The Legend of the Chained Nikita:

...Invariably, speculation centers on Mikhail Suslov as the leader or spokesman of this "camp...

...Just about everyone else is an appointee of the Khrushchev era...

...or else one assumes that numbers and majorities do not matter in these bodies—and then there would be no reason to believe that a hostile but victorious Suslov would continue to tolerate Khrushchev in power if he could dispense with him (much as the Molo-tov-Malenkov bloc would have dispensed with him in 1957...

...To assert that Khrushchev is being forced to act as he does is no sounder than it was, 20 years ago, to portray Hitler as a tool of the German General Staff or of the Krupps...

...Such hypothesizing is both healthy and understandable...

...No doubt, there is some truth in the recent analysis of the large number of Soviet officers facing demobilization and viewing their loss of status and income with something less than enthusiasm...

...But all this has nothing to do with officers forcing a decision upon him...

...To be sure, a "Khrushchev man" may turn against him, just as Khrushchev himself turned against Stalin after his death...

...And, here, the thesis of the Stalinists' ascendancy does not stand up...

...Nor is this to suggest in any way that there are not real tensions and differences in Soviet society and the Soviet regime...

...Granting for the sake of argument that Suslov represents a "tougher" line than Khrushchev, what are his levers of power and who are the others who back him in the top echelons of the Kremlin...

...But I suggest that if those who detect an inhibited Russian Prometheus should be proved right, it will be for the wrong reasons— or rather for reasons not now in the public domain...

...included...

...What is startling and disturbing in the recent wave of reassessments is the ease with which the view has spread that Nikita Khrushchev was in fact constrained to act as he did...

...But we are talking about probabilities or, better yet, evidence and clues...

...Of course there are, and the image of a homogeneous totalitarian apparatus is as unrealistic as the thesis I am trying to contest...

...nist party, almost to a man, and they accept Party discipline in political affairs...

...Quite the contrary...

...In the Soviet case, we know that such disagreements have existed, in recent years, over such issues as the relative priority of consumer goods, the long-range effect of foreign aid, the universal fatality of nuclear warfare and the possibility and desirability of relaxing the cold war...

...Since then the priority of the Party—in word and in fact—has explicitly been raised to unprecedented heights...

...Similarly, the breakdown of the Paris conference has no doubt pleased greater concord between the two leading Communist powers...

...It is plausible to assume that such differences were present in March-April 1960 when the general lines of Soviet foreign policy were reviewed...

...The tightening of controls and the struggle against "revisionism" included among its various manifestations the reinforcement of political control over the armed forces...

...Thus, the attempt to link Vyacheslav Molotov, as the leading Stalinist (which he was) in his Outer Mongolian quasi-exile, to Chinese Government head Liu Shao-chi in an alleged anti-Khrushchev drive is an artificial construct which has been tried and found wanting more than once before...

...There is, in other words, no one to challenge his effective control...

...Unless, that is, one is satisfied (as one well-known correspondent says) that this trend must be taken on faith and evidence for it may not be apparent for months...

...The Legend of the Chained Nikita By Alexander Dallin An inquiry into the bugbears, myths and illusions in Western analysis of Soviet affairs THE BOTHERSOME U-2 story and the drama of the summit con-ference-that-was-none have provoked an orgy of speculation about Soviet motives and intentions...

...And if Mikoyan were about to be axed (as some commentators have suggested), Khrushchev would scarcely have ridiculed such speculation by relating that Mikoyan had just invited him to his vacation ground in the Caucasus...

...Others can suggest, argue, make themselves heard—and they can do so more successfully and with greater impunity than in Stalin's days...

...political analysis must be based on assumed probabilities even if access to the source is barred...

...Some who have swallowed it are either unwilling to re-examine their assumptions about the nature of "coexistence," or else cannot reconcile the memory of the burly politician, who last fall toured the U.S...

...that he was (as one authority put it) "under strong pressure," or (as another writes) a "prisoner," a tool of nefarious hidden forces...

...Without going into the complexities of the Sino-Soviet relationship, it may be said as a general proposition that the Chinese tail does not wag the Soviet dog (nor, for that matter, vice versa...

...Soviet marshals and generals are members of the CommuOne of the most astute observers of the contemporary Russian scene, Alexander Dallin is associate professor at the Columbia University Russian Institute...

...No such denial was made, for instance, when either the Molotov-Malenkov group or Marshal Georgi Zhukov or, later, Nikolai Bulganin were ousted...

...But it has never been in a position to challenge the political leadership...

...To the best of our knowledge, I submit, this is simply not so...

...The permutations and combinations of the three evil genies add little of substance...

...with a smile and a simile and a sandstorm of hope, with the angry old man in Paris...

...The differences between Moscow and Peking continue to be as great as ever, it seems...

...From Frunze and Tukha-chevsky to Zhukov (surely, men more powerful and more popular than the Konevs and Malinovskys of today), the military leaders have been, in the last analysis, at the mercy of the dictator, who has been able to dispose of them as he saw fit...

...no less far-fetched and no less dangerous than the present Soviet insistence that Eisenhower (or any other American political figure) is a tool of the Pentagon and/or Wall Street, The present mood reveals above all —if my line of argument is correct...

...The confusion of American voices is not likely to have clarified matters for the Muscovite observers...

...And the same is true of the military...

...Disagreements at the apex of totalitarian regimes are endemic...

...As one runs down the list of the three top bodies, one fails to see more than a few names of men who could turn, or could have turned, on the khoziain...

