Non-Atomic Strategy for NATO

...It is likely that in any case the control system for tests above ground would take several years to set up in practice, quite apart from the formidable problem, so far untouched, of persuading Communist China to accept such a control system...

...For these reasons, it appears that the French explosion will force the United States to reappraise its whole approach to this problem...

...Meanwhile, however, President Eisenhower's news conference on February 3 emphasized the danger that the spread of atomic weapons may be greatly accelerated because existing nuclear powers may decide to help others produce atomic weapons, or even to give them complete weapons...

...Moreover, some experts believe that the ally would gain enough knowledge of the warhead in the course of training to make duplication possible...

...Yet no serious preparation has been made to insure that a local atomic battle would not immediately spread to all-out global war...

...But so long as the United States retains her atomic striking power and her political and military ties with Western Europe, such a strategy holds far more promise of providing her allies with the security which is the main purpose of the alliance...

...So far the U.S...

...If they do not receive outside help, the European countries at least may decide that the cost of producing a nuclear weapons system outweighs the military and diplomatic advantages...

...indeed the fact that West Germany may be able to launch atomic bombs against the capitals of Poland and Russia makes nonsense of the whole concept of a "pause...

...At present it is envisaged that they should be supplied under the "double veto" system...

...But there is probably as big a chance that this system could be evaded by an ally in a crisis because permission to join warhead and missile would not come through in time...

...Britain would like to bridge this gulf by arranging a moratorium on small underground tests during which seismological techniques, at present exceptionally primitive, could be improved...

...In the first place, it incites America's allies to concentrate on producing their own nuclear weapons at the expense of their contribution to NATO's collective forces—this has already been demonstrated by Britain and France...

...On the other hand, at present no country in the world views the imminent spread of atomic weapons with enthusiasm...

...Captain Liddell Hart, for example, has recently shown in detail how 26 divisions of conventional troops would be able to hold not only the 20 Soviet divisions now in East Germany but the further 20 Soviet divisions which might be brought into East Germany within 10 days...

...Consequently, there is a real danger that the United States might try to cut the Gordian knot of coalition diplomacy by giving atomic weapons outright to all her NATO allies...

...France, for example, has no prospect at present of building a delivery system for her bombs which could penetrate Soviet defenses or survive a surprise attack...

...But at the moment the United States is opposing a total test ban on the grounds that science is not yet in a position to detect underground tests below a certain strength...

...The current nuclear strategy, on the other hand, looks as if it will involve NATO in political and military contradictions which will not only disintegrate the alliance but also prejudice the existing chances of stopping the spread of atomic weapons...

...Under these arrangements, warheads are held by small American detachments while the means of delivery are held by the European ally concerned, and authority for marrying the two rests solely with the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who as an American must in practice obtain his orders from the President of the United States...

...Quite apart from the obvious problems which might arise in case of a surprise attack, the smaller-yield atomic weapons now under development have the warhead built into the means of delivery, so that the physical basis of the "double veto" system does not exist...

...This might not matter too much if the only problem were to deter deliberate attack by Russia, since the increased severity of the retaliation would only strengthen the deterrent...

...In fact NATO has never got near its target force, and few of the 20 divisions it does possess are up to strength or adequately equipped...

...military wishes to carry out underground tests to perfect several new families of atomic weapons, particularly low-yield weapons for use on the battlefield...

...Communist China is now the only non-atomic power which has so far admitted its intention of joining the nuclear club...

...The Japanese Prime Minister, for example, has gone so far as to say that he would not seek atomic weapons for Japan even if Communist China were known to possess them...

...Thus, more and more NATO is coming to depend on initiating the use of atomic weapons...

...And Russia is refusing a partial ban because she knows that the U.S...

...In the second place, it creates a form of discrimination inside the alliance which could destroy its unity...

...This number of NATO divisions might be substantially reduced if West Germany provided a citizen militia in the forward zone...

...Thus, besides a ban on nuclear tests, stopping the spread of atomic weapons is likely to depend on NATO finding a strategy for the defense of Western Europe which does not require America's allies to possess atomic weapons for themselves...

...Existing NATO strategy is self-contradictory in any case...

...would use the threat of all-out thermonuclear attack on Russia to compel withdrawal...

...For such a situation NATO's current posture is suicidal...

...By Denis Healey NON-ATOMIC STRATEGY FOR NATO West's reliance on atomic weapons for European defense must lead to dangerous growth of the nuclear club LONDON THE FRENCH atomic explosion in the Sahara has reminded the world that within 10 years another dozen countries may be making their own nuclear weapons...

...During this pause the U.S...

...Such a reappraisal was becoming inevitable in any case, because the increasing dependence of NATO strategy on so-called "tactical" atomic weapons is beginning to cast doubt on the practicability of the existing arrangements...

...A similar proposal was made in the recent statement on defense by the Democratic party's Advisory Committee...

...has given Britain special treatment in this field under the revised McMahon Act, which permits the transfer of technical secrets to countries which have already proved "substantial progress" in the production of nuclear weapons...

...Indeed, it has come very close to this already by agreeing to supply West Germany not only with short-range atomic missiles like the Honest John and the Sergeant, but also with strategic missiles like the Matador and the Mace, which could drop nuclear bombs on Warsaw and Moscow...

...Thus, at the moment, any measure designed to halt the diffusion of nuclear power can be sure of powerful international support, even from countries which might otherwise expect to produce atomic weapons for themselves quite soon...

...There is no doubt that as the possession of nuclear weapons grows more widespread, whether by gift or by independent production, the difficulty of starting atomic disarmament will increase, and the remaining non-nuclear powers will have a greater incentive for joining the atomic club...

...But everyone knows that the main danger of war in Central Europe arises not from a deliberate Soviet attack but from a confused local situation produced perhaps by a rising, as in Budapest or Poznan in 1956 or East Berlin in 1953...

...By throwing doubt on the value of the projected Blue Streak missile, Britain's Defense White Paper for 1960 suggests that her atomic deterrent will disappear in practice once her existing force of V-bombers becomes obsolete—unless she is given more up-to-date means of delivery by the United States...

...It is, of course, possible to argue about the precise strength NATO would need to implement a strategy for the defense of Western Europe by conventional weapons...

...Moreover, the stability which could be thus achieved even under existing circumstances could be much increased at a lower price by agreement between Russia and the West on the inspection and control of forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Central Europe—a proposal repeatedly made by Russia and supported, albeit timidly, by the United Kingdom...

...The capacity for producing atomic bombs is spreading rapidly, and so far no country has refrained from entering the field once it has the capacity to do so...

...In 1957, NATO agreed to produce 30 divisions which, in the event of a major thrust by the Red Army, would use "tactical" atomic weapons to enforce a pause in the fighting...

...In any case, the spread of nuclear weapons is likely inside NATO unless a positive decision is taken to stop it...

...It was intended that these divisions would throw back a small local incursion with conventional weapons alone...

...But this formula has obvious disadvantages...

...In turn, the incentive for Afro-Asian countries to join the nuclear club may become irresistible...

...NATO does not need atomic weapons even to fulfill its stated role in Central Europe—except insofar as their presence in the rear would be a deterrent against their employment by the Red Army...

...And if atomic weapons spread more widely inside NATO, Russia may be compelled to follow suit on her side of the Iron Curtain...

...Outside France itself the reaction on both sides of the Iron Curtain to the French explosion was uniformly hostile—West Germany's Konrad Adenauer was the only foreign statesman to have a good word for it, and he was widely criticized in Germany for his position...

...By far the simplest first step toward stopping the spread of atomic weapons would be a ban on tests...