Russia 5 Years After Stalin-lO

...Numerous articles in the press have stated that an officer can no longer ignore the recommendations made by the Party organization or bureau of his unit, even when they concern technical matters...

...Whether he actually "saved" Khrushchev, as has been alleged, is open to doubt...

...Although he made certain concessions to their demands, he never allowed them to become too powerful or too independent...

...Stalin's death led to an almost immediate rise in the status of the armed forces, and in particular of Zhukov...

...Members of Party organizations are free to criticize a commander for his failures and shortcomings, to correct inadequacies in training, and to help improve the combat readiness of the forces, but they are still prevented from criticizing the commander s direct "orders and regulations...

...The number of professional soldiers who became full members of the committee rose from four to six...

...This concept has provided the basis for tightened Party control and even for curtailment of the commander's authority to issue orders...

...The current Soviet press indicates that many officers still succeed in evading many of the controls and that their subordinates in the Party organizations are often reluctant to criticize them...

...One by one, Soviet commanders who had been purged or slighted by Stalin were rehabilitated, the most notable example being Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, executed in 1937...

...In theory, the principle of edinonachalie is still in force, but its scope has been greatly reduced...

...The officer could thus be criticized at Party meetings by his fellow Party members, who were often his subordinates, and his performance was under the constant surveillance of the Party organization of his unit...

...The Chief Political Administration, in turn, called for the preservation of "the norms of Party life," and for the "increased activeness and militancy of Party organizations" in the armed forces...

...Fearing unrest at home and desiring to capitalize on Zhukov's popularity, the "collective leaders" made him a First Deputy Minister of Defense under Bulganin and, following Beria's fall, a member of the Central Committee...

...Immediately following the June purge, the military press opened a campaign for increasing the role of Party organizations in the armed forces...

...Their role was probably more passive than active, but they were more inclined to side with Khrushchev...

...Fearing further gains on Zhukov's part, the Khrushchev-Bulganin team sought to check his growing power...

...This trend culminated in Khrushchev's open denunciation, before the 20th Party Congress, of Stalin's role as a military commander...

...In fact, Marshal Sokolovsky, a long-time associate of Zhukov, was recently made First Deputy Minister of Defense in addition to Konev...

...Of course, there can be no question that the new control measures are resented, and to some degree resisted, by the professional officers...

...One way to achieve this was to prohibit all criticism of the '"service activities" of commanders at Party meetings...

...The series began in our issue of March 24 with a discussion of foreign policy by David J. Dallin...

...Under the latter system, the political officer was subordinated to the commander, limiting bis own activities primarily to problems of the morale, education and welfare of the troops...

...In his climb to the top, Khrushchev made clever use of the military...

...At the same time, Konev gained new prominence by presiding over Beria's trial, and General (later Marshal) Kiril Mos-kalenko, another wartime associate of Khrushchev, was given command of the crucial Moscow Military District...

...In fact, however, the zampolit, like the commissar, being a representative of the Chief Political Administration of the Armed Forces (a special section of the Central Committee of the Party), always checked on the reliability and performance of the officers and interfered in their activity...

...Although always extensive, the actual degree of Party control has varied with the leadership's views concerning the loyalty of the armed forces as well as with the requirements of military efficiency...

...The professional officer, like most professional people in the Soviet Union, is caught between his desire for efficiency and authority and his allegiance to the Party that places its control and domination above efficiency...

...Instead of standing together, certain generals and marshals would ally themselves with one or another Politburo faction...

...This course is more logical, as most officers are themselves Party members and may therefore find this form of control more palatable...

...More important, the prestige of the Chief Political Administration went into progressive decline...

...Foremost among those who sang Khrushchev's praise was Konev, whom Khrushchev made commander of the Warsaw Pact forces and Deputy Minister of Defense...

...Marshal Ro-dion Malinovsky became Minister of Defense, while Konev remained First Deputy...

