The Soviet Army's New Role

SHUB, BORIS

By Boris Shub THE SOVIET ARMY'S NEW ROLE Kremlin power may pass from Party to military hands in wake of recent Moscow upheaval Since Stalin's death, there has been much speculation abroad as to...

...Today, the continued presence of the Party's political representative at the division, regiment and company level remains a thorn in the side of officer and enlisted man alike...
...In other words, they regarded the Malenkov regime as too "soft" and felt they themselves could better safeguard the power and prestige of the Soviet Union...
...The Case for Bonapar+ism: After Stalin's death, another school of thought in the West held that the lack of real stature among his Party successors created potentialities for military dictatorship—probably headed by Marshal Zhukov...
...They reappeared soon after the Nazi invasion, but in 1942 Soviet officers were given undivided command authority (though even in this period the NKVD was very active in the Army...
...the Gestapo manufactured documents to frame the Soviet generals...
...An articulate spokesman for this theory was Isaac Deutscher, author of Stalin: A Political Biography...
...The Army leaders, he contended, believed that power must be exercised with a strong hand to retain the undivided allegiance of the Soviet population and, more especially, to prevent explosions among the non-Russian peoples and the satellites...
...He has promised the Soviet public adequate food and housing within a relatively short span of time...
...Later, when the tide had turned, the commissars returned as "political advisers...
...How Zhukov now sees his political role remains an enigma...
...After Hitler's troops had swept to the gates of Moscow, encircled Leningrad, and reached the Volga and the Caucasus, men like Marshals Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Ko-nev and Vasilevsky led the great counter-offensive that drove the enemy from Soviet soil...
...And in the "doctors' plot," which Stalin invented shortly before his death, it is notable that most of the intended "victims" of the alleged conspiracy were leading Soviet generals (again, with Zhukov missing from the list...
...the rest were products of Soviet military academies and training centers...
...The presence of the politruk often inhibits relations among officers as well as between officers and men, and his compulsory indoctrination classes are generally detested...
...In retrospect, it looks as though Stalin executed Tukhachevsky and his associates, and then proceeded with a mass purge of the officers' corps, in order to be secure against a "Bona-partist" power bid before or after the outbreak of war...
...In other words, Stalin felt that the most effective way to blacken the names of the alleged conspirators with the Soviet public was to accuse them of planning to murder the Army leaders...
...The thousands of desperate letters received by Red Army soldiers from their families in the villages precipitated a sharp conflict between Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov and Stalin, and the latter was sufficiently alarmed by Army opposition to sound a temporary retreat...
...From Khrushchev's speech and other sources, we know that Stalin had a pretty low opinion of the men who surrounded him...
...5. Finally, Marshal Zhukov's apparently decisive role in the ouster of two top Stalinists, Vyacheslav M. Molotov and Lazar M. Kaganovich, as well as Stalin's former secretary and purge aide Georgi M. Malenkov, gives added support to the theory that the Army leadership is, in effect, undermining the "monolithic" fagade of the totalitarian system...
...By 1926, however, only 26.3 per cent of Red Army officers had had military education in the Imperial Army...
...There is evidence that Stalin himself was concerned with the problem of how the regime could maintain adequate symbols of authoritarian power after he was gone...
...He may even agree to some formula for the beginnings of effective disarmament...
...In his last years, he proclaimed himself "Generalissimo" and surrounded himself increasingly in his public appearances with the victorious marshals and generals of the Soviet Army (with the notable exception of Zhukov, whom he regarded as too "big" a figure...
...That is why the Army leaders may have favored more legal rights for Soviet citizens and a greater effort to meet their economic needs...
...In comparison with the American, British and French armed forces, the Soviet Army is still little better than a feudal institution...
...The generals may well argue that Soviet armed forces must remain in the satellites, under the Warsaw Pact, as long as NATO exists...
...How many top Communists were scheduled to be purged for complicity in the doctors' plot will never be known...
