Showdown at Geneva:
TRAGER, WILLIAM HENDERSON and FRANK N.
Cease-Fire in Laos—Two Articles Showdown at Geneva By William Henderson and Frank IV. Trager The fact that the 14 nations which participated in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina...
...The absorption of Southeast Asia into the Communist empire would also have other fateful consequences for the free world...
...The Communists, especially if they agree to supervised national elections, are likely to demand the immediate withdrawal of all foreign military forces and advisers from Laos, and the cessation of military support activities...
...Thus, even if a national election is honestly supervised by the International Control Commission or some other international neutral body, a non-Communist victory is by no means assured...
...Ideally, such a line would move the opposing forces back to their 1954 positions, with Phongsaly and Samneua (only) assigned to the Pathet Lao...
...But it must be recognized that a variety of situations may develop over the next few weeks which will confront the United States with the stark option of intervening militarily in Laos or surrendering the beleaguered Buddhist kingdom to the Communists...
...These are some of the contingencies that are likely to emerge at the Geneva conference...
...It is the one great rice surplus area in a continent chronically short of adequate food supplies, and would at a stroke relieve what is perhaps Communist China's greatest economic problem...
...or 3) whether to disrupt the conference and intervene effectively in Laos to establish a genuine truce line...
...In reality, such a withdrawal prior to the national elections would disarm free Laos and render it defenseless against further Communist infiltration...
...The region possesses vast wealth in natural resources...
...The tiny kingdom, however, may well prove to be a key to the Communist takeover of mainland Southeast Asia...
...The West's objectives should be a temporary de facto partition along a line which does not by itself guarantee the security of what is left of free Laos today, but which does provide a tenable geopolitical basis for a future free Laos...
...True, the formation of a provisional government would give de facto recognition to the Pathet Lao...
...4. Military withdrawal...
...intervention in Laos would constitute another "wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time...
...Here the key questions are leadership of the regime and the relative strength of representation to be accorded each side...
...In any case, to minimize Vietminh and Communist Chinese reactions, intervention should be for clearly limited goals, although it would probably necessitate pushing the Pathet Lao out of the panhandle and sealing off something like the line indicated above...
...Disruption of the conference on this issue might also present the United States with the necessity for military intervention to defend the truce line and the remaining Laotian territory free of Communist control...
...2) whether ?? withdraw from the conference but do nothing, which would join hypocrisy to weakness...
...Every effort must be made to fill the top provisional government post with a man who is strong enough to "hold the ring" until a final settlement is reached...
...In the light of the above, what should the West seek at the conference table in Geneva...
...Presumably, the International Control Commission, composed of representatives of India, Canada and Poland, will supervise the cease-fire at least for the duration of the conference...
...For example, a breakdown of the conference after prolonged negotiations might bring about a more or less permanent partition along the agreed upon truce line, with each side continuing to receive outside support, but with further fighting and foreign intervention forestalled by the dangers which are involved in these eventualities...
...The last, of course, runs the terrible risk of massive counterintervention by North Vietnam and Communist China, and can be justified only on the ground that the alternatives are even more disastrous...
...To prevent deliberate stalling by the Communists while they strengthen their position in the non-Communist portions of the country, it is imperative that the provisional government be tied down to a timetable for new national elections under international neutral supervision...
...Similarly, since the provisional government will be in power until the balloting is concluded, its proWestern members may not be able to improve the chances of the nonCommunists in the elections...
...The present conference is being held against the background of a validated cease-fire in Laos between the forces of the legitimate Royal government and the Pathet Lao...
...In theory, this would give effect to the concept of a neutral Laos...
...Until this supervision is formally worked out, the International Control Commission or another body can serve as an electoral commission to supervise preparations for the elections...
...Trager The fact that the 14 nations which participated in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina are meeting in that Swiss city again this week is proof of the failure of United States policy in Laos between 1954 and 1961...