...Nevertheless, Zhukov apparently felt strong enough to launch a campaign for strengthening the principle of edinonachalie against interference from the Party organization within the armed forces...

...The Party organs were instructed to increase their efforts toward "rallying" the armed forces around the Communist party and the Government, but the "Instructions" stressed edinonachalie and explicitly prohibited criticism of the commanders' "orders and regulations" at Party meetings...

...But instead of playing off these factions against one another, Zhukov had in effect lent his support to Khrushchev, the strongest contender for absolute power...

...It would appear that Khrushchev has chosen to let the power of the Chief Political Administration become somewhat weaker, and to rely more heavily upon the Party organizations for control of the armed forces...

...Zheltov, however, has reappeared as a department head in the Central Committee, where his talents are presumably used to keep an eye on his successor...

...Zhukov not only had asked for the impossible, but had revealed himself as a poor politician...

...General F. I. Golikov...

...In our next issue, George L. Kline will examine education in Russia...

...The marshals could not but favor the faction which emphasized heavy industry, armaments and larger defense budgets...

...But Zhukov ignored these demands...

...The military press campaigned for the subordinates' unquestioning obedience to officers' orders, and deplored the interference of Party secretaries in the military decisions of the commanders of their units...

...At the same time, however, the number of military candidate members in the committee was reduced from 22 to 12...

...It seems more likely that Khrushchev was guarded against direct action by the Malenkov-Molotov opposition by Ivan Serov, the head of the State Security Committee and Khrushchev's faithful bodyguard, and by Marshal Moskalenko, commander of the Moscow Military District...

...The political role of the armed forces would doubtless increase in the event of an intensive and prolonged power struggle in the leadership...

...Following Stalin's death, the fortunes of the armed forces rose and fell in direct proportion to the intensity of the factional struggle within the "collective leadership...

...At such time, the officers might ally themselves with whatever group opposed the ruling power of the Party, for they are likely to remember that they can be masters in their own house only if the dominance of the Party is drastically reduced...

...The military men have always sought the full implementation of the principle of edinonachalie, or unitary command, which gives the commander sole authority in all military matters except for propaganda and education...

...In these new conditions the military felt able to demand stricter enforcement of the principle of edino-nachalie...

...But, while lip-service was paid to this principle, in Stalin's time, it was never implemented in a fashion satisfactory to the officers—despite the fact that eventually 90 per cent of the officers were Party members, the Minister of Defense was a trusted Party leader, and no professional officers served in the highest Party organ, the Politburo...

...In turn, Zhukov publicly supported Khrushchev's purge of Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kagano-vich and Dmitri Shepilov...

...In June 1956, Konev became First Deputy Minister of Defense and as such was second only to Zhukov...

...On May 8, 1955, Konev made the key speech on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the victory over Germany...

...The leadership has also made it clear that the officer is, first of all, a Party member whose first loyalty must be to the Party rather than to his professional hierarchy...

...Zhukov was charged with weakening Party control over the armed forces, fostering a cult of his own personality, "adventurism" in foreign policy, and incorrect military theories...

...Criticism of officers at Party meetings was encouraged...

...The Soviet press ranked him third in importance after Zhukov and Vasilevsky...

...The fact that these two trends are irreconcilable is one of the factors contributing to social unrest and to the inefficiency of the Soviet system...

...the principle of edinonachalie did not mean that commanders were immune from such treatment...

...Zhukov was also able to reduce further the power of the Chief Political Administration...

...One result of the crisis was Zhukov's promotion to full membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee, from which Khrushchev had purged most or all of his rivals...

...In February 1955, Khrushchev forced Malenkov to resign as Premier and replaced him with Bulganin, while Zhukov was named Minister of Defense...

...This fell short of Zhukov's earlier demand that criticism of the commanders' "service activities" be prohibited...

...The marshals were also given increasing credit for their wartime victories...

