China, Russia and the Bomb

...Shortly afterward, he agreed that a provision on accession was possible if the operation of the treaty with respect to the three original parties was not linked with the accession of other states...

...from its Asian allies...

...on cessation of tests, its only feasible course was to attempt to shelve the question relating to accession of other countries and to hope that Peking might be influenced by other means...

...recognition might be granted, provided China accepted the independence of Taiwan and the neutralization of the off-shore islands...

...China and other socialist countries, including "the establishment of atom-free zones and systems of collective security in Europe and in Asia and the Pacific region...

...capability...

...The last reference to it during this period was made by Chen Yi in his May 10 interview with West German correspondents when he supported the concept and also predicted that China would shortly have atomic weapons (Die Welt, May 12, 1958...

...attempts to create "two Chinas...

...How can one who is not recognized go to attend a conference with those who do not recognize him...

...In his February 29 press interview in Jarkarta, when asked if he believed important international issues could be resolved without China's participation...

...Kang argued that because of U.S...

...China is prepared, however, to use the concern over its exclusion from such agreements to reinforce an image of itself as an independent entity with which both the U.S...

...tour, the Soviet Premier may have had in mind some gesture to placate the Chinese in his September 18 speech at the UN General Assembly...

...Both the Soviet and Western delegates carefully refrained from mentioning Communist China, though that country must have been foremost in their minds when they discussed accession...

...Nor did the Jen-min Jih-pao editorials of February 1 and 8 which commented on Khrushchev's speech...

...But Chinese Party leader Chou En-lai, who addressed the congress the following day, made no reference to such a zone...

...Secretary of State Christian Herter had earlier recognized the need to bring Communist China into the disarmament discussion at some stage, but in February 1960, after suggesting that the UN might be responsible for the adherence of other powers, he added...

...THOUGH DURING Khrushchev's Asian tour Khrushchev and the Soviet press made several statements supporting Asian participation in summit meetings and disarmament negotiations, at no time did support appear to be specifically rendered to China's participation in disarmament negotiations...

...there was the temporary elimination from Chinese statements of support of an Asian atom-free zone...

...Since immediately before making this declaration, Khrushchev had referred to the disarmament and test-ban issues as among those requiring negotiation at the summit, there is some possibility that the assurance was given with the Chinese in mind...

...nuclear capabilities there and a U.S...

...Without prior commitment, China might hope to exact, as the price for her adherence to such an agreement, not only U. S. recognition and membership in the United Nations, but also the removal of U. S. nuclear weapons from the Far East to the advantage of China's conventional forces...

...Yet, only a few months later, on May 23, 1958, after the Commander of the Chinese Air Force, Liu Ya-lou, indicated that China would be able to make atomic bombs "in the not too distant future...

...Khrushchev took note of the apprehension of small states, and states not represented at a summit conference, that the great powers would disregard their interests...

...To my knowledge, this is the first and only time the projected atom-free zone was limited to "East Asia and the Pacific region...

...I don't think it would necessarily require Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations any more than it would require recognition by any power of China...

...Presently employed by the Rand Corporation as a researcher, she has been published in such publications as the China Quarterly and Problems of Communism...

...During a side trip to Pyongyang, North Korea, this delegation, the only one to support Khrushchev's proposal during the congress, had just signed a joint statement with Kim II-song which fully endorsed the Khrushchev proposal...

...India, Indonesia and Japan in a summit conference...

...In this essay, Miss Hsieh analyzes Communist Chinese statements in the context of Sino-Soviet relations and their differing international stances...

...The timing of the Tsarapkin and Liu Ya-lou statements in the contexts of the test-ban negotiations and the proposals for a Far East atom-free zone (plus Chinas apparently reluctant consent to the latter) suggests that China had temporarily reconciled itself to a transitional military strategy—one which recognized China's relative military weakness until it could manufacture atomic weapons and which, in the meantime, called for limited military objectives and continued reliance on the Soviet Union's deterrent capability...

