Would the Red Army Withdraw?
COTTRELL, ALVIN J. & HAHN, WALTER F.
If we agree to withdraw U. S. forces from Western Europe, will Eastern Europe witness a Soviet Withdrawal? By Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of...
...The stakes of the struggle, allegedly, were political and ideological, and concerned the degree of liberalization to be offered the peoples of the Soviet Empire...
...And his enemies fled in terror...
...The United States long ago announced its intention of reducing its European troop commitments in favor of smaller, more mobile nuclear-equipped contingents...
...The recent Russo-Polish agreement governing the specific status and deployment of Soviet forces illustrates the Kremlin's sensitivity to this threat...
...The Soviet proposal, the most comprehensive unveiled to date, made a number of dramatic suggestions...
...The Hungarian uprising has fired emotions to the point where the West Germans could not be expected to countenance the annihilation of their brethren across the border...
...Recent developments in Poland and Hungary, however, show that the Red Army has a dual purpose in Eastern Europe...
...If 10 Soviet divisions were necessary to suppress an indigenous uprising among 9 million Hungarians, how many of the 27 Red Army divisions in East Germany (population: 17 million) will be required to cope with a rebellion thero, actively aided by outside forces ? In short, the supposed disparity between Soviet and Western ground forces is rapidly becoming insignificant...
...The Kremlin has almost obsessively avoided creating situations where the only alternatives are total war or retreat with loss of face—witness the use of "volunteers," the waging of war by proxy, and similar tactics...
...The only instance in which the Kremlin abandoned these precepts was the Berlin Blockade, and even that appears in retrospect as a miscalculation which was quickly redressed...
...It also speaks of an aerial inspection system applicable to a region roughly 500 miles east and west of the German zonal border...
...And now the focus is shifting into two areas in which the implications are far more explosive...
...Moreover, the center of such an uprising would be Berlin, where American, British, French and Soviet contingents rub elbows...
...The Kremlin pursued this policy of indirect conflict when it was in an apparent position of strength...
...For overall strategic reasons, therefore, the Soviet military leaders may well have shared in the decision to reintervene in Hungary...
...This time, Brentano warned, the West Germans would not react passively as they did in 1953...
...Soviet policy has consistently sought to make certain that the cold war is waged with the weapons of political and psychological warfare...
...Moscow has known for some time that the policy of assimilating Eastern Europe into the Soviet Empire had reached the point of diminishing returns...
...A mutual evacuation of 500 miles would push the Red Army back to the borders of the Soviet Union...
...Eisenhower referred to the USSR's continued strategic superiority in Europe...
...for the West, it would mean a withdrawal of foreign forces to the Spanish border and the Channel coast...
...Soviet military leaders could not look with enthusiasm upon any step which might weaken the Soviet military position in Eastern Europe—without any corresponding removal of Western forces from the traditional approaches to Russia...
...If the Soviet dilemma is seen in these terms, could not the Kremlin's latest proposal be an initial attempt to make the best of an impossible position...
...Soviet actions in Hungary have shown, however, that the conflict within the Kremlin embraces more than political objectives...
...On the other hand, the Western military machine, with its superior means of waging nuclear warfare, is far better geared for open and total warfare...
...The Hungarian rebellion clearly destroyed this myth...
...The proposal speaks of a "considerable reduction" of American, British, French and Soviet troops in the territories of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact countries...
...In view of the Hungarian experience, how many Soviet divisions must be committed to upholding other unpopular regimes in the satellite realm...
...The obvious Soviet relief which greeted the pacification of the Middle Eastern crisis underscores the fact that Moscow today is in no position to play with the prospect of global conflict...
...2. A considerable reduction of U.S., British, French and Soviet troops in the territories of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries...
...Since the cold war began, the West has regarded the Soviet military machine in Eastern Europe strictly as an aggressive spearhead poised for a thrust to the English Channel...
...If commensurate Soviet reductions can accompany these planned cuts, it is difficult to see what we stand to lose...
...Soviet recognition of this fact is brought out again in Point 5 of their November 17 disarmament proposal, which provides for the liquidation within two years of "the foreign military, naval and air bases in the territory of other states...
...nor can it be sure that Gomulka, through either personal initiative or popular pressure, will not attempt to secede from the Soviet orbit...
...This situation was described—in reverse—by West Germany's Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano at the recent meeting of the North Atlantic Council...
...Such a contingency would pose innumerable problems of adjustment...