...The speed and ease with which the image of Khrushchev as the instrument of some grey eminence has spread in this country reflects, I believe, more about ourselves than about Soviet reality...

...Either one grants the reality of some measure of collective decision-making there—and then Khrushchev's complete and systematic packing and control of the Party Presidium, Central Committee and Secretariat must be clearly recognized (the changing relationship among these three bodies is irrelevant for our purposes, as Khrushchev now fully controls all three...

...As usual, the role of China is most obscure...

...Close scrutiny of Soviet sources, even frequency count and pecking order, can be essential for hints about intramural politics...

...Neither the theory (or, to use Nathan Leites' term, the "operational code") nor the record of Bolshevik behavior over half a century would permit tolerating a leader who is anything less than a complete master of all his own decisions...

...There were, and no doubt are, real divergences about proper Soviet strategy in foreign affairs...

...But no man and no faction can force its will on the Khrushchev machine, Nothing is impossible in Soviet affairs...

...So far as the Soviet military is concerned, it will be well to remember, first of all, that it has never constituted a united political force...

...And the image of Marshal Rodion Malin-ovsky following Khrushchev's every step in and out of Paris as a watchdog of the hidden junta in Moscow is too silly to take seriously...

...Of the old-timers, the only ones who remain are Anastas Mikoyan (usually considered either opportunistic or relatively "soft") and the virtually impotent Kliment Voroshilov and Otto Kuusinen...

...There is no surrender to Chinese dragons, whatever the balance of Soviet decisions...

...But I know of no shred of evidence showing that Khrushchev has now, after years of modulating and mitigating Sino-Soviet differences, been compelled to accept Peking's views, on this or on any other matter...

...There is no evidence whatever that this relationship has changed...

...The legend of the chained Nikita includes three evil spirits, which operate either singly or together, depending on whose version you read...

...At times, Khrushchev is apparently prepared to listen to them...

...In the aftermath of his exhibition of vilification and vulgarity, Khrushchev continues to refrain from signing the peace treaty with East Germany...

...High officials and prominent newsmen have indulged in it more freely than at any time since Stalin's death...

...In the absence of inside information, we must probe Soviet intentions by a process of triangulation which includes Soviet ideology, Soviet pronouncements and the record of past Soviet performance...

...Moreover, the notion of an explicit coalition of Stalinists, Militarists and Chinese Communists joining hands to choke Nikita fails to reflect much insight into totalitarian politics...

...If one trend emerges unmistakably from the various personnel shifts in the Soviet Government and Communist party leadership in recent years, it is the almost uninterrupted consolidation of control by the Khrushchev machine and the elimination of any power base for a possible challenger...

...he continues to promote a variety of cultural, commercial and scientific exchanges with the West—the U.S...

...That so many responsible men, after years of following and interpreting Soviet affairs closely in this country, should have adopted this inversion of wishful thinking strikes me as more than deplorable...

...No doubt Khrushchev's militant stance helped to reassure those in Russia, in and out of uniform, who have been bothered by the gnawing fear that the Man in Moscow might be taking his "peaceful coexistence" seriously, or might let his impulses jeopardize rational defense requirements...

...As for Soviet pronouncements, Khrushchev would not have made his statement of May 28 if a real crisis of confidence or control had been involved...

...These are The Military, The Stalinists and The Chinese...

...As for the Stalinists, the question is of course, "Who are they...

...It is he who has the ultimate authority to decide about crucial shifts of military policy and personnel, not the other way around...

...The latest shifts, including Frol Kozlov's and Leonid Brezhnev's reappointments, merely underscore this trend...

...If in 1955-56 there could be any doubt about the priority of the Communist party, it was emphatically and unmistakably removed in 1957...

...Now, Khrushchev confidently ridicules those "silly allegations" which contend that he "is being opposed by army officers and generals," or that "other socialist countries are pressing the Soviet Union to give up the policy of detente and other things of this kind...

...All this is not a critique of Kremlinology...

...These issues have included the inevitability of war, the cult of the individual, tactics toward the United States, the communes, the availability of nuclear weapons and no doubt a good many others as well...

...our continued failure to focus on, and accept as given, the long-range nature of Soviet outlook and objectives, and to see against this background the skillful but by no means unerring flexibility of Moscow's hand...

...But this is a byproduct of the story, not its cause...

...It has been faction-ridden and divided on important problems of military (and, implicitly, foreign) policy...

...Anyone who has seen the man in action for a few hours can confirm that the recent performances were fully and typically his own, both in content and in form...

...For that matter, Peking's publication of Molotov's speeches and statements, which Moscow failed to print, is by no means unprecedented, as recent comment has suggested: Precisely the same was true, for instance, in November 1958...

...For years, differences between the two powers have demonstrably existed over a wide range of issues, without seriously jeopardizing their alliance...

...he submits new proposals on disarmament-by-stages and continues negotiations on nuclear test suspension...

...In assessing Soviet foreign policy objectives, Dallin calls for a factual review of Communist strategy by analysis of Soviet ideology, public statement and past performance, so that the USSR's outlook and objectives, as well as its tactics, are clarified...

...All three militate strongly against the view which I have been contesting here...

...The style of the Paris performance smacked not only of Bolshevik tactics but reflected Khrushchev's personal amalgam of bullying and smiling, his immense flexibility and the characteristic ease with which he can shift gears suddenly, completely, from subject to subject, from vulgar diatribe to humility, from insult and insecurity to sweet reasonableness—and back...