Storm Over Suez
ARNOLD, G. L.
Two Titles STORM OVER SUEZ By G. L. Arnold London If the matter were not so serious, the spectacle of the Western powers trying and failing to adopt a firm line with Egyptian President Nasser...
...From the start, those familiar with Sir Anthony Eden's political and personal record did not take these threats very seriously, and their skepticism is now beginning to be widely shared...
...Such control was nonetheless envisaged in the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 and in the various official declarations concerning the expiration of the Suez Company's lease in 1968...
...whereas the extra transport costs of taking tankers around the Cape (if the Canal were closed or the tolls exorbitant) would come to almost $4 per ton for an average-size tanker...
...But it will not be easy to sell this line of thought to the burgeoning nationalisms of Asia...
...Two Titles STORM OVER SUEZ By G. L. Arnold London If the matter were not so serious, the spectacle of the Western powers trying and failing to adopt a firm line with Egyptian President Nasser would be distinctly comic...
...If and when the Egyptian Government increases the tolls, the impact on the price is likely to be trifling...
...But this is just the kind of thing that no one expects the Eden Government to do...
...Anyone who wants the Western powers to do more must find ways and means to stiffen their spines...
...That the interim measures hastily adopted to "freeze" Cairo's income from shipping dues are not going to hurt very much is apparent when one considers that Egypt has thus far been able to live without the Suez Company's revenues...
...Somewhere in this argument there is a hole through which great gusts of Arab and Asian nationalist indignation are going to blow in the months to come, whether or not the matter goes to the United Nations or the Hague Court...
...It soon became evident that the real aim of Western policy, underlying the indignant noises now audible on stage, is to secure an agreement leaving Egypt in possession of the Suez Canal but placing its operation under some form of international control...
...There is talk of building super-tankers too large for Suez and capable of economical operation on the Cape route, but this is a long-term prospect...
...It is now the British contention that unfettered Egyptian control of Suez is not merely undesirable but intolerable...
...It is just for this reason that the French Government is in favor of resolute action to keep the Canal open under all circumstances...
...Only now has it suddenly been discovered that Colonel Nasser cannot safely be left in sole control of a waterway through which so much Western shipping has to pass...
...disapproval...
...At the same time, there is genuine pressure on the Government to safeguard Britain's oil supplies, the bulk of which pass through the Canal...
...The interim prospect of prolonged deadlock and economic warfare would begin to look really grim if the Eden Government could be trusted to live up to its implied threat to do everything short of war to bring Colonel Nasser to his senses...
...Sooner or later, no doubt, some form of international control will be established, if only because the maritime powers are beginning to realize that Colonel Nasser is a professional blackmailer...
...Meanwhile, Colonel Nasser is sitting pretty...
...And since the cost-per-ton of freight charges from Kuwait to Britain, at the present market rate for charter tankers, is $14—of which less than a dollar is accounted for by passage through Suez—the toll charges, even at double or triple the present rate, would still be only a small percentage of the cost to the consumer...
...He has now been publicly stigmatized as an embryo Hitler by the French Government, solemnly lectured by Sir Anthony Eden, and even treated to some gentle admonitions by the U.S...
...The conclusion must therefore reluctantly be reached that very little will come out of all the present excitement...
...The argument, now fashionable in British Conservative circles, that the whole upset is due to Britain's abandonment of military control over the Suez base can be dismissed briefly...
...There is talk, too, of building additional pipelines to the Mediterranean, but they are still in the dream stage...
...Though unlikely to harm him in the short run, these verbal rumblings are probably indicative of a change of mind such as preceded the gradual, reluctant extrusion of Mussolini from the select company of European statesmen...
...And since Colonel Nasser must be as well briefed about Sir Anthony's constitutional spine-lessness as Mussolini was twenty years ago at the time of the Abyssinian debacle, the threats now current here tend to ring somewhat hollow—even to the Tory right-wingers, who at heart do not believe that their government is capable of the kind of drastic action that might have to follow if Nasser and his associates reject the idea of international control...
...On the other hand, the 1954 Anglo-Egyplian agreement, under which Britain evacuated Suez, did commit both parties to uphold the convention, thereby indirectly guaranteeing freedom of navigation...
...the estimated cost per ton of oil going through the Canal is less than one dollar...
...Before considering the chances of such an outcome while the present Egyptian regime remains in power, it is worthwhile to look at the legal background...
...Even a large increase in the tolls need not affect the price of oil to the consumer or to industry...
...This is not an easy operation, and perhaps we would all be well advised not to expect them to display more firmness than they did in the Thirties...
...It is now argued that Egypt had only to wait for this event in order to obtain legally what Nasser has now seized by force, but it is also suggested that national control of an international waterway is wrong in principle...
...nor did the Constantinople convention of 1888, to which Egypt (then a viceroyally of Turkey) never adhered...
...This issue must, however, be differentiated from the question of Canal tolls and their presumptive effect on oil prices...
...The treaty did not entitle the British to slay for the purpose of protecting shipping rights...
...State Department...
...even if it means sending troops and warships...
...This, however, leads to another awkwardness...
...It is nonetheless apparent that Nasser has seriously blotted his copybook and made matters more difficult for his admirers and apologists in official quarters...
...But, quite apart from the evident lack of stamina in official Western quarters, there is genuine puzzlement over the means proper to the occasion...
...especially in the face of U.S...
...This undertaking, of course, has been persistently violated by Egypt in regard to ships bound for Israel—without drawing a British protest...
...Tolls at present average about $23,000 per tanker...
...It is even conceivable that if and when Nasser embarks on his next adventure—which will probably be directed against Israel, and timed to take place about four weeks after his latest escapade has been officially forgiven—there will be some quite genuine irritation in Washington and London, perhaps even accompanied by a few harmless gestures intended to warn him off...
...On this subject, there are some exaggerations current...
...In the event of a total stoppage, that is to say, all the economic advantages are on Colonel Nasser's side: He can hold out longer...
...It is rooted in a misunderstanding of the 1936 treaty with Egypt, which concerned defense of the Canal against external (i.e., Italian) aggression, not its administration as an international waterway...
...It is true that the "freezing" measures interfere with Colonel Nasser's proclaimed intention of using these revenues to build the Aswan Dam, but it is much easier for him to postpone this operation for a year than it is for the maritime nations to do without the Suez Canal...
Vol. 39 • August 1956 • No. 34