...If the Soviet advantage in this realm has been manifestly overstated, there is every reason for the West to act on the basis of its new knowledge...
...Soviet actions in Hungary, therefore, did not resolve the basic postwar dilemma...
...A cogent answer to these questions entails a consideration of the alternatives available to both sides...
...From a military point of view, therefore, the Soviet army in East Germany is in a precarious quandary...
...Could this mean the possibility of discussing a staged withdrawal of all forces from this area, a withdrawal enforced by ground and aerial inspection...
...It could mean also the beginning of the end of Russian occupation of Eastern Europe—with all its momentous political implications...
...An uprising here would confront the Soviets with an impossible situation...
...Not only must the Red Army assign a considerable pail of its East German garrison to anticipate a popular uprising, but the survival of this garrison is threatened by the potential extinction of lines of communication running through Poland...
...At this point, the Soviet Union is prepared for neither contingency...
...But recent events have also cast serious doubt on the Soviets' supposed element of strategic superiority, namely, the ability to defeat the West in a limited European conflict...
...But the coin must be turned for a Soviet view of the same phenomenon...
...Additional ground forces might be accommodated in these areas and along the coast of Franco...
...By Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania On November 17, in the midst of the smoldering Hungarian and Middle East crises, the Soviet Union followed the announced explosion of a hydrogen bomb with a grandiose proposal for new disarmament talks...
...Behind East Germany, moreover, lies Poland...
...It would seem prudent for the West to offer the Soviets the opportunity which they may well be seeking...
...If the Soviet proposal for a reduction of forces in Europe is accepted, it could mean a dissipation of relative Soviet strength in return for a dissipation of relative Western weakness...
...This is the immediate fortress guarding the invasion gateway to Russia, and the line of direct contact with the forces of the West...
...The President's suggestion that the United Nations represents the best framework for disarmament discussions must be construed as a polite cold shoulder to the Soviet initiative...
...The first of these is East Germany...
...3. The establishment of an aerial inspection system applicable to an area of 800 kilometers in depth (roughly 500 miles) east and west of the demarcation line separating East and West Germany...
...But this political decision severely compromised the security concepts of Soviet military leaders, who have always been influenced by traditional geopolitical assumptions...
...One day, surprised bv his enemies in an unguarded fortress, he impulsively threw the gates open wide...
...At the same time, an independent and neutral Hungary meant the creation of a military vacuum jutting to the very borders of the Soviet Union—a condition which was unacceptable to the Red Army command so long as the West remained at the traditional invasion gates...
...it must in fact consider them as potential foes...
...The pages of history bear ample witness to the fact that spontaneous revolution does not await a careful computation of odds necessary for success...
...The Kremlin cannot be certain that Wladyslaw Gomulka will continue to control the restiveness of 27 million Poles...
...The dimensions of this dilemma have become clear since the Hungarian uprising...
...Reintervention after the initial defeat of the Red Army garrison was justified by the Kremlin on strategic a3 well as political grounds...
...Generally, however, the West must view present Soviet moves within the objective framework of strategic factors, instead of habitually considering all Soviet proposals as mere propaganda...
...Have recent events produced an entirely new frame of reference for a European settlement, of which arms limitation remains the sine qua non...
...This was the motive behind the frantic efforts to integrate a remilitarized Germany into the Atlantic alliance...
...The We st should not emulate the opponents of a famous Chinese general of the 3rd century a.d...
...Until then, a discernible equivocation had marked the new Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe—an equivocation popularly attributed to a Kremlin power struggle between "Khrushchevists" and "Stalinists...
...who was universally credited with possessing an infallible strategic knowledge...
...It does suggest, however, the possibility of a quid pro quo whereby U.S...
...It should be assumed that elements in the Soviet high command would consider liquidating gradually its commitments in East Germany and the satellite area as a whole only if they are permitted to do so without losing face, and only if this withdrawal is accompanied by a commensurate diminution of the supposed Western threat to Russian security...
...Brentano's speculations before the NATO Council were not exaggerated: A protracted East German revolution could not possibly remain confined to the Oder-Neisse and Elbe borders, but would spread —either into a limited conflict encompassing both West and East Germany, or into total war...
...For the first time, the West has realized that not only can the Kremlin not rely on the satellite troops for support...
...At the NATO meeting, the West officially voiced its fear that another major uprising in the Soviet camp could lead to a general war...
