Psychological One-Upmanship

...While the destruction of nuclear delivery systems might only encourage conventional aggression where one of the two nations had conventional or logistic advantages, the removal of defenses would make war much too costly to be countenanced by any rational government...

...not having completely adequate information, might not want to run the risk that they are wrong...

...Yet the general principle underlying them seems valid...

...Perhaps it should be proposed that 10 hours a week, including at least some hours in the evening, be set aside during which each of the two nations could monopolize the radio and television time of the other...

...otherwise the position of the U.S...

...The substantial support, not merely in Asia, Africa or Europe, but even within the United States for variants of Soviet proposals that cannot withstand even superficial analysis indicates the need for a positive offensive in the field of disarmament and arms control...

...and the Soviet Union that would provide sanctuary (and egress) for informers and that would, in addition, pay substantial rewards to informers whose information proved correct after inspection...

...It is a commentary on human nature, and perhaps on the nature of the bargaining situation, that if one bargainer makes all the proposals, he can soon turn his maximum demands into minimum demands and thrust the burden of apparent stubbornness upon his undemanding opponent...

...If the USSR then calls off its propaganda war and begins to bargain seriously, it may be possible to adopt some control measures which do in fact diminish the danger of nuclear war, even though the Soviet regime might find these measures politically disagreeable...

...The UN teams, of course, would have unlimited right of inspection...

...Therefore, one guarantee against such a war is provided by the opportunity to carry the evidence to a nation that its government is acting aggressively...

...Wars may be encouraged if governments can fool their people concerning the nature of the international situation...

...the very violence of the Soviet protest would be evidence that the Kremlin had been forced onto the defensive...

...The radical nature of these proposals might, of course, create initial public scepticism...

...Two things must be done...

...at the same time, to announce that this program would be discontinued when an arms control agreement had been reached...

...Shutting off the flow of information would then be interpreted as evidence of an intention to act aggressively...

...any violation of these expectations would create at least some short–run resentments...

...In this phase, the Communist system of government can be made the direct target of attack...

...and the USSR would know that neither could gain an advantage in the procurement of such weapons systems, neither would have an incentive to develop a system which decreased the security of both...

...In the second place, it is not easy to shift roles in midstream...

...Since so much misinformation exists on testing and since no other proposals for arms control are likely to be taken seriously by the world public unless we seem willing to agree to a test ban...

...Still other possible proposals would include the elimination of all anti–aircraft installations and all civil defense measures...

...Although the removal of this pressure from the U.S...

...This proposal might in time have great appeal for the public, although it would be important not to press the appeal until the measure becomes more practicable than it perhaps is at the present time...

...Perhaps the first step to take is to reach an agreement on an atomic test ban...

...In the first place, it is difficult to formulate such programs without being as irresponsible as the Soviet Union...

...The unilateral possession of a temporarily "perfect" offense or defense might tempt one side or the other to strike quickly before the other side could develop a weapons or defense system that might reverse the military balance...

...Imaginative Western disarmament proposals would wrest initiative from the Soviets and advance peace PSYCHOLOGICAL ONE–UPMANSHIP By Morton A. Kaplan MORTON A. KAPLAN is now on leave as a professor of international relations at the University of Chicago...

...The U.S...

...might offer substantial and nearly total disarmament depending upon guarantees of the right of peaceful political opposition and upon UN supervised elections in all NATO and Communist nations...

...Russia does not handicap itself in this way...

...Moreover, the speed–up in scientific communication would make for the advance of science, not only with respect to defense developments, but with respect to all sectors of scientific work...

...If the governmental process is not subject to checks, the government can carry out surprises both with respect to other nations and with respect to its own people...

...Moreover, the program would impinge equally on NATO, so that the USSR could hardly convince the world that some diabolical trick were involved...

...If the population and industry of the U.S...

...The USSR managed to maintain and improve its international position during its time of weakness immediately following World War II by aggressive international bargaining which the West failed to match...

...Soviet leaders could be asked whether they have as much confidence in their people as the West has in its...

...security, even if the Soviets remained adamant...

...would be a distinct gain, it would not solve the problem of arms control...