...Those who hope the Army leaders will wrest power from the Party apparatchiki point to these factors, among others, to support their choice: 1. As far back as the era of forcible collectivization (1929-1932), strong opposition to Stalin's policies came from the Army command...
...shals Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik and their associates sympathized with the Party "liberals" headed by Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov, who wanted a better life for the workers and peasants and less terror...
...By 1937, ex-officers of the old Army had been reduced to a relative handful...
...Yet, to date, there is no evidence of articulate opposition to this caste system within the Soviet Army command...
...The overwhelming desire of the Soviet people is for higher living standards, more liberty, and freedom from fear of another world war...
...One school of thought believes that MarBoris Siiub, author of The Choice and Since Stalin, was for several years political adviser to R1AS in Merlin, lit' is now the Program Policy Adviser for Radio Liberation...
...Because of Nazi barbarism, these generals were greeted as liberators...
...During the 1937-38 purge, the Fourth Department concerned itself chiefly with collecting incriminating material on Army commanders...
...At the same time, the Soviet generals remain beneficiaries of a caste system...
...Nevertheless, the Soviet commander of today is still subject to control from above by the Political Administration and on lower levels by the Party cells within Army units...
...Perhaps the generals have less of a vested interest than some of the Party apparatchiki in sticking to economic and political patterns which retard the transformation of the Soviet Union to some sort of constitutional order...
...During the war, Smersh—an organization with arbitrary punitive powers—was the name that inspired terror in the military ranks...
...In a sense, all factions in the Soviet power struggle since Stalin's death have been pushed in that direction...
...They have given repeated lip-service to Communist world objectives...
...He also knows that he is widely regarded in the West as an individual with comparatively clean hands (despite his role in suppressing the Hungarian revolt...
...In effect, this Soviet-German military combination was said to be directed against both Hitler and Stalin in order to restore good relations between the Soviet Union and Germany and prevent a new world war...
...During the Russo-Finnish War (1939-40), the commissars were dropped from the Army...
...And they may favor continued penetration of the Middle East and other "soft" areas in order to tilt the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union...
...Many of the top commanders suffered during the 1937-1938 Army purge, which started with the execution of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and ultimately sent thousands of officers to death or concentration camps...
...Despite the years of cold war and anti-Western propaganda since V-E Day, the expectations aroused during World War II remain imbedded in the consciousness of the Soviet Army and people...
...There is reason to believe that they fear policies of too great relaxation which might bring satellite revolt or more serious unrest among the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union...
...All these factors give him great potential influence...
...According to Khrushchev, he compared them to "blind kittens" who would be helpless when he died...
...By 1937, too...
...Much will depend on the success or failure of Khrushchev's bold programs for agriculture and industry...
...None enjoyed the popularity attributed to Marshal Zhukov...
...Despite these negative factors, however, there is much in 1957 Soviet society that virtually forces a positive role on the Army leadership...
...They have never openly challenged the basic social structure or the caste system it has produced...
...And nowhere is that system more clearly reflected than in the Army itself...
...In recent years, the MGB (secret police) special section in the Army seems to have been abolished, and direct police surveillance may no longer exist since the post-Beria changes in the security system...
...Accounts published after Stalin's death indicate that Beria, Malenkov and Molotov were among them...
...For ordinary common sense reminds the Soviet public that Nikita S. Khrushchev, Nikolai M. Shvernik, Anastas I. Mikoyan and Party "Marshal" Nikolai Bulganin are involved in the same past crimes as the "anti-Party" group of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov...
...Just as the execution of Beria and his aides greatly weakened the terror-prestige of the MVD, so the charges leveled against Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich raise basic questions about the entire leadership of the Communist party...
...Whether Zhukov and the other Army leaders are satisfied with this arrangement remains to be seen...
...In the meantime, an ever higher percentage of the new officers' corps had Young Communist League education and belonged to the Communist party...
...4. The Army leaders—and Marshal Zhukov himself—are believed to have played an important role in the removal and execution of MVD chief Beria and the subsequent reduction of MVD powers...
