Confusion in Berlin
HURWITZ, HAROLD
Khrushchev's talk with Social Democratic chief Ollenhauer points up political division among German Socialists and lack of a unified Western policy CONFUSION IN BERLIN By Harold...
...Brandt announced that he would not meet with the Soviet Premier...
...Their thinking parallels the defeatist views of certain British Labor circles...
...They were stunned by the contents of the joint communique...
...As for the Allied officials in Bonn, they had nothing against the meeting if the Federal Government gave its "approval...
...Many Berliners do not realize that the Mayor's role is narrowly defined where international maneuvers are concerned...
...For by permitting its inclusion in the communique...
...There he learned from a high Austrian diplomat that the Soviet Premier might want to meet with him...
...But far more important are the basic differences in judgment, emphasis and mood between West German Socialists and their counterparts in Berlin...
...Berliners greeted the Mayor's decision with mixed feelings...
...The diplomats also might have given thought to whether it would not be better to confront Khrushchev with both Ollenhauer and Brandt, or perhaps even Brandt alone...
...At 8:25 P.M...
...Brandt loyally issued a statement criticizing the allegation...
...In the light of Western reactions, they came to feel that any points the Mayor might score could not possibly outweigh the risk of serious misunderstanding "on the outside...
...It was more negative than the first, but hardly more clear...
...This was not true, but the Mayor was interested and wanted to give careful consideration to the pros and cons of such a meeting...
...Moreover, its unflagging faith and determination, both under the late Mayor Ernst Reuter and Willy Brandt, have resulted in remarkable progress and a firm confidence in the Western powers that is by now a tradition...
...This is especially true for the critical months ahead...
...Even the left-wing Berlin Socialists, who normally share the views of the West German SPD, saw this as a serious problem...
...Since 1946, in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties like the Berlin blockade, it has led the struggle to keep the city free...
...In Leipzig, as it happens, foreign Communist correspondents had circulated the rumor that he wanted to see West Berlin but had been talked out of making the trip by East German Communist chief Walter Ulbricht...
...For example, the diplomats might have considered whether Khrushchev should be encouraged to come to West Berlin, where he could see for himself what he is up against...
...At 3:30 P.M., too, Ollenhauer was back in West Berlin to report on his morning encounter to top Berlin SPD leaders...
...Monday morning Ollenhauer, accompanied only by a press relations man, was picked up by a Soviet Embassy limousine and whisked away to the rendezvous...
...At this point, one would expect a unified policy for handling the Soviet Premier to be worked out...
...While awaiting this, West Berlin leaders became increasingly skeptical about the advisability of Brandt's talking with Khrushchev...
...It is not surprising, therefore, that Brandt handled his invitation to meet Khrushchev with extreme caution...
...Unwittingly, Khrushchev spotlighted both the division that separates the popular Socialist Mayor from his party colleagues in the German Federal Republic, and the serious lack of unity in the Western powers' approach to the Berlin problem...
...Brandt was met at the airport by Ollenhauer...
...In fact, Brandt asked, "Is that the Soviet or the German communique...
...Then the group emerged to read a joint communique, which stated that they had discussed a "peace treaty," "liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin" and "the status of West Berlin...
...Petty personal jealousy, which manifested itself in a failure to consult with Berlin Socialist leaders, was at least partially responsible for the SPD chief's inept performance...
...Ambassador's representative was shocked at the very idea...
...Ollenhauer told Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brenta, no of the upcoming meeting...
...The reaction of the Allied officials in Berlin who were consulted was most confusing...
...But this hardly diminishes the seriousness of the situation...
...the first reply from Bonn arrived...
...Time and place were not discussed, nor did Brandt give any indication of his feelings about a meeting...
...Informed of this before landing...
...It's vitally important for them to see tangible proof that their spokesman is a respected member of the Western leadership team and not merely its echo in Berlin...
...Finally, Bonn's second answer arrived...
...This ended the debate...
...And there would be no advantage to stressing this in Berlin at the moment, or to emphasizing the fear of stirring up distrust abroad...
...Presumably, he in turn told certain U.S., British and French diplomats about it...
