Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age:
KAPLAN, MORTON A.
WRITERS and WRITING Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age The Necessity for Choice. By Henry A. Kissinger. Harper. 370 pp. $5.50. Reviewed by Morton A. Kaplan Fellow of the Center of...
...1959...
...The present book may not have the sale of Kissinger's previous work, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy...
...In such an event, the bargaining situation would undergo change and the effectiveness of limited retaliation may be doubtful...
...He now recognizes that they might be subject to greater blackmail with independent nuclear systems than if they lacked such weapons...
...The basic theoretical work on this subject, of course, was done some time ago by Herman Kahn and much of the relevant discussion also appears in Kahn's recent book, On Thermonuclear War...
...on the contrary, he deliberately phrases his arguments to carry conviction rather than to explore alternatives...
...The author also alludes to the use of nuclear weapons under other conditions...
...Since he conclusively argues against massive retaliation, he must be suggesting some form of limited nuclear retaliation...
...Although I agree with his goal of political federation in NATO, I would be more inclined to go slowly until the proper political prerequisites can be forged...
...He discusses the problem of limited war in Europe, rejecting the alternatives of both tactical nuclear war (which he had previously espoused) and massive retaliation...
...Many American proposals for inspection have little military merit and serve mostly to provide points of entry into Russia, a seeming confirmation of Russian suspicions...
...Kissinger provides a brilliant analysis of the strategic situation that will exist when both Russia and the United States have invulnerable deterrent systems...
...Reviewed by Morton A. Kaplan Fellow of the Center of International Studies at Princeton Henry Kissinger is without question the most brilliant American polemicist in the general area of foreign and national policy...
...Yet without an announced policy, it would be most difficult to resort to limited nuclear retaliation before the conventional holding line began to collapse...
...Many of Kissinger's arguments were used by the present reviewer against bis original position...
...indeed it is the best wide-ranging work on foreign policy written in the postwar decade...
...His treatment of the Russian tactic of transforming all bargaining into a unilateral process of Western concessions is worthy of extended discussion and analysis...
...When Kissinger sometimes adopts viewpoints opposed to his own past ideas, or developed by others, he presents them with great brilliance and éclat...
...In trying to devise a publicly acceptable policy, therefore, Kissinger has resorted to one that may involve greater strategic dangers...
...He recognizes the natural fears of the NATO countries about America's willingness to defend them and accepts a joint NATO system as the preferable alternative...
...Kissinger has retreated from bis previously held idea of independent nuclear forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations...
...The Eisenhower Administration played Russian roulette with the security of the United States, undermined its deterrent power (whatever the actual facts are on the missile gap), alarmed our allies, induced contempt for America in the Kremlin and paralyzed our diplomacy...
...The most important aspect of the so-called missile gap is deterrence...
...His concluding call for stronger conventional forces, raised primarily in Europe, may well be heeded, in part at least, by the Kennedy Administration, to the relief of policy specialists...
...Undoubtedly, Kissinger is aware of this position...
...He also dismisses the feasibility of limited retaliation, because the bargaining situation would change as Russian armies sweep across Europe...
...Even uncertainty about Soviet potentialities does not obviate the need for a vigorous American policy...
...His is not dispassionate analysis...
...General Thomas S. Power, head of the Strategic Air Command, made more up-to-date estimates for Congress a year later...
...The book also contains a profound discussion of the importance of the new nations in world affairs...
...The great perennial issues themselves are not debated, but the issues that may decide the perennial debate are here discussed with unsurpassed skill...
...April 27...
...He also has much to say about the role of the intellectual in politics, and the debilitating effects of committees and conformism...
...If his arguments are muted for fear of public reaction, his political judgment may well be sound...
...Kissinger offers an extensive and brilliant discussion on bargaining with the Russians...
...He points out that we should be concerned more with finding effective policies and less with speculating on unlikely changes in Russian leadership or society...
...Kissinger adopts many of Thomas C. Schelling's conclusions about arms control and points out that inspection may be a most misleading consideration that distracts attention from the requirements of stability...
...Indeed, economic integration—as in the European Common Market—may provide a more feasible means for political federation...
...Clearly, treating NATO as a merely military alliance can have only undesirable consequences...
...The requirements for a Russian first strike were first estimated publicly by the present writer in The New Leader...
...To a considerable extent, Kissinger's book is a sustained polemic against the defense policies of the Eisenhower Administration...
...His discussion of the missile gap should be required reading for everyone who essays to debate the issue...
...Nevertheless, it is by far the better book...
...We are losing our ability to deter Russian aggression at the periphery and may even become vulnerable to a Russian first strike...
...But the Soviets do have the productive capacity required for such a strike...
...Here he ignores the argument that couples limited nuclear retaliation with adequate conventional forces capable of holding some reasonable line, while bargaining is taking place...
...Whether the Soviet Union possesses enough weapons for a first strike is still unknown, for our present knowledge is based on uncertain intelligence estimates...
...Kissinger maintains that it is wishful thinking to believe that they will eventually develop democratic systems patterned after ours, and advocates that the U.S...
...He possesses an unusual ability to seize particular positions and publicize them in a compelling and convincing manner...
...encourage developments in newly independent countries consonant with American values, without necessarily tying aid to military considerations...
...In this book, his positions are extremely sound and their expression represents his deepest beliefs...
...He admits that any limited war in Europe will occur under a nuclear umbrella and that only our willingness to use nuclear weapons can deter Russia from strategic choices that would help the Soviets win...
Vol. 44 • April 1961 • No. 16
