annihilate Sweden in a matter of minutes without having to fear significant reprisal...
...Yet, even in advance of the official hearings, it seems safe to predict ultimate approval, however tough the going may prove to be...
...The United Nations General Assembly will surely call upon all nations to join the test-ban treaty...
...Nor does it seem likely that such cooperation can be limited to this one area...
...and the USSR observe the accord in good faith, but France, China and/or the other countries refuse to join and begin testing above ground (China) or continue testing (France...
...And if the balance of terror has thus far served to prevent nuclear war, the common purpose embodied in the test-ban treaty is likely to manifest itself in efforts to reverse any tendencies toward escalation in cold war conflicts...
...Even if it were destroyed in a nuclear exchange, Sweden could still wipe out several Soviet cities...
...The Sino-Soviet rift already appears irrevocable...
...It may be that the Big Three will accept France with its Hbombs and China with its A-bombs into the nuclear club, and then try to close membership permanently...
...legitimately cite similar grounds to justify its opposition to further French testing...
...While the above alternatives are not exhaustive, they give some idea of the range of significant possibilities...
...Yet consider the disturbing implications—so far as they bear upon power interests in the U.S...
...or it scores a technical breakthrough, operating within the limitations imposed by the treaty, that upsets the balance of terror...
...Without passing judgment on the treaty itself, and assuming it will enter into effect, what are its prospects...
...Presumably Washington and Moscow wish to see the first alternative obtain...
...Still another serious consequence of the treaty's rejection, of course, would be the damaging impact on world public opinion...
...and the USSR were empowered by the UN to launch an air attack against China's atom test sites unless Mao called off his country's efforts to make an atom bomb...
...and the USSR observe the treaty in good faith...
...At the moment, this means specifically preventing France from testing an H-bomb and China from acquiring any bombs at all...
...Norman Jacobs is currently editor-in-chief of the Foreign Policy Association and adjunct assistant professor of International Affairs at New York University...
...Were Moscow to participate in any action or threat of action aimed at preventing China from developing atomic weapons, the rift would give way to the bitterest kind of hostility...
...The possession of a few bombs would thus give Sweden a potential for massive retaliation which, as a relatively minor power, it could not otherwise hope to have...
...Even if his atomic force cannot make France a superpower, it will increase French bargaining power at the diplomatic table and radically upset the existing military balance between his country and both the USSR and the U.S...
...In any country with a parliamentary form of government, such a defeat would immediately compel the resignation of the prime minister...
...and the USSR to permit other nations to acquire nuclear arms is to suffer a decrease in national power which, objectively, amounts to the most serious of defeats short of losing a war...
...It is obvious that world public opinion will generate an enormous amount of pressure to exclude the third alternative...
...For a long time to come, it would be difficult to dispel foreign distrust of the sincerity of the United States or of its good faith in negotiations over other cold war issues...
...Cannot the U.S...
...The French leader has strongly justified his policies by appealing to raisons d'état...
...Thus, the U.S...
...As for France, it would certainly withdraw from NATO if Washington exercised any strong pressure upon it to make it suspend its projected H-bomb tests...
...and the USSR—implicit in the proliferation of atomic weapons and the means of delivery among a considerable number of nations...
...This forecast may seem extravagant...
...Suppose France was faced with a similar threat, or the possibility of a total blockade of the Pacific island where its preparations for an H-bomb test are presently under way...
...The possibility, no matter how distant, that it may become a nuclear superpower is terrifying...
...when Khrushchev asserts that the survivors of a nuclear war will "envy the dead," the chances of future U.S.-Soviet confrontations à la Cuba seem remote...
...In the case of an open society such as the U.S., however, the possibility of cheating is abstract, given the virtual certainty of detection...
...membership in the League of Nations...
...In the U.S...
...it may even propose sanctions against nations that defy the ban...
...In 1955, Winston Churchill uttered his memorable warning: "We may now have reached a stage . . . where safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation...
...The implementation of any such proposals would of course have the most serious consequences on relations between the two superpowers and China and France...
...For, other things being equal—or even somewhat unequal—in the weighing of the treaty's advantages and disadvantages, the fate of President Kennedy's leadership of the nation and of the West depends on ratification...
...Some have argued that precisely for this reason the diffusion of nuclear weapons among smaller nations might actually serve to deter their use by the two superpowers...
...and the USSR develop a bond of mutual interest that cuts across other cold war differences and leads to a radical change in existing alliances...
Vol. 46 • August 1963 • No. 16