...A typical case of rivalry was that between Marshals Georgi Zhukov and Ivan Konev...

...Many commanders had stifled Party activities on the ground that they weakened the principle of edinonachalie...

...The political weakness of the Soviet armed forces also stemmed from their lack of unity...

...As professional officers they had command responsibilities and were subordinate only to their military superiors, but as Party members they were subject to Party discipline and subordinate to the decisions of their Party unit, its secretary, and its bureau...

...General Alexei Zheltov, was replaced by a professional officer, Col...

...the professional officer was responsible for combat, training and administration...

...Following Zhukov's dismissal, Party control over the armed forces increased rapidly...

...It is doubtful whether Khrushchev will succeed in establishing really tight control over the military without resorting to Stalinist police methods, and the re-institution of the latter might rally a powerful opposition against him...

...Subsequently, Marshal Moskalenko charged that "the situation had reached the point where Communists [in...

...the armed forces] were actually not permitted to address the Central Committee of the Party, to express their proposals and ideas...

...Various Party organizations and a special department of the security police have maintained controls at all levels of the armed forces...

...The relationship of the Soviet Army to the Communist party and its leaders has always been complex and generally unsatisfactory to all concerned...

...Such controls were also instituted in connection with the purges of 1937 and as a result of the Soviet military defeats in 1941-1942...

...Leon Goure is a journalist working for the Rand Corporation who specializes in military affairs...

...In fact, his denunciation of their role in the Stalinist purges went so far beyond the official line as almost to implicate Khrushchev himself...

...It was obvious that Khrushchev and the Party machine would not tolerate such conditions...

...It was subsequently revealed that some officers took disciplinary action against subordinates who had dared to criticize them at Party meetings, while others prevented the Party organizations of their units from meeting...

...Although at first glance Zhukov appeared to have gained in power, he was actually isolated in the Presidium, which Khrushchev was packing with his own supporters...

...IN PREPARATION for the crisis which led to the June 1957 purge of the Presidium, Khrushchev sought to reach an accommodation with Zhukov 011 the role of the Party within the armed forces...

...Available evidence appears to support the first of these charges...

...By October 26, Red Star reported that Party activity in the armed forces had "considerably increased" since the promulgation of the "Instructions," but implied that Zhukov had hampered their implementation...

...The new prominence of the military was reflected also in its increased representation in the Supreme Soviet (73 members in 1954 as against 52 in 1950...

...This step drastically reduced the number of zampolits...

...A real, Bolshevik devotion to the Party of the commander-edinonachalnik means that he always and in everything acts in conformity with , the policy of the Party, with its orders and directives, that without sparing his strength and energy he fights for the realization of the Party's policy, of its life in the sphere of military development...

...His strength had depended on the preservation of a collective leadership in which the contending factions were forced to bid for the support, or at least the benevolent neutrality, of the military...

...The number of hours devoted to the political indoctrination of the troops was more than doubled, and officers were compelled to attend political lectures...

...the latter was associated with Khrushchev on the Ukrainian front during the war...

...In a series of speeches and articles, Zhukov now criticized the Party groups for failing to back the officers who instilled strict discipline, and demanded that they concentrate on strengthening military discipline: "The strengthening of discipline must begin first of all with the strengthening of edinonachalie and increasing the authority of the command cadres...

...Local civilian Party committees, whose functionaries are less likely to be impressed by military rank than those in the armed forces, have been encouraged to take a more active part in the Party life of the military units stationed in their area...

...It was indicative of the backstage maneuvering on the eve of Stalin's death that the alleged military victims of the so-called "doctors plot" were Marshals Konev, Leonid Govorov and Alexander Vasilevsky...

...On all three points he was opposed by Khrushchev...

...In subsequent issues, Boris I. Nicolaevsky discussed the Communist party, Gleb Struve literature, Richard Pipes nationalities, Simon Wolin the secret police, Vladimir Gsovski law, Myron Rush the economic managers, Lazar Volin agriculture, and Olcg Hoeffding industry...

