Defending Southeast Asia

...At the same time, it has to be made clear to the man in the street that peace can not be the highest desideratum of American policy, that our interests cannot be maintained without the possession and, where necessary, the use of force...

...A substantial portion of U.S...

...True, most observers now agree that among the developing nations generally, these programs are in need of fundamental re-examination...

...Since the collapse of the Nationalist regime on mainland China in 1949, successive administrations have recognized that it is vital for the U.S...

...This explains the emphasis on military assistance and defense aid programs, and also the importance attached to the Manila Pact...

...Possible alternatives are a purely regional organization to concert the interests of the free Asian countries in meeting the Communist danger...

...William Henderson is currently the associate executive director for the Council on Foreign Relations...

...bilateral arrangements between the United States and the countries of the area, whether formal or informal...

...Where local capability proves insufficient, the U.S...

...Even then, attempts should be made to harmonize the demands of the national interest with the requirements of an orderly world community and with U.S...

...And resort to war can be justified only when there is no alternative for the protection of a vital interest...

...The use of forceful measures short of war should be eschewed except in the most critical circumstances...

...The months ahead, therefore, must see Washington providing more dynamic and more imaginative leadership in the field of international affairs...

...A military policy commensurate with U.S...

...Some steps already have been taken to achieve this, with the training of special task forces for guerrilla-type operations...

...It should always be kept in mind, of course, that security alone cannot be the goal of U.S...

...Thus the ultimate responsibility for the defense of Southeast Asia necessarily falls to the U.S...

...In the long run, in a democracy such as ours, the policy now apparently under consideration by the Administration must enjoy overwhelming popular understanding and support if it is to succeed...

...lacked the courage or conviction to implement it fully, and at the moment of supreme crisis jettisoned it completely...

...But in the last analysis the heart of a strengthened policy for Southeast Asia lies in the political determination and military capability of the United States, not in the diplomatic instruments that carry it into effect...

...Somehow, the public must be persuaded that the stake in Southeast Asia, as in many other parts of the world, is genuinely vital to the national interest of this country...

...American military strategy, which still places primary reliance on the deterrent effect of massive nuclear retaliation, is insufficient for dealing with the problem of security against the Communists in Southeast Asia...

...responsibilities in Southeast Asia requires, above all, a capacity for limited and guerrilla warfare...

...efforts...

...And there is no doubt at all that in Laos a great deal more could have been done to strengthen the military capability of the Royal Army, especially for guerrilla-type operations, to improve the political effectiveness of the Government, and to promote more rapid economic and social reform...

...Whatever the, chosen vessel of our policy—and careful attention should certainly be paid to the circumstances involved—it will remain an empty shell unless backed by the power and resolution of an awakened America...

...To the extent that Southeast Asian countries are themselves alive to the Communist danger, and to the extent also that they possess the means for making an effective contribution toward their own defense, the United States' burden is lightened...

...Finally, official Washington will have to make some readjustments itself in the light of its new thinking...

...This cannot be taken lightly...

...Even more important, it is highly questionable that they are psychologically prepared to accept the risks and sacrifices which might be required in assuming that responsibility...

...Properly conceived, military policy should be part of a much broader American approach to the problems of Southeast Asia in a period of revolutionary turmoil...

...The melancholy fate of the tiny Buddhist Kingdom of Laos demonstrated both the wisdom of this analysis and the inevitable result of failing to pursue it to its logical conclusion...

...No doubt some danger of massive Communist attack from the north exists: One cannot be sure of the direction which Communist China's foreign policy might ultimately take...

...These must be dealt with by military measures short of all-out war...

...At present, though, the real threat to the area comes from subversion and "wars of liberation," i.e., seemingly indigenous revolts that are in fact organized, led and supported as an integral part of the world-wide Communist conspiracy...

...to prevent Southeast Asia's absorption into the Communist orbit...

...They cannot be bought "on the cheap" by means of aid programs alone, no matter how massive...

...THE LESSON OF LAOS Defending Southeast Asia By William Henderson Washington's reported decision to send troops to South Vietnam in the event of a stepped-up Communist offensive there indicates it may have learned the bitter lesson of the Laos debacle: United States policy for Southeast Asia was wisely conceived, but the U.S...

...or perhaps even a unilateral guarantee on the part of the U.S., extended either to an Asian regional organization or to individual Asian countries...

...To be sure, the United States should seek to implement its basic aims by peaceful means in so far as this is humanly possible...

...Consequently, security has been considered the essential precondition for progress on political, economic and social reform...

...And defining the circumstances in which this power would be brought to bear, at least in general terms, would impart a sense of direction and deliberateness to American policy as well as give confidence to the Southeast Asians themselves...

...Thus far we have placed primary reliance on the Manila Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, but the failure of that organization to act effectively in Laos has seriously compromised its usefulness...

...Yet the intrinsic disparity of power between the Communist bloc and the newly independent nations of Southeast Asia—in the case of Laos, between the Royal government and the blocsupported Pathet Lao movement based in North Vietnam—is so great that the latter will probably never be able to stand alone against a determined Communist attack...

...Moreover, a clear understanding by the Communists of the broad range of our intentions is essential if this type of deterrence is in fact going to deter...

...There has, of course, been an awareness of the deep-seated political, economic and social problems besetting the area, and the intimate interconnection between these problems and the Communist menace...

...But beyond this, and without flinching, force has to be considered a possible instrument of policy—whether it be to defend Thailand against external aggression or to safeguard the Philippines from a Communistled rebellion that threatens to topple the Government...

...The task has been regarded, I think rightly, as military in the first instance...

...But the permanent amelioration of internal conditions within a democratic environment is impossible unless Southeast Asia is first safeguarded against the traditional Communist weapons of aggression and subversion...

...aid has always been devoted to nonmilitary purposes...

...Having highly mobile land, sea and air units stationed in or along the periphery of Southeast Asia, and demonstrating a willingness to use them by frequent maneuvers, training exercises, fleet visits, fly-pasts, etc., would generate a respect for U.S...

...If security is the key to Southeast Asia's future and its freedom is an overriding United States interest, this country may have to fight to insure them...

...Space does not permit a discussion of the most appropriate diplomatic vehicles for an invigorated American military policy in Southeast Asia...

...obligations under the United Nations Charter...

...determination to defend the area that repeated verbal protestations can never attain...

...has no alternative but to make up the difference, even if this involves direct military intervention...

...But these forces must be developed to the point where they are capable of intervening effectively and in time to prevent the forcible expansion of the Communist empire...

...Nevertheless, it seems clear that the American people do not yet understand the full implications of their responsibility in Southeast Asia...

...To calculate otherwise would really mean that Southeast Asia is not a vital interest, and that its loss to the Communists is an acceptable hazard of the cold war...