Cracks in the Communist Bloc

...The situation is by no means irretrievable, however...

...Albania is perhaps the weakest link in the Chinese chain, both because it is so far away and because there is undoubtedly much less sympathy in the international Communist movement for Albania than for China...

...The "compromise" worked out at Moscow in late 1960 showed both sides were aware that an impasse was preferable to the break-up of the world Communist movement...

...Despite Khrushchev's insistence that no party could dictate to another, it must have become clear to him that if he allowed the Peking-Tirana axis to continue without criticism, it might soon become the basis of a much larger group of dissidents within the international Communist movement—a group that Peking clearly sought to form and to head...

...Italics mine...

...The statement was in fact omitted...

...A longer version of this article will be published in China Quarterly...

...If Albania had similarly decided to play the middle, it is possible that Khrushchev would not have attacked it openly...

...Donald S. Zagoria is a specialist in Sino-Soviet affairs with the RAND Corporation...

...Yet, too much was at stake to accept a humiliating surrender...

...But it will at least avoid catastrophe in a game that is now being played very close to the water's edge...

...Khrushchev's attack on the Albanians probably came as a surprise to Peking...

...In a speech to the North Korean Party Congress, the first mention of the Soviet Program by any Chinese leader, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing referred to the Program in a rather offhand manner...

...In fact, this seems to be the position reflected in post-Congress Chinese statements, those made in connection with the anniversaries of the Bolshevik Revolution and of the Albanian party...

...Both sides are clearly anxious to avoid an open split that would prove disastrous—especially to China...

...In some respects, Khrushchev's open denunciation of the Albanians may be more an admission of weakness than an indication of strength...

...Apparently because he is not willing to engage the Chinese frontally and risk an open break, though obviously they are the real source of his problem...

...Instead, he prefers to attack the Chinese through their proxies in Tirana...

...Kang delivered the polemical assault on Soviet policy at the Warsaw Pact meeting early in 1960...

...Malenkov's emphasis on light industry would have meant fewer Soviet capital goods for China...

...Khrushchev's unexpected attack on Stalin at the Congress suggests another important element in his current relations with bloc countries...

...There were visible differences between Moscow and Peking over Laos, Yugoslavia, Albania, the new U.S...

...Did the Anti-Party Group in general, and Molotov in particular, seek to make common cause with the Chinese in an effort to unseat Khrushchev...

...In this connection, the reaction of the 80-odd world Communist delegations at the 22nd Congress to the Soviet attack on Albania is significant...

...Italics mine...

...The results of this Soviet-sponsored "poll" of the international Communist movement will undoubtedly be pondered by the Chinese, who are manifestly fearful of isolation...

...Although Jen-min Jih-pao ("People's Daily") published the full text of the Program on August 5, there was no comment whatever, an unusual omission for a document of such importance...

...At the Congress itself, Chou En-lai said only that the new Program "set forth for the Soviet people a grand plan for building Communism...

...The Congress made it plain, therefore, that the depth of commitment of the European, Middle Eastern and Latin American parties to Moscow is greater than the depth of commitment of the Asian parties to Peking...

...Cracks in the Communist Bloc By Donald S. Zagoria In his opening speech to the 22nd Party Congress, Nikita Khrushchev made his principal target plain enough when he said that the course laid down by the Russians at the 20th Congress in 1956 would not be changed because they could not yield on a question of principle "either to the Albanian leaders or to anyone else...

...The Chinese were tacitly supported by all the Asian parties which, with the single exception of Ceylon, refrained from mentioning Albania...

...D.S.Z...

...Pyotr Pospelov accused Molotov of "slanderously alleging" that the Party line laid down at the 20th Congress was "in complete contradiction to the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism," a position also taken by Peking...

...And just before the 22nd Congress opened, a high-ranking Chinese spokesmen went so far as to reject in unmistakable, if still veiled, language the Soviet concept of "national democracy" for the underdeveloped countries...

...This was the first issue between Moscow and Peking to be "put to a vote" in the international Communist movement...

...The attacks made at the 22nd Congress on Vyacheslav Molotov and the Anti-Party Group were clearly related to the Sino-Soviet conflict...

...This was made quite explicit by Soviet spokesmen themselves...

...The struggle over Albania illustrates the rivalry over power and authority that has been at the heart of the Sino-Soviet conflict since 1956...

...D.S.Z...

...The Chinese will probably not give up their claim to veto power over Soviet organizational and policy decisions, and the Soviets are hardly likely to accede to such a claim...

