Why Adenauer Yielded

...The next election is less than two years away, and it would be hard to explain to hundreds of thousands of wives, parents and children that one ambassador was too high a price to pay for the release of their kin...

...and, more significantly, he was the first to do so since Hitler had ravaged Russia...

...The Germans admitted that they could not afford to be less firm in their stand than they expected of their allies...

...The Kremlin had obtained diplomatic, but not trade and cultural relations...

...Bonn also published reservations, reaffirming its claim to speak for all of Germany and its refusal to recognize either the Communist East German Democratic Republic (DDR) or the present German boundaries...

...In an exchange of notes which followed, Moscow suggested that both parties consider specific steps, such as the exchange of documents on diplomatic relations, and the conclusion of trade and cultural treaties...

...And would this not wreck any reasonable prospect of German reunification in peace and freedom...

...One German source has told how Professor Walter Hallstein, drafting the final communique with Molotov, proposed that the German reservations be included, if only as a unilateral statement of position...

...Instead, they went no further than the respectable opinion that both nations, living as peaceful, friendly neighbors, could assure peace in Europe...

...When the Russians questioned their existence, they were left unchallenged...

...At Moscow, the German Chancellor faced unique pressures Why Adenauer Yielded By Richard C. Hottelet Bonn On June 7, the Soviet Union approached the German Federal Republic with the offer of normal diplomatic, economic and cultural relations...

...The Soviets had said in so many words that the Paris Treaties made reunification impossible now...

...Even if the Russians were putting on a false display of injured pride, they might attract both attention and sympathy...

...According to German sources, the Chancellor retorted that 90,000 was by no means the total number, and that some 100,000 German civilians were still unaccounted for in the Soviet Union...

...After having, two days before, branded the prisoners as war criminals guilty of unspeakable atrocities, he reportedly proposed to Adenauer, almost casually, that the Germans could have the prisoners in return for an ambassador...

...The Soviet Union got essentially what it wanted: the German Government's agreement to establish diplomatic relations and to exchange ambassadors...

...Ambassador Charles Bohlen, whom he somehow held responsible...

...One logical sequel would have been a Soviet offer of alliance, open or secret...

...The question follows at once: Did the Chancellor not see in advance that he might be confronted with such a dilemma...

...Perhaps they had dropped the idea...

...and had reiterated their step-by-step Geneva formula...

...In a way, the Germans were flattered...

...Or so it might have appeared to an old man, fatigued from heavy infighting at the conference table and ceaseless fencing over vodka and caviar, who had never been east of Berlin and had never before faced such merciless pressure...

...Outside the theater, later, prominent members of the German delegation were surrounded by curious onlookers and engaged in conversation...

...Adenauer's departure, Soviet propaganda began to set the stage for the release of the prisoners, not so much to the Chancellor as to the East German satellite...

...This fear has been at least partially allayed by the unqualified statements of all concerned that German reunification is the most urgent problem facing the four foreign ministers at Geneva...

...Or if, as seems to have been the case, he could not have insisted on preconditions for his going, why did he not secretly inform his allies that the prisoners were the chink in his armor and that he might be forced to give in if the Russians pressed their advantage...

...The Soviet leaders were well advised to dwell as forcefully as they did on the measureless suffering which the German armies had carried into their country...

...Moscow has still admitted no connection between the return of the prisoners and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn...

...One would have been the temptation for Adenauer to believe that he could henceforth arrive at quick solutions with the Soviet leaders, man to man...

...Chancellor Adenauer described later how he had discussed these points with the Soviet representatives and had been told that he could express his reservations in any manner he pleased...

...He and his political advisers in Moscow maintained, and German public opinion seems fully to have borne them out, that they could not afford to reject such a proposition...

...Rejection of the Soviet offer was no longer simply a dignified refusal to pay blackmail, but could appear as a display of German arrogance...

...Yet...

...the old statesman's integrity remained unimpaired...

...This end was a stunning psychological setback for Dr...

...Their wish for diplomatic relations seemed no longer a tactical whim but an act of high policy, a carefully contemplated approach which could not lightly be scorned...

