National Defense and the Campaign

HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE CAMPAIGN By Samuel P. Huntington SINCE THE BEGINNING of the cold war in 1946 few, if any, issues have been more important than the adequacy of the American defense effort....

...Security as the only goal for military and foreign policy programs is inadequate precisely because security is not what is immediately at stake in world politics today...
...disarmament was viewed as an alternative to deterrence, and the arms-control proposals were of a sweeping character presupposing the abandonment of the policy of peace through strength...
...Adequacy of the Means...
...To meet this threat, they urge that measures be taken: (1) to protect existing retaliatory forces through dispersal, through warning systems and through air-alert systems which would keep a significant number of SAC bombers in the air at all times...
...On the other hand, however, the party which has favored stronger armaments has been reluctant to advance its views actively in a Presidential campaign for the fear that such action would reinforce its image as the war party...
...LIMITED WAR...
...Security, however, can become such an overriding goal that it may blind the Government to the other possible goals of military policy...
...First, to deter major Soviet attack, is it necessary to have a retaliatory force which can devastate Soviet strategic air and missile forces (i.e., a counter-force capability) or is it sufficient to have a retaliatory capability which can devastate Soviet population and industrial centers (i.e., a finite deterrent) ? The requirements for the former are much greater than those for the latter, and the difference between the two will probably increase greatly in the coming decade...
...Similarly...
...3) the increasing effectiveness of the Soviet air defense system, which would further devastate whatever retaliatory forces got off the ground...
...The way in which that environment can work to discourage debate of defense policy is well illustrated by the 1956 campaign...
...and no effort has been made to expand the inadequate airlift available for these forces...
...Two years later Secretary of State Christian Herter defined American foreign policy as "survival without surrender...
...The basic issue is whether the United States is willing to make the domestic sacrifices required to play a great, constructive and positive role in world affairs...
...Those who hold that current policies are inadequate point to: (1) the vulnerability of American overseas air and missile bases to attack by Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) ; (2) the possible development of Soviet inter-continental missile (ICBM) capabilities to the point where the Russians could substantially eliminate SAC bases and long-range missile sites on the North American continent...
...was greater than that of the Soviet Union and that, in any event, this power was sufficient as a minimum deterrent...
...Having chosen the one, the Administration logically should choose the other...
...Here, apparently, was an issue on which the Democratic party was fully united, on which it had built a positive record in Congress during the previous four years, on which, apparently, it had the support of the public, and the urgency and importance of which had been underlined by the criticisms of dissenting generals and admirals from all three services...
...Defense policy was aimed at deterrence and the development of strong and ready military forces...
...The Gallup polls consistently showed large pluralities in favor of stronger military forces...
...Judged by the record of the immediate past, American military policy has successfully deterred large- and small-scale aggressions...
...In sum, security alone is a narrow and limited goal for a great nation...
...Viewed in terms of the political role of the United States in world politics, the Administration may be disastrously wrong...
...The restrictive effects of too great a concern with security can be seen in the space and missiles programs on the one hand, and arms control on the other...
...Furthermore, the long-run tendency of the arms race is toward relatively invulnerable air and missile forces, thus limiting the effect of any counter-force...
...Even Governor Rockefeller declared that the "ultimate purpose" of defense policy is "national security...
...Such intervention will probably mean either a limited conventional war, similar to the Korean War though perhaps smaller in scale, or a limited nuclear war...
...But since weapons and forces do not come into being overnight the most important issue of all is whether the decisions on military programs today will provide adequate defense in the mid-1960s...
...in domestic politics, strong armaments are identified with war...
...The Administration has created an artificial distinction between military and civilian space programs...
...But if the Administration ever allows retaliatory strength to fall to the level where the policy makers begin to fear that SAC could be wiped out in a surprise attack, American foreign policy would disintegrate...
...Adequacy of the Goal...
...At 1956 Congressional hearings, both Army General Matthew Ridgway and Strategic Air Command chief General Curtis LeMay deplored the deficiencies and inadequacies of the Administration's military effort...
...This spring U.S...
...Simple common sense dictates that on an issue of such transcendent importance it is better to spend a few hundred million dollars too much than too little...
...American policy during the cold war may be narrowly directed to military security to the exclusion of broader political considerations...
...If elections have any function in a democracy, certainly the election this year should offer the American people the opportunity to ratify or to reject that choice...
