Sino-Soviet Stresses and Strains

...We do know, however, that Moscow assisted Peking in constructing a railroad linking the Chinese capital with Ulan Ude in the Soviet Union, traversing the Mongolian Peoples Republic...

...Even within the framework of continuing consultation, differences of posture have suggested ongoing policy conflicts sometimes lasting for months...

...Their conjectures embrace a variety of situations, ranging from actual armed clashes to disputes which render the alliance inoperative...

...Yet the Soviet response to a limited U.S...

...Khrushchev's sudden trip to Peking and his subsequent position aroused plausible speculation that matters of prestige as well as of policy had come to a head...

...In the Communist bloc crisis of 1956, for instance, the dominant policy of Peking varied from that of certain groups in Moscow...

...It is true that Mao Tse–tung declared...

...SOME OBSERVERS believe prestige rivalry is already gnawing at the bonds linking China and Russia, and they anticipate that this will be a growing divisive force...

...As research on contemporary China slowly pulls abreast of that on the Soviet Union, we shall be able to make two–sided attacks on the problem of Sino–Soviet interaction...

...The implications of the Polish Party crisis and of the Sputnik launchings for Sino–Soviet relations were not anticipated even by those who foresaw these events...

...This disparity will be even more striking in the Soviet Far East, remote from Moscow's control but close to Peking's power base in Manchuria...

...Further, it is argued that Moscow's constraints upon Peking's actions will decline in effectiveness as China becomes less dependent upon Russian material and technical assistance...

...However, we can examine in more detail the obstacles confronting the alliance so as to offer a tentative estimate of its durability in terms of the three purported causes of dissolution...

...If Moscow and Peking disagree, what is to be the response of Communists throughout the bloc, not to mention those throughout the world...

...Neither the railroad nor this survey could have been undertaken without considerable Russian assistance, if not actual Soviet initiative...

...These policy conflicts are attributed to a fundamental divergency in Peking's willingness to risk war as compared with Moscow's...

...Khrushchev not only advanced implicit lines of criticism by quoting Lenin, but elaborated new theoretical propositions markedly different in emphasis from those current in Peking...

...Population increase has centered in urban areas, reflecting industrial development based on exploitation of mineral resources...

...Manchuria, the most heavily populated Chinese area contiguous with the Soviet Union, has approximately 45 million persons, compared with less than seven million scattered through the Soviet Far Eastern provinces...

...VISITORS to the Soviet Union seem to find ready expression at the "man–in–the–street" level of concern over China's growing population...

...THESE INSTANCES of possible or probable Sino–Soviet disagreement prompt several observations...

...The Quemoy–Matsu crisis of 1958 may have been a case in point...

...In 1958 Khrushchev's first statements seemed to guarantee Soviet involvement in the event of shooting between U.S...

...Lesser members of the bloc may move between the two giants so as to curry favor, jockey for status and perhaps negotiate alignments on the familiar pattern of Western politics...

...Another situation might find the same individuals, or their successors, interacting quite differently...

...Since discussion turned around Stalin's domestic as well as foreign policies, the Chinese analysis may, unintentionally perhaps, have had repercussions in Soviet elite politics...

...They point to Peking's emphasis upon size and population in terms of measuring power, and to traditional Chinese conviction of superiority over all foreigners, including Russians...

...The decline of doctrine as a guide to action permits greater flexibility of action, but threatens greater political uncertainty for Communist leaders...

...In the immediate future, increased agricultural output and continued industrialization may ease the imbalance between supply and demand of foodstuffs, while expanding the productive employment of labor...

...In 1956 Peking delayed public comment on de– Stalinization, and then issued an analysis at variance with that published in Moscow...

...Even more than in the former case, however, this may have increased tension within the alliance because of its involvement with matters of domestic controversy...

...This willingness, in turn, may be critically affected by the degree to which each side is motivated by concern for prestige needs...

...A second example of different postures arose in 1957–58, when Chinese statements struck a more consistently belligerent note than those emanating from Moscow, claiming that Communist superiority over the West had resulted from Soviet ICBM and earth satellite accomplishments...

...In addition, Chinese innovations in theory and practice, typified by the 1958 commune movement, are held to cast a shadow over Russian claims of socialist leadership which provides "the basic road" for all to follow in the construction of Communism...

...For instance, in 1956–57 Go– mulka sanctioned de-collectivization, solicited economic aid from the U.S...

...However, these disagreements may still play an important role in downgrading the impact of the alliance by disrupting its coordination of strategy...

...But there is little reason to believe that this signals a mass migration northward in pursuit of arable land...

...Yet granting the hazards in such projection, is this objection fundamental...

...For one thing, the population disparity conjures up an image at variance with that presently formulated by Peking, which explicitly champions Moscow's leadership while implicitly accepting the modest role of junior partner...