...Carlo Schmid has sketched the circumstances in these words: "They told us, to begin with, that there were no halfway diplomatic relations, but only proper ones through regular ambassadors: and there were no diplomatic relations some time, but either now or not at all...

...But the Chancellor was, and has always been, willing to shoulder the responsibility for what Hitler did...

...In this framework both East and West German governments could sit down together and work out the problem...

...The Chancellor had to content himself with the Russians' word that they would investigate any list he gave them and release all the people on it, provided that they had served out their labor contracts in the Soviet Union...

...They saw the Soviet offer of diplomatic relations as a device for legalizing the status quo...

...One of the crowd asked how German youth fell about military sen ice...

...Bulganin and Khrushchev made no such suggestion...

...The Germans' rebuff on reunification was even more complete...

...Not content with distancing themselves from these German sentiments in private, the Russian leaders promptly whistled up a TASS dispatch to discredit them in public...

...Once one had ambassadors in Bonn and Moscow, one could discuss anything, including problems which might today not yet be ripe for solution...

...It was a compromise heavily weighted in Moscow's favor...

...Molotov reportedly agreed, but, when the draft was presented to the plenary session, Khrushchev angrily refused to accept this passage...

...The Moscow Conference was neither a tragedy nor a seed of suspicion in the Western camp...

...Arriving in Moscow, Adenauer was plunged into a political and psychological situation for which no one could have prepared him...

...With dignity and imperturbable calm, he gave the Russians blow for blow in emotional argument...

...Within hours of their departure, the Kremlin announced the imminent arrival of a delegation from East Germany...

...But there is no evidence that the Chancellor has been left with any taste for personal power politics...

...His first statements were defensive and subdued...

...next day...

...But then they would believe either that we were not serious about the prisoners and reunification, or that we considered ourselves too good to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, or that we attached no value to peaceful relations with her...

...He is known to have been very favorably impressed with the Soviet Prime Minister, and is quoted as having said: "Now I can write directly to Bulganin...

...But there is a disturbing discrepancy between the outlook and intentions unmistakably expressed by the Chancellor and his associates before Moscow and the outcome of the negotiations...

...Konrad Adenauer is a strong leader with a broad autocratic streak...

...Bulganin first suggested a deal on this score at a Kremlin banquet on the evening of September 12...

...Even more did the effusive cordiality piled on the East Germans bring out the Russian leaders' belief that their encounter with Adenauer had been a triumph for them...

...The TASS declaration put East and West Germany on the same footing, alleged that the German boundaries had been fixed at Potsdam, and limited Bonn's rights to the territory of the Federal Republic...

...He has moved ahead, within the limits set by Parliament, with preparations for German rearmament...

...Conversely, it was freely admitted that German reunification in freedom depended in the first instance on the solidarity of the Western powers at forthcoming conferences...

...in a more important respect, they were astonished...

...The Russians had unhappy reason to consider us powerful and perhaps still to equate one German with four Russians...

...German-Russian relations were suddenly screwed into new focus...

...It admonishes Chancellor Adenauer and his friends to reflect on the limitations of any one man's capacity...

...What affected them was their own importance, which the Soviet delegates emphasized...

...There was apparently little doubt in his mind that he could keep the humanitarian problem of the prisoners separate from the political question of national unity...

...A day after Dr...

...He was informed flatly that the Russians would not associate themselves with the German position in any way...

...Moscow ignored the matter of the German prisoners and shrugged off reunification as one of any number of "international" questions which could be raised...

...It may suddenly have dawned on Adenauer and the others that they had in fact committed themselves to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union under practically any conditions short of dishonor when they accepted the Soviet invitation to come to Moscow...

...Subsequently, however, the Moscow atmosphere wore off...

...Stalin in his last years had repeatedly expressed his desire for a Russo-German partnership...

...Adenauer himself has declared that the decisive factor was the Russians' offer to return the German prisoners...

...Much the same goes for the German reservations...

...Especially painful was the Soviet treatment of the prisoners problem...

...Instead of ending one round in order to meet again later under more auspicious circumstances, might the Chancellor not be slamming the door on future normal contact with the Russians, with one-sixth of the earth's surface and more...

...Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Germany were inevitable anyhow...

...They would have been grateful even for some formulation defining the problem of reunification as urgent...