...But at the very time when there was this slight narrowing of the political gulf between the two countries, the gap over authority and power seemed to yawn even wider...

...They published a collection of ancient Chinese stories about ghosts in which the preface warned against those "ghost-fearing men of the 20th century" who are "frightened out of their wits by imperialism and reaction...

...Yet in June 1957, when Khrushchev defeated the Anti-Party Group, Peking had serious reservations about the purge...

...He made a curious reference to the "firm security" of the country's borders on both the Chinese and Soviet sides, which may have been meant to reassure the Outer Mongolian party that Moscow would not tolerate Chinese attempts at border adjustments...

...In both capitals, Kim got formal assurances of support in case of trouble with the West...

...At present, it is impossible to answer this question with any certainty...

...Second, China can continue along the middle road already suggested by Chou En-lai—that of expressing regret that Khrushchev has brought his quarrel with Albania out into the open and calling for unity and a principled settlement of the dispute on the basis of "equality and unanimity through consultations...

...It suggests that geography plays an unexpectedly large role in Communist bloc politics...

...and that only then will China be in a position to challenge Soviet leadership of the bloc...

...The crucial question is: Will Khrushchev's attack on Albania lead to a public break with China, thus bringing into the open a smoldering conflict that has become increasingly intense over the past several years...

...Why, then, did Khrushchev launch his surprise attack on Albania...

...The most serious aspect of Albania's defiance was its demonstration to the Communist world that the tiniest of all bloc countries, if supported by Peking, could defy the Russians with impunity...

...Moreover, one month before the Soviet Draft Party Program was released—and presumably after the Chinese had seen it—Peking made it quite clear that while the Program was valid for the Soviet Union it had no binding effect on the Chinese Communists...

...Had differences been limited to mere matters of policy, the hardening of Soviet foreign policy since the summer of 1960, combined with the radical domestic retreat of the Chinese, might have gone some way toward removing or decreasing the causes of conflict...

...The Chinese continued implicitly to challenge Soviet authority by building up the cult of Mao Tse-tung and calling for the Sinification of Marxism-Leninism...

...At that time the Russians wanted a strong statement condemning factionalism, but the Chinese reportedly objected...

...During the year and a half preceding the 22nd Congress, the Russians had imposed economic sanctions on Albania, and may even have attempted a coup...

...This unprecedented statement, in effect calling upon the Chinese party to swallow its pride and patch up its quarrel with the Russians as the only way out of its worsening domestic economic crisis, probably represented the views of a considerable number of Chinese moderates...

...Khrushchev has already made known that this is his price for welcoming Albania back into the fold...

...There was nothing "mechanical" about Chou En-lai's pointed use of the word "unity" 15 times in the course of four paragraphs of his speech to the Congress, the same paragraphs surrounding the one in which he implicitly rebuked Khrushchev for his attack on Albania...

...The Russians take the position that a "majority" of the Communist states can impose discipline...

...In a very bitter and revealing speech delivered on the anniversary of the October Revolution, Hoxha declared that the Stalin question was in part being "used as a bogey for putting pressure on the other parties and for liquidating the leaders who do not please N. Khrushchev...

...Its comment on the removals from the Presidium was the least enthusiastic of the entire bloc...

...A mounting economic crisis at home and an apparent division of opinion within the Chinese party on how far it would be wise to flout Moscow were among the factors which ruled out an aggressive attitude...

...Finally, Peking can take a defiant pro-Albanian stand by launching an open counterattack against the Russians, but it can do this only at the very great risk of splitting the Communist movement wide open at a time when China is in desperate economic straights...

...The Chinese, on the other hand, are trying to avoid isolation within the bloc...

...And none of the Asian parties followed Chou-En-lai's example by criticizing the Russians implicitly for their attack on Albania...

...Khrushchev has found an exposed and vulnerable point in the opponent's position and has chosen to apply the scalpel rather than the axe...

...This would entail the resignation of Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, the Albanian party leaders...

...They had withdrawn (or were forced to withdraw) their submarine fleet...

...There remains, therefore, the same question of authority that was left unsettled at the 1960 Moscow conference...

...The Asian parties' "support" for Peking should be qualified, however...

...Recent developments have increased the possibility of such a break...

...Immediately before the 1960 Moscow conference, the Chinese Communists seemed prepared to risk an open split if they could not get a settlement on their own terms...

...He seemed to be dexterously reaping the advantages of being wooed by rival suitors...

