The Alternatives for France
ARON, RAYMOND
The Alternatives for France By Raymond Aron The revolt of the peoples of Asia and Africa against the West is not primarily inspired by a demand for individual rights; it is, above all, a revolt...
...Are the leaders of the National Front convinced that the offer of free elections is made in good faith and that the promises will be kept...
...they would enjoy a complete equality of civil rights and eventually even political rights, although the principle of French sovereignty would not be subject to question...
...In the interior of this "French Republic," Moslems, up to a certain percentage of the total population, would be permitted to live...
...The sole goal in the war, with Tunisia and Morocco independent, is to find "intermediaries" whose nationalism is not xenophobic...
...When the French declare that (he leaders of the Algerian National Front would install a theocratic or totalitarian regime, they do not meet the question of principle involved, even if they are correct...
...What period of time will elapse between a cease-fire and free elections...
...the guerrilla menace, if not eliminated, will have reached the point of exhaustion...
...Would Algeria evacuated by France be unviable economically, if not politically...
...Increasingly, the nationalists in Tunisia and Morocco who do not wish to break with France are caught between the need to maintain solidarity with the Algerian rebels and the desire to maintain contact with the French Government...
...What does French sovereignty in Algeria mean if the two independent countries of North Africa have descended into chaos or no longer have any contacts in the West, except with the U.S...
...The truth is that the present French policy of war in Algeria contradicts our policy of retaining the friendship of Tunisia and Morocco...
...This version of partition is most difficult to realize...
...What influence will the Communist party exercise...
...Another version of the partition plan calls for Tunisia to annex the eastern part of Algeria, Morocco the western part, while the center, with a bridge to the Sahara, would make up a number of French departments...
...But France, disavowed bv half of its people and by its allies, cannot continue to fight without a tangible goal, even if its enemies act against their own best interests without even knowing it...
...Such a solution might not be excluded in fact if we were to lose our fear of words...
...It means applying to North Africa the Israeli experience in the Middle East...
...As the duration of the war impels Tunisia and Morocco to increased intervention, the governments of these two independent countries will become more and more hostile and their French inhabitants will depart...
...If we recognize that Algeria has its own personality, we can no longer exclude the possibility of an Algerian state...
...And, whether we wish it or not, North Africa is a unit...
...agreement with the governments of Tunisia and Morocco...
...Everyone estimates that pacification will take two to three years...
...I.et us take an optimistic hypothesis: In 1%0...
...In any case, it seems to me to be necessary to break with certain taboos...
...In brief, a "pacification" which demands three more years of fighting cannot succeed because the situation will meanwhile have irreparably deteriorated in Tunisia and Morocco...
...We cannot "rewin" Algeria while "losing" Tunisia and Morocco...
...or the French Government would fix the limits of further progress in advance, crushing hopes for any further development, and the National Front would continue to fight despite the exhaustion of its forces...
...The colored peoples, whom the peoples of the West have humiliated, employ a Western vocabulary to express their demands...
...Would Algeria be reduced to chaos...
...But there are limits to the responsibilities which the community can assume on behalf of a part of itself...
...4) acceptance of the principle of an Algerian state...
...The "loss" of Algeria is not the end of France...
...As the chances of peaceful coexistence between the two communities diminish, the temptation to prefer war to surrender will increase...
...What will take place during those three years in Tunisia and Morocco...
...Neither Tunisians, nor Algerians, nor Moroccans would accept a solution that would aggravate the problems within the former protectorates without promoting reconciliation between Frenchman and Moslem...
...It is because we refused to grant Tunisia and Morocco, even in principle, the long-run perspective of independence that we ended up by conceding it suddenly...
...We come thus to the last policy: acceptance in principle of an Algerian state without excluding the vocation of this state for independence...
...On the other hand, we can recognize it without harming our larger national interests...
...Let us assume another optimistic hypothesis: Neither Tunisia nor Morocco intervenes officially in the Algerian conflict...
...In refusing to accept an Algerian state in principle, we prevent the attainment of a federal or confederal solution...
...The remainder of the country would constitute an Algerian Republic, in which the French would enjoy equality of rights, but as foreigners (or possibly with a special statute...
...Probably...
...We have seen that the autonomy of Algeria does not conflict with French interests in the long run...
...Partition is a solution which a number of political figures have suggested...