...In a nutshell, the Germans had intended to avoid any commitments with the Russians at this time...

...One of the normally most convincing arguments in Adenauer's arsenal was that Germany is too weak to stand alone and is in NATO and the Western European Union for entirely defensive reasons...

...First came recognition of the status quo, the abandonment of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in favor of a European security system...

...Molotov promptly denied that he had consented to its inclusion...

...If we did not want them, we should say so openly...

...The whole truth of what happened in Moscow must await the improbable publication of Adenauer's frank memoirs, but the above seems a reasonable hypothesis...

...The Russians brusquely repulsed suggestions that this agreement be included in the communique or documented in some fashion...

...It is borne out indirectly by the Chancellor's own deportment since Moscow...

...Bonn had received some of its prisoners, but no Soviet commitment on German unity...

...perhaps they realized that so bald an overture would have antagonized Adenauer...

...A standard banquet at the Kremlin became a Communist victory dance with Khrushchev trumpeting his conviction of the ultimate downfall of the West and kissing Walter Ulbricht...

...Might the Soviet Union not then genuinely consider the West German leaders as revanchists and provocateurs who wanted only to humiliate the Soviet Government...

...Ruling out the possibility of a treacherous turn toward the East, there would appear to have been two main dangers in Moscow...

...Nothing budged the Russians, and when the communique and Adenauer's exchange of letters with Bulganin were made public, they all contained exactly the phrasing which Moscow had first employed in its note of June 7. No double was left about who had called the tune...

...One junior member of the delegation put his feelings in these words: "For years, I had been accustomed to thinking of Russians as monsters who had raped our women, devastated our country and murdered our prisoners of war...

...A second dangerous possibility was that the Western allies would take fright at the Moscow compromise, suspect the Germans of having essentially damaged the Western position and prepare a compromise of their own on the German problem...

...Politically, it was by no means tragic...

...Lavish hospitality and the perhaps unexpected display of pageant and tradition can be assumed to have left them essentially unmoved...

...To be specific, Western officials were told that the trip to Moscow was primarily an exploratory mission...

...Yet, whenever the Chancellor and others pointed to Germany's weakness, they were contradicted at once with the vehement assertion that Germany is no small, minor power but a great nation, strategically, politically and economically...

...Some of them reminisced about their own experiences in Germany and their good contacts with Siemens and AEG, the two largest manufacturers of electrical equipment...

...What, then, about the prisoners...

...Accepting a factual position of diplomatic equality with the DDR in Moscow could only help Soviet policy...

...Why did he not make release of prisoners his price for going to Moscow, and leave himself free to discuss only the legal, unemotional problem of reunification...

...He made several attempts to persuade Bulganin and the others that NATO not only does not threaten Russia but completely rules out the danger of another German invasion, since the Benelux nations, France, Britain and the others would hardly support aggressive German designs...

...One strange aspect of the Moscow Conference is the Chancellor's failure to submit the names of the 100,000-odd German civilians reasonably presumed to be in Soviet hands...

...But on the subject of diplomatic relations, naked pressure was brought to bear...

...The Chancellor in no way betrayed the Western position at Geneva, but resolutely proclaimed his loyalty to NATO and the Western European Union...

...The audience nearly went wild when Adenauer grasped and shook both of Bulganin's hands...

...It was mutual...

...In the past, his country has profited greatly from being taken as the image of the old man's probity...

...On September 13, a communique issued in Moscow outlined the compromise reached after five clays of exhausting and at times brutal exchange...

...If we wanted to set conditions for diplomatic relations, we could look around for other partners...

...Encouraged by Foreign Minister von Brentano, he called on the West to remain united and strong, mistrustful of Soviet blandishments...

...Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and the Chancellor spent much of the last afternoon trying to wring from the Russians some direct acknowledgement of their coresponsibility for the reunification of Germany...

...Conscience, a precious thing in Western culture, is a handicap in negotiations with the Soviet Union...

...They could well effect Adenauer's and Germany's isolation as violators of the Geneva Spirit, dogs in the manger and general world nuisances...

...At the conference table and on the numerous social occasions, the Soviet leaders spoke of the importance they attached to trade with Germany...