...Thus the Chinese delegation seemed to be deliberately balanced between "conciliators" and "militants," a common Communist practice when there is a division of opinion at the top...

...Albania has not been the only cat's paw in this battle for power and for spheres of influence...

...Thus China's behavior so far indicates it is neither prepared to abandon the Albanians nor march to the barricades to defend them...

...An unsigned editorial in the August 2 Pravda, the Soviet Party newspaper, noted that the Program testified to the Party's "leading role" in the further development of Marxism-Leninism and bluntly stated: "The [Soviet] Central Committee is the true center of theoretical thought...

...True, it is likely that Peking had earlier supported Khrushchev against Georgi Malenkov...

...As for the Soviets, there must be many within the Party who believe Khrushchev is taking too great a risk of splitting the bloc by his provocative public attack, and that the way to continue to deal with Albania and China is, as Chou suggested, in private, "comradely" discussions...

...For what the Russians are seeking to avoid at all costs is the creation of an Asian Cominform led by Peking and supported by other parties throughout the Communist movement...

...A balance of conflicting influences was evident in Chinese public statements from the time of the Moscow conference of the 81 Communist parties in the fall of 1960 right up to the eve of the 22nd Party Congress...

...instead, there was a vigorous attack on "Yugoslav revisionism,' the euphemism that Peking has employed since 1958 to denote "soft" Soviet policies...

...P'eng reportedly launched a bitter attack in the summer of 1960 both on the Soviet party and on Khrushchev personally...

...Khrushchev himself is probably not as determined to exact a Chinese surrender as he is to force a Chinese retreat...

...A joint communique signed in Moscow criticized "deviations from the principles of Socialist internationalism," phraseology which in this context could only have been aimed at Peking...

...Nevertheless, Peking is opposed to Soviet disciplining ot any Communist party without Chinese approval...

...But the Chinese must have been bitterly disappointed when Khrushchev stole some of Malenkov's thunder by adopting a semimoderate position toward the West and toward the relative priorities to be accorded heavy and light industry...

...A retreat of this kind would weaken China's prestige in the international Communist movement and would serve as a deterrent to any future Hoxhas and Shehus who believe they can defy the Kremlin with impunity as long as they have Chinese support...

...But Khrushchev called the Program "a new stage in the revolutionary theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin," and noted pointedly: "We can proudly say to those who want to know what Communism is, 'Read our Party Program.' " But despite indications that the Sino-Soviet conflict had by no means been bridged before the Congress, neither Party was prepared to force matters to a head...

...While the Chinese continued their veiled polemics against the Russians, they did so somewhat less clamorously than before...

...In July 1961, Moscow displayed rare benevolence toward all three of the Asian satellite countries (Outer Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam), extending massive aid to run through 1965...

...The Russians, for their part, gave no signs that they were preparing a major offensive against Peking...

...Even then, however, it was highly questionable whether they would march over the brink...

...Without Soviet military, economic and diplomatic support, China is a third-rate power whose survival is questionable...

...that the "balance of forces" is patently on the Soviet side...

...Mikoyan also referred to Molotov's opposition to Khrushchev's personal diplomacy...

...They are most likely to take the second position, which in effect Chou took at the Congress and in the little publicized message he radioed to Khrushchev while flying back to Peking...

...During this period, however, the Sino-Soviet conflict continued to smolder...

...Peking is in the midst of an economic crisis that is expected to last at least for three years...

...In this light, the First Secretary's ironic remark at the end of the Congress is clear: "We share the anxiety expressed by our Chinese friends and appreciate their concern for greater unity...

...Administration, and strategy and tactics in the underdeveloped areas...

...Even if a Chinese middle-road position is possible, it may well be that Khrushchev is not prepared to accept it and is determined to exact the surrender he failed to get in 1960...

...The mixed Chinese delegation must have come to Moscow unprepared either to press the initiative or to make a substantial retreat...

...At any rate, there can be little doubt that after the autumn of 1957 the views of the Peking Left, both on foreign and domestic policy, were much closer to those of the discredited Molotov than to those of Khrushchev...

...There would thus seem to be a good chance of a compromise that will satisfy neither Moscow nor Peking, and will deeply embitter the Chinese leadership...

...Peking "conciliators" must be arguing that now is not the time to force the issue with Moscow...

...A communique issued a few days later in Peking made no reference to such "deviations...