...In addition, both Russia and China stood to benefit by an arrangement which, if accepted by the West, would remove American nuclear weapons from the Far East and ban their use in the area, prevent Japanese development of atomic weapons, maximize the potential of China's conventional forces and permit China to pose as a non-atomic power among Asians behind the shield of Soviet nuclear retaliatory Alice Langley Hsieh is a political analyst and student of contemporary Chinese affairs...

...But then he continued: "Many questions which could be solved now mostly concern the states that take part in the conference" (italics mine...

...These two possibilities would concern the Soviet Union, for they could mean the loss of effective Soviet control over China's military moves, the danger of the USSR being drawn into a war not of Moscow's choosing or timing, and the chance that China s limited actions might develop into a general war...

...In putting forward a proposal so palatable to much of the Japanese public (since the zone now covered the U.S...

...Thus ended the second round in the discussion of Far East atom-free zone...

...But after condemning America's introduction of "nuclear and rocket weapons" into South Korea, Chou said: "We advocate the establishment of an area free of atomic weapons, an area of peace, throughout the whole of East Asia and the Pacific region...

...To what extent China might be inhibited militarily by the awareness that in the technological-military race it would inevitably lag far behind the United States and Soviet Union remains a moot question...

...For both Communist partners, the concept of an Asian atom-free zone, even if it were unacceptable to the West, constituted a political-psychological instrument for dividing the U.S...

...The USSR would control China's desires for access to nuclear weapons and great-power status CHINA, RUSSIA AND THE BOMB By Alice Langley Hsieh ONLY A YEAR AFTER the November 1957 meetings between Mao Tse-tung and Nikita Khrushchev, when the Soviet Union probably refused to grant the Red Chinese an atomic capability, came the first indication of Chinese support for an Asian atom-free zone—on February 10, 1958, when Premier Chou En-lai described the atom-free zone "as what the Chinese people have all along supported...

...But if the Soviet Union was serious about a test-ban agreement and saw in it the means of freezing the military balance with the U.S., consideration of China's interests in the negotiation of a treaty and the institution of an inspection system would have delayed an agreement interminably or prevented it altogether...

...Moreover, in contrast to the declaration of the Warsaw Treaty members that "the situation is now more favorable than ever before for fruitful disarmament talks...

...and the USSR must deal, and to secure any political by-products that might come its way...

...In this way China might hope to enhance the military and political value of its conventional forces in the face of possible American intervention...

...The Chinese were also alert to certain unofficial suggestions made in the U.S...

...In commenting on Khrushchev's speech, however, the Chinese made no mention of this assurance...

...She sees growing divergences of policy arising from serious conflicts of interest on the subjects of disarmament, nuclear capabilities, atomic test bans and the inclusion of China in great-power agreements...

...It is likely that in line with its endorsement of the Rapacki plan in late 1957 and early 1958...

...As long as the Soviet Union accorded priority to an understanding with the U.S...

...that to gain Chinese participation in disarmament agreements United Nations membership and even U.S...

...It was hardly surprising, therefore, that on April 10 Chou En-lai, in a broad condemnation of U.S...

...A direct Chinese response to Herter's statement, however, was not forthcoming until May 11, when in a press conference at Rangoon Chou stated that "if China is invited to take part in the big-power disarmament conference while the People's Republic of China is not recognized, we, of course, cannot consider the matter...

...and then spoke of important peace proposals put forward by the Soviet Union...

...Chinese commitment to such a proposition would have been of distinct advantage to the Soviet Union: It would have provided the Kremlin with a measure of control over Chinese military operations affecting United States interests in the Far East...

...insistence on an arms race "the struggle for general disarmament is a long-term and complicated struggle between us and imperialism...

...This is inconceivable...

...again insisted that international agreements made without the participation and signature of China would have no binding force...

...Moscow might have had some influence in this and might have been countering a Peking request for an atomic capability by praising the merits of an atom-free zone in Asia...

...Huns, Ch'i, voice support for the Khrushchev proposal...

