Defense Is More Than Deterrence

...Its early development shows clearly that a totalitarian government able to operate without concern for the public can press and rush military and other projects at will, while its democratic competitor must move slowly and carefully in order not to antagonize taxpayers, consumers, and spokesmen for rival branches of the armed services...

...In such a comparison, even the ICBM may emerge as less important than first imagined...

...Their actual use in war, since it is suicidal for both parties, does not belong to their rational and practical functions...

...To yield to the temptation and public pressure for satellite development and for propaganda victories, merely to wipe out the humiliating blow suffered by this country in recent weeks, might have serious military consequences...

...At a time when the Soviet leaders were whipping their scientists, engineers and industrial managers—and paying them well for the job—into whatever action was needed to produce both the ICBM and the satellite in advance of the United States, our administration was moving with the caution dictated by its overwhelming concern for a balanced budget and by the prevailing mood in Congress...

...Yet, the proper American response to the satellite must be based upon an evaluation of its military significance, since military preparedness rather than international "prestige" should be the primary guiding consideration...

...Such a blow then could make a resort to total nuclear war suicidal for the Soviets even though they alone possessed ICBMs with which to strike effectively at targets in the United States and could guide them from outer space...

...It would have a far greater advantage, however, if it possessed missiles capable of reaching their targets, missiles without which the benefits of spotting and guiding would be wasted...

...Quite conceivably, this countrv...

...Either they must agree to a rise in overall military expenditure—which would seem the wisest thing to do— or else they must leave the present defense budget alone and not yield to the natural desire to restore damaged prestige by an increased emphasis on the instruments of deterrence of total nuclear war, such as ICBMs and satellites...

...On these assumptions our ability to deter the Soviets from launching an all-out nuclear war remains assured even if we have not yet developed ICBM, satellites or manned platforms in outer space...

...The satellite destroyed any illusions or doubts which still remained regarding the truth of this earlier announcement...

...The decisive factor will be the eventual distribution of military power...

...Therefore, before the U.S...

...Such deterrence, moreover, is all that the arsenal of long-range missiles and planes with thermonuclear warheads, as well as the instruments to guide them, can ever achieve...

...It might be argued that the democratic requirements of public consent and sound finance are things so precious as to compensate for any advantage our totalitarian opponent may gain from freely exploiting its people in a race for international prestige...

...But if, as must be feared, the overall defense budget remains at its present level, the question becomes not one of evaluating the ICBM and the satellite as military weapons but rather one of comparing the value of these super-weapons with the value of the other, more conventional, non-thermonuclear and non-total-war weapons which are bound to be squeezed out of the budget by any shift of funds to the more spectacular instruments of warfare...

...That is no mean accomplishment at a time when vacillating countries in Asia and Africa are looking for the wave of the future and wish to be on the side of maximum promise...

...An impression of Soviet technological superiority is particularly serious because in American propaganda to the outside world such superiority—industrial, scientific and technological—has been sold (oversold, perhaps) as the distinguishing American trade-mark...

...Ironically, taken by itself the Soviet satellite offers no proof that the Soviet Union has overtaken this country in know-how or technical proficiency...

...But has not the balance of military power also been affected by the Soviet victory in the satellite race, which was surely more than a prestige victory such as a country may win at the Olympic Games...

...Thus, the Soviet satellite, and what it has revealed of Soviet military accomplishments, places before the American people a painful choice...

...Only the expert can evaluate the military value of "moons" that are capable of circling the earth and thus the degree to which their early possession by one side affects the balance of military power...

...Therefore, what made the appearance of the Soviet satellite so serious militarily was the light it threw on the earlier announcement of a Soviet ICBM...

...The capacity for such deterrence has the effect, however, of placing a premium on attacks, limited in one of many conceivable ways, to which the Soviets could assume that we would be unwilling to respond by massive and suicidal nuclear retaliation...

...Probably, no weapons expert will deny that any country which obtained a monopoly of the means with which to spot targets and guide missiles to their targets from the vantage point of outer space would have a substantial military advantage...

...The significance of the satellite lies in another field...

...The fact that the Soviets would be able to make their attack peculiarly murderous because of their newly developed super-weapons would not make such an attack any less suicidal provided the West possessed the capacity for devastating retaliation, though with less spectacular means of delivery...

...with its ring of bases around the circumference of Soviet territory, can strike a truly devastating retaliatory blow at the Soviet Union even without intercontinental missiles...

...The mere fact of the existence of this new and startling contraption does not provide us with any clear evidence of its military significance...

...can afford to engage in a race for satellites—and possibly for even more spectacular outer-space successes, such as visits to the moon —the immediate task which confronts us is a careful evaluation of the military need for early success in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles...

...After all, in the long run the alignment of nations will not be determined by sheer propaganda victories or by such intangibles as the appeal of alleged technological superiority...

...Even an unrestrained concentration of effort and expenditure on the ICBM, considered today's ultimate weapon, might, paradoxically enough, be a fatal blunder...

...Such concentration would be safe only if new and additional appropriations permitted it to come out of funds supplementary to the present overall military budget...

...If we cripple our ability to meet such attacks effectively, since these are the most likely attacks of the future, we shall have paid for effective deterrence of total war with the risk of military disaster...