Back to Geneva

HEALEY, DENIS

CAN THE WEST RISK A SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER? Back to Geneva By Denis Healey London The marathon conference now going on in Geneva is the first major confrontation of the...

...Within the context of such an agreement, Bonn would find it more difficult to oppose discussion of the reduction and control of arms and forces throughout Central Europe...
...This seems sound because underground tests, which demand an international detection system, are too expensive for any but the richest powers and are no longer thought likely to make possible any important change in the balance of military power between the Soviet Union and the West...
...The real question the West has to decide at Geneva, however, is whether it is worth risking a shift in the present balance of thermonuclear power in Russia's favor for the sake of a test-ban agreement which would immensely increase the obstacles facing other countries which wish to join the atomic club...
...Back to Geneva By Denis Healey London The marathon conference now going on in Geneva is the first major confrontation of the great powers since the frustrated 1960 summit in Paris...
...Moreover, since each side already inspects the other's armed forces in Central Europe by scientific reconnaissance and espionage, little would be required in the way of inspection beyond the legitimization of these techniques...
...For despite false reports in hostile newspapers, Dr...
...But if Adenauer is no longer strong enough to protect his loyal servants, there is a strong case for his allies to cease waiting for Bonn to act and to take the initiative in Geneva themselves...
...Not only do the Labor and Liberal parties oppose the British deterrent, but in the last few weeks a Conservative ex-Minister of Supply and the young Conservative Bow Group have both argued in favor of Britain's founding a non-nuclear club...
...Central Europe is an area where each side has clearly abandoned any hope of winning political advantage by force...
...In addition, he can set off regular crises over the access routes to accelerate this process without fear of effective retaliation...
...Khrushchev's monstrous violation of the test moratorium last summer is of course to blame for the new demands...
...America might therefore find it worthwhile to press for an agreement confining the possession of atomic weapons to itself and Russia...
...Kroll has said no more than Germany's allies and Chancellor Adenauer himself believe...
...Apart from the formidable complexity of the issues themselves, Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy have given Nikita Khrushchev an incentive to go slow at the Foreign Ministers' level by offering to attend a summit conference if there were "certain major and clear points of disagreement" (Macmillan), or "if we were faced with an extremely dangerous situation" (Kennedy...
...For since he built the wall along the boundary of East Berlin, Khrushchev can afford to wait until there is either a critical decline in West Berlin's morale or in West Germany's confidence in its economic survival...
...Above all, arms control in Central Europe would provide the best context within which a solutionacceptable to the West as a whole and to the Germans themselves in particular—could be found to the problem of Berlin...
...If the West decides in favor of taking this risk, it might be well advised to settle for the proposal Kennedy and Macmillan made last September at the beginning of Russia's tests series—namely, to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere which can be detected by existing national techniques...
...The prospects for rapid progress are not good...
...By narrowing discussion of the Berlin issue to what happens in that city and along its routes of access, the West offers Khrushchev no incentive to negotiate...
...The removal of Dr...
...And their incentive to agree now should be all the greater, for they each know that in a year or two their political, or power relationships with their allies may change for the worse...
...On the other hand, the predominance of America and Russia in their respective alliances is such that if they can reach agreement on these issues, they may be able to persuade their allies to follow suit...
...It has already agreed to unilateral restrictions on its own rearmament in NATO without any compensating agreements on what will happen in East Germany...
...Further difficulties arise from the absence on each side of allies whose consent is needed to any agreement on major issues: France and Western Germany are vitally concerned with both disarmament and Berlin...
...Thus the only fields where Geneva may hope to produce fruitful negotiation are those where disarmament would not risk upsetting the global balance between the major powers, but would tend instead to stabilize it...
...It is thus particularly unfortunate that on the question of a nuclear test ban, the one issue where agreement has in the past seemed within reach, there has recently developed an important difference of opinion between Britain and the U.S...
...Inevitably, the agenda is the same: disarmament, a nuclear test ban, Berlin, Southeast Asia...
...Denis Healey, a regular NEW Leader contributor, is Labor Member of Parliament for South East Leeds...
...yet as long as the arms race continues there, political instability could easily produce an explosion which would drag the great powers into an unwanted atomic war...
...This is indeed a strong argument for an American test series in retaliation for Russia's violation of the moratorium...
...No important segment of opinion in Britain believes that Kennedy has any alternative but to prepare to resume atmospheric tests in the event Russia refuses a reasonable test ban treaty in Geneva...
...Hans Kroll from his position as West German Ambassador to Moscow shows how powerful the forces of unreality still are in West German politics...
...Unless the Bonn government believes that it will soon acquire atomic weapons and be able to use them to improve its situation, it is difficult to see a valid reason for its opposition to a discussion of arms control in Central Europe...
...A ban on the transfer of atomic weapons and information would certainly be resisted by France— and perhaps by Germany as well— unless it were also extended to Britain...
...And Russia insists on preserving its military advantages by keeping the strength and deployment of its forces secret...
...Indeed, there is widespread gratitude for the tact with which he announced this decision...
...The possibility that a country might violate an agreement is of course always present...
...For the present, valid strategic arguments make America insist that, even in the first stage of disarmament, inspection should cover not only arms destroyed but the stocks and production facilities remaining...
...They also believe it would be possible for Russia to carry out a further series without prior detection between the long period after a test-ban treaty is signed and before the agreed inspection system has been fully established...
...There may be madmen in West Germany who believe in the atomic liberation of their compatriots, but it is no secret that Bonn's nervousness over arms control arises rather from reluctance to admit to its electorate that the old propaganda about negotiation from a position of strength is quite irrelevant to German reunification...
...Kennedy's experts have solid grounds for believing that although the last series of Russian tests gave Khrushchev no decisive advantage, a further series might do so...
...Fortunately, opinion in Britain is moving steadily away from favoring the attempt to maintain an independent nuclear striking force...
...In such a case its co-signatories have no other sanction available but to resume testing themselves...
...But the British government feels that, by wishing to add to the inspection provisions included in last April's draft treaty further provisions against even the preparation of tests, Washington is making it appear that the West is no longer serious about a test ban treaty altogether...
...China with disarmament and Southeast Asia...
...As always, this remains by far the most hopeful first step toward general disarmament...
...Unfortunately, these are fields where the Western allies strongly disagree with one another...
...ON GENERAL DISARMAMENT it IS difficult to see any real prospect of progress...

Vol. 45 • April 1962 • No. 7


 
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