...The role of these Party organizations had grown with the increase in Party membership, a development that had placed the officers in a difficult position...

...The Soviet commander-edinonachalnik wrote Red Star on March 26, "is distinguished first of all by his deep devotion to the Party...

...During his tenure in the Ministry of Defense, Zhukov had considerably reduced the role of the Chief Political Administration and of the Party organizations in the armed forces, and many officers had apparently taken advantage of his position to push edinonachalie as far as possible...

...no mention was made of Zhukov or his close associate Vassili Sokolovsky...

...As a result, the zampolits at company level (who had been introduced in 1950) apparently were abolished in 1955, and company commanders were made responsible for the political as well as the military training of their men...

...No representative of the Chief Political Administration was elected to the Central Committee either as full or as candidate member...

...The terms "orders and regulations," interpreted narrowly, applied only to verbal and written orders, thus leaving the commanders open to criticism for all their other activities or shortcomings...

...He did not purge Zhukov's supporters, nor did he liquidate Zhukov himself...

...We consider," Zhukov warned in April 1956, "that he who attempts to interpret the struggle against the personality cult as a struggle against edinonachalie is doing a disservice to the efforts to improve the combat proficiency of the armed forces...

...All Party members, the articles said, regardless of rank, were subject to criticism and self-criticism...

...The greater attention paid to the military councils at the Military District level has increased the role of the regional Party secretaries who participate in them...

...Although the pace of reimposition of Party control over the military has been rapid, Khrushchev has nevertheless shown some signs of caution...

...Alternatively, he will be forced to seek uneasy compromises between the requirements of Party control over the armed forces and the need for preserving the morale and efficiency of the officer corps...

...In the success of this policy he was no doubt aided by Zhukov's poor judgment and by the continuing factionalism within the military high command...

...Thus, during the Civil War, ex-officers of the Imperial Army had to have their orders countersigned by political commissars...

...The unpopular head of the Chief Political Administration, Col...

...It stressed, in particular, the right of Party members to criticize others regardless of rank, and made the narrowest possible interpretation of the earlier prohibition of such criticism...

...During the succeeding months, Khrushchev intensified his efforts to strengthen Party control in the armed forces...

...Increasing autonomy of the armed forces, regardless of Zhukov's personal ambitions, would in the end have created a rival power center to the Party...

...At other times, the commissar system was replaced by that of the zampolit...

...Nevertheless, Zhukov was apparently sufficiently satisfied with Khrushchev's policies to side with him in the June 1957 leadership crisis...

...It was further revealed after Zhukov's ouster that the number of hours devoted to the political indoctrination of enlisted men had been reduced, while the political indoctrination of officers had been made voluntary, rather than mandatory as before...

...The issue centered around Malenkov's emphasis on a consumer-goods program, his proposal to cut the military budget, and his assumption that the Soviet thermonuclear capability represented an effective deterrent to Western aggression...

...On the same day, having just returned from a trip to Yugoslavia and Albania, Zhukov was ousted from his post of Minister of Defense, and on November 2 came the public announcement of his expulsion from the Presidium and from the Central Committee...

...Such controls inevitably conflicted with the interests of the professional officers...

...Finally, to judge by the speed with which the majority of the marshals joined in the condemnation of Zhukov, the military high command was by no means prepared to back its chief in a showdown with the Party...

...After the 20th Congress, Zhukov was elected a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the first professional officer to enjoy that distinction...

...Military leaders unavoidably became involved in the political struggle between the Malenkov and Khrushchev factions...

...On April 27, 1957, a set of "Instructions" was issued in the name of the Central Committee to this effect...

...After February 1955, references to their own wartime military role appeared more and more often...

...In the Party," said Red Star on July 31, 1957, "there is no division between the "chosen' and the "unchosen,' there are no two disciplines, one for the leaders and another for the rank and file...