...To resolve this impasse the Soviet Union might have insisted on bringing the Chinese into the Geneva test-ban negotiations at an early stage...

...China also implied that it had no intention of being bound by Soviet commitments to the West, or of being used as a pawn by the Soviet Union in its negotiations with the West...

...thereafter, references to such a proposal rapidly disappeared from the Chinese communications media...

...These qualified Khrushchev's remarks by saying he had proposed that "an area of peace covering the Far East and the whole Pacific region be set up...

...Kang's characterization of the disarmament problem, when viewed beside China's atomic aspirations and her other objectives on the international scene, tends to indicate China's lack of interest in this question...

...A small atomic capability would underline China's claim to great-power status and permit it, within limits, to practice atomic blackmail against its neighbors...

...On his part...

...He declared that "such fears have no basis at all," and that "as far as the Soviet Government is concerned, it has never had and does not have any intention of negotiating behind the backs of other states about matters having a direct bearing on their interests...

...Possibly the move was part of a dual strategy for Japan and China...

...But a Chinese commitment to such a concept also posed obvious disadvantages to Peking...

...This sudden reticence may have reflected a growing Chinese concern over the possible effects of a test ban upon China's aspiration to become a member of the nuclear club...

...The first indication of Chinese support came in an article Soong Ching-ling wrote for Pravda (February 14), and not until February 16 did a Chinese publication...

...IT WAS SURELY not without premeditation that Khrushchev, on January 27, 1959 (a few months after the conclusion of the Quemoy crisis), dramatically revived the concept of an Asian atom-free zone...

...It might be prepared, in fact, to accept the risk of initiating military operations independent of Soviet approval, even if they so directly affected U.S...

...He had taken the position that the agreement (and the control system) should be limited to the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, who would "promote the assumption by all other states in the world of an undertaking not to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type...

...Moreover, a premature Chinese commitment to an atom-free zone would also weaken China's bargaining position vis-a-vis the U.S...

...On arriving in Peking, Khrushchev again called for China's participation in the UN but said nothing about China's role in other international negotiations...

...In view of Peking's lack of enthusiasm for Khrushchev's 1959 U.S...

...Even so, the text of the joint statement signed by the Chinese Communist party and the JCP delegation on March 4—as well as the communique issued jointly on March 17 by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and Inejiro Asanuma, leader of the Japanese Socialist party delegation—cast serious doubt on China's eagerness to promote the idea...

...CHINA'S APPROACH TO the disarmament question must be seen in the context of its growing divergence from the Soviet Union on the question of the correct tactical approach to the West...

...On February 4 Kang Sheng, addressing the meeting of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, extended Chinese refusal to be bound by any international disarmament agreement without its formal participation and signature to include "all other international agreements...

...To accept it before a test-ban agreement might prejudice China's bargaining power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the matter of nuclear aid, either for an atomic capability or for the scientific and technological assistance to facilitate indigenous atomic developments...

...China, if it possessed even a small nuclear capability, might be willing to shoulder the risks of initiating a limited war with conventional weapons in the hope that the United States would be discouraged from using its much larger nuclear arsenal...

...In the longer run, however, the Chinese no doubt realize that even experimental explosion of an atomic device would increase China's prestige among Asian countries...

...This approach had some effect, for the Chinese began slightly more active propaganda in favor of an atom-free zone in the Far East as the result of the arrival in Peking of the Japanese Communist party (JCP) delegation to the 21st Party Congress in Moscow...

...This continuing Soviet ambiguity, along with a clearer definition of the U.S...

...interests in Asia as to leave open the possibility of a nuclear response...

...ON DECEMBER 4, 1958, Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Soviet delegate to the Geneva test-ban conference, challenged the West's position that the proposed agreement should contain an article on accession of other parties, arguing: "You wish to liberate a genie from a bottle whom you will not be able to put back in the bottle and keep under control...

...In the event of a test-ban agreement, China might be prepared to adhere to it on the condition that the Soviet Union provided it with an atomic capability...