...No military commander relishes the prospect of indefinitely encamping a considerable part of his army in hostile territory in order to support hated regimes...
...Prior to the Hungarian uprising, the West was prone to compute the Soviet superiority in ground forces on the basis of the total strength of combined Soviet and satellite armies...
...The Kremlin's fundamental shortcomings in the means of waging total warfare have already been mentioned...
...We can safely assume that the Kremlin wants to avoid an East German bloodletting at all costs: This is the main reason for the presence of some 27 Soviet divisions on German soil...
...Furthermore, the loyalty of the Red Army itself is open to question, as demonstrated by the widespread Soviet defections in Hungary...
...In fact, even the defensive merits of Lhe Soviet East German "stronghold" have been severely circumscribed...
...President Eisenhower's reply ended rumors to the effect that the United States had been considering modification of its past position on some aspects of disarmament...
...Political circumstances may change, but the basic geographic considerations of Russian security remain fixed...
...In other words, Washington does not appear to believe that recent events in Eastern Europe have altered the balance of power to the extent where negotiations over troop reductions would be profitable...
...forces might not be compelled to withdraw 3,000 miles across the Atlantic Ocean...
...Brentano enumerated graphically the implications for the West inherent in another East German revolt...
...The United States already has substantial forces stationed at its airbascs in Morocco, Spain and England...
...The Red Army cannot withdraw unilaterally without losing face and without extending an open invitation to the categorical overthrow of the East German Communist regime...
...Under no circumstances could the Soviets tolerate a Hungarian situation between the Oder-Neisse and the Elbe...
...The same assumption cannot be made if revolution erupts in East Germany and Poland...
...Perhaps the most significant were: 1. The reduction by one-third during 1957 of the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France in Germany, and the establishment of an effective system of controls over these reductions...
...The most important of these assumptions is the basic indefensibility of the vast plain stretching from the Carpathians to the Urals—a trough which provided the invasion route for Napoleon in 1812 and Hitler in 1941...
...Today, with gaping fissures appearing in the "monolith," the reasons dictating a continuation of this policy are even more compelling...
...In short, the Red Army is perched on a powder-keg...
...De-Stalinization was used to make the best of an inexorably deteriorating Soviet position in the satellites...
...Could it be that the proposal presents at least a genuine basis for discussion...
...There is a real desperation, therefore, behind the Soviet proposal on disarmament—a desperation which should induce the West to take a closer look at it...
...Even the most perfunctory assessment of Soviet strategy leads to a negative conclusion...
...The Kremlin could interfere at the time that it did in Hungary in the belief that this intervention would not unleash the dangers of total war...
...In any event, a Polish uprising would immediately affect the Soviet position in East Germany: Not only would such an uprising spread westward, but the Kremlin would be compelled to shift the bulk of its occupation army from East Germany to Poland, leaving the Ulbricht-Grotewohl regime without the military support indispensable for its survival...
...It can also be assumed, however —and this must be perfectly clear to the Kremlin since Hungary—that the sheer weight of an occupation army is not an absolute deterrent to revolution...
...The Hungarian uprising confirmed these apprehensions...
...As soon as revolt exploded in Hungary, the Soviets frantically reinforced their already substantial military garrisons in the volatile German Democratic Republic, scene of an uprising in June 1953 and again a political tinder-box...
...Is the Kremlin now prepared for a general conflagration...
...Our policy-makers seem to minimize the fact that the Soviets are caught on the horns of a formidable dilemma, and that they may yet go to great lengths to wrench themselves free...
...In the long run, however, the Soviet military must recognize the fundamental untenability of its position...
...The Soviet strategy since the advent of the cold war has been one of indirect and protracted conflict—of nibbling, absorbing and infiltrating...
...A democratic Hungary portended the disintegration of Communism in the satellite realm, and, potentially, in the Soviet Union itself...
...On the other hand, it cannot remain there indefinitely without committing the cardinal military sin of overextension...
...The idea of moving uncomfortably close to the "brink of total war" runs counter to every precept which has guided Soviet strategic conduct...
...The sum of all these parts is the manifest confusion, weakness and irresolution of the Soviet leadership...
...clashing strategic considerations are involved...
...From the beginning of the cold war, the stated objective of the West has been to redress the existing imbalance of ground forces in Europe...
...The proposal was received in Western capitals with the same skepticism accorded to most Communist offers...
Vol. 40 • January 1957 • No. 3