...As for itself, the Federal Government felt that "It is not inopportune to carry on such a conversation...
...For the first time, the mounting impatience here for some "outside" counter-action to the Soviet moves was directed at Brandt...
...Almost a week before he was to see Khrushchev...
...At 3 P.M...
...For a meeting between Khrushchev and the Mayor in West Berlin, despite Ulbricht's objections, would have been a strong blow to the prestige of the East German satellite regime...
...The Federal Government then was asked to attempt to clarify the Allied position through inquiries by the Foreign Ministry in Bonn...
...Indeed, an unusual opportunity was missed...
...In essence, it left the final decision on the matter up to Berlin...
...At the same time, it would have provided West German SPD leaders with an object lesson in handling Kremlin spokesmen on the subject of Berlin...
...Above all, they feared that it would be misunderstood abroad and might detract from the support Brandt had gained for Berlin during his trip, particularly in the United States...
...Some thought it was a good thing for Khrushchev to have to swallow a "no...
...Monday, the Soviet Embassy verbally informed the West Berlin Rathaus that Khrushchev was prepared to see Brandt the following morning "since wishes had been expressed for a meeting...
...This last, particularly, aroused the ire of West Berliners...
...Both he and the diplomat, moreover, were unaware of the fact that Ollenhauer had already agreed to visit Khrushchev the following Monday in East Berlin...
...The Berlin SPD, molded by different experiences, rejects this panicky approach...
...Khrushchev's talk with Social Democratic chief Ollenhauer points up political division among German Socialists and lack of a unified Western policy CONFUSION IN BERLIN By Harold Hurwitz BERLIN ONE OF the most interesting and revealing aspects of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's recent visit to East Germany was his meeting with German Social Democratic party (SPD) leader Erich Ollenhauer, and Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt's refusal to follow suit...
...And after hearing it, the Berlin Social Democrats were leary about encouraging the Mayor's meeting with the Kremlin boss...
...This, combined with their defeatist anxieties, has created a real dilemma for them...
...Many prominent SPD members in the Federal Republic see an overall solution to the present crisis not only as Germany's last chance for reunification, but also as Berlin's only chance to remain free...
...But it was generally agreed that nothing would be jeopardized if the Allies and Bonn gave Brandt an unequivocal go-ahead...
...But although he immediately went into conference with Ollenhauer, it was Sunday noon before any West Berlin city official or Socialist party member was told of the impending East Berlin meeting...
...Immediate consultations were begun with the Allies, the Federal Republic, the Senat (city executive) and the SPD and Christian Democratic (CDU) coalition party leaders...
...Ollenhauer let the Communists introduce their formula for suspending four-power jurisdiction of the entire city and turning West Berlin into a "free city" as a compromise...
...On his return to Berlin Sunday morning...
...Even more important, a Western-approved meeting between Brandt and Khrushchev would have shown better than any fancy words the confidence that the West has in the man the Berliners have chosen as their leader...
...For two hours, while the press relations man waited in an anteroom, he was closeted with Khrushchev, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to East Germany Mikhail Pervukhin and a Soviet translator...
...Thus they are willing to give serious consideration to far-reaching disengagement proposals and such Communist gambits as "confederation," a "peace treaty with two German states" and "German reunification is a problem which the Germans must solve among themselves...
...Brandt was in Vienna completing a tour of free-world capitals to gain firm support for beleaguered West Berlin...
...In an unusually strong editorial, the tabloid B. Z. had accused the SPD chief of trying to bask in the Mayor's glow to cover up his poor record on German defense...
...Moscow, after all, claims that West Berlin is actually part of the "German Democratic Republic...
...Brandt, in defending his decision, has wisely avoided any public reference to the confusion in Western circles...
...At 11 P.M...
...When Khrushchev arrived in East Germany...
...The British were encouraging, the French left it up to the Mayor and the U.S...
...Their problem is that Moscow is clearly unwilling to throw in freedom for the Soviet Zone and West Berlin...
...But it was impossible to tell exactly what the Federal Government's message meant, so clarification from Bonn was again requested...
...others were deeply disappointed...
Vol. 42 • March 1959 • No. 13
