Khrushchev's Waiting Game

...We may equally discount the question of disarmament as a motive...

...To understand his diminished sense of urgency, we must start from the fact that summit conferences, just like all other devices of diplomacy, are means for definite political ends...

...The other is offensive—the disruption of the Atlantic Alliance, and the winding up of the ring of U.S...

...al inspection—could easily be settled without a summit meeting...

...He knows equally well that the one vital aspect that may be ripe for agreement—that of a permanent ban on nuclear tests enforced by internationRICHARD LOWENTHAL frequently writes on Soviet affnirs in these pages...

...Yet there may be one way in which he could raise the subject with advantage to himself: if he could seriously pose as the champion of U.S...

...but it would not be surprising if he thought that time and the atmosphere of detente are working in his favor...

...and even that is still the subject of serious objections, not only by the West Germans, but also by the French...

...We may safely omit such generalities as "peaceful coexistence...

...Finally...

...on the contrary, we can rely on it...

...any concessions on Berlin are bound severely to diminish West German enthusiasm for NATO...

...The diplomatic gains can lie only in the direction of the other two basic objectives, and these are the same which Stalin pursued in vain...

...bases which is the physical expression of that alliance...

...That condition is that he should by then feel strong enough to offer the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, without serious risk to the implementation of his plans for the further economic and political integration of his empire there...

...Unlike these men, he wants the U.S...

...There remains the other direction of Soviet diplomatic endeavor—the disruption of NATO and the liquidation of U.S...

...The idea of a mutually guaranteed "neutral belt" between Russia and an American-held Western fringe of Europe remains unacceptable to him...

...bases in Europe...

...What he wants is an unprotected Europe with Russia as the only major military power within reach...

...Khrushchev wants to be seen and remembered as the man who got the Soviet Union recognized as the equal, if not the superior, of any power on earth—and that, without world war...

...he wants to be reasonably sure that there will be no more major trouble in the first place...

...or to the signing of separate peace treaties with the "two German States...

...But by now this has, in effect, been done by his United States visit...

...Given that the changed attitude of the West is helping him in this, he still needs some more time to make sure—to tighten the bonds of non-military control, to remove the elements suspected of "neutralism" and "revisionism" from any positions of importance...

...because the Soviet leader knows perfectly well that any plan for gradual all-around disarmament in stages is far too complex to be negotiated in the limited time the heads of government will have at their disposal...

...The first—not necessarily in importance but in actual achievement—is the consolidation oi Khrushchev's personal prestige as the head of a peace-loving world power, for international, but mainly for domestic, purposes...

...which means no more and no less than the avoidance of world war, not because we doubt that Khrushchev wants to avoid world war...

...But he, too, can rely on the corresponding determination to avoid world war on the Western side...

...But he has also noted the indications that the French, who are less immediately concerned...

...At the Geneva conference of Foreign Ministers last summer, Russia was given to understand that the Western governments had, in fact, accepted the present partition of Europe, and had no desire to encourage any further troubles within the Soviet empire...

...Khrushchev knows, from the course of the Geneva negotiations and of his personal talks with Western statesmen, that only one of these symbolic victories looks at present as if it is within his reach—the new Berlin statute...

...For two years now he has been in undisputed control of all the levers of power in the Soviet Union...

...Relaxed atmosphere may favor Premier's goal of disrupting NATO and gaining West's acceptance of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe Khrushchev's Waiting Game By Richard Lowenthal SOVIET PREMIER Nikita S. Khrushchev has lately become remarkably patient about a summit conference of East and West, for which he had been pressing for many months with every means in his power...

...Already, technical factors are combining with President Eisenhower's concern for economy in armaments to diminish the importance of some of the European bases in American eyes...

...He has inherited his power, but not yet his authority...

...not only to leave West Germany and the Continent, but to return across the Atlantic altogether...

...Khrushchev has already achieved substantial progress, at least in the first direction...

...It is not good enough at this stage that Soviet troops could always come back in case of major trouble...

...One purpose of the summit meeting was to dramatize this achievement...

...and Russian military disengagement from Europe...

...This leaves three possible basic objectives...

...One is strategically defensive—the final and formal acceptance of Russia's European postwar conquests by the non-Communist powers...

...That could be done if the West would agree to Khrushchev's being accompanied by two East European Communist leaders as full partners to the summit...

...General de Gaulle's objections to an integrated NATO command will not diminish in force once the first French atomic device has been exploded...

...He no longer has any rivals, but he is still fighting the shadow of his awesome predecessor...

...Any frontal attack by Khrushchev on NATO might have the effect of consolidating its ranks rather than speeding up the existing tendency to disintegration...

...Khrushchev was received as an equal by the head of the greatest non-Communist power, and without the participation of any allied runners-up...

...But he may feel that by the spring, the atmosphere may be favorable for launching from the summit a major propaganda campaign for this objective in the name of further detente —on one condition...

...This article is published by agreement with the London Observer, for which he is a roving correspondent...

...A summit meeting by itself cannot now add to the prestige thus gained and already minted into the steadily outpouring currency of domestic propaganda...

...might waive their objections in return for a friendly attitude of Russian diplomacy elsewhere, which might make it easier, for instance, to obtain a cease fire in Algeria...

...In the past few years, he bas hinted at the idea from time to time, but he has plainly been too conscious of the risk of raising hopes of independence among the East European satellites to pursue the subject seriously...

...The question is—what are the ends for the sake of which Khrushchev has called for a summit meeting...

...Of course, Khrushchev knows that this cannot be achieved at a single summit stroke...

...he has neither killed millions of Russians in peace, nor fought and won a great war...

...Hence, he agrees that it may be worth his while to talk to General de Gaulle first in order to improve the chances of an "understanding" at the summit...

...Of course, Khrushchev's ideas of disengagement differ decisively from those that have been advocated in the West in recent years, for example, by George Kennan, or by the leaders of the British Labor party, and the German Social Democrats...

...or at least to negotiating a new status for West Berlin which would depend on East German consent...

...All that remains for the summit in this field is to make that acceptance symbolically visible...

...This is probably the basic reason that the present detente is not leading to more liberalization, but to stricter political control in Eastern Europe—and also why Khrushchev is not in a hurry to get to the summit just yet...