...If the Soviet Union were to accept the German terms on the prisoners and reunification, which seemed most unlikely, steps might be undertaken which would lead to diplomatic relations...

...but nothing would be signed during this visit...

...both Soviet leaders denied any knowledge of German prisoners beyond Bulganin's figure of 9.626...

...There is not the slightest evidence that he was bribed or bullied into any secret understanding with the Soviet leaders, or that Bonn has reconsidered its policy and is heading for a new Rapallo...

...The possibility of German refusal suddenly appeared in a new light, not anticipated by the Chancellor...

...It is, instead, a sobering and instructive episode for all who may be called upon to negotiate with Soviet power...

...In return, it gave the Germans 9,626 former German prisoners of war...

...He appears to have approached the Russians with little better preparation than he had undertaken for previous conferences, overlooking the vital fact that he had heretofore dealt only with friends...

...It then promptly concluded a treaty with Grotewohl and Ulbricht confirming the DDR as a nominally sovereign state and legitimate partner in international affairs...

...He is not disposed to share either authority or responsibility, and this is both his strength and weakness...

...On the contrary, not only have he and his collaborators stressed the need for Western solidarity with growing emphasis, but his actions have backed his words...

...He would have spared himself and his friends considerable anguish...

...When a German replied that rearmament was a sober duty and that young and old wanted peace, the Russians cheered...

...Adenauer struck back sharply with his own legitimate grievances, reminded them indirectly that they and others had helped build up Hitler and that the Soviet Army too had done "terrible things...

...The program of the Bolshoi Theater was changed from Boris Godunov to Romeo and Juliet for Adenauers benefit, and the great theater meaningfully applauded the sledge-hammer point of Montague and Capulet embracing at the fight of their dead children...

...He was deeply disturbed by critical comment in the West, and vented his guilty conscience in a surprising, ill-considered attack on U.S...

...But no simple tabulation of quids and quos can convey the humiliation which the Soviet negotiators heaped on their German guests...

...Many members of the German delegation have said that they were profoundly impressed by the "atmosphere" in Moscow...

...But this attitude has also led him to fall back on quick expedients when faced with problems which he has neither delegated to others nor equipped himself to solve...

...If this was not duplicity, and if the Chancellor suffered neither physical collapse nor political amnesia at the conference table, what did take place to swing him around...

...The Moscow Conference convened on this basis...

...In his relations with France, notably on the touchy Saar issue, he has brushed aside bitter political opposition in standing by his obligations...

...He would seem to have taken it for granted, too, that he could simply put on his hat and leave if Soviet terms proved unacceptable, perhaps selling the Russians a face-saving but noncommittal formula...

...The Soviet Union appeared as a giant, a huge anonymous machine which would go clanking on without feelings and emotions...

...But suddenly I realized that in the eyes of the Russians we Germans were monsters, also somewhat larger than life-size, who had invaded and ravaged their country and murdered their people as slave laborers and prisoners of war...

...The German "mystic fear' of Russia was not one-sided...

...People approached secretaries and members of the German staff in art galleries and museums and whispered: "How glad we are that you have come, and "It is good for us to be together...

...Nothing, however, was more crushing than what happened soon after the Germans left...

...The simple explanation seems to be that the Chancellor allowed himself to be overwhelmed and outmaneu-vered...

...Most Germans have grown accustomed to thinking of their country as strategically second rate, dwarfed In the industrial might of Russia and the United States...

...Bulganin then referred the larger figure to Khrushchev, who is said to have replied, "Yes, that's about right...

...Here again, the Russians were manifestly masters of the situation...

...He was the first leader of an independent, democratic Germany ever to visit the Soviet Union...

...They did not mean only the strangeness of their surroundings or the contrast between preconceived notions and reality...

...His first reaction was relief at the thankful welcome he received from his people...

...Bonn shied away from going farther than discussing ways and means by which such agreements could be prepared...

...Khrushchev and Bulganin deliberately and melodramatically brandished the prestige of the Soviet Union...

...This blackmail gave the Soviet arguments a new gravity...

...Furthermore, said Bonn on August 12, normal relations presupposed both frank discussions and an understanding between both governments on the problems of German unity and the release of Germans in Soviet hands...