Berlin Detente-Two Views The Pitfalls of Negotiation

...It is true that no concessions seem as yet to have been definitely agreed upon by President Eisenhower and Macmillan, except the decision to hold a summit conference even if the foreign ministers' conference does not succeed...

...The conservative papers in Britain naturally made a virtue of necessity and built Macmillan's humiliating and discouraging experience in Russia into a great triumph, with Macmillan assuming the leadership of the free world in British eyes...

...Britain is now the weakest link in the alliance, not only because of Macmillan's grave domestic political problems and the overhanging elections, but because of Britain's economic fear of German competition and of the Common Market...

...that alone could be disastrous in its psychological and military implications...

...a relaxation of East-West trade restrictions...

...But in any case, because of our promises to the German people and Khrushchev's own promise at Geneva in 1955, Western acceptance of any kind of disengagement or other concessions, without insisting on at least German unification, would clearly be an indirect surrender to the Soviet ultimatum...

...No doubt this soft policy also expresses, at least in part, his sincere and objective judgment...

...But aside from the military disadvantage to the West of halting tests without making the ban part of a more general disarmament agreement, to accept the kind of token inspection which Macmillan reportedly discussed with Khrushchev would set a highly dangerous precedent...

...It is unlikely that they have already forgotten the meaning of Munich...

...The demand for German unification is even being watered down to the point where, under the guise of a step toward unification, Macmillan is really promoting the beginnings of Khrushchev's plan for a German confederation, which means increased recognition for the East German puppets...

...What is the West doing, to exploit and reinforce those Soviet fears in bargaining with the Kremlin...

...this would be a step toward the city's neutralization, a loss of its present status as a Western outpost guaranteed under the Potsdam Agreement...

...A Soviet setback in Berlin offers the best chance in a long while for the West to regain the initiative and launch a diplomatic offensive...

...The free elections formula is the symbol of the liberation of East Germany and of all Eastern Europe...

...That is the only goal which could justify the risks to the West of any large measure of disengagement...

...But by the terms of the Macmillan policy, we will pay dearly to get something far worse than the present status quo which worries Khrushchev so much...

...Such a pact would only serve to prevent Western aid to any future satellite revolution, and so stabilize the Soviet tyranny...

...He is bent on preventing a showdown on Berlin, whereas the hope for the West lies in a showdown from which Khrushchev would have to retreat...

...Such concessions might include a beginning of disengagement ; an atomic test ban without adequate inspection...

...2. It would increase the prestige of the East German Communists and so help Khrushchev control unrest in the East Zone...

...For if we stand firm, the British voters will have to choose between Macmillan and the NATO alliance, on the one hand, and the break-up of the alliance, on the other...

...By leaving the initiative to Macmillan, the West has been leading from weakness in its negotiations with the Soviets...

...But if we go nearly as far as the British press indicates Macmillan wishes us to go...

...It is even reported that Macmillan wants to draw the United Nations into West Berlin...

...According to Macmillan's formula, all such threats would be negotiated at summit conferences, on the principle of "mutual concessions" from both sides — the Soviets' "concessions" amounting merely to willingness to give up most of what they demanded in their threat...

...Here we present two opposing views...

...He would relieve the Soviet fears, stressed by General Taylor, and would repudiate our pledges to press for free elections in those countries, without getting anything in return...

...we will risk abandoning the main purpose of the alliance in order to preserve the alliance...

...Nevertheless, the whole trend of well informed press speculation, and the trend of nearly everything Macmillan has said since his return from Moscow, has been in the direction of some retreat...

...But it was generally agreed from the start that it would be fatal to yield to that Soviet blackmail...

...Moreover, the Macmillan formula of "first steps" toward unification...

...If so, the Soviet blackmail on Berlin will have paid off...

...will be interpreted by the world as at least a partial Western surrender to the war threat...

...This would help German neutralists and nationalists and weaken pro-Western policies...

...If we are as firm as Secretary Dulles would have been and as German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French President Charles de Gaulle still wish to be, Macmillan will have no choice, committed as he is to the alliance, but to stand with us...

...A troop and arms freeze in all Germany, which Macmillan tentatively discussed with Khrushchev, would mean surrendering the whole Western program for German rearmament—and all this without even demanding German unification, let alone raising the issue of Soviet treaty violations in Hungary or the other countries of Eastern Europe...

