NATO: Sword and Shield

...The problem is almost entirely one of mutual confidence inside the alliance...

...For it is scarcely conceivable that NATO would be able to drop nuclear weapons on targets far inside the Soviet Union without triggering all-out war...

...Thus he referred to the concept of a NATO strategic retaliatory force simply as "an extremely interesting thought, but one which has not to my knowledge been proposed by or within the alliance...

...But, unfortunately, as Supreme Commander of NATO he could not be sufficiently explicit either about end or means...

...This is certainly a difficult problem—not only in terms of Congressional politics but also in terms of institutional machinery...

...And its answer may determine not only the prospects for Western security, but also the prospects for disarmament or for any political settlement with the Soviet Union in Europe...

...If this process goes much further the alliance may snap under the strain...

...But the countries of Western Europe are likely to resist any freezing of the present pattern, which would leave them permanently without their own atomic retaliatory capacity, unless the United States agrees to give them a more convincing share in the decisions governing the use of America's striking power...

...The only sort of conflict which is at all likely in Europe is local fighting resulting from a confused situation—like a rising in East Berlin—for which neither Washington nor Moscow has direct responsibility...

...the probability that Russia would respond to such attacks with all-out retaliation would be so high that America could not risk it unless it was prepared to accompany the NATO attack on "tactical" targets with an attack by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) on the whole of Russia's retaliatory system...

...America cannot prevent most of its allies from producing their own atomic striking forces if they decide to do so, but the European powers can produce atomic deterrents from their own resources only at the cost of their contribution to the shield force of the alliance— thus still further increasing America's commitment to suicide in case of war...

...Because of this, its allies do not trust America to invoke its deterrent power on their behalf in an emergency...

...retaliation, the probability of such American retaliation to anything but a direct attack in itself has declined...

...except for a momentary spasm of resolve by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in Moscow 18 months ago, none of the Western governments has shown any desire to test the sincerity of the proposals...

...In other words, America must give Europe a share in the sword in return for Europe's cooperation in strengthening the shield...

...For the key to NATO's nuclear predicament lies in the psychological fact that while even a five per cent chance of U.S...

...So long as the United States could threaten massive thermonuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union in response to any attack on an ally, without fear of Russia replying in kind, the answer to the first part of the question was clear enough and no one was much concerned to answer the second part...

...It would be unforgivable if NATO now decided unilaterally to upset the present balance of forces in Central Europe without at least finding out whether Russia was prepared to cooperate in stabilizing the balance in its present form...

...Such an arrangement has often been proposed by Russia, but so far...

...And so long as America alone has the safety-catch NATO remains in its present situation...

...In any case, the problem of control is raised in a much more intractable form by General Norstad's proposals to establish collective NATO nuclear forces of a type which, even if they are called tactical, could not be used without creating a high probability of all-out Soviet response...

...European share in control of nuclear deterrent is key to strengthening alliance's conventional forces NATO: Sword and Shield By Denis Healey LONDON GENERAL Lauris Norstad's speech last month to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentarians has finally brought into the open a question which the alliance has chosen to evade: What is the role of atomic weapons in NATO strategy, and how should the alliance control their use...

...Since they would have to be used first if they were used at all, they would be provocative in the extreme and would tend to undermine the stability of the existing strategic pattern in Europe...

...The question is whether the relative stability that at present has been achieved in Central Europe by a tacit agreement on both sides to observe certain military restrictions can be reinforced by an explicit treaty arrangement for the limitation and control of forces in the danger areas...

...In that case, both America and Europe will have far less security than they have now...

...Within the limits of NATO strategy, the process can be halted only by a compromise under which, in return for a more convincing share in control of the nuclear deterrent, Western Europe helps to raise the threshold of provocation at which the deterrent must be brought into play...

...A further argument against this proposal is that the sort of intermediate range missiles now available for "tactical" use would be almost impossible to protect against surprise attack if they were based on the continent of Europe...

...But the problem is not insoluble...

...and of suppressing them without atomic weapons should they occur...

...The United States must contrive some means of satisfying its allies that the deterrent will be invoked if they should ever need it...

...The tragic irony is that NATO unity is being strained by this discussion at a time when no one seriously believes that Russia is likely to initiate deliberate aggression on a large scale in Europe anyway...

...If we compare Russia's handling of the present Berlin crisis with the Berlin crisis over a decade ago, we are justified in inferring that Russia is far more influenced by the increase in America's nuclear capacity than by the decline in America's readiness to use it...

...Indeed, during the Berlin crisis earlier this year Secretary of State Christian Herter went so far as to tell the United States Senate, "I cannot conceive of any President involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly we are in danger of all-out devastation ourselves...

...However, the actual claim he made on behalf of Supreme Headquarters for nuclear missiles capable of reaching beyond Moscow, although presented as a modernization of his existing tactical air forces, was in practice a claim for a strategic retaliatory force...

...And it may well be that the United States can restore allied confidence in her intentions as much by dynamic leadership in her diplomacy as by an up-to-date restatement of her purely military commitments...

...There is, therefore, a dangerous crisis of confidence developing inside NATO...

...There is a range of intermediate solutions which could satisfy Europe without offering Russia the temptation to risk aggression...

...In particular, since all the retaliatory forces of the alliance are held by America and Britain outside the NATO framework and the responsibilities of Supreme Headquarters are confined to the defensive shield, Norstad was compelled dangerously to confuse the role of atomic weapons in NATO strategy...

...To put it another way...

...In any case, it would be wise both for strategic and political reasons to leave the United States with the sole responsibility for providing for the Western thermonuclear deterrent, and to keep the deterrent based—so far as possible—off the continent of Europe...

...While Washington is looking for less catastrophic alternatives to all-out nuclear war, Europe is looking for ways to strengthen the credibility of American retaliation—and individual European countries like Britain and France are seeking to provide themselves with an independent capacity for massive thermonuclear retaliation...

...America does not trust its allies with the power to trigger their own strategic striking force against its will...

...It should not be impossible to bring the probability of American retaliation up to a level which would satisfy Western Europe...

...If the West wants to improve its security it should concern itself primarily with ways of making such local conflicts less probable...

...The most obvious way of solving this problem is by cooperation with the Soviet Union—whose interests in this respect coincide with those of NATO...

...The purpose of General Norstad's speech may have been to suggest the lines along which such a compromise might work...

...For as long as the Americans have the physical capacity for massive retaliation Russia is unlikely to gamble on their unwillingness to use it...

...retaliation is probably enough to deter the Soviet Union, none of America's allies would feel safe if there were a 95 per cent chance that America would not invoke the deterrent on their behalf...

...If all 15 countries have a trigger to SAC, the alliance will be no different from a coalition of 15 thermonuclear powers...

...If all 15 have the safety-catch, the deterrent might lose all credibility...

...there is no evidence whatever that Russia is prepared to speculate on a failure by America to fulfill its obligations to its allies...

...But now that Russia has a massive thermonuclear capacity of its own and has developed the doctrine of a pre-emptive strike to anticipate U.S...

...The growing inadequacy of the threat of all-out American retaliation as a deterrent to any attack on Europe has set European opinion moving in the opposite direction from that of the United States...