...It could be argued that no people would permit aggressive war under modern conditions and that therefore the danger of such war stems from the power of a small group of individuals to act secretly...

...And any breakdowns in the communications would serve to alert defensive forces so that the advantages of surprise largely would be lost...

...The United States still has the economic capacity to implement a program that would strain the resources of the Soviet Union if that nation attempted to compete...

...It could be claimed that one of the factors that might make disarmament possible is that under present world conditions a people would not support its government in aggressive war...

...and these may be either free, subsidized or at normal costs, depending upon the wishes of the distributor nation...

...yet, they might have considerable popular appeal...

...and the Soviet Union were, so to speak, hostages of the other nation, neither could afford to attack, for the counter–attack of the other would devastate it...

...This was not disastrous as long as the U.S...

...The Soviet Union could be asked whether it was or was not serious about disarmament, and could be challenged to relieve the fears of mankind...

...And programs must be developed which appeal to the needs, fears and hopes of much of the world...

...If this proposal were feasible, however, it might appeal strongly to world opinion...

...Finally, if the Soviet Union still appeared unyielding, all the stops could be pulled...

...military security...

...Since both the U.S...

...indeed, the satellites probably would soon go by default...

...indeed, it attempts to blame the troubles of the world upon the nature of capitalism and of bourgeois democracy...

...Yet much could be done to redress the balance if the onus of inflexibility could be removed—that is...

...By and large, the Soviet Union has proposed and the United States has rejected...

...If the Soviet Union refuses to bargain seriously, then even more radical proposals which link present world dangers even more closely to the nature of Communism could be made...

...In such circumstances, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, a more intelligent political leader than most, might very well decide that a mutually advantageous arms control agreement is preferable to an unequal arms race...

...The United States needs to secure the psychological initiative and may be able to find proposals to put the Soviet Union on the defensive...

...had in mind...

...If both sides could be protected against the possibility of such uneven technological developments, each would be considerably mere secure...

...The measures so far suggested do not involve the destruction of the Soviet form of government, although admittedly these measures would make for some major changes in the present Soviet system...

...it would probably be wise to negotiate seriously on the subject...

...The formulation of new and appealing programs will not be easy for several reasons...

...Moreover, each nation must guarantee that no reprisals will be taken against citizens who make use of these facilities...

...The onus of inflexibility must be shifted to the Soviet Union...

...These would be designed more to win the propaganda war with the Soviet Union than to lead to an agreement on arms control, and therefore would be used only in the event of Soviet recalcitrance...

...If it were feasible to station scientists from each of the two nations in the laboratories of the other with full access to all major research projects, uneven technological development would become almost impossible...

...It would be too much, however, to expect the USSR to change its position radically merely because of the pressure of world opinion...

...If, in addition, monitors were stationed at all air and missile sites with open channels of communication to their home governments, it is perhaps doubtful whether even solid–fueled missiles could be employed successfully in surprise attack, for even minimal preparations would become apparent to at least some of the monitors...

...That substantial margin of security is passing, however, and may even now no longer exist...

...Half–measures could be denounced as meaningless, misleading and fraught with danger—indeed likely to precipitate the war they were designed to avoid...

...And no matter how unreasonable the proposal and how reasonable the rejection, there is a tendency to accuse the rejector of stubbornness or inflexibility...

...Furthermore, there would be no incentive to develop or to manufacture weapons which would tend to unstabilize rather than to stabilize the nuclear balance—for instance, weapons which placed a premium upon surprise attack...

...Secrecy, lack of channels of communication, the freedom of Party leaders from popular accountability, or even from accountability within the system, could be denounced as the obstacles to large–scale and perhaps nearly total disarmament, with all that would mean for both the peace and prosperity of the world...

...The most serious and valid proposals may founder precisely because they are too difficult to understand and because they permit the Soviet Union to capture the initiative...

...This measure, however, should not be used as a substitute for other measures maintaining a military alert system...

...Obviously, this is easier for a totalitarian than for a democratic government...

...Although the Soviet Union would almost surely accuse NATO of attempting to flood Russia with "lying and malicious propaganda...

...In addition, the Soviet Union must be given some practical reason to compromise on arms control...