...All this is understandable, but it has obscured the American people's comprehension of the real implications of Macmillan's policies...

...an extension of credits to the Soviet bloc: a so-called European security pact: and a summit conference at which these concessions would be formalized...

...Beyond all this, Macmillan at Moscow apparently went far in promising to eliminate the last vestiges of restrictions on trade with the Communist bloc...

...there are now indications of Three weeks hence, on May 11, the Big Four foreign ministers will convene to discuss Berlin, Germany and European security...

...Instead of calling Khrushchev's bluff in Berlin and ending the effectiveness of new Soviet threats, at least for a long period to come, we will have made it easier for him to blackmail us again later...

...From the beginning, it was hardly conceivable that the Western Allies would yield on Berlin itself...

...which Khrushchev is trying to change...

...POSSIBLY the most dangerous of all the proposed Macmillan giveaways is his reported tentative agreement with Khrushchev to accept the end of atomic testing without adequate inspection, if the U.S...

...in one form or another...

...The Soviet fear of the satellite peoples, he noted, is one of the main reasons that it would be folly for Moscow to go to war...

...The reunification of Germany would be of little advantage to the West unless it is made part of a general European settlement which restores some real measure of freedom to Eastern Europe...

...could be persuaded to agree...

...British press reports have probably exaggerated the degree of disengagement which Macmillan favors, but the whole trend and philosophy is wrong...

...The Democratic leadership has been playing a constructive role in urging a greater defense effort and in backing the policy of not yielding an inch on Berlin...

...It would be far better for the West to return to its insistence on the free elections formula, which is the only safe, honest and democratic method of upholding the ideal of unification in freedom...

...It is the one goal for which the West could afford to pay something in the way of disengagement or atomic tests concessions...

...Although Macmillan has advocated firmness against a Soviet take-over of Berlin, he has urged a willingness to make changes in the direction of neutralization, and even Khrushchev himself never demanded Communist occupation of West Berlin...

...on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Conference...

...It would imply an element of trust in Soviet promises that would violate the fundamental Western principle President Eisenhower has repeatedly stated: Since Soviet promises cannot be relied upon, all agreements with them must be self-enforcing...

...More ominous still, the acceptance of all of then has been urged by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan...

...except to the extent of tolerating an East German take-over under protest and treating the East Germans as Soviet agents, as long as they do not interfere with Western traffic into the city...

...In other words, it was agreed that we must face the Berlin showdown, for until it has been faced the threat will always be hanging over our heads like a Sword of Damocles...

...This issue was not fought out in the Eisen-hower-Macmillan meeting, which, aside from settling the terms for a summit conference subject to French and German consent, involved an exchange of views rather than definite agreements...

...For even if Macmillan only succeeded in putting over his plan to end atomic tests without adequate inspection...

...The East European captive nations are not even mentioned except in connection with a proposed overall security pact...

...No wonder the British report that Khrushchev called a military freeze for Germany an "interesting suggestion...

...But if the Administration avoids a Berlin showdown by making such concessions as Macmillan desires, the Democratic opposition will naturally shift its emphasis to the party's proposals for more domestic spending and for welfare measures wh'ch promise benefits to groups of voters...

...However, a camouflaged surrender always appeared to be a greater danger—in other words, that we would buy tacit and probably temporary Soviet acceptance of the status quo in Berlin by making other concessions...

...and even this change has not been definitely announced...

...Thus any steps toward unification by confederation rather than by free elections would help Khrushchev's Trojan Horse tactics, and relieve his fears about East Germany by increasing the recognition and stability of the puppet regime...

...Because of its popularity in Britain, only some new Khrushchev blunder or the united pressure of all of Britain's allies can now force a shift in the general Macmillan line...

...in which improved relations between East and West Germany are made the beginning of confederation...

...And when it comes to the election showdown, the British people can probably be counted on to back him, even if we do not go along with the policies he proposes...

...The series of indirect concessions which Macmillan proposes, however moderate in degree they may be...

...This is the precedent which Macmillan's plan for dealing with the Berlin crisis would establish...

...In the meantime, until the Soviets accept the formula, it would ensure the maintenance of the status quo...

