Toward an Algerian Peace

...The movement toward a new settlement of the long-standing conflict was initiated by de Gaulle in a speech on June 14...

...Filled with hope and optimism...

...I don't believe that the negotiations have broken down permanently: Both parties fear the odium of causing the failure and both will wish to avoid carrying the stamp of "the enemy of peace...

...It is certainly possible to meet the FLN demands on reasonable grounds, but the move will have to come from de Gaulle...

...At the same time he repeated that in the preparations for self-determination all sectors of Algerian politics would be free to participate: "It is guaranteed that the choice [of independence, association or integration] will be completely free . . . and that all—yes, all— shades of opinion will be able to take part...

...I tell them that we await them here to find with them an honorable end to the combat that still drags on, to settle the disposition of arms and to assure the fate of the combatants...

...Despite breakdown of preliminary talks, de Gaulle is likely to seek new negotiations Toward an Algerian Peace By Sal Tas Paris Though there are still many stumbling blocks in the way of a settlement of the six-year-old Algerian war, peace at last may be in sight...

...and the reaction of the Algerian French after de Gaulle's June 14 announcement was so weak in comparison with the violent demonstrations in January that there is every reason to believe that they now know the Army will not be with them...

...First, tremendous pressure was brought by Tunisia and Morocco, who know that a war on their borders and directed from their capitals prevents them from establishing normal domestic stability, normal relations with France and, indeed, normal relations with the rest of the world...

...But whatever steps are made in the next few weeks for new negotiations, the path to an Algerian peace will still be long and difficult...

...Hopes for an Algerian peace, which only a few weeks before had seemed so bright, had dimmed considerably...

...De Gaulle's desire to settle the Algerian conflict is undoubtedly genuine and strong—his prestige and influence depend to a large extent on the public's faith that he will be able to achieve peace...

...Only on this basis can both the moral and material interests of the Algerian French be guaranteed...

...No one else has the ability to direct French opinion so forcefully and no one else can override the objections of the conservatives and the "ultras," who are opposed to any kind of peace negotiation whatsoever...

...Furthermore, de Gaulle is the only person who can control the French Army in Algeria...

...Third, the war itself has not been going well for the FLN this year and the prospects of a long seige against the strong, well-organized and increasingly active French Army were not attractive...

...Yet the clarity and precision of the guarantees and the conciliatory tone in which they were delivered were new...

...Nor has the Government been sensible in excluding Ben Bella from the discussions: He is one of the most reasonable FLN leaders and he will have to be freed anyway if the negotiations are successful...

...It is also essential that de Gaulle give the FLN the equality in negotiations that it so desires—which he can do only by breaking the backbone of colonial resistence among the Algerian French...

...Paradoxically, only this equality, if seen and accepted by both sides, can form a solid basis for any stable new Algerian society...

...That is why any discussions about a cease-fire must necessarily include discussions about guarantees for self-determination...

...As to including political questions on the agenda, it seems to be impossible to avoid this and impractical to try...

...The FLN objected to de Gaulle's terms for peace negotiations on two major grounds: 1. Boumendjel discovered that the French had a ready-made and non-negotiable proposal for organizing the peace talks: The meetings would be held in secret, the Algerian delegation would be restricted in its movements, forbidden to communicate with anyone except its representatives in Tunis and barred from contact with Ben Bella, the FLN leader imprisoned in Paris...

...At the moment both France and the Algerian Provisional Government are aiming toward eventual negotiations in Paris—and despite angry statements from leaders of both sides and the Algerians' rejection of President Charles de Gaulle's preliminary conditions, there is as yet no reason to conclude that the negotiations will not eventually take place...

...Second, there was strong pressure from a number of young central African states who themselves had gained independence after friendly discussions in Paris and who saw de Gaulle's move as a genuine and serious attempt for a settlement...

...As he had done twice before, he invited the leaders of Algeria's rebel National Liberation Front (FLN) to attend meetings in Paris and discuss the conditions for "an honorable peace...

...The French Government took the proper position in insisting on secret negotiations and even Abbas himself agreed that public talks are of only limited value...

...2. The French insisted that no discussions of Algeria's political future could be included on the peace talk agenda...

...In a bitter and insulting speech a few days later, Abbas repeated the position of the communique and charged that "even in negotiation the French Government holds to the colonialist viewpoint and rejects any discussion between equals...

...The FLN leaders—though taken by surprise—were encouraged by de Gaulle's invitation...

...FLN leaders, however, have rejected the Chinese support, for they realized that to follow the Chinese advice would be to expose their movement to tremendous dangers: from the West, from the emerging neutral African states, and from the Tunisian and Mor-rocan governments who would not want to jeopardize their international positions by having Chinese troops operate from within their borders...

...For them, peace would mean liberation from a nightmare...

...Once again, in the name of France," he said, "I turn toward the leaders of the insurrection...

...It is a thorny problem, but the FLN position seems just: It has taken up arms for political goals and must therefore demand guarantees of a political character...

...The preliminary meetings had collapsed...

...There were several important reasons for FLN willingness to negotiate...

...It will lay down its arms, but only with the assurance that it will be able to attain its end —self-determination—by political, if not military, means...

...Thus, it is up to the General alone to make the first steps toward meeting the FLN demands...

...Besides, he will not be the first politician in France to leave the prison cell for the conference table...

...On the surface there was nothing new in this latest statement...

...So important do they regard the continued conflict that they have offered extensive military aid to the FLN and have used the full force of their propaganda activities to support the rebels...

...But the Government made a mistake in insisting that the FUN delegation be completely isolated from the outside world: surely some reasonable compromise could be agreed upon which would permit the Algerian leaders freedom of movement without jeopardizing France's insistence on the elimination of harmful publicity...

...Since the January uprising, Army leaders loyal to de Gaulle have gained more and more power and now will almost surely do what de Gaulle wants...

...The French also refused to give any indication of the make-up of the French negotiating team—which would be the most effective indication of the standing the FLN delegation would have in the eyes of the French Government...

...All along this point has been the major stumbling block to successful negotiations: France wants a cease-fire before agreeing to political discussions about the future of Algeria, and the FLN insists on guarantees on political issues before agreeing to a cease-fire...

...Five days later he returned to Tunis—empty handed...

...These conditions were obviously unacceptable to the Provisional Government and in a communique on July 4 it rejected them flatly, but announced that it was still willing to negotiate under conditions fixed by mutual agreement...

...Boumendjel arrived in Paris June 25...

...On June 20 Algerian rebel leader Ferhat Abbas announced that he would head a delegation which would meet with the French President and would dispatch a "responsible representative to Paris to organize a means for the voyage...

...It seems likely that de Gaulle will eventually accede to the Algerian demands...

...For the first time every ironic or haughty remark was absent—this was not an invitation to surrender, this was an invitation to negotiate...

...De Gaulle's behavior recently, however, has indicated that he is now sure of the Army's loyalty...

...Indeed, the only group strongly opposed to peace negotiations was the Chinese, who see continuation of the Algerian war as a convenient weapon in their cold war propaganda...

...The Army, not the French population of Algeria, holds the real power and all hopes for future peace depend on its attitude...

...Five days later FLN representative Ahmed Boumendjel flew to Paris for preliminary negotiations...