...The strain on Communist China in this respect was recently amply demonstrated by its agreement to purchase $362 million worth of Canadian food grains...
...Given the actual military situation, the best the free world can do is pursue a policy of "least loss" which denies the enemy its maximum aspirations...
...This would guarantee Pathet Lao success in areas now under their control, give the Communists a wide base of operations for attempting gains in the rest of the country and sharply improve their chances for a legal takeover of the whole country...
...At the present near hopeless juncture in Laos, it should perhaps be noted, there are solutions worse than partition...
...Finally, the loss of Southeast Asia would be a profound moral and psychological shock to the whole free world...
...The long delay in achieving a cease-fire has made it possible for the Pathet Lao not only to invest the central plain south and west of Phongsaly and Samneua provinces, but also to establish Pathet Lao pockets in the panhandle of Laos along the eastern border contiguous to Communist North Vietnam...
...However, since a provisional government will be in charge, such reforms may be difficult to institute...
...It has been argued that U.S...
...Absorption of Southeast Asia would also mean the addition of 175 million people to the already enormous manpower potential of the Sino-Soviet bloc...
...Indeed, if the Geneva conference produces a Laotian "compromise" which could lead to Communist absorption of the entire kingdom, United States prestige in Asia and throughout the free world will suffer a severe blow...
...If extensive cheating is reported and verified, the United States will have to decide 1) whether to continue participation in the conference, which will have become a thinly disguised forum for ratifying a Communist takeover of Laos...
...And in view of the obvious weakness of King Savang Vathana and of the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan forces, inclusion in the government would give the better organized Pathet Lao an extraordinary opportunity to extend their influence both over the provisional government and throughout areas still under Royal control...
...Frank N. Trager is professor of international affairs at New York University...
...1. A defensible truce line...
...But it is difficult to see how this can be avoided...
...and the latter can be expected to reject the pro-Western Prime Minister Boun Oum or General Phoumi Nosavan...
...But unwillingness to take any chances at all may move the Russians to oppose a single national election and urge separate elections on each side of the truce line...
...This line might be drawn east of the Royal capital of Luang Prabang and the administrative capital of Vientiane, and including all the Laotian panhandle...
...India and Japan would be more than ever exposed to the growing colossus of Sino-Soviet power...
...If Communist intransigence makes some approximation of this line impossible, and thus seeks to forestall the prospect of a viable free Laos surviving a possible partition, the United States would again be faced with making the grave decision of whether to intervene militarily to secure a continuing geographic basis for a free Laotian government...
...What is more, the region lies athwart the main lines of communication between Europe and the Pacific, and its occupation by a hostile power would effectively cut the world in two...
...The Western attitude toward the provisional government should be conditioned in large measure by its decisions and actions with respect to the proposed elections...
...3. National elections...
...The objective of a stable government, secure from the pressures of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the operations of the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao, has not been achieved...
...2. Provisional government...
...No doubt others will also arise...
...During the period before elections are held, the free world will have its last opportunity to institute urgent reforms in Laos which will weaken the appeal of the Pathet Lao and strengthen the effectiveness of the non-Communist elements...
...At the very outset, therefore, a defensible truce line having the clarity of the 38th parallel in Korea or the 17th parallel in Vietnam must be clearly established...
...Strategically located along the Mekong River, it provides entry into the heart of the Southeast Asian rice bowl and its control by the Communists would immensely increase the pressures upon Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and the already severely pressed South Vietnam...
...William Henderson is associate executive director of the Council on Foreign Relations...
...Prince Souvanna Phouma should be rejected by the West as leader of the provisional government because he has now apparently joined the Communists...
...This will be especially true if, as seems likely, the Communists succeed in preventing effective work by the nonCommunists in Pathet Lao territory...
...It would also require the reorganization of the Royal Lao Army under American tutelage, the reconstitution of a Lao government for what remains of free Laos and the extension of all possible assistance to make it viable and effective...
Vol. 44 • May 1961 • No. 21