...In conjunction with policy conflicts, however, prestige rivalry may gain added importance...

...Nor is there objective cause for such apprehension...

...Both Mao Tse–tung and Chinese Communist Premier Chou En–lai appeared to buttress Wladyslaw Gomulka's Polish regime at a critical time when it faced important Russian pressures...

...China may stabilize its population during the 1970–30 period while still leading the world with approximately 800 million inhabitants...

...The analyses generally focus on three sources of probable tension: (1) population pressure...

...Almost all agree on the basic unity of Sino–Soviet policies for the immediate future...

...On the contrary, last year municipal employes in Shanghai pledged to participate in planned parenthood while obscure quotations from Friedrieh Engels were cited in support of "regulating the production of population...

...It is a good thing...

...The Soviet Far East is not a promising area for extensive agricultural development without capital investment and technological innovations, neither of which normally accompany mass migrations...

...2) prestige rivalry and (3) policy disagreements...

...These outside inferences reshape the world, if not the domestic postures of the two leaders...

...First, hope for dissolution of the Sino–Soviet alliance seems misplaced...

...Even less attractive is the arduous route across the Gobi Desert into sparsely settled Outer Mongolia...

...A second observation on recent Sino–Soviet differences concerns the failure of ideological guidelines to answer specific policy problems...

...Only less a distortion of reality, however, are the non–Communist terms of "Soviet empire" and "satellite nations" insofar as they imply static relationships extending from 1949 to the present...

...The commune permits a more rational allocation of manpower to all agricultural activities, from irrigation and land reclamation to harvesting and distribution...

...Less noticed but no less important in its future implications is the joint Sino–Soviet survey of the upper Heilunkiang, or Amur River, dividing Manchuria from the Amur oblast...

...By 1980, China's population, projected from present trends, will outnumber that of the Soviet Union by four to one, with more than one billion persons in China compared with less than 275 million across the border in Russia...

...It may also control consumption of its members so as to maximize the amount of food available for urban areas...

...The resolution of interest conflict is in large part determined by the willingness of each side to compromise...

...For the moment compromise resulted, despite the temporary loss of prestige which each leader suffered in turn...

...Without passing judgment on the likelihood of various factional alignments conjectured to exist between Peking and Moscow, the logic of the situation indicates that Chinese reactions to developments within Russia and the bloc in 1956–57 could not have been without import for power struggles and shifts in Moscow...

...The relatively low level of economic development in China, together with the large population, appears to make the consequences of miscalculation and of general war less disruptive than for the Soviet Union...

...However, his later explanation of Moscow's responsibility raised some doubts in the minds of observers as to whether Russian obligations might not be redefined so as to avoid raising the risk of general war, even should this mean defeat for a local Chinese action...

...Should such a situation develop with this particular outcome, the alliance would not only suffer a setback, but its subsequent deterrent force would be considerably reduced...

...To put it in Mao's terms, "non–antagonistic contradictions" may arise which prove incapable of resolution through "comradely discussion...

...Yet it seems certain that bloc unity cannot be reestablished on the enforced pattern of Stalin's time, nor is it guaranteed by more permissive practices of Stalin's successors...

...To the degree that Sino–Soviet differences impinge on domestic policies and politics, as with the disputes over de–Stalinization, Gomulka's leadership and the commune movement, this maneuvering is likely to increase in importance...

...Soviet techniques have overcome some obstacles, but the region still appears to be barely self–sufficient in foodstuffs...

...True...

...This cautions us against undue optimism in our search for the future problems most likely to arouse tensions within the alliance...

...Finally, by 1970 the accumulative impact of birth control may check population growth in China...

...Even should cultivation of virgin lands in Manchuria, coupled with the proposed Heilunkiang development plans, permit a doubling of the population there by 1980, the physical facts of life across the river seem unlikely to induce a spill–over into Russian territory...

...The results should show a significant gain over our present ad hoc approach to individual instances of disagreement, which mixes newspaper reports of doubtful reliability, intuitive judgment and primary sources in equal proportion...

...And many non– official American observers of the Soviet scene have even gone so far as to speculate about an eventual conflict between the two countries...

...Particularly in this era of rapid international communication, the movements of Communist figures and their shifting positions on issues permit ready inferences as to respective bargaining positions...

...At the least, prestige rivalry is held to decrease the willingness of each partner to compromise on matters affecting the third source of tension, conflicts of policy interest...

...Through the gradual spread of contraceptive practices, restrictions on early marriage and supervised abortion and sterilization...

...Like aspirin, however, the repressant only postpones coping with the problem...

...Furthermore...

...This leads to a third point...

...It may be objected that too many variables occur from one situation to another to permit the past to serve as a guide to future interaction between the two allies...

...This approach has much to commend it...

...At present...