...The present Soviet Army leaders, who twenty years ago saw their closest associates shot or imprisoned (and whose own lives were threatened), have not forgotten that Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Shvernik and Bulganin supported Stalin and NKVD chief Nikolai Yezhov in 1937-38...
...For this reason, it is doubtful, for example, that they are as firmly committed to unmodified continuation of the present state- and collective-farm system as was Stalin...
...And Stalin's spiteful treatment of Marshal Zhukov after the war probably increased the latter's popularity, making him seem a victim of the Stalin dictatorship...
...Moreover, the war necessarily created a spirit of relative freedom and of comradeship among officers and men which was a far cry from the Party-police oppression the average Russian had known previously...
...All had been identified too long in the public mind as men who carried out Stalin's orders and sang Stalin's praises...
...By 1937, war with Hitler was looming on the horizon, and there were grave reasons to doubt the loyalty of Red Army troops and the general population in the event of a conflict...
...In a sense, the reconsolidation of Soviet power along these military-bureaucratic lines—in the face of the public's desire for decent living conditions and greater social justice—would be Bonapartism, mid-20th-century style (with or without a military man as ruler...
...There are intimations in Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 that not one of the Party leaders felt certain of being spared...
...If we look at the generals from the standpoint of the authoritarian caste system which Stalinism produced, then assigning them a larger role today in order to preserve that system makes sense...
...The Army leadership can be expected to favor policies at home and abroad which satisfy these aspirations (with the reservations already mentioned...
...The steps taken since 1953 toward greater individual security against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, the erosion of the once all-pervasive system of denunciation, the partial dismantling of the concentration-camp system—all this can be traced, in part at least, to the Army's increased role in Soviet life...
...More recent evidence along the same lines is supplied in Walter Schellen-berg's book The Labyrinth...
...By Boris Shub THE SOVIET ARMY'S NEW ROLE Kremlin power may pass from Party to military hands in wake of recent Moscow upheaval Since Stalin's death, there has been much speculation abroad as to whether power in the Soviet Union was passing from the Party machine to the Army leadership...
...he expects industrial and bureaucratic decentralization to bring substantial benefits to the country...
...More policy-making power in the Army command could spell a continued inflexible line in international affairs...
...On the other hand, they seem to favor any policy—consistent with the maintenance of Soviet internal and international strength—which would make for a more satisfied peasantry...
...They probably regard the piling up of thermonuclear weapons and long-range missiles as essential to Soviet security...
...The Outlook: What kind of "Communists," then, are the leading marshals and generals of the Soviet Army...
...There is no question that these moves are universally popular in the Soviet Union...
...He evidently had a higher opinion of the generals...
...It is quite conceivable that they backed Khrushchev against Malenkov precisely because Khrushchev is opportunistic enough to be pushed into making greater changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy...
...At the very top, Party "Marshal" Bulganin remains as much a reminder to Marshal Zhukov of past Party interference as the politruk is to the lower ranks...
...The Army As an Independent Force: Those who doubt that the Army command is now a political force independent of the Party apparatus point out that all the leading marshals and generals are veteran Party members and that nearly nil officers are either members or candidates...
...After V-E Day, the work of the Army Poliiical Department was intensified as part of the general campaign to restore the supreme authority of the Party leadership...
...For the moment, his position depends on the support of the Army command and the Party apparatus...
...According to this view, the Army leaders also looked with little favor on Malenkov's emphasis on consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry...
...Significantly, while Stalin continued to purge and kill his party associates even after the war (e.g., Nikolai Voz-nesensky in 1949), he found it inexpedient to liquidate Zhukov, whose popularity he obviously resented...
...and the latter's Fourth Department (Intelligence) was responsible to NKVD chief \ezhov...
...It is safe to assume that they—and the Party leaders as well—are studying Yugoslav and Polish agricultural policy with considerable interest...
...Marshal Konstantin Rokos-sovsky, who was jailed for several years, is only the most notable of the World War II commanders who have reason to remember the purge...
...In one respect at least, Deutscher was on firm ground: None of the Party leaders who succeeded Stalin was a public symbol of undisputed strength and authority...