...political results are not...
...American policy during World War II has often been criticized because it was narrowly directed to military victory to the exclusion of political goals...
...and its political system, the confidence of its allies, the respect of the neutrals and the flexibility of its diplomacy...
...We will lose that competition if we make security alone our overriding goal...
...In the last five years, the U.S...
...PREOCCUPATION with security has also limited the ability of the U.S...
...In the light of all this, the development of limited war forces instead of vast strategic counter-forces will give the nation a greater flexibility of policy and a decrease in military costs...
...Military programs must be judged not only by how much they contribute to security but also by how much they contribute to the continuing competition of peaceful coexistence...
...An authority on American military policy since 1945, he is the author of The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations...
...In 1956 and '57, the Administration in effect chose a finite deterrent strategy, and the Administration's position certainly seems to be the most persuasive one...
...American policy has been directed toward achieving that minimum level of security considered necessary by the Administration in power...
...And this issue, in turn, depends on whether the U.S...
...In the coming decade, direct aggressions across international boundaries seem less likely to occur than subversion, guerilla warfare and civil war...
...Although public opinion polls indicated widespread support for stronger defense, they also indicated that when questioned as to which party was most likely to prevent a future war, the voters invariably chose the Republicans by a substantial margin...
...The record of the past four years indicates that while it has accepted this logic in principle, it has not done much to implement it in practice...
...apart from the Chinese conquest of Tibet and the border activity in Laos, neither have any other Communist countries...
...The Eisenhower Administration has maintained that its military programs are adequate for security, which is debatable but possibly true...
...A dangerous dichotomy has existed for several years between the logic of foreign policy and the logic of domestic politics...
...The problem of the adequacy of American retaliatory defense forces involves two major questions...
...Such interventions will require the clearest understanding of the relation between military force and diplomatic objectives, and they may require the development of entirely new strategic concepts, weapons, tactics and means of political-military collaboration...
...2) to speed the development and production of better missile systems in either static ("hardened") or mobile sites (Minuteman, Polaris) ; and (3) to accelerate the development of anti-missile defense systems...
...The present Administration has chosen to aim at security alone...
...Yet to base policy on any other assumption would significantly multiply the risks confronting the nation...
...But Administration leaders and executive agencies, preoccupied with the great goal of security, have been insensitive to the other benefits from test bans which might counterbalance the slightly enlarged risks to security...
...in the race into space...
...American foreign policy rests on the assumptions that peace can be maintained only by deterring Soviet aggression, that deterrence requires strong and balanced military forces and that inadequate military forces invite war...
...In a strategy of deterrence, the key decisions are strategic ones: the overall size of the military effort, the balance among the functional programs, the force levels of the armed services, the nature and number of their weapons...
...The suspension of nuclear tests, for instance, may limit or slow down the development of American military strength and may, therefore, adversely affect the military security of the country...
...For a counter-force capability is required only if this country is relying on its retaliatory forces to the exclusion of other forms of military capability—which it is not...
...We will accept nothing less...
...and (2) more importantly, the adequacy of security as a goal of military policy...
...This year the criticisms which Senator John F. Kennedy has made of the Administration's defense policies, together with similar attacks by Senators Stuart Symington, Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey—not to mention Governor Nelson Rockefeller—suggest that the previous pattern of abstaining may be broken...
...the Strategic Army Corps has been reduced from four to three divisions...
...The choice of the latter strategy implies the need to make other provision for deterring small-scale aggressions...
...A minimum level of security has usually been interpreted as requiring: • A massive retaliatory force sufficient to deter a major Soviet nuclear attack on North America...
...Army and Marine Corps personnel have been cut...
...Space exploration, he said, was accepted throughout the world as "the primary symbol of world leadership in all areas of science and technology...
...The phrase "limited war" can cover a wide range of contingencies, including both external and internal aggression...
...The Administration has consciously chosen the policy of a finite deterrent and now it has the greater responsibility of insuring that the means exist to implement that policy...
...security has not been endangered...
...During the first decade after World War II American defense policy and disarmament policy tended to move in opposite directions...
...Security is neither an ultimate nor a positive goal—indeed, it defines not only the extent of American defense efforts but also a limit to those efforts...
...Defense deterrence will require not only the protection of the retaliatory force but also the protection of the civilian population...
