Shifting Policy in New Delhi

...On the question of India's China policy, three attitudes appear to have prevailed within the Government until recently: First, there was the anti-Communist element (for whose removal the pro-Communist press has been clamoring in the interests of efficient implementation of the Third Plan...

...And both China and Pakistan are suspected here of being responsible...

...Many Indians are fearful that because of Nehru's constant insistence on keeping the cold war out and his unwillingness to accept military aid from the West, it will be difficult for Britain or the U.S...

...What is even more to the point, a strenuous non-official but presumably officially backed effort is being made in New Delhi to encourage the public to help the soldiers on the border...

...At any rate, it would seem that the fears held by many Indians about the nature and extent of Soviet assistance to India are at last beginning to be shared by the Government...

...New Delhi clearly underestimated the extent to which China is capable of acting independently of the Communist bloc...

...In 1961-62, the Gross National Product expanded at a rate of 2.2 per cent, as against an annual population rise of 2.5 per cent...

...But he would find it hard to justify to the public India's acquiescence to being treated as a domestic issue by Peking...

...Nevertheless, the Prime Minister has asserted that India has friends everywhere, while China is gradually becoming isolated...

...In addition, Chinese determination to demonstrate to the world that New Delhi cannot stand up to Peking is humiliating to all Indians -and particularly to the Prime Minister, who for months assured the public that everything was well and is directly responsible for the foreign policy which has brought the country to this pass...

...Nehru's chief reason for that policy was his desire to keep the cold war out of India...

...But it has surely not been absent from Peking's calculations, not to mention the nightmares of Nikita Khrushchev...

...As far as Nehru himself is concerned, two major considerations seem to predominate: After having been the greatly wooed leader of the neutralists, with both blocs making much of him, he is hardly going to relish the prospect of playing second fiddle to Mao Tse-tung...

...his Government had confined itself to formal protests against encroachments, and attempts to present a studied case to the Chinese...

...Although the public's attitude is clear, the call for national unity is not without meaning when one considers the frequent quarrels among those in power...

...They also know that if Soviet help comes at all, it will be slow in coming and effective only in prolonging the conflict-in other words, in weakening China, rather than strengthening Indian resistance...

...and 2) the steady undermining of other Asian governments by the Chinese Communists...

...to take the initiative...

...If the intention is to unite the nation on other matters, utilizing external threats as the major argument, it is a new conception for the Government of India, which in the past has sedulously tried to play down border troubles...

...The potential power-and importance in the Communist world -of a China that can "restore" Stalinism, while at the same time dominating the largest neutralist nation, may only recently have occurred to Indians in the Government...

...But it is even more well known that New Delhi's procrastinating policy has led to a rapid deterioration in its relations with the Himalayan states, and that the nation has been steadily losing ground in Asia because of a policy of trying to be friendly to a country which obviously looks upon India as the likeliest victim of its own expansionist ambitions...

...A third group, belonging to neither camp, was waiting to see which of the first two would come up on top...

...It is fully appreciated here that the small professional Indian Army can only hope to put up faint resistance against the Chinese: Despite Nehru's fervent speeches and declarations, Indian military equipment is inadequate for ousting the Chinese from home soil...

...Consequently, the Indian Government was slow in communicating frontier news to the public and attempted to play down Chinese aggression...

...and not long ago, in Colombo, Nehru observed that India could ill-afford increased defense expenditure...

...Krishna Menon is the most prominent spokesman of this element...

...But it is clear now that the idea of a negotiated settlement, at however leisurely a pace, has been discarded as a result of China's operations on the Northeast frontier and its crossing of the McMahon Line...

...Yet the nature of China's revolution, particularly the phase through which it is now passing, makes it liable to overconfidence, undue reliance on military strength and an expansionist zeal rising out of a combination of nationalism and Communism...

...They know it will take time for the Prime Minister fully to readjust his sights...

...The policy change was based on two factors: 1) recognition of the seriousness of Chinese intentions...

...There was considerable public agitation in India against Nehru's optimistic view of China...

...More recently, as the tempo of Chinese military operations in the Himalayas has been stepped up, press reports have hinted at the purchase of fighter planes from Indonesia and negotiations with the United States for military transport planes, helicopters and fighting equipment...

...Several developments in recent months have come as unpleasant shocks in India...

...Second, there were those who deplored Chinese aggression as a needless interruption to the progress of Indian Socialism, consistently played down border incidents, and even now make gestures of appealing over the head of Peking to the Chinese "people...

...And Asoka Mehta, the Chairman of the Praja Socialists, in a public speech to rally Bombay opinion behind a "Push-China-Back" policy, has similarly reaffirmed this view...

...Relations between India and China have been permanently damaged, and in the coming months-while winter makes any large-scale military operations difficult in the Himalayan region-they will probably deteriorate further...

...Both the Prime Minister and President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan have called for national unity in the face of aggression...

...In the Indian states there is a trend toward regionalism which often results in bitter recriminations...

...But the recent change of policy has led to the fullest information being placed before the public with the greatest dispatch...

...Radhakrishnan...

...India's Third Five-Year Plan, initiated last year, has run into heavy weather...

...Domestic developments have also affected the Government's China policy...

...These figures indicate that economic development is going to require a far more rigorous effort than the Planning Commission had anticipated...

...Before this change, Nehru had repeatedly stated that the Sino-Indian dispute would take years to resolve...

...This has struck many as anomalous insofar as there has never been any dispute over the question of repelling Chinese aggression...

...Because of the Soviet Union's present ideological troubles with China, Nehru also seemed to assume that India could count, if not on Soviet support, at least on these differences to hold back Chinese expansion...

...Indeed, the trumping up of imaginary grievances against India on the flimsiest grounds has now become a pastime in this region...

...Afraid to assert itself lest the Nehru Government's ideological commitment to Socialism be used against it, this group has played a waiting game...

...The opposition was mainly led by the leaders of the Praja Socialist party, who also contributed a great deal to keeping the Tibet invasion fresh in the public mind...

...similar thinking was behind his reluctance to seek timely military aid...

...Sharokh Sabavala is The New Leader's correspondent in India...

...And both Parliament and the press strongly condemned the Government for delaying releases and withholding information...

...His Defense Minister, V K. Krishna Menon, whose recent speech in Bangalore condemned China and Pakistan for disturbing India's peace, has repeated the theme...

...EFFECTS OF THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR Shifting Policy in New Delhi By Sharokh Sabavala Bombay In a public statement about a month ago, Jawaharlal Nehru roundly declared he would rather see his country overrun by the enemy than seek military aid from a foreign power...

...Among them were anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta during the Asian Games, and King Mahendra of Nepal's direct attack on India's policy toward his tiny nation...

...The emphasis on national unity is generally ascribed to the increasingly important role played by Dr...

...And they conclude that the Chinese Army, even if its present objectives are limited, is likely to dominate future politics in Asia, as the Soviet Army dominated East European politics after World War II...

...And within both the ruling Congress party and the ministries, a constant struggle for power is being waged, with the top leadership often directly involved...

...In the last analysis, it is Indian public opinion, roused against any compromise over the border question, that restrains the Nehru Government from any policy other than resistance-though at this point the Government itself is frankly not inclined to compromise...

...These two contradictory facts reflect a basic shift in New Delhi's attitude toward Peking's increasingly aggressive border incursions...