...But the USSR might even be able to achieve surprise, for it could denounce the agreement after securing the information about American weakness and then attack at a time of its own choosing...

...must call for the overthrow of the Soviet regime...

...The present German situation is a good example of this fact...

...There may be serious defects in any or all of these proposals...

...The symmetry of a bargaining situation can soon be destroyed if the initiative is forfeited to an aggressive person or nation...

...However, it might not really be necessary to go even this far...

...SOVIET PROPAGANDA on the subject of disarmament has, with a few exceptions, been much more effective than has American propaganda...

...From some nations, this support may be impossible to obtain, for past resentments as well as racial hatreds lead many to irrational desires for the defeat of the U.S...

...Some of the measures suggested below begin to impinge on the viability of the Soviet Government and probably should be advanced only if the USSR continues to press its presently unacceptable and misleading measures for disarmament...

...But the proposals must be simple and they must appeal to the hopes of mankind...

...Since one of the worst dangers today is that of surprise attack or of a massive nuclear response to what might be a surprise attack, monitoring of the channels through which such attacks could be ordered might help to minimize these dangers...

...and its North Atlantic Treaty allies possessed a substantial margin of military security...

...If the Russians accepted, they could not in fact wage war...

...Undoubtedly, many governments other than the Communist ones might be alarmed by these proposals...

...Some danger might remain of hidden plans or hidden weapons or defense systems that could still upset the nuclear balance and touch off nuclear war...

...cannot compete with the Soviet Union until it is willing to show—and correctly—that most of the dangers of the nuclear age stem from the nature of the Soviet regime, from the possibility of surprise attack which requires a kind of secrecy and political control not generally possible within democracies and especially within coalitions like NATO...

...During the coming period of the missile gap, the NATO nations may require for their safety firm domestic public support for governmental policy, as well as considerable support from some of the uncommitted nations...

...It could be made clear that we were not concerned about the kind of economic system the Russians had adopted, but only the potentialities within the Soviet political system for surprise attack or for misleading the public into support for aggressive war...

...This ought to be done despite the fact that the arguments used to support a test ban are foolish, quite apart from the substantial difficulties of policing a ban...

...One might propose United Nations stations located in every major city in the U.S...

...Moreover, it could be asserted that disarmament hinges on such information distribution...

...Yet this short–run cost must be paid...

...The offer of substantial and nearly total disarmament, provided there were full international supervision, might by itself be sufficient to accomplish any legitimate purpose the U.S...

...Few people accuse the Soviet Union of inflexibility for refusing free elections in East Germany, but the U.S...

...The U.S...

...otherwise the Soviet monitors might become aware of such a great weakness in the American defense posture that the Soviet Union might find attack an acceptable strategy even if it could not gain full surprise...

...Repeated often enough however—until the ideas in them became familiar—they might develop considerable appeal...

...Measures may be proposed which conflict with the inherent nature of the regime and yet which do not of themselves require the dissolution, but only the modification, of the regime...

...Yet the argument could be made plausible...

...and NATO is almost sure to be eroded...

...removed without making irrational concessions to the Soviet position...

...Many perfectly reasonable demands are not made because we think the Soviet Union would surely reject them or because we think the demands incompatible with the nature of the Soviet regime...

...Indeed, it would be possible to divide research between the two nations and to use the large savings for international aid programs...

...This does not mean that the U.S...

...It might, however, serve to convince the Soviet leaders that they could depend neither upon the pressure of a misled world opinion nor upon American political complacency to undermine U.S...

...Such a program would directly increase U.S...

...In addition, each nation should be permitted to distribute as many copies of as many newspapers, magazines and books as it wishes within the borders of the other...

...In shifting course, at least one deep–seated prejudice common to Western thinking must be dropped...

...is accused of inflexibility if it does not make concessions to the Soviet Union on its demands concerning Berlin...

...Of course, the United States would have to be strong enough to react successfully against an attack before it proposed such a plan...

...One of the great, potentially unsettling factors in world politics stems from the possibility of technical innovations...

...Expectations concerning American and Western behavior have been established...

...At the present time, the Russians may believe us to be weak, and yet...

...One other way to attempt to get the Russians to negotiate seriously is to initiate a crash development and production program in the weapons area and...