...Unfortunately, other interpretations suggest themselves...
...or a policy of the kind applied in Tunisia and Morocco which led to the independence of the ex-protectorates...
...If such is the choice, the time will come when we shall need the courage to adopt a radical solution: to offer to evacuate Algeria, voting the billions necessary to repatriate French inhabitants or to maintain a French enclave on the coasts which the rebels would be unable to conquer...
...Most of the French in Algeria would be relocated in the coastal area from Algiers to Oran...
...it is, above all, a revolt against foreign domination...
...The likelihood of terminating a guerrilla war where the guerrillas receive external aid is remote...
...As for the other form of partition—two republics, one of French sovereignty, the other Moslem—that, too, is scarcely practical...
...And which nationalists would be won over if the possibility of the creation of an Algerian state was foreclosed beforehand...
...It is possible, even probable...
...What will be the nature of the regime of this improvised state...
...Is the policy of pacification, as currently conducted, leading to a successful conclusion...
...Where will we be in Tunisia and Morocco three years from now if peace has not returned to Algeria...
...I have never met anyone who shares the confidence of Resident Minister Lacoste...
...The ties that bind us to Algeria are not indissoluble...
...You cannot hold power by force against a national insurrection in the name of liberal ideas, for the use of force is incompatible with liberalism...
...but if they were given the choice between free institutions under Western guardianship or tyrannical institutions in an independent state, the majority of them—or at least the intellectuals who speak in their name—would prefer the latter...
...Nonetheless, the two countries constitute supply bases for the Algerian combatants in the same way that China was a supply base for North Vietnam...
...Some attacks will take place sporadically, in the cities and the countryside, but the reconstruction of an Algeria which is both French and autonomous will be on the road to realization...
...Acceptance of a policy which would ultimately lead to Algerian independence would at least provide the opportunity for a solution midway between indefinite violence and sudden capitulation...
...Either the proposals would be considered (as with Tunisia and Morocco in the past) the first step on a long road, and the Moslems who might deal with us would suspend judgment while waiting for the next step...
...In accepting a cease-fire, the National Front may fear that it is putting itself at the whim of the French Government, for once it calls off hostilities it will have a difficult time starting them again...
...We are finally confronted by the two alternatives: either pacification combined with reforms and the promise of a statute...
...But the issue before us is the choice between two evils...
...In recognizing an Algerian state, we cannot exclude independence for Algeria...
...2) modification less of our goals than of the method employed to achieve pacification: (3) partition...
...Some say that, in refusing to permit free elections, the National Front admits that it is not sure of winning a peaceful contest...
...The policy of pacification leads not to peace but to the perpetuation of a ruinous war, which tends to make its continuation inevitable...
...Such a statute would certainly be necessary if there is any hope of detaching some of the moderate nationalists from the National Front...
...But nationalist demands, with their mixture of religious and racial fanaticism, with their Western ideology aiming at self-rule, with their human aspirations for equality, are a fact...
...Will it give our compatriots who have lived on African soil for generations the possibility of remaining there...
...Would reforms or the proclamation of a statute enhance the possibilities of pacification...
...Last spring, a military effort was necessary to reenforce the moderates in our two former protectorates...
...Economically, Algeria is a burden...
...We cannot fail to recognize that fact without causing a catastrophe...
...Perhaps there are no longer any alternatives to abandoning Algeria or continuing the war indefinitely...
...But then we must ask: Would partial reforms have such an effect...
...The arguments turn on one issue: Will France agree to surrender its sovereignty over Algeria at some future date...
...Probably our feelings would be identical with those of our compatriots in Algeria if we were in their place...
...On the contrary, the economic and demographic disparity between France and Algeria inevitably necessitates the establishment of an authority suitable to Algeria...
...The real alternatives that confront us at present are four: (1) continuation of the policy of so-called "pacification...
...Those who are opposed dwell upon the uncertainties of the future of an Algerian state...
...The further prolongation of the war plays into the hands of the extremists...
...This effort would require $700 million a year, for three years...
...Precedent does not encourage repetition...
...The establishment of an Algerian state is a difficult enterprise, and no one can guarantee its success...
...To wait for the general staff of the National Front to accept proposals of this ambiguous nature does not represent a policy...
Vol. 40 • September 1957 • No. 37