...Although the Albanian First Secretary is obviously not a disinterested observer, it does in fact seem likely that— whatever the internal compulsions for the move against Stalin—Khrushchev is also consciously using the "personality cult" issue to blacken Communist leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Hoxha, who have refused in recent years to accept his dictates...

...On the one hand, a Chinese editorial on the anniversary of the Albanian party contends that the unity between the Chinese and Albanian peoples "can be shaken by no force on earth.' On the other, the speech of a high-ranking Chinese spokesman on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution calls unity between Peking and Moscow the cornerstone of the Communist camp and mildly warns against any words or deeds not in the interest of this unity...

...And no one in the Communist world could doubt who the "anyone else" was after Chinese Premier Chou En-lai failed to applaud Khrushchev's attack on the Albanians, implicitly condemned it two days later and abruptly returned home before the Congress concluded...

...First, it can advise the Albanians to submit to Khrushchev's blackmail...

...This brings somewhat closer to reality a nightmare that must haunt Moscow—the possibility of a breakup of the Communist world into Eastern and Western empires...

...In the spring of 1960, shortly before China launched a major polemical assault against the Russians, Tao publicly argued that the "condition essential to the smooth progress of Socialist construction" was to "make our utterances and action beneficial to international solidarity...

...In addition to the moderate Chou, who is probably more inclined to conciliation than Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i and other Chinese militants, the delegation included Tao Chu, the influential First Secretary of Kwantung, who had previously made clear his views on the need for patching up the Sino-Soviet dispute because of overriding economic necessity...

...He does not want to pose the manifold differences between Moscow and Peking in a way that would force Peking to surrender or to leave the Communist bloc...

...Otto Kuusinen accused the former Foreign Minister of "fishing in foreign waters," and Anastas Mikoyan said that Molotov "was close to foreign opponents" in rejecting "peaceful coexistence [and] treating it as a variant of the cold war, as a state of armed peace...

...China probably would have preferred a change in Soviet leadership, but what it did to bring this change about is not known...

...In early July, also, North Korea's Premier Kim IIsong made brief visits to both Moscow and Peking...

...that it is overridingly important to build up China's economy so that it can enter the ranks of the great powers...

...The Russians were backed by nearly all the parties in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America, most of whom joined in the condemnation of Albania...

...It is the language of a man who believes he has his opponent cornered...

...This is not the language of an ultimatum...

...At present, it is even more doubtful...

...And the fact that all but one of the Asian parties refused to attack Albania will undoubtedly be pondered well by the Russians, too...

...If the Chinese comrades wish to make efforts toward normalizing relations between the Albanian Workers party and the fraternal parties, there is hardly anyone who can contribute to the solution of this problem more than the Communist party of China...

...In launching a frontal assault on Albania, therefore, Khrushchev was in effect saying that all his previous attempts to bring the tiny nation to heel had failed, and that the only choice left was an open threat of expulsion from the Communist bloc...

...Chou En-lai's sudden departure had all the signs of a walk-out, and the very composition of Peking's delegation to the Congress indicated that Communist China was not preparing for a showdown...

...The Soviet Premier would much prefer to deal with "collective" leaderships in other parties so that he could play one faction off against another and minimize the ability of any single leader to defy him...

...Abstention is, after all, a middleof-the-road position...

...But the Albanian party continued to side with the Chinese on most outstanding issues of intra-bloc and global policy, evidently fearing above all that Khrushchev's rapprochement with Yugoslavia might ultimately lead to political annexation by Tito...

...The attack on Albania leaves Peking with a number of possible responses, all equally unpalatable...

...The Albanian leaders, by intensifying their attacks on Khrushchev—they have called him an "anti-Marxist liar" and a Machiavellian, and threatened to expose him with secret documents^are fast making any compromise solution impossible (assuming Khrushchev is interested in such a compromise...

...There soon may not be any middle ground left for the Chinese to stand on, particularly if the Russians begin to take disciplinary actions against the Albanians, such as expelling them from the Warsaw pact...

...In the same month, the Russians sent no less a person than Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov to the Mongolian Party Congress...

...On the other hand, the remaining two members of the Chinese delegation, P'eng Chen and Kang Sheng, had in the past identified themselves with the more militant wing of their Party...

...China's effort before the Congress to delimit the applicability of the Soviet Program was in marked contrast to the Russian and East European effort to universalize it...

...Russian space ships, he said, and the Draft Program, "which outlines the gigantic plan of the Soviet people," were "strong proof" of the superiority of the Socialist system...