Disengagement and German Reunification
HEALEY, DENIS
DISENGAGEMENT AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION BERLIN THERE IS no doubt that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev has already achieved one of the main aims he had in mind last November when he started the...
...All the Germans believe that Khrushchev's first aim in the present diplomatic struggle over Berlin is to obtain legal sanction for his postwar military conquests, and to stabilize the Communist regimes in East Germany and the satellite states...
...Cannot the West decide from now on to take the initiative itself...
...On the other hand, there is far less confidence among Adenauer's opponents that the policies they have so far espoused will bring German reunification quickly...
...my impression during a morning's tour of the Soviet Sector was that living standards have already reached the level which obtained in West Berlin seven or eight years ago, and this was confirmed by responsible officials in West Berlin...
...Minister for Economy Ludwig Erhard's refusal to be kicked upstairs as President of the Federal Republic greatly weakened Adenauer's prestige in his own party—indeed it was a sign that the Old Man is losing his grip...
...The basic assumption of Adenauer's policy till now has been that the West could afford to ignore the existence of the Communist government in East Germany...
...Ulbricht will find it impossible to stabilize his position and national Communism will be strengthened in East Germany as in Poland...
...If Berlin were included in an area of arms limitation and control, its vulnerability to military pressure would be partially reduced...
...For it is realized that it will be extremely difficult to maintain the freedom of West Berlin if ever the West abandons hope for the freedom of East Germany...
...and takes the initiative in proposing increased contact with East Germany...
...There is already a surprising degree of agreement across party lines about the general principles which should guide a revised German policy toward reunification...
...For the first time since Hitler's collapse, both sides are now beginning to discuss reunification with sober realism...
...Also, morale in West Berlin, though exceptionally high at the moment, would inevitably fall if reunification seemed totally unattainable and living standards in East Berlin caught up...
...And the West might remind Khrushchev that Albania is no less dependent on Western tolerance than West Berlin on that of Russia...
...If there were any Germans who secretly believed that the West might make at least diplomatic use of its military force, they were finally disabused by President Eisenhower's March 11 statement that America would not fight a ground war in Europe and that resort to nuclear war, though this might become necessary in certain circumstances, would be disastrous for the people of Germany themselves...
...They think, too, that Khrushchev's desire to halt the arms race before the balance of terror is upset again and atomic arms are much more widespread may lead him to accept a settlement in Central Europe which gives him less than he would like...
...The discontent of the East German population is one obvious source of trouble for the Russians...
...The Germans now know that they will have to revise their foreign policy if they want to free their compatriots in the Soviet Zone...
...But there is a case for putting a United Nations contingent in West Berlin as well as NATO troops, and for trying to involve the UN juridically, perhaps as a mandatory authority...
...which prevented discussion of any military conditions for German reunification that did not assume the continuation of the military status quo in Western Europe...
...But these are a minority, even inside the Christian Democratic party itself...
...Nor is there much fear of an outright blockade...
...And the Chancellor's sudden decision to accept the presidency himself has strengthened this feeling...
...All the Germans now admit that their country-will never achieve reunification unless the West is prepared to make military and political concessions comparable with those it demands of Russia...
...The real threat to Berlin is more subtle and long-term...
...The Germans are united in supporting the Western determination to meet any Russian military challenge to Berlin with a military response and to break any economic blockade by instituting a new airlift...
...But there is growing reluctance to accept the only alternative to disengagement—namely, resignation to the permanence of the status quo...
...Such ideas are presented with less certainty today than before Khrushchev's recent visit to East Germany...
...DISENGAGEMENT AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION BERLIN THERE IS no doubt that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev has already achieved one of the main aims he had in mind last November when he started the present crisis over Berlin...
...At the moment, the West has a priceless asset in the morale of the Berliners themselves, and in the outstanding personal qualities of their leader, Mayor Brandt...
...There are at last signs of a readjustment of Western policy in this respect—but several years late, and in response to Soviet pressure...
...But very few believe that Russia is likely to make the sort of challenge to which a military response by the West would be politically or technically practicable...
...But these assets can only be fully exploited in the context of a far more realistic policy for German reunification than the West has so far pursued...
...He reasoned that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's growing strength would ultimately compel Russia to agree to liquidate Communist party chief Walter Ulbricht's regime by free elections and permit NATO's advance to the Polish frontier...
...In that case, it is not too difficult to imagine the outlines of a possible agreement...
...It would be impossible to maintain this indefinitely if Russia played cat and mouse with the flow of imports—particularly since Berlin's economy depends mainly on the confidence of business men in West Germany, not traditionally the most unselfish and socially-minded section of the population...
...Western troops must stay in West Berlin, and Soviet troops should not be allowed there unless Western troops are allowed in East Berlin...
...If the West can buttress its military strength with a more imaginative diplomatic posture, it will enter the forthcoming negotiations on Berlin with a much stronger hand than it has at present...
...The calculated starving of a beleaguered city would wreak havoc with Soviet policy and propaganda in Asia and Africa—Berlin's Mayor Willy Brandt was much encouraged by his recent tour in the Far East...
...Meanwhile, contacts between the two Germanys should be progressively extended so as to reduce the present gap between the systems to the point where it might be finally closed in all-German elections...
...He has succeeded in destroying the illusions on which West German Premier Konrad Adenauer has based at least the public case for his foreign policy since World War II...
...Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' calculated indiscretion about the possibility of alternatives to free elections, added to his earlier suggestion that the West might treat with officials of the Pankow Government as agents of the Soviet Union, has broken the long-standing taboo that prevented any discussion of a gradual approach to reunification, which would imply some form of negotiation between the two German regimes within the framework of a Four Power Agreement...
...In other words, it is no longer possible for any German government to pursue a policy which makes the continued division of Germany inevitable while simultaneously claiming that it will achieve reunification...
...On the other hand, there is much less confidence on the Left that Russia will easily agree to a program which will remove the basis of her political control in Eastern Europe...
...This is in fact precisely the policy which the British Labor party and the German Social Democratic party have been urging for some years...
...For this reason, it is vital that the West have a policy which offers the prospect of reunification and the withdrawal of the Red Army as a real possibility in the foreseeable future...
...An airlift, even if Soviet radar interference restricted it to good weather, could prolong this period up to nearly two years...
...Berlin already possesses between six and 12 months of stocks in essential foodstuffs and raw materials...
...During a week's discussions with leading Germans of all parties, I was unable to find a single one who still believed that it would ever be possible to reunify his country by standing firm on the conditions which the West has maintained for the last ten years...
...Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's discussion with Khrushchev on limiting and controlling armaments within an agreed area of Europe broke the other taboo...
...But the supporters of disengagement think that if the West proposes that arms control should lead to troop withdrawals...
...There are still many Germans, including Adenauer, who are prepared to accept the division of Germany for the indefinite future rather than abandon any of the principal tenets of their policy...
...Precisely how Western strength would operate to produce this desirable conclusion has never been disclosed, for Adenauer, no less than his NATO allies, has always insisted that the West would stick to peaceful means...
...Macmillan's plan for a zone of limited armaments is seen as the first step in a process of military disengagement which would end with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from German territory...
...Moreover, the West must think more boldly about posing counter-threats to Russia if Moscow continues to threaten the economic life of West Berlin...
...The city's production and living standards are four times as high as during the last blockade...
...By Denis Healey To quote Polish Communist party boss Wladyslaw Gomulka's brutal words at the recent Congress of the Polish Communist party, this is like saying that you are going to skin a sheep without using a knife and with the consent of the sheep...
Vol. 42 • April 1959 • No. 16