...Instead...
...Whether out of necessity or conviction remains largely unknown...
...the NKVD served as the Party's police watchdog over the Armv...
...Indirect support for this theory is found in the memoirs of General Walter Krivitsky, former Chief of Soviet Intelligence for Western Europe...
...Pay differentials are shocking by Western standards, and so is the treatment and status of the enlisted man...
...2. What political program—if any —the purged marshals and generals of 1937 had, remains a mystery...
...the Party continued to exercise the same political control over its Communist officers...
...The Army leaders have, since Stalin's death, been instrumental in a substantial reduction of police terror...
...According to a different version of the 1937 purge, the Red Army leaders were plotting with anti-Hitler elements in the Wehrmacht...
...However, the mere fact of Communist party membership tells us little about the true feelings of the Army command toward the Party leadership...
...The precise form that police control takes in the Army today is not entirely clear...
...This prospect is regarded with favor by those who regard the Army as more responsive to the interests of the people than the Party leadership...
...The Army, after all, consists of the Soviet workers and peasants in uniform, while the Party leadership represents only the Communist ruling caste, less than 8 million strong...
...The meeting of the Soviet and Allied armies, and the friendship between Marshal Zhukov and General Eisenhower, symbolized these hopes...
...Another important cause of friction between the Army commanders and the Party apparatchiki is the survival of Party-political control— channeled through the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army —over all ranks...
...Stalin, according to this view, found it convenient to accept the charge of conspiracy (or actually believed it...
...The generals may also believe that the Soviet Union must continue to give priority to heavy industry so as to keep Soviet military power at peak levels...
...But he would be a singularly insensitive man not to know how powerful he is as a symbol both to the Soviet Army and to the Soviet public as a whole...
...They are certainly patriots who want the Soviet Union to preserve its power in the world...
...They have also benefited from the fratricidal conflict among Stalin's heirs...
...Today, we know that as late as 1938 there was strong opposition to Hitler's war plans in the German General Staff...
...Bukharin was author of the 1936 Constitution, which Stalin turned into a farce...
...In his judgment, the military regarded this course with grave concern...
...How long the Army leadership supports Khrushchev will depend largely on the success of these ventures...
...Such a "policy of strength" may seem, to the Soviet military mind, to require preservation of the managerial-military caste system at the expense of production for use and a more equitable social and political structure...
...But both Krivitsky and Schellen-lierg can be interpreted quite differently: To wit, there was no Red Army conspiracy against Stalin...
...In any event, it is noteworthy that Stalin was preparing to tell the Soviet public that a number of Party leaders were plotting to kill, not the dictator's Party heirs, but the military heroes of World War II...
...As victim of long years of Party interference and terror, the generals might also be inclined to want more free inquiry in education and greater cultural freedom...
...To millions of Soviet citizens and soldiers, the Red Army command, fighting as comrades-in-arms of democratic Britain, America and France, may have appeared as the natural leaders of a better and freer postwar era...
...Neither have they forgotten the Party leadership's systematic campaign after World War II to minimize the role of the Army and its leaders in the defeat of the Axis armies...
...Deutscher thought that the Malenkov regime of 1953-55 was moving from the ruthlessness of the Stalin era to a system which would gradually assure a better life for Soviet citizens and work for more normal relations with the non-Soviet world...
...They may take the position that Soviet security interests demand the continued division of Germany while Soviet political strategy tries to detach West Germany from NATO in order to achieve a new Russo-German understanding at the expense of the West...
...3. During World War II, the Army leaders did achieve considerable popularity...
...They are, furthermore, as well aware as Western military leaders that World War III would be disastrous for all concerned...
...In 1918, when the Red Army was founded, the institution of political commissar was created (1) to indoctrinate the mass of peasant recruits with Lenin's program, and (2) to assure the loyalty of non-Communist officers of the pre-Revolutionary Army whom War Commissar Leon Trotsky had conscripted (over considerable Party opposition) to build an effective military machine...

Vol. 40 • July 1957 • No. 29


 
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