2. Moscow's Real Goal:

...Khrushchev has opened up a Pandora's box by precipitating a crisis in Central Europe...

...It might well lead to our finding ourselves badly out-maneuvered come late fall...

...In responding to the crisis, the American people should understand that vital Western interests are involved even if Berlin itself is not directly threatened...

...Judging by the hostile Soviet and East German reaction to Senator Mike Mansfield's (D.-Mont...

...Such a program should present concrete proposals for American and Soviet contributions...

...But if the West stands firm, the Kremlin may suddenly shift to intermediary tactics designed to achieve the minimum objective—Western recognition of the East German regime—implicitly at first, explicitly later...

...We could propose a UNsupervised plebiscite in West Berlin on the Soviet proposal to alter its status...

...The effect of such measures would be to drive the East European Communist elites into a more militant posture without, however, stimulating popular support for us...

...It would generate a vested interest in avoiding war and would increase East European fears of Soviet recklessness...

...Who, after all, would want to fight over a passport stamp...

...vacillation in Laos, as well as Western passivity in Hungary in 1956 and during the 1953 East Berlin uprising, make it imperative that Washington convince the Kremlin it means business when it says it will fight to protect its position in West Berlin...

...However, the offer would highlight the issue of selfdetermination...

...This will undoubtedly tarnish the image of itself which the Kremlin has been busily propagating as a champion of national liberation...

...For this reason, the suggested program does not preclude taking covert steps designed to convey credibly in the event of major hostilities our readiness to activate the antiCommunist potential present in Eastern Europe...

...There are both offensive and defensive components in the Kremlin's calculations, and there are maximum as well as minimum objectives...

...The West might also offer help in the economic development of the area and ask the Soviet Union to join an East European development program to bring living standards up to those of Western Europe...

...Success here would achieve the long-standing Soviet desire to expel America from Europe...

...To some extent, the Berlin crisis has already revealed fissures in the Western camp...

...For all their anti-militarist rhetoric, the elites of these nations are very power-conscious and the Soviet Union has gained prestige by the forceful assertion of its interests...

...Nikita Khrushchev's speech of June 29 reveals his preoccupation with this objective...

...the shares of each ought to exceed present Soviet commitments to East European development...

...The Soviet Premier could attempt to attain Western recognition by signing a peace treaty with East German Party chief Walter Ulbricht...

...Presumably, the U.S...

...In these circumstances something approaching a war scare is perhaps inevitable...

...The West German position would drive the Poles and Czechs solidly into Soviet hands, and thereby also achieve one of the Kremlin's major purposes...

...The matter of dealing with the East Germans is not a superficial and trivial issue, but we could make it appear so by accepting quietly—and with great relief —polite East German control over the access routes to West Berlin...

...The West Germans, on the other hand, have already hinted that "the German question" involves not only Berlin but also the liberation of East Germany and the territories lost to Poland in 1945, which have been settled by eight million Poles...

...But the West should seize the opportunity to polarize the alternatives confronting the Communist world: emphasizing the attractiveness of the status quo while indicating that any unilateral change would jeopardize the Communist elites in Eastern Europe...

...should therefore make it clear now that any alteration by the East German regime, gradual or otherwise, of the existing arrangements with the Soviets would lead to measures directed not only at East Germany but at the USSR itself...

...Failure in Berlin is also likely to damage Soviet prestige among the uncommitted nations...

...It is also necessary to forewarn the public of the possibility of war, and to mobilize its support...

...In our response to the Soviet challenge we should not allow this consideration to be obscured...

...Probably the most effective way of achieving credibility would be to undertake a series of steps which increasingly predetermine the Western military response in case of a Soviet or East German move against its lifeline into Berlin...

...Our determination to defend Europe links us to the British while our rejection of the subjugation of East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe links us to the Germans...

...But in neither case should we accept their policies...

...A response limited merely to reasserting Western determination to stay in free Berlin would be inadequate...

...Most East Europeans have no interest in pulling Western chestnuts out of the Berlin fire while they themselves remain subject to Soviet domination...