...Since 1958 the Administration has yielded some ground to its critics but it has not done all that they have demanded...
...On few issues during Eisenhower's first term were the two parties more sharply divided Samuel P. Huntington is Associate Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Associate Professor of Government, at Columbia University...
...A finite deterrent, on the other hand, deters only the strategic offensive forces of the enemy...
...The arms race was first concerned with the means of destruction (atomic and hydrogen bombs), then with the means of delivery (jet bombers and missiles) : now it appears that the means of defense will assume a greater and greater importance...
...The Administration freely admitted that the Soviets would have a three-to-one lead in long-range missiles, but it discounted the significance of this figure, arguing that the overall retaliatory power of the U.S...
...American forces and Allied forces (supported by American military assistance) sufficient to deter—or, if this proves impossible, to suppress quickly—small-scale aggressions or disorders inimical to American interests in the "gray areas" of the world...
...is to take into account and deal adequately with both the policy of the great deterrent and the policy of limited war...
...to take the lead in arms control...
...A former Research Fellow of both the Social Science Research Council and The Brookings Institute, Professor Huntington has also taught at Harvard and published widely in scholarly journals...
...In 1952, Eisenhower vigorously criticized the Administration's conduct of the Korean War, but he did not directly attack the scope of the defense effort except to suggest that the Republicans might be able to produce comparable results for less money...
...Rather, the failure to debate them will be due to the inhibitory effects of the political environment...
...Continental defense forces sufficient to protect the retaliatory force as a supplementary deterrent and to minimize damage if the deterrent should fail...
...THE GREAT DETERRENT...
...Presumably such a deterrent must include forces which: (a) can withstand an initial Soviet surprise attack, (b) sustain the losses imposed by the Soviet air-defense system, and (c) still inflict damage upon the Soviet Union which would be unacceptable to the Soviet leaders...
...U.S...
...Information Agency head George Allen declared that the Soviet successes in space had "tremendously" increased the prestige of the Soviet Union and caused "a great loss of prestige" for America...
...and (4) the willingness of the Soviets to accept much larger losses of life and industry than the Western countries...
...The potential political role of space achievements hence receives little recognition...
...Present policy also appears to give insufficient weight to the changing needs of deterrence...
...The United States is engaged in a continuing political competition...
...So long as this dichotomy exists, foreign policy necessarily rests on a shaky basis...
...Scientific and military results, in short, are "real...
...But even if true, it would not mean that those programs were adequate for the role which the United States should play in world politics today...
...Viewed in the narrow context of military security, the Administration may be right...
...Any Communist attack across an established or recognized international boundary is likely to require American intervention...
...In responding to the criticisms in the early part of this year, it also indicated that its policy was based not only upon relative military capabilities but also upon estimates of probable Soviet intentions regarding those capabilities...
...If both Soviet and American retaliatory forces eventually become almost completely invulnerable to attack, the arms race may well focus on which side is able to reduce the vulnerability of its cities, industries and populations...
...This is most unlikely...
...More recently, however, arms control has been seen not as an alternative to deterrence but as a corollary to it, as a means of increasing the effectiveness of deterrent forces...
...So long as the Administration remains convinced that it has an adequate retaliatory force and acts on this conviction, American diplomacy will retain a high degree of effectiveness...
...European defense forces, American and Allied, to deter small-scale attacks on western Europe and to insure that any major Soviet aggression would require the deliberate choice of all-out war...
...must be prepared to meet these challenges if it is to continue an effective policy of finite deterrence...
...The "missile gap" debates of the last two years have involved the issue of whether current defense policies will suffice to meet this standard in the early 1960s...
...Immediately after the Soviet sputniks in 1957, the President declared: "Our defense effort, large as it is, goes only far enough to deter and defeat attack...
...The critics of the Administration's defense policies included Democratic Senators from all over the country, farm states as well as industrial states...
...After each Soviet sputnik, lunik or other space achievement, Administration officials argue that U.S...
...The Soviet sputniks and luniks "are taken as evidence that the Soviet Union is able to challenge America successfully in all these fields, including even production...
...The issue is which nation will be the major influence in world politics...
...Herbert York, Director of Research and Engineering for the Defense Department, for instance, dismissed the Soviet lead in space propulsion as "more a question of acute embarrassment than national survival...