...Macmillan's thesis is that we must make these concessions in order to get Khruschchev to negotiate, that he will not negotiate except at the summit and that there is no one else in Russia to negotiate with...

...Such an agreement would be all the more idiotic coming after the revolutionary new U.S...

...a drift toward some form of retreat from present Allied positions, such as those listed above, without any comparable Soviet quid pro quo...

...All these demands have been included in Khrushchev's recent speeches and in the Soviet statement of March 29...

...It is in our interest to do what we can to conciliate the British, who are our most important allies...

...Another dangerous aspect of negotiating a new and more neutral status for West Berlin, thinning out military forces in a zone of Central Europe, etc., could be its effect on Congress and the Democratic party opposition in the U.S...

...But instead of demanding such concessions...

...This would be appeasement in the name of unification...

...Thus the opportunity to use the Berlin crisis to get the American people and Congress committed to a greater defense and foreign aid effort will be lo=t...

...The United States press met the British praise of Macmillan at least half-way, first, because his proposals were news (in the sense that they represent a new line), and second, because of the general sympathy for Macmillan's domestic political difficulties and a proper desire to preserve and strengthen the Anglo-American alliance...

...The issues remain to be hammered out between now and the foreign ministers' conference...

...space tests, with their possible effects on missile warfare...

...The motive of Macmillan's pro-summit policy is probably mainly political, but it may also be an effort to pressure France and Germany on the Common Market issue...

...However, Macmillan's motives are less important than the fact that he has initiated this policy to a chorus of praise from the British press, and he tends to be increasingly committed to it as it gathers momentum...

...would be the worst thing the West could do, for two reasons: 1. By raising false hopes of unification in freedom, it would help fix German political attention mainly on the unification goal, rather than on the integration and security of Western Europe and the liberation of Eastern Europe, including East Germany...

...So the compromise starts from the new situation which Khrushchev's threat has created...

...Christopher Emmet is executive vice-chairman of the American Council on Germany...

...This, of course, was routine party politics...

...Denis Healey (page 11), a regular NL contributor, is a leading Labor MP...

...THE BERLIN ULTIMATUM must be made the occasion for negotiations not on Berlin, nor even on Germany alone, but on the whole problem of Germany and East Europe...

...This was stressed by General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, in his recent Senate testimony...

...Like George Kennan a few years ago, Macmillan would have us "accept the finality" of the Soviet satellite empire...

...The parallel with Hitler's Rhineland is obvious...

...but even the independent and pro-Labor British press has joined the praise, partly from national pride over his assumption of international leadership, and partly because they really approve his proposals...

...Yet since the West has so little to negotiate with (we cannot threaten war), it would be suicidal folly to grant economic concessions without obtaining Soviet political concessions in return...

...As that date nears, the debate on how to approach these problems is being stepped up in Western capitals...

...All this is now being lost sight of...

...and the trend toward the disintegration of NATO through the unwillingness of its members to make the necessary sacrifices would be resumed...

...The favorable press which Macmillan has received all over the world makes it more difficult, but also more necessary, to clarify these facts...

...The whole risky Berlin maneuver indicates Khrushchev's fear of the captive peoples, especially, of course, the East Germans...

...and especially after the recent statement by General Taylor that to end testing now would seriously injure the relative military position of the U.S...

...Once having created the "Frankenstein monster" of nuclear weapons, we would be foolish to end testing at this point, just when the bombs are at their most destructive, most poisonous and least flexible phase...

...As a matter of fact, the series of endless summit conferences which Macmillan proposed to Eisenhower would facilitate future Soviet threats like the present one on Berlin...

...We are told that a summit conference is the price we must pay to avoid a dangerous showdown in Berlin...

...Under his influence...

...Another factor may well be the increasing Soviet domination of Iraq and the consequent threat to the great British oil interests there and to the British Protectorate of Kuwait, which by itself contains one-quarter of the world's oil reserves...

...Macmillan is adding increased trade to the other offers he wants us to make—on the summit conference, on German unification, on disengagement, on the issue of atomic tests and on a security pact...

...It is in the interest of the United States to help Macmillan with his political difficulties...

...Such Western concessions would represent a whittling away of an already gravely weakened Western position, unless matched by Soviet moves toward German unification in freedom...