Inter-Arab Rivalry and the West:

...indeed...

...Both Arab states now receive the most up-to-date Soviet tactical weapons, including supersonic jets, the heaviest armor and rockets of one sort or another...

...The Western powers have little room for maneuver, and must balance their desire to maintain a free Israel with their desire to keep as much Arab support as they can...

...Israel is not the only one to suffer in this respect...

...and is making a great play of his Palestine plans in his efforts to subvert Nasser's power in Syria...

...Take, for example, the issue of the Palestine Arab refugees...

...Such an agreement would not necessarily bring peace between Israel and the Arabs, or between Arab rivals for hegemony, but it would have allowed the political temperature to drop a little...

...An analysis of Inter-Arab Rivalry and the West By A. V. Sherman LONDON THE SUDDEN deepening of the crisis in U.S.-Arab relations which accompanied the Cleopatra affair earlier this month came as a reminder not only that the Arab-Israeli dispute is as intractable as ever, but that it is still intricately involved with world struggles...

...At present, the main aim of Soviet policies is to isolate and outflank the "Northern Tier" powers—Turkey, Iran and Pakistan—which form the hinge between the West's European and Pacific defenses, and to gain a foothold in Africa...

...The nature of inter-Arab rivalry is such that with the single exception of Tunisia, whose leadership has shown enviable maturity, rivalries in the struggle for Arab hegemony are usually expressed by competing in some extreme of hostility to something or other...

...Later, as Russia becomes more deeply entrenched, these policies may begin to show diminishing returns...

...And when political exigencies impel Nasser to take a more actively anti-Israeli line than usual in the Suez Canal, on the borders or in economic warfare, the Israelis are faced with the unpleasant choice of whether or not to react...

...Nasser has built a good deal of his appeal on the promise to emulate Saladin and reconquer Palestine...

...Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the rest cannot afford, or believe they cannot afford, to lag behind...

...While Russia continually incites against Israel in its Arabic broadcasts and diplomatic activities (conveniently ignoring its part in helping to create the State of Israel), the West, though unwilling to match Soviet behavior, is understandably loathe to embarrass or offend its actual or potential supporters in the Arab world by too-overt support for Israel...

...Moreover, Western military aid for those Arab states which are the target of Communist or Nasserite pressure is viewed by the Israelis with mixed feelings...

...But if, as appears likely, the Soviet Union is turning back to a "hard line" it will certainly not give up its tactical advantages in the Middle East...

...If the summit talks had progressed seriously, a stage might have been reached when it was in the interest of both sides to insulate the area from the cold war in order to prevent the great powers being drawn into Middle Eastern disputes...

...Arab nationalism's struggle against the West: and the cold war...

...The particular intractability of the conflict stems to a large extent from the fact that it lies at the intersection of four disputes: the Palestine dispute itself...

...Western measures to counter Soviet penetration into the region often actually work to Israel's disadvantage...

...To a significant extent, Israeli difficulties stem from the fact that Soviet penetration into the Middle East and Moscow's use of violent anti-Israelism as one gambit in its bid for Arab sympathies have not automatically won Israel corresponding Western support but have instead tended to lead to Soviet-Western competition for Arab sympathies—and devil take the hindmost...

...On the one hand, they welcome anything which helps prevent extension of Nasser's power in the region: on the other, they fear that eventually the arms may well be turned against them...

...Even when Israel has completed one round of re-equipment, it knows it will face another and possibly more difficult one in two or three years and, therefore, has to gear her diplomacy accordingly to the detriment of its flexibility and balance...

...inter-Arab rivalries...

...Because both the Arab states in question, and others, make no secret of their plans to annihilate Israel at the earliest possible moment, and outdo each other in boasting about them, the Israelis have no alternative but to gear their military re-equipment to Khrushchev's deliveries to the Arabs...

...By mental habit and by the logic of the situation the competing Arab states and parties feel moved to respond to Soviet prodding even where it is against their long-term interests...