...Yet few things are more striking in American politics than the extent to which this issue has not been debated in Presidential campaigns...
...has made considerable progress in developing tactical atomic weapons for a limited nuclear war, but it has not prepared itself to fight a limited non-nuclear war...
...Involved in the cold war is not just military security but also the prestige of the U.S...
...Here the use of force by the U.S...
...The U.S...
...This attitude has led to a continuous series of political defeats for the U.S...
...Conventional forces, which would bear the brunt of a non-nuclear war, have been reduced...
...If defense policy takes its proper place as an issue in this year's campaign, the most important questions to be debated are: (1) the adequacy of the means which the Eisenhower Administration has employed to achieve security...
...In foreign policy, strong armaments are a prerequisite to peace...
...Apart from its intervention in Hungary in 1956, the Soviet Union has not engaged in any direct aggression...
...We can lose that competition without losing our national "security...
...Given the desirability of a finite deterrent, the second question is: What constitutes an adequate minimum deterrent...
...Hence, the real defense issues—upon which there were serious differences of opinion within the Executive Branch —were virtually ignored during the campaign, and the proposals to suspend nuclear tests and eliminate the draft were advanced instead...
...In 1954, Democratic leaders inside and outside Congress vigorously attacked the New Look, massive retaliation and the cut-backs in conventional forces...
...this argument is simply an excuse to avoid or suppress the issues...
...Given these conditions, the critics argue, the Soviets might be tempted to launch a surprise attack...
...Critics of the Administration often seem to assume that if the Soviets were reasonably sure that they could knock out the American retaliatory force, they would do so...
...Past success, however, is no guarantee of the future...
...But the possibility that the dichotomy will be overcome and the 1956 pattern not repeated this year is enhanced by the fading of Korean War memories, increasing public awareness of the relation between military force and peace, the widespread concern over defense among the younger Democratic leaders and the scope and gravity of the defense policy issues now at stake...
...To counteract their identification with war, which was unpopular, the Democrats also had to play down their identification with armaments, which were popular...
...in Congress than on the adequacy of the defense effort...
...As Keith Glennan, Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, has said: "We cannot run second very long and still talk realistically about leadership...
...If they are not fully debated in this Presidential campaign, it will not be because defense strategy is too technical or requires too much classified information to be debated publicly...
...A counter-force capability could conceivably deter both large and small aggressions...
...First priority goes to primarily military programs because they have direct implications for "national security...
...In 1948, both candidates avoided foreign policy issues...
...In 1956, Adlai Stevenson suggested the desirability of ending nuclear tests and the draft, but he explicitly avoided attacking the adequacy of the Administration's defense effort other than incidentally...
...On every one of seven key roll-call votes between 1953 and 1956, 78 per cent or more of the Democrats voting voted for increasing military appropriations and 88 per cent or more of the Republicans voted against increasing them...
...We want adequate security...
...The reason for this failure lies chiefly in the acute sensitivity of the Democratic party leaders to the "war party" label which the Republicans attached to them during the Korean War...
...Shortly after the Soviet sputniks, for instance, Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas declared that "we must not be talked into 'hitting the moon with a rocket,' for example, just to be first, unless by doing so we stand to gain something of real scientific or military significance...
...Most of the debates over defense policy have centered on the adequacy of the means to achieve security, not about the adequacy or desirability of security as a goal of military policy...
...Second priority goes to scientific programs, handled by the civilian space agency, which have scientific implications...
...Articulate and effective American leadership in the drive to suspend nuclear testing could have political pay-offs in the cold war which would far exceed the increased risks to national security...
...Certainly, the issues of the adequacy of both the means of defense policy and its goals are more vital and relevant than ever...
...How much "acute embarrassment" can we afford...
...to bolster friendly governments or movements inevitably means involvement in the domestic politics of other countries...
...We want no more than adequacy...
...Yet, despite urgings from advisers, Stevenson did not make the inadequacy of the Administration's defense effort a major theme in his campaign...
...policy has been slow in adjusting to this change...
...Yet it does not seem to be fulfilling that responsibility: Too much uncertainty still exists about the policy, uncertainty in an area where there should be only certainty...
...A widening gap exists between the military and economic effort which is required to maintain national security on the one hand, and that which is required to restore and maintain American political leadership on the other...

Vol. 43 • September 1960 • No. 35


 
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