...The British position means, in effect, that the Kremlin would automatically attain its minimum goals...

...Yet Khrushchev's challenge to the West in Berlin should be welcomed...

...U.S...

...Meanwhile, the reaction of the West would probably be one of relief that a new war had been avoided...

...The British yield too much, the Germans desire too much...

...The greatest effort must now be made to identify precisely the nature of the common Western interest in Berlin and to relate our response to it...

...The U.S...

...Neither of these two approaches is compatible with long-range American goals, which are necessarily broader in scope than the more parochial German or British interests...

...Moscow has created the Berlin crisis, and the world should not be allowed to forget this fact...

...The British, in keeping with their fundamental but largely implicit predisposition to yield to external aggression as slowly as possible, and to respond forcefully only when actually attacked, have already been speculating on the possibility of recognizing the East German regime in return for concessions...

...The Administration should tell the American people now that the issue posed by Khrushchev involves not only the Western presence in free Berlin but also its relationship with the neo-Stalinist Ulbricht regime...

...The minimum objective—some form of Western recognition for the Ulbricht regime—would have the important "defensive" consequence of stabilizing Eastern Europe, and eventually, of leading to disillusionment in West Germany with the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and the United States...

...With their conflicting interests, democracies find it difficult to deal with hostile and ambiguous strategies...

...For example, the West could test the sincerity of the oft-proclaimed fears of a West Germany armed with nuclear weapons by pledging never to arm the West German army with such weapons in return for a Soviet pledge not to alter the status quo in Berlin...

...At the same time, the West should be careful to avoid any overt steps aimed at provoking unrest in Eastern Europe...

...In this case, moreover, there is a causal relationship between the slavery and the poverty...

...Growing insecurity in East Germany, increasing frustration of Communist radicals in China and elsewhere, doubts among his own people—these are among the possible consequences of his defeat...

...and its willingness to respond forcefully even to ambiguous Soviet or East German challenges will make all Communists in Russia and Eastern Europe weigh more seriously the possible consequences...

...The maximum objective is the expulsion of the West from Berlin...

...By offering incentives for peace, the West would strenghten existing trends toward diversity...

...Otherwise, there is great danger that the nation may he willing to fight for Berlin hut will not understand the importance of backing the Administration over the apparently "obscure" issue of whether or not to deal, and how to deal, with initially polite East German officials controlling Berlin's access routes...

...Zbigniew Brzezinski, Associate Professor at the Russian Institute of Columbia University, is author of The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict...

...At this point, when the major task of the West is to deter Soviet aggression, it would be in its interest to reassure the East European peoples, and even their present elites, that their territorial status (including the Oder-Neisse Line) is secure...

...broader proposal, even this would probably be unacceptable...

...Eastern Europe, which has not forgotten the Soviet-imposed rejection of the 1948 Marshall Plan, would welcome a program of this kind...

...We should not forget that Eastern Europe is the Latin America of Russia and that its status is likely to change...

...He stands to gain a great deal if he resolves it on his terms, but he has much to lose if he is put on the defensive and denied his goals...

...It is now the Administration's task to take political advantage of the opportunities this challenge offers...

...Berlin is thus a symbol of the American commitment to self-determination for all people...

...After this is signed, the East Germans may politely wave our convoys through, only to apply "salami tactics" later, when their "sovereign" right to control them has been established de facto...

...wishes to remain in Berlin because it is determined to deny Western Europe to the Communists, and because it believes that Europe in general (and Germany in particular) will never be secure so long as it is half enslaved and half impoverished...

...He has, as Stalin did so often before him, united the American people...

...In fact, there is a danger that idle talk about East European uprisings might cause resentment against the West...

...Our friends will urge us to "negotiate" with the East Germans, while the Soviets will be praised for having been reasonable...

...Whatever the outcome of the Berlin crisis, it will inevitably demonstrate the Soviet disregard for the principle of selfdetermination...

...The majority of East Europeans are not anxious to risk their lives for the reunification of Germany (indeed, there is some East European Schadenfreude that at least some Germans are sharing their misery...