...this more belligerent posture found Peking well in advance of Moscow in raising tension over Taiwan and the offshore islands in late 1958...

...It is not true, however, as frequently asserted in the West, that the regime has reversed its 1953 decision to promulgate birth control measures throughout the country except for national– minority areas...

...No evidence has been found to indicate the rescinding of the 1957 announcement which officially approved abortion and sterilization...

...This does not lessen the importance of such clashes when they do occur, however...

...10,000 Chinese laborers assist in Mongolian construction projects on two– or three–year rotation assignments...

...counterattack against a Chinese offensive in the Taiwan Strait, for instance, might vary considerably, depending upon a number of factors in the particular situation...

...Nor do policy conflicts, even if exacerbated by prestige rivalry, appear sufficiently sharp and irreconcilable to dissolve the alliance, particularly if considered against the partners' parallel policy interests...

...Conversely, selective quotation from Marx, Engels and Lenin in support of the commune program in China did not assure approval in the Soviet Union...

...I have suggested that research in past instances of disagreement between Peking and Moscow facilitates such understanding...

...Two additional instances of possible friction are of particular interest because of their relevance for domestic affairs...

...At a less serious level, disagreement might arise over the advisability of accommodation with the West on such matters as nuclear test bans, control of outer space and international disarmament proposals...

...First, only one of these cases, the Quemoy–Matsu crisis, was readily detected in advance by Western specialists...

...We have this large population...

...Exemplified by Mao's proclamation of "East Wind prevailing over West Wind" and his categorizing the U.S...

...Until resolved, such differences may carry important consequences...

...Both serve to develop the Soviet Far East, but similarly both offer new possibilities for an increase of Chinese migration into the borderlands on a scale heretofore impossible...

...I have already suggested that Khrushchev's proposal of Nehru for Middle East summit talks in 1958 may have come without prior consultation with Mao...

...The magnitude of these divisive forces is held to be so great as to overshadow cohesive aspects of the alliance, particularly since key factors which have thus far held the alliance together may decline in importance...

...Space precludes striking a comprehensive balance between the divisive and the cohesive forces in the Moscow– Peking axis...

...In the Soviet Union more changes have occurred, without, however, causing any serious break in the continuity of policy formation...

...Below this line, climatic conditions limit agricultural yields...

...Similar changes will occur in Peking as age and death remove the original leadership, yet similar continuity can be expected...

...We do not know what confidential advice may have been tendered by Russian experts in China...

...Chinese land hunger does not pose a serious threat, objectively, to the Soviet Union...

...One consequence of unilateral action may be to increase the demand for consultation on all possible points of difference...

...At higher points of contact, however, evidence of anxiety in Sino–Soviet relations is understandably scanty and circumstantial...

...They are unlikely to dissolve the alliance, particularly when weighed against the mutuality of strategic, economic and ideological interests which act as a counter–force binding Peking and Moscow...

...A more serious objection may be directed against inferring inner Communist politics from open Communist communications...

...In and of themselves, such considerations can hardly place a critical strain upon the alliance unless we assume some basic irrationality or compulsiveness in Russian or Chinese behavior...

...and Chinese Communist forces in the Strait...

...In the 1956–57 crisis, different points of emphasis in the policies of East European regimes seemed to parallel differences manifested in the Russian and Chinese positions...

...I have already suggested a possible divergence between Moscow and Peking on the degree to which war may be risked in seeking to change the status quo...

...Does the fait accompli occur, and if so, what burden does it place on the alliance...

...and arrived at a modus vivendi with the Catholic Church in Poland...

...Chinese impetuosity or impatience may combine with Russian jealousy or insecurity to rend asunder the alliance...

...Opening this line facilitated movement of Chinese into an area which had been an exclusive Russian sphere of influence for more than 30 years...

...Afghanistan or Laos, the partners may differ on the pattern of Sino–Soviet intervention because of their different estimates of the consequences in terms of American response...

...Prestige rivalry is seen as inherent in Russian–Chinese relationships with other Communist regimes and with the uncommitted nations of Asia, the Middle East and Africa...

...The summer of 1958, for instance, saw Khrushchev propose a summit conference on the Middle East crisis which would have included Indian Premier Nehru while excluding Mao...

...Khrushchev's secret speech against Stalin, the Hungarian Revolution and the commune movement came as complete surprises...

...Thus its arable land is unlikely to attact Chinese colonization, any more than it has attracted Russian tillers to the Far East...

...In this time, the elite composition in China has varied slightly...

...Unilateral action on the Chinese side may have resulted in military pressures along the disputed Indian and Burmese borders, offsetting Soviet blandishments toward these uncommitted countries...

...The single rail line crossing Kansu and Sinkiang, now being completed with Soviet assistance, will undoubtedly swell the population of northwest China...