...it would have reduced the difficulties of the China problem at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: and it would have checked Chinese pressures for atomic sharing...

...In his January 14, 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet...

...posture in the Far East, growing U.S...

...Even if it is true, however, that the Soviet Union has refused to grant China an atomic capability, it must reckon with the probability that in the long run China will be able to manufacture atomic weapons on its own...

...Khrushchev referred to his earlier statement to the Indonesian Parliament supporting participation of China...

...should a test ban be agreed upon...

...The extent of Soviet concern is suggested by the lack of any available evidence of Russia's granting atomic military facilities to China...

...Thus, over the past few months, a pattern has emerged in China's attitude toward disarmament negotiations...

...testing area in the Pacific) Moscow may well have been deliberately pursuing a policy which it believed China would have no alternative but to support...

...attitude on the role of China in disarmament agreements, probably triggered the next Chinese moves...

...This, Tsarapkin maintained, would be adequate to prevent atomic tests by other countries...

...The Soviet Union's preference for using military power to erode the defenses of the West gradually, rather than to assault them frontally, found no favor among the Chinese, who remained faced with a firm U.S...

...There is, of course, the interesting possibility that the Soviet Union, in seeking to confine the operation of the treaty to the three original parties, wanted to leave uncontrolled an area where it might continue testing...

...Early in 1960 the Russians and Chinese renewed their polemical exchanges on the degree of Chinese participation in international negotiations...

...it would have limited the occasions on which Soviet deterrent might have to be invoked...

...Instead, their response took the form of a dramatic assertion by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on January 21 that "any international agreement concerning disarmament, without the formal participation of the People's Republic of China and the signature of its delegate, cannot of course have any binding force on China...

...have been indicating a desire on China's part to restrict any atom-free zone in the Far East to China's periphery...

...The Soviet position no doubt left Peking with serious reservations about how far it could rely on the Soviet Union not only to support Chinese policy in the Far East but also to see that Chinese interests were not prejudiced in international negotiations, particularly those relating to disarmament...

...He stated that it was inconceivable for anyone to think that "a stable and reliable solution of major world problems could be achieved without the participation of the great People's China" and then went on to demand that China be seated in the United Nations...

...disregard for China's prestige...

...Perhaps in consequence of this ambiguous Soviet attitude and in contrast with past Chinese reserve, Chou En-lai took the opportunity to clarify the Chinese position by asserting on October 6 that China must "exercise its right to have its say on all major international questions which concern its interests and the interests of world peace...

...Tsarapkin specifically referred to France, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, Italy, Japan and Australia as countries which might engage in testing...

...In his opening address to the 21st Soviet Party Congress he asserted that "a zone of peace, above all, an atom-free zone, can and must be created in the Far East and the entire Pacific basin...

...Could Chou, by changing the phrase "Far East," previously used by both Soviet and Chinese spokesmen, into "East Asia...

...Moreover, it suggests that China was making an effort to insulate itself from the Soviet position on universal disarmament, if not directly questioning the Soviet position, which the Chinese might consider could lead to a weakening of the bloc's nuclear posture...

...These statements referred primarily to Japanese support of an atom-free zone in the Far East and Pacific...

...China's reluctance to commit itself to an atom-free zone in "the Far East and the entire Pacific basin" was underlined in the course of Chou En-lai's report to the National People's Congress on April 18...

...In taking this position, Peking unequivocally put the great powers (including the USSR) on notice that China's interests could not be disregarded...

...At first he urged that there be "a peace area in Asia...

...China seems to have no real interest at present in committing itself on the question of disarmament, including the nuclear test-ban issue, for such a commitment would impair her own atomic aspirations as well as her bargaining position with both the USSR and U.S...

...At the same time China made it plain that her aspiration to become an atomic power would be relinquished only at an appropriate price—if at all...

...The Soviet Union revived the concept of an Asian atom-free zone, now defined as covering the Far East and Pacific basin, apparently without prior coordination with Peking...