...Soviet arms deliveries to Gamal Abdel Nasser (and to some extent General Abdul Karim Kassem, the Iraqi dictator) create Israel's most urgent problems...

...Whatever their decision, cogent reasons can be adduced for adopting the opposite course...

...Though the Jordanian Government would have wished to resettle them to neutralize their political potential, and the Lebanese Government wanted to have them resettled elsewhere, outside of the Lebanon, neither Government dared say so for fear of denunciation from Cairo, on the grounds that resettlement of the refugees would compromise their claim to return to their former homes, and thus constitute treason against the sacred struggle to reconquer Palestine...

...Were Nasser to change his mind tomorrow, he would be unlikely to change his policies now, since Kassem is eagerly denouncing him for readiness to compromise the interests of the refugees and for "cooperation with Imperialism and Zionism...

...Long Nasser's battering-ram against their host governments, being concentrated, bitter and easily excitable, they are a valuable weapon in the international field...

...Israel's present position is particularly complicated, even paradoxical, Though Israel is the target for direct Soviet hostility and endangered by Soviet military, diplomatic and economic aid to Nasser, it can never hope to enjoy any corresponding measure of support from the West...

...Though Israeli defense planners believe their higher morale and efficiency can to some extent offset Arab numerical superiority in both men and equipment, they cannot afford to fall behind where quality is concerned, or allow Arab superiority in heavy equipment to rise above a certain ratio...

...The initiative is now clearly in Soviet hands...

...Such problems involve considerable diplomatic strain as well as economic burden...

...Though Nasser campaigns violently against the West, sparing no effort to overthrow pro-Western or moderate regimes and movements—whether modern democracies like Tunisia, monarchies like Jordan, or moderate African nationalist movements like the Kenya African National party—and enjoys considerable Soviet aid, he now also receives substantial economic aid from the United States and kid-glove treatment from the West in general for fear of "driving him further into Moscow's arms...

...This aid, in turn, permits him to finance his swollen military budget, increasing the threat to Israel and its neighbors...

...For example, a Communist take-over in Iraq, or even support for anti-Nasser elements by the Soviet Union, causes difficulties with Nasser, while support for Nasser wins Moscow enemies in other Arab states...

...indeed, this has helped make it so difficult to solve or even damp down at the edges...

...Israel, naturally, ranks high on the list as a target for such hostility...

...The West is already at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Russia in dealing with Arab nationalism, which for a variety of historical reasons developed largely as an anti-Western drive and has hardly had time to become anti-Soviet...

...So long as the cold war continues in its present form, the USSR has every incentive for continuing its present Middle Eastern policies of incitement against the West and Israel, because those policies have produced obvious dividends...

...Each new round of equipment is more expensive, thanks to technical progress, and it is even more difficult to obtain, since the Israelis, unlike their neighbors, must obtain permission from Western governments to buy the arms—manufactured by very few countries—and must pay for it in hard cash...

...This involves them in scrapping and replacing their heavy equipment every two or three years as new Soviet weapons make it out of date...

...Kassem, taking advantage of his lack of a common frontier with Israel, denounces Nasser for his "compromising" attitude towards Zionism and demands an early attack on Israel...

...Deliveries are made on the most favorable terms and appear to have priority over deliveries to Russia's own satellites...

...In short, Kassem is out-Nassering Nasser and forcing Nasser further along his present path—if forcing were necessary...

...Moscow will continue to encourage, or incite, anti-Isaeli and anti-Western attitudes, and the West will continue to be torn between conflicting aims: to avoid antagonizing the Arabs, yet not to let Israel down...

...Israel can do nothing but react by seeking economic aid and promises of arms from the Western powers and whatever diplomatic sympathy, or at least neutrality, it can find...

...Kassem is now trying to build a Palestinian cadre of his own to use against "the three usurpers of Palestinian soil—Israel, Egypt and Jordan...

...The West cannot afford to give up the Northern Tier, which plays a key role in its global strategy, and has no other quid pro quo to offer the Russians, no line which would satisfy both...

...At present all four disputes interact, exacerbate one another and defy piecemeal solution...