...Talk of an allegedly "inevitable" Sino–Soviet schism may serve as intellectual aspirin to repress our policy headaches with both Moscow and Peking...

...A few points bear restatement at this juncture...

...Kirghiz and Tadzhik Republics...

...One indicator lies in Soviet policies which may affect Chinese migration toward border regions...

...More probable policy conflicts do not appear to be of similar magnitude...

...The past five years indicate that extensive consultation at various levels, prior to implementation by joint policy, is the norm of Moscow–Peking relations...

...The persistent use of insecticides and pest–extermination programs, chemical and natural fertilizers, improved seed strains, and modern planting techniques should increase yields markedly...

...Peking has alternative approaches to its population problem...

...Should this divergence exist and should it become intensified in their overall approaches to policy, sharply conflicting strategies may emerge on particular problems...

...It is concluded that lebensraum needs will lead to Chinese colonization of Russian territories, if not to actual war...

...For all of Peking s insistence on Soviet bloc leadership, there is no reason to assume that Mao is without regard for his prestige vis–a–vis Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, or for his regime vis–a–vis that of Moscow...

...This can slow decisions and dilute strategy, as experienced among non–Communist allies...

...Success in this exploitation, however, requires an understanding of Sino–Soviet conflict and prudent policy adjustments...

...An indirect approach, therefore, may permit a higher degree of confidence in calculating the degree to which present Soviet policy is shaped by considerations of Chinese territorial ambitions arising from population pressures...

...In 1957–58 these cracks in Communist unity were resurfaced with tributes to "Soviet leadership" and diatribes against "modern revisionism...

...Least of all is massive migration likely to traverse the 1,500 miles of mountains and arid plains separating populous North China from Soviet Central Asia...

...Seven years of this interaction since Stalin's death suggest patterns of individual and group behavior and the interplay of personality and policy...

...What impact are these disagreements likely to have upon the alliance...

...As the alliance approaches the second half of its 30–year tenure, however, divisive forces are seen to dominate its working relationships...

...On the contrary...

...In 1958 the reverse pattern occurred...

...In particular, China's eventual independence in the manufacture of nuclear weapons may remove one of the most critical constraints which presently appears to limit China's freedom to differ with Russian policy and strategy...

...This is an extreme case whereby disunity would lead to defeat for one of the partners...

...JUST TWO WEEKS AGO, Secretary of State Christian Herter, in reply to a press conference query, commented on the possibility of policy divergences between the Soviet Union and Communist China...

...Above the 55th parallel, permafrost hampers construction of buildings and communication lines...

...This suggests that recent Soviet policy has not been basically affected by apprehension about China's millions overrunning Russia's remote regions...

...In the event of a Communist coup or '"national liberation" struggle in such border countries as Iran...

...It is here that the prestige rivalry of Peking and Moscow may exacerbate policy conflicts so that disagreement spills over from bilateral to multilateral discussions...

...Because the two regimes place their primary foreign policy emphases in different portions of the world, major policy clashes seem seldom to arise...

...Unlike the northeast, however, this region does not offer promise for supporting more persons than reside across the border in the Kazakh...

...The result may be to stalemate Sino–Soviet strategy, or at least to reduce its chances of success...

...In addition to attempting anticipation of future points of conflict, we might also re–examine in detail the dynamics of past conflicts, thereby hopefully learning more of their inception and more of their resolution...

...Completed in February 1959, this survey selected sites for hydroelectric power stations, flood control, irrigation and navigation improvements...

...As with de–Stalinization,"comradely advice" might have been justified in order to clarify principle and practice for Communist parties throughout the world...

...Apparent Russian disagreement over the initial surge of communes in China may have arisen because of Peking's hint that Communism could be attained in the near future through this radical restructuring of society whereby free services would eventually realize the goal, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need...

...The impact of policy differences may vary considerably, depending upon how they are communicated between the allies...

...In terms of continuous, stable leadership as well as of collected writings which may be dubbed "theory," the Chinese elite is well ahead of its Soviet counterpart, at least at present...

...Second, there is good reason to look for continued recurrence of disagreement and conflict within the alliance, sufficient for exploitation by Western policy...

...Certainly if one partner courted war with the United States, thereby involving the other partner against its express advice, the mutual assistance pledge would face its most severe test...

...it does not eliminate it...

...Whether it is so small a matter as the drafting of anniversary greetings or so large a question as the inclusion of participants at summit conferences, prestige considerations cannot but play a conscious part in the formulation of policy...

...The phraseology, "commonwealth of Socialist states," does violence to reality insofar as it implies that relations within the bloc resemble those among former members of the British Empire...

...Points of omission in Soviet public communications on Chinese developments, and less certain points of commission in private Soviet comment, indicated displeasure over Peking's policy...

...as "a paper tiger...

...Yet this did not seem to lessen Chinese support for his program